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The 4th DG ECFIN Annual Research Conference (ARC) was held on 11-12 
October, 2007, in Brussels, with over 100 participants. The theme was Growth 
and income distribution in an integrated Europe: Does EMU make a difference? 
 
The choice of topic for the 2007 ARC was inspired by growing concern about 
inequality in Europe. There appears to be a growing perception, not only in 
Europe but also – indeed perhaps even more so – in the US, that prosperity has 
been fairly unevenly distributed, resulting in a widening gap between rich and 
poor and a squeezing of the middle classes.  
 
This concern was addressed in four sessions followed by a panel discussion: 
 
1. The economics of distribution and growth. Recent issues and experience.  
2. Distribution and growth in Europe – The empirical evidence.  
3. Does the euro make a difference?  
4. Is Europe different? (Economic integration, globalisation and distribution). 
 
While a great deal of evidence was presented suggesting that differences do 
exist in measured inequality across countries and over time, there was no clear 
support for the popular view that inequality has been sharply increasing in 
continental Europe.  
 
According to Thomas Harjes, it has increased only moderately or, in some cases, 
even declined (See "Globalization and income inequality. A European 
perspective"). Looking at long-term developments in the distribution of personal 
income, Anthony Atkinson said in his keynote address ("Distribution and 
growth in Europe – The empirical picture"): “The variety of experience points 
to the need for a variety of explanations. The distribution of personal income is a 
subtle combination of different mechanisms, each subject to exogenous and 
endogenous forces.”  
 
As emphasised many times during the conference, inequality is by no means a 
simple phenomenon to measure or characterise, as single indicators like the 
widely used Gini-coefficient and datasets are often inconsistent, making 
international comparisons more difficult. Against this background Atkinson 
found it misleading to talk of “trends” when describing the evolution of income 
inequality, preferring to think in terms of “episodes” when inequality rose or 
fell.  
 Public policies were found to matter for income distribution and, as argued by 
Antonio Afonso, Ludger Schuknecht and Vito Tanzi, there is still considerable 
scope for improvements in the efficiency of public spending ("Income 
distribution determinants and public spending efficiency"). As efficient social 
public spending, education performance and strong institutions are strongly 
correlated and higher per capita incomes are associated with more generous 
public spending, all EU countries could enhance their human capital equality 
through better designed public spending. This would also make redistribution 
policies more affordable and politically sustainable.  
 
Daniel Waldenström noted that the reduction in progressive taxation at the top 
of the distribution seems to have had a negative effect on equality in a panel of 
16 developed countries ("Determinants of inequality over the twentieth century: 
Evidence from the twentieth century" co-authored by Jesper Roine and Jonas 
Vlachos). The size of this effect is, however, fairly small, suggesting that 
taxation is relatively ineffective at reducing inequality by lowering the income 
shares of the top income earners. He concluded that economic growth and 
financial development seem to have been pro-rich over the twentieth century.  
 
Do we have an adequate economic theory for the inequality-growth nexus? In 
her keynote address on "The economics of distribution and growth. Recent 
issues", Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa noted that different combinations of factors of 
production determine growth and distribution. Causation may, however, vary 
and there may also be other factors, such as policies and technologies, which 
simultaneously determine growth and inequality. She argued that the growth 
process will not bring about a reduction of inequality by itself. Hence 
redistribution will remain a policy concern even in affluent societies. It was 
clear that economists are still searching for theoretical explanations on how 
growth and inequality interact, taking into account that individuals receive not 
only labour but also capital income.  
 
Amparo Castelló-Climent demonstrated that the effects of inequality on growth 
depend on the level of development ("Inequality and growth in advanced 
economies. An empirical investigation"). There is a negative effect in less 
developed countries and a positive one in high income economies. However, 
this positive effect is not stable over time and is highly affected by atypical 
observations.  
 
The conference tried to shed light on the possible impact of EMU on inequality, 
but did not reach a consensus. In his keynote address "Economic integration, 
growth, distribution: Does the euro make a difference?", Giuseppe Bertola 
stated that the euro has contributed to growth as aggregate euro-area production 
and trade integration have increased. Employment performances also appear to have improved in comparison to other EU countries. But euro-area countries 
also appear to have experienced increasing inequality, mainly due to social 
policy becoming less generous. 
 
This evidence, while still preliminary and open to various interpretations 
according to Bertola, suggests that improvement of public and private 
instruments of income redistribution and risk sharing via financial markets 
should be given high priority in order to reduce the potential adverse effects of 
the euro on income distribution. During the lively debate following Bertola's 
keynote address it was mentioned that social spending has remained broadly 
stable in the euro area. It was also suggested that the usage of aggregated 
inequality data may have distorted the results.  
 
Florence Bouvet analysed the evolution of per capita income inequality among 
European regions during the period 1977-2003 ("Dynamics of regional income 
inequality in Europe and impact of EU regional policy and EMU"). Inequality 
has decreased since 1977, owing to a decrease in between-country inequality, 
and despite an increase in within-country inequality since the mid-1990s. 
Inequality has been greater among low-income regions than among high-income 
regions. Her econometric analysis suggests that EMU has so far contributed to a 
reduction in regional inequality in richer EU countries, while it has exacerbated 
regional disparities in poorer countries.  
 
In his keynote address ("Issues in the comparison of welfare between Europe 
and the United States"), Robert Gordon compared welfare in the EU15 and the 
US, asking how Europe can be so productive yet so poor. His answer was that 
work hours in Europe have fallen drastically in the past 40 years, reflecting long 
vacations, high unemployment, and low labour force participation. Low work 
hours in Europe are mainly due to higher labour taxation and the generosity of 
the welfare state together with employment and product market regulation and 
generous unemployment benefits. 
 
Turning to real GDP comparisons, Gordon estimated Europe’s welfare in 2004 
to be at about 79 percent of that in the US, whereas per capita incomes stood 
only at 69 percent. An additional dimension in his welfare comparison was the 
growing inequality in the US as compared to Europe. His paper surveyed the 
related literature and concluded that the transatlantic contrast is due to a mix of 
institutional and market-driven explanations. In particular he mentioned the 
common and more lucrative use of stock options at the managerial level in the 
US as one reason for the difference 
 
Alena Bicáková and Eva Sierminska focused on financial market issues, notably 
the relationship between inequality of home ownership and access to credit markets and mortgage market development in five EU countries ("Home 
ownership inequality and the access to credit markets"). Mortgage availability 
affects home ownership in particular among the lower income deciles. Policies 
supporting home ownership among young households should preferably target 
low-income groups. 
 
Many of the issues raised during the 2007 ARC were discussed by the 
concluding panel. It was noted that many EU policies that promote growth, 
market integration, trade, employment and competition also work in favour of 
social cohesion, fairness and equality. Several commentators recommended that 
additional research be carried out on the impact of EU policies on equality. 
There is also considerable scope for further work on data issues and empirical 
research as well as on the theoretical underpinnings of equality developments.  
 
A selection of the papers presented at the research conference will be 
forthcoming in a special issue of Journal of Economic Inequality.  
 
 
Lars Jonung and Jarmo Kontulainen 
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0This survey draws heavily from joint work with Stephen Turnovsky.
01 Introduction
The relationship between growth and income inequality has occupied the at-
tention of the profession for some 50 years, since the appearance of Kuznets
(1955) pioneering work, and is both important and controversial. It is impor-
tant because policy makers need to understand the way in which increases in
output will be shared among heterogeneous agents within an economy, and
the constraints that this sharing may put on future growth. Its controversy
derives from the fact that it has been di¢ cult to reconcile the di⁄erent the-
ories, especially since the empirical evidence has been largely inconclusive.1
A ￿rst aspect of the debate ￿ both theoretical and empirical- con-
cerns causation. Does the growth process have an impact on inequality?
Or does the distribution of income and wealth among agents determine ag-
gregate growth? Despite the controversy, one thing is clear. An economy￿ s
growth rate and its income distribution are both endogenous outcomes of
the economic system. They are therefore subject to common in￿ uences,
both with respect to structural changes as well as macroeconomic policies.
Structural changes that a⁄ect the rewards to di⁄erent factors will almost
certainly a⁄ect agents di⁄erentially, thereby in￿ uencing the distribution of
income. Likewise, policies aimed at achieving distributional objectives are
likely to impact the aggregate economy￿ s productive performance. Being
between endogenous variables, the income inequality-growth relationship ￿
whether positive or negative ￿will re￿ ect the underlying common forces to
which they are both reacting.
A second cause of controversy is that many of the theories proposed ex-
1See Aghion, Caroli, and Garc￿a-Peæalosa (1999), Bertola (2000) and Bertola, Foellmi,
and Zweim￿ller (2006) for overviews of the theoretical literature, and Forbes (2000), Baner-
jeee and Du￿ o (2003) and Voitchovsky (2005) for recent empirical analyses.
1plore a single mechanism applicable only to particular types of countries.
Theories about rural-urban migration, such as the Kuznets hypothesis, can-
not describe the relationship between inequality and growth in mature indus-
trial economies; models based on credit market imperfections are applicable
only to those economies where such imperfections are substantial; and the
concept of skilled-biased technical change adds little to our understanding
of the relationship between the two variables in countries with stagnant
technologies.2
In this paper I review recent developments in the theory of growth and
distribution. My focus will be on those theories that can help us under-
stand the relationship between these two variables in modern industrial
economies. In these countries, the growth process is the result of a com-
bination of technological change, capital accumulation -either physical or
human-, and changes in the supply of labour. I will argue that each of
these represents a possible mechanism creating a link between inequality
and growth. Causation need not be the same in all cases. It could run from
growth to inequality, from inequality to growth, or there may be other fac-
tors, such as policies and technologies, that simultaneously determine both.
I make no a priori distinction between these, as all of them may be present
in one form or another.
It is important to emphasize a number of issues that I will not addressed
in this paper. My discussion of the role of labour market institutions concen-
trates on their impact on the distribution of wages, and I will not considered
how they a⁄ect unemployment and the possibility that higher unemploy-
ment increases income inequality. The reason for this is that the empirical
2Surprisingly, the bulk of the empirical literature has paid little attention to which
countries should be included in the dataset to test a particular theory. A notable exception
is Voitchovsky (2005).
2literature ￿nds no evidence of a signi￿cant relationship between unemploy-
ment rates and the distribution of income.3 Also, my analysis of income risk
will be limited, and I will not consider the implications of trade openness.
A substantial literature exists on these questions, which complements the
approaches reviewed in this paper.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section decomposes a coun-
try￿ s growth rate into four components: technological change, human and
physical capital accumulation, and changes in the labour supply. I then
examine the mechanisms relating inequality and growth considering these
components one by one. Section 3 considers the inequality-growth relation-
ship when growth is driven by physical capital accumulation. Section 4 looks
at technology and human capital, while section 5 addresses the question in
terms of the e⁄ects of changes in the labour supply on inequality and growth.
The last section concludes.
2 A Framework of Analysis
Consider an aggregate production function of the form
Y = F(K;AL);
where K denotes the aggregate physical capital stock, A the level of tech-
nology, L a measure of the aggregate labour input, and the function F(:)
exhibits constant returns to scale to capital and labour. We can then write



















3See Checchi and Garc￿a-Peæalosa (2005).
3where sK and sL are, respectively, the capital share and the labour share in
aggregate output, and sk + sL = 1 . The labour input in turn depends on
the quality and the quantity of labour. Let us express it as
L = Q ￿ (H ￿ P):
The ￿rst term, Q, captures the quality of labour, or human capital, while
the term in brackets is the labour supply, itself the product of the number
of hours each employed individual works, H, and the number of employed
individuals, P, and hence measures the quantity of labour in the economy.
















Of course, the quality of labour and the hours supplied may vary across
individuals, so that we should write L =
P P
i=1
Qi ￿ Hi; or more generally
L = G(Qi;Hi) if individuals with di⁄erent levels of human capital are not
perfect substitutes. Then, the rate of growth of aggregate labour would also
depend on the distribution of human capital and on the covariance terms of
individual￿ s hours and human capital.
In the simple setup in which we can de￿ne an aggregate measure of labour
























That is, the rate of growth depends on the growth rates of technology,
physical capital, human capital, and the labour supply, as well as on the
(possibly endogenous) factor shares.
The contribution of these factors to average per capita output growth
4varies across countries and over time. Table 1 reports a growth accounting
exercise for three EU countries, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, that experi-
enced fast growth in the last two decades of the 20th century. The rate of
growth of per capita GDP is decomposed as the sum of the rates of growth of
total factor productivity (TFP), the capital-labour ratio, employment, and
participation. The table indicates very di⁄erent patterns across countries.
The increase in capital per worker played an important role in both Portugal
and Spain, while in Ireland its contribution was modest in the earlier pe-
riod and negative in the latter one. In contrast, TFP growth was the single
most important factor driving growth in Ireland. The increase in the rate
of labour force participation has contributed substantially to GDP growth,
in some instances (Portugal and Spain) more than TFP growth.
Table 1 around here
Let us now consider individual incomes. An individual￿ s market income
which is given by
Yi = rKi + wQiHi;
where Qi > 0 and Hi ￿ 0. Our measure of inequality will be a function of
the distribution of relative incomes. De￿ning yi as agent i￿ s income relative








where ki, qi, and hi denote, respectively the agent￿ s physical capital, human
capital, and hours relative to the mean, N is the population, and p ￿ P=N
is the participation rate. Alternatively, if the agent￿ s wage rate is not pro-
5portional to her human capital so that wi = w(qi); we can write




where !i ￿ w(qi)=w is the individual￿ s wage relative to the average wage,
w. An inequality index, I, can then be de￿ned as a function of individuals￿
relative incomes, that is I = ￿(yi). Inequality then depends on factor shares,
the distribution of capital (physical and human), the distribution of hours
of work, and the participation rate. Each of these elements represents a
channel that potential links, in a causal or non-causal way, inequality and
growth.
3 Physical Capital Accumulation
3.1 A Simple Endogenous Growth Model
Let us start by considering a single source of heterogeneity, unequal initial
capital endowments.4 Consider an economy where output is produced by
a representative ￿rm according to a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production
function of the form
Y (t) = K(t)￿(A(t)L)1￿￿; (1)
where 0 < ￿ < 1 is the capital share in aggregate output. The labour input
L is given and constant, output and factor markets are competitive, and






e￿￿tdt; ￿ > 0; (2)
4The discussion in this subsection follows closely the analysis in Bertola (1993). See
also See Garc￿a-Peæalosa and Turnovsky (2006)
6subject to her budget constraint
:
Ki(t) = rKi(t) + w(t) ￿ Ci(t): (3)
The solution to the consumer￿ s problem together with the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst-
order condition for pro￿t maximization yields the rate of growth. The rate
of growth of consumption can be shown to be the same for all agents, equal





Suppose also that aggregate productivity depends on the current capital
stock through a learning-by-doing externality, so that A(t) = K(t), as in





We can now turn to individual incomes. Since the only di⁄erence be-
tween individuals is their initial capital stock, we can write agent i￿ s relative
income at time t as
yi(t) = ￿ki(t) + (1 ￿ ￿): (6)
An important feature of this model is that, since there are no transitional
dynamics, all agents accumulate capital at the same rate and hence the dis-
tribution of relative capital remains unchanged. The distribution of income
is then determined by the distribution of endowments and factor shares. A
higher capital share, i.e. a higher value of ￿, will imply both a faster rate of
growth and a more dispersed distribution of income.
73.2 Taxation
The above analysis implies that di⁄erences in the technology across countries
will result in di⁄erent rates of growth and distributions of income. Growth
and inequality will also be a⁄ected by policy parameters. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that all income is taxed at a constant proportional rate ￿ and that
the revenue is used to ￿nance a lump-sum transfer, denoted b, so that the
individual budget constraint is now5
:
Ki = (1 ￿ ￿)rKi + (1 ￿ ￿)w + b ￿ Ci: (3￿ )
In this case, the rate of growth is given by
g =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)L ￿ ￿
￿
; (5￿ )
while agent i￿ s relative net (or after-tax) income is
yN
i = ￿ki + (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿(1 ￿ ki); (6￿ )
where we have used the government budget constraint to substitute for b. In
this case, higher taxation will be associated with a more equal distribution
of income and with slower growth.
Using this simple model, the early literature on inequality and growth
argued that if the tax rate were endogenously determined through majority
voting, greater wealth inequality -de￿ned as a greater distance between the
capital owned by the median and that owned by the mean individual- would
result in a higher tax rate and hence lower growth.6 This lower rate of growth
can be associated with higher or lower after-tax income inequality due to
the opposing e⁄ects of a more dispersed distribution of capital and a higher
5Time dependence of variables is ommitted whenever this causes no confussion.
6See Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994).
8tax rate on disposable income.
To sum-up, when growth is driven by physical capital accumulation we
￿nd that
(i) di⁄erences in technology (￿) result in a positive correlation between
growth and pre-tax income inequality,
(ii) di⁄erences in income tax rates (￿) lead to a positive correlation
between growth and post-tax income inequality,
(iii) greater wealth inequality -measured in a particular way- leads to
slower growth,
(iv) di⁄erences in wealth inequality may lead to a positive or negative
correlation between growth and post-tax income inequality.
The striking conclusion is that, even in this simple model, the sign of the
relation between inequality and growth is ambiguous, and depends crucially
on the way in which we measure inequality. We could turn to the data to
try to ￿nd support for one or other of these mechanisms. Unfortunately,
the empirical evidence has generated a fuzzy picture. Early studies, such
as Alesina and Rodrik (1994), found a negative correlation between income
inequality and growth, while a positive correlation and the fact that both
variables are jointly determined are consistent with the more recent ￿ndings
of Barro (2000), Forbes (2000), and Lundberg and Squire (2003). The one
consistent result is that there is no support for the "political economy"
argument behind (iii) and (iv); tax rates are not correlated with pre-tax
income inequality, nor is higher taxation correlated with slower growth.7
7See, among others, Perotti (1996) and Rodriguez (1999).
93.3 Wealth and Income Dynamics
One of the major drawbacks of the AK model sketched above is that there
are no wealth dynamics. The constant growth rate implies that all agents
accumulate at the same rate and hence the distribution of relative wealth
remains unchanged. However, in a Ramsey-type model with diminishing
returns to capital this is not the case.
In a recent paper, Caselli and Ventura (2000) have characterized rel-
atively mild conditions under which various sources of heterogeneity are
nevertheless compatible with viewing the aggregate (average) economy be-
having as if it is populated by a single representative consumer. In par-
ticular, when the only di⁄erence across agents is their initial wealth and
preferences are homothetic, then saving is a constant fraction of total life-
time wealth, de￿ned as the sum of all future labour earnings and interest
payments. Because savings are linear in individual wealth, then aggregate
savings are independent of the distribution of capital in the economy. In
other words, the behaviour of the aggregate economy with heterogeneous
agents is identical to that of the representative consumer economy.
Aggregate dynamics do, however, have a distributional impact. To un-
derstand why the evolution of wealth inequality depends on aggregate dy-
namics consider two individuals having di⁄erent capital endowments. Ho-
mothetic preferences imply that they both spend the same share of total
wealth at each point in time and have the same rate of growth of total
wealth. Total wealth has two components, physical capital and the present
value of all future labor income. Since wages are growing at the same rate
for both agents but represent a higher share of total wealth for the poorer
individual, then his capital must be changing more rapidly than that of the
wealthier agent. When the economy is accumulating capital, this means
10that his capital stock is growing faster and wealth inequality is diminishing.
What will happen to the distribution of income? Recall that with the
Cobb-Douglas production used above, the income of agent i is given by
yi(t) = ￿ki(t)+(1￿￿). If the distribution of capital is becoming more equal
over time, then the distribution of income will also become more equal.
The e⁄ect on incomes of a narrowing wealth distribution can be weakened
or strengthened by changes in the labour share. Consider, instead of the
Cobb-Douglas production function, a more general function of the form
Y (t) = (￿K(t)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(AL)￿)
1=￿ ; (1￿ )
where ￿ ￿ 1 and 1=(1 ￿ ￿) is the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labour. The share of labour is now
sL(t) =
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿(AL=K(t))￿: (7)
With a CES production function, the shares of capital and labour in total
output change as the economy accumulated capital the labour share changes.
Since individual incomes are given by
yi(t) = (1 ￿ sL(t))ki(t) + sL(t): (6￿ )
the endogenous evolution of K(t) will determine sL(t) and hence the weight
of capital income in the individual￿ s budget constraint. If the elasticity of
substitution is less than 1, that is if ￿ < 0, a growing capital stock implies
a rising labour share, reinforcing the e⁄ect of declining wealth inequality.
However, if the elasticity is greater than 1, income and wealth inequality may
move in opposite directions. The labour share falls during the transition and
o⁄sets, partially or totally, the impact of the changing wealth distribution
on income inequality.
114 Technology and the Quality of Labour
Building on the seminal work of Nelson and Phelps (1966), one of the most
important lessons that the new growth theories have taught us is that we
cannot separate the process of human capital accumulation from that of
technological change. Nelson and Phelps argue that a major role for edu-
cation is to increase the individual￿ s capacity to innovate and to adapt to
new technologies. This complementarity between education and R&D ac-
tivities has two important implications. First, technological change requires
educated workers. Indeed, the new growth theories have emphasized the
importance of having an educated labour force in order to have R&D-driven
growth. Second, under the Nelson and Phelps approach to human capital,
workers with di⁄erent levels of education are not perfect substitutes. As
a result, their relative rewards depend not only on the relative supplies of
high- and low-education workers, but also on the speed and on the type of
technological change. This has given rise to an extensive literature that ex-
plores the concept of biased technical change and its implications for wage
inequality.
4.1 The E⁄ect of Technical Change on Labour Market In-
equalities
The basic idea behind the hypothesis of biased technical change is that
di⁄erent types of labour are not perfect substitutes.8 This can be captured
by an aggregate production function of the form
Y = K￿(￿(AsLs)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(AuLu)￿)(1￿￿)=￿; (8)
8An excellent review of this literature is provided by Hornstein, Krusell and Violante
(2005).
12where Ls is skilled labour and Lu unskilled labour.9 The elasticity of sub-
stitution between the two types of labour is given by 1=(1￿￿), and they use
skill-speci￿c technologies, with As representing the technology used by the
skilled and Au that used by the unskilled. Note that with ￿ = 0 we would be
back to the Cobb-Douglas function with perfect substitution across di⁄erent











If ￿ > 0; i.e. if skilled and unskilled labour are substitutes, then whenever
skilled productivity grows faster than unskilled productivity the relative
wage will increase. That is, if technological improvements lead to a faster
increase in As, we will say that there is skill-biased technical change and
growth will be accompanied by a higher relative wage.
One of the problems of this approach is that, although intuitive, it re-
quires large di⁄erences in the rate of growth of relative productivity to ex-
plain observed changes in the skill-premium in the last decades of the 20th
century. A complementary approach is to also allow for capital-skill com-
plementarity, as suggested by Krussell et al. (2000). They argue that we
should distinguish between structure capital, denoted Ks and comprising
buildings and infrastructure, and equipment capital, denoted Ke and cap-





￿[￿(AeKe)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(AsLs)￿]




9The literature tends to de￿ne those with only college education as "unskilled workers"
and those with college education as "skilled workers", although there are clearly sources
of skills other than formal education.
13which allows for a di⁄erent degree of complementarity between equipment
capital and skilled workers than between equipment and unskilled labour.

















Their estimates using US data imply ￿ > 0 and ￿ < 0; indicating that there
is capital-skill complementarity which implies that the skill premium can
increase even if the relative productivity of the two types of workers and the
relative supplies remain constant. The source of the change in the relative
wage is an increase in equipment capital which, since this type of capital
is complementary with skilled labour, raises the marginal product of the
skilled. In other words, under the assumption of capital-skill complemen-
tarity, innovations that reduce the cost of equipment capital and hence raise
their supply will tend to increase the skill premium.
4.2 Indirect E⁄ects of Biased Technical Change
The concept of biased technical change has proven to be a powerful tool re-
lating technological progress to wage dynamics. The problem is that because
technological progress is hard to measure directly, the only way to identify
the e⁄ect of biased technological change is by not being able to attribute
changes in the skill premium to other causes. These other causes have been
argued to be changes in the internal organization of ￿rms and in labour mar-
ket institutions. Bust what is the source of changes in ￿rms￿organization
and institutions? Perhaps the most enduring contribution of this literature
will be the idea that both organizational change and the evolution of labour
market institutions are partly the result of biased technological change.
A number of recent contributions have argued that technological change,
14and in particular IT-technologies, have changed the internal organization of
￿rms; see, for example, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) or Saint-Paul
(2001).10 The overall conclusion of this literature is that technologically-
induced organizational change tends to increase inequality both within a
￿rm and across workers in di⁄erent ￿rms, and is seen as largely responsible
for the increase in labour earnings of top managers.
Technological progress has also been argued to be a source of changes
in labour market institutions; see Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001)
and Ortigueira (2007). What these theories argue is that the collapse of
centralised wage bargaining in the late 20th century was the result of the
increase in the productivity gap across workers brought about by equipment-
speci￿c technological progress and equipment-skill complementarity. Empir-
ical evidence, in turn, indicates that changes in labour market institutions
can account for part of the recent increase in wage dispersion, and have been
shown to have a substantial impact on overall income inequality.11
4.3 Human Capital, Inequality, and the Welfare State
The determinants of the degree of income inequality in a country include
social and political forces as well as economic ones. In particular, govern-
ment transfers can be an important source of household income, suggesting
that even if growth matters in shaping the distribution of income, policy
choices also play a crucial role. For example, in 1993, social security ben-
e￿ts accounted for 14% of household income in the UK (Atkinson, 1997),
and in rich industrial economies, the di⁄erence between market income and
disposable income is between 10 and 19 15 Gini points (see Brandolini and
10Empirical support for the complementarity between technology, organizational change
and human capital is provided by Bresnahan at al. (2002) and Caroli Van Reenen (2001).
11See Koeninger, Leonardi and Nunziata (2007) and Checchi and Garc￿a-Peæalosa
(2005).
15Smeeding, 2007). It is then essential to understand the way in which taxes
and transfers a⁄ect the relationship between growth and inequality.
An obvious question that arises is what determines the degree of redis-
tribution, or, more generally, the size of the welfare state.12 The idea that
inequality, human capital accumulation, and the welfare state are jointly
determined has been explored by BØnabou (2000, 2005).
BØnabou examines an overlapping generations model in which growth
is driven by the accumulation of human capital. Individuals are endowed
with di⁄erent levels of human capital and with random ability. There are
three key elements in the model. First, an individual￿ s disposable income
depends on her human capital, her ability, and the degree of redistribution,
denoted ￿. Second, some individuals are credit constrained and hence invest
in the education of their o⁄springs less than they would in the absence of
constraints. Third, individuals vote over the extent of redistribution, and
do so before they know their own ability.
Two relationships appear. On the one hand, the desired degree of redis-
tribution is a decreasing function of the degree of human capital inequality
in the economy, that is,
￿ = ￿(inequality); with ￿0 < 0: (10)
The intuition for this is that redistribution provides social insurance against
the uncertainty concerning ability. The more unequally distributed human
capital is, the more unequal the distribution of expected income is and hence
the more expensive insurance becomes for those with high human capital.
As a result there will be less support for redistributive policies.
12A more egalitarian welfare state may take the form of direct income redistribution,
but also of stronger labour market institutions that would tend to reduce inequality in
market incomes.
16On the other hand, we have a relationship governing the process of hu-
man capital accumulation. Greater redistribution relaxes the credit con-
straint of the poor, allowing them to increase the educational attainment of
their children which in turn results in a lower degree of long-run inequality.
That is,
Inequality = ￿(￿); with ￿0 < 0: (11)
Since the two relationships are decreasing, they may intersect more than
once and give rise to two stable equilibria for the same preferences and
technological parameters. One equilibrium is characterized by low inequality
and high redistribution, while the other exhibits high inequality and low
redistribution.
This approach has a number of important implications. First, the equi-
librium relationship between inequality and redistribution will be negative,
rather than positive as the more naive approach in section 3 suggested.
Second, di⁄erent sources of inequality have di⁄erent impacts on the extent
of redistribution. If inequality is mainly due to di⁄erences in human capi-
tal endowments, the support for redistributive policies will be weaker than
when inequality is largely due to random ability shocks. Third, which of
the two equilibria results in faster growth is ambiguous. It depends on the
distortions created by redistribution -mainly in terms of the labour supply
of the rich- and the positive e⁄ect of a greater investment in education by
the poor. The latter e⁄ect is likely to be weak in industrial societies with
well-developed ￿nancial system, and hence we would expect the former ef-
fect to dominate. That is, the equilibrium with a more redistributive policy
will exhibit less inequality and slower growth, the latter being the result of
the reduction in working hours induced by taxation.
17Before we turn to the question of taxation and labour supply in the
next section, consider a possible interpretation of BØnabou￿ s analysis. In his
original framework, the random term in the individual￿ s income function is
interpreted as innate ability, but it can be given alternative interpretations.
For example, uncertainty could be related to the overall performance of
the sector in which the worker chooses to work, which in turn depends on
the degree of openness and competition faced by the sector. Under this
interpretation, an increase in openness would increase the uncertainty faced
by individuals with a given level of human capital and lead to greater support
for redistribution. That is, trade openness would result in a lower degree of
inequality. The e⁄ect on growth would be ambiguous, as more redistribution
would tend to reduce the labour supply but openness may itself have other
positive e⁄ects on output growth.
5 Labour Supply
5.1 Leisure: Extending the basic growth model
The 1990s witnessed a substantial widening of the gap between working
hours in the United States and Europe. While in the 1970s both German
and French workers spent about 5 percent more time at work, by the mid-
90s working hours in these two countries had fallen to 75 and 68 percent of
hours worked in the US.13 This observation has recently sparked a debate
about the causes and e⁄ects of di⁄erences in labour supply; see Beaudry and
Green (2003), Prescott (2004) and Alesina et al. (2005). The literature has
largely focused on whether taxes or preferences have driven these di⁄erences,
and on the impact of labour supply on growth. However, little attention has
been paid to the distributional implications of an endogenous labor supply.
13See Prescott (2004).
18In this section I discuss how an endogenous supply of labour a⁄ects both
growth and inequality, and the role that taxes play.
5.1.1 Factor returns and factor shares
Consider the AK model with heterogeneous capital endowments of section
3.1, but suppose now that utility depends both on consumption and on








i )1￿￿e￿￿tdt; ￿ > 0;￿ > 0 (12)
Suppose also that all agents are endowed with one unit of labour, so that
Hi = 1 ￿ li are the hours worked by agent i. The budget constraint is then
:
Ki = rKi + w(1 ￿ li) ￿ Ci: (13)
The ￿rst implication of allowing for ￿ exible labour is that the elasticity
of leisure in the utility function, ￿; becomes a crucial parameter determining
both the rate of growth and the distribution of income. In particular, the
















where l is average leisure and average hours worked are H = 1 ￿ l. The
￿rst equation is the Euler equation, the second equates the marginal utility
from consumption and leisure, and the third is simply the aggregate budget
constraint.
14See Garc￿a-Peæalosa and Turnovsky (2006).
19With a Cobb-Douglas production function and normalizing the labour
force to one, we can write output as Yt = Kt
￿(AtH)1￿￿: Further assuming
that At = Kt, the three equations above can be expressed as
g =
￿(1 ￿ l)1￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
; (E1)









which jointly determine the equilibrium rate of growth and leisure. An in-
crease in ￿, that is, a stronger preference for leisure, will result in a lower
average labour supply and slower growth. The intuition for this is straight-
forward. A stronger preference for leisure tends to reduce the labour supply,
which reduces the marginal product of capital and hence the rate of growth.
The degree of income inequality is also a⁄ected by the parameter ￿.
Recall that agent i￿ s relative income is given by
yi = (1 ￿ sL)ki + sLhi (17)
and hence depends on her relative supply of hours, hi. The work time
chosen by agent i will depend both on the aggregate labour supply, as it
a⁄ects the wage rate, and on her capital stock, which creates a wealth e⁄ect
that induces capital-rich agents to work fewer hours. It is possible to show
that








(1 ￿ ki) (18)
where the term in square brackets is positive (from the transversality con-
dition).
The key mechanism generating the endogenous distribution of income is
the positive equilibrium relationship between agents￿relative wealth (capi-
tal) and their relative leisure. This relationship has a very simple intuition.
20Wealthier agents have a lower marginal utility of wealth. They therefore
choose to work less and to enjoy more leisure, and given their relative cap-
ital endowments, this generates an equilibrium income distribution. There
is substantial empirical evidence documenting this negative relationship be-
tween wealth and labour supply. 15
We can then write relative income as





(1 ￿ ki) (19)
where sL is the share of labour, which is simply 1￿￿ with the Cobb-Douglas
production function. We can rewrite this expression as








(ki ￿ 1) (20)
which implies that income is less unequally distributed than capital. The
reason is that the distribution of labour supplies is negatively correlated with
that of wealth endowments, thus reducing the variability of income relative
to that of capital.
Moreover, using the equilibrium conditions (E1) and (E2), it is possible
to show that a stronger preference for leisure, that is a higher value of ￿,
results in a more equal distribution of income. The reason is that a higher
￿ leads to an increase in leisure and hence a lower income for all agents.
However, the capital-rich reduce their working hours by (relatively) more
and hence experience a greater decline in income, thus leading to a less dis-
persed distribution. Another way to think about this, is that a lower labour
15Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) ￿nd evidence to support the view that large
inheritances decrease labor force participation. Cheng and French (2000) and Coronado
and Perozek (2003) use data from the stock market boom of the 1990s to study the
e⁄ects of wealth on labor supply and retirement, ￿nding a substantial negative e⁄ect on
participation. Algan, ChØron, Hairault, and Langot (2003) use French data to analyze
the e⁄ect of wealth on labor market transitions, and ￿nd a signi￿cant wealth e⁄ect on the
extensive margin of labor supply.
21supply implies a higher wage and a lower return on capital. Since capital
endowments are more unequally distributed than labour endowments, the
change in factor returns will result in a more equal distribution of income.16
The e⁄ect of di⁄erent hours worked can be weakened or strengthened
by changes in the labour share. For this we need to consider again a CES
production function of the form
Yt = (￿Kt
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(AtH)￿)
1=￿ : (21)
As in section 3, the labour share is given by
sL =
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿H￿; (22)
where we have used the fact that At = Kt. With a CES production function,
the endogenous labour supply will also determine the shares of capital and
labour in total output, and hence the weight of capital income in the indi-
vidual￿ s budget constraint. If the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1,
that is if ￿ > 0, the lower labour supply induced by a higher ￿ increases the
labour share and further reduces income inequality. If the elasticity is less
than 1, then the resulting fall in the labour share will mitigate the e⁄ect of
endogenous labour on inequality.
5.1.2 Taxation
One possible reason why labour supplies di⁄er across countries is di⁄erent
preferences for leisure. As we have seen, a stronger preference for leisure
results in a lower labour supply, slower growth and a more equal distribution
of income. If preferences are the cause of di⁄erences in labour supply, growth
16The argument that the behaviour of capital returns is essential to understanding dis-
tributional di⁄erences has, however, been emphasized by Atkinson (2003) and is supported
by recent empirical evidence for the OECD (see Checchi and Garc￿a-Peæalosa, 2005).
22rates and inequality levels across countries, then there are no strong policy
implications.17 An alternative view, put forward by Prescott (2004) among
others, is that di⁄erences in time use are due to di⁄erences in taxes between
the US and the EU. That is, they are the result of government policy.
Prescott￿ s argument that higher labour and consumption taxes are the
main cause of the reduction in working hours in Europe raises a puzzle.
If capital endowments are more unequally distributed than labour endow-
ments, then the increase in labour taxes should also have increased post-tax
income inequality. This contrasts with the positive correlation between av-
erage hours worked in a country and the Gini coe¢ cient of income reported
by Alesina et al. (2005) for OECD economies. Table 2 reports the e⁄ective
tax rate on labour income (a combination of the consumption tax, ￿c, and
the tax on labour income, ￿w) and the Gini coe¢ cient of disposable income
for France, Germany, and the US. It indicates that a higher tax rate is asso-
ciated with both fewer working hours and a lower degree of post-tax income
inequality.
Table 2 around here
Let us now examine the simultaneous response of the aggregate labour
supply and personal income inequality to changes in taxation, and try to
understand to what extent increases in the e⁄ective tax rate on labour can
result in a more equal distribution of income. To do this, consider the model
of the previous subsection, but suppose that now capital income, labour
income and consumption are taxed at rates ￿k , ￿w; and ￿c, respectively.18
Then, the individual￿ s budget constraint is
17There may be a reason for intervention if preferences are endogenous and multiple
equilibria possible; see Alesina, Glasser and Sacerdote (2005).
18See Garc￿a-Peæalosa and Turnovsky (2007a) for the details, and well as Garc￿a-
Peæalosa and Turnovsky (2007b) for a similar analysis in the context of a Ramsey model.
23:
Ki = (1 ￿ ￿k)rKi + (1 ￿ ￿w)w(1 ￿ li) ￿ (1 + ￿c)Ci: (16￿ )
The resulting macroeconomic equilibrium is now given by
g =
￿(1 ￿ l)1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿k) ￿ ￿
￿
; (E1￿ )











and it is straight forward to show that higher taxes on wages and con-
sumption lead to a lower labour supply and growth rate, in line with recent
empirical evidence; see Cardia, Kozhaya, and Ruge-Murcia (2003).
Now consider what is the e⁄ect of taxation on income inequality. Because
the taxes have redistributive e⁄ects, we need to consider the net (or after-
tax) income of agent i, yN
i , which can be shown to be given by
yN






sL(1 ￿ ￿w) + sk(1 ￿ ￿k)
(1 ￿ ki): (23)
Clearly, net income will be more equally distributed than market income,
yi, if ￿k > ￿w. In the mid-90s the tax rate on capital income was about 40
percent in the US, Germany, and France.19 In the case of the US, since ￿w
was also 40 percent, the model implies that yN
i was approximately equal to
yi and hence taxation had no direct distributive implications. Meanwhile,
the tax rates observed in Europe imply negative redistribution.
But taxation also a⁄ects the distribution of income indirectly, through
its impact on factor returns. Recall that market income is given by





(1 ￿ ki): (22)
With a constant labour share, the e⁄ect of the taxes will operate through
19See Carey and Rabesona (2004).
24leisure, l. Higher taxation of labour and consumption will reduce the labour
supply, increasing wages and reducing the return on capital, and thus result-
ing in a less dispersed distribution of income. This e⁄ect can be su¢ ciently
strong to overcome the direct distributive e⁄ect of the taxes, so that a higher
e⁄ective tax on labour is associated both with lower working hours and a
more equal distribution of post-tax income, consistent with the positive cor-
relation between average hours worked in a country and the Gini coe¢ cient
of income reported by Alesina et al. (2005) for OECD economies.
5.2 Women in the labour market
One aspect that has received little attention in the recent growth literature
is the role of labour market participation. Yet, changes in participation
rates can have a substantial impact on per capita GDP growth, as reported
in table 1. The table indicates that growth in participation has contributed
substantially to GDP growth, in some instances more than TFP growth.
Moreover, the increase in participation has been largely due to the massive
entry of women in the labour market in these countries in the last two
decades of the 20th century. Between 1984 and 1998, both Ireland and
Spain experienced an increase in female participation rates of over 3% per
year and Portugal of 1 % per year, while male participation rates declined
slightly over the period.20 These numbers imply that the contribution of
female labour market participation to output growth is of the same order
of magnitude as that of TFP growth, and raises the question of what are
the implications of women entering the labour market for the relationship
between inequality and growth.
There are two reasons why we could expect a relationship between female
20Author￿ s calculations from "OECD Labour Force Statistics V4.4".
25labour participation, inequality, and growth. The ￿rst concerns the policies
that would promote female participation, and their relationship to wage
inequality. The second aspect is the impact of increased participation on
inequality across households.
Women￿ s decision of whether or not to participate in the labour market
is based on a comparison of the forgone home production if they work with
the income obtained if employed. In all industrial countries there is still a
large gap between the hourly wages of men and those of women. Wage gaps
are particularly evident in two types of jobs. One are female dominated jobs,
such as nursing, which tend to command lower wages as compared to jobs
with similar employee characteristics. The second are part-time jobs which
are characterized by substantially lower hourly wages than similar full-time
jobs. Di⁄erences in wage rates are aggravated by the fact that the tax rate
of the income of married women is higher than that for men or for single
women. Encouraging female participation would then require policies that
reduce the gender wage gap and that lower the tax rate for second earners
(see OECD, 2004). Such policies would then lead to lower gender inequality
which would increase participation and hence result in faster growth.
Lower inequality between the wage rates of men and women may never-
theless be associated with increases in inequality when measured for other
groups. Reducing the gender wage gap is likely to be due to an increase
in the wages of women at the top of the earnings distribution, and hence
would increase the dispersion of female earnings. This is precisely what we
observe in the US, where the sharp reduction in the gender wage gap at the
end of the 20th century was associated with increases in the dispersion of
female hourly wages and female earnings, (Gottschalk and Danziger, 2005;
Burtless, 2007). In other words, faster growth will be associated with lower
26inequality across gender groups but greater inequality within-groups.
Throughout the paper we have looked at inequality among individuals,
yet the empirical literature and policy-makers are often concerned with the
distribution of income among households. Increased female participation
and the increased dispersion of female earnings will have major implications
for the distribution of household incomes.
When married women did not work, the distribution of labour income
across households was simply given by the distribution of earnings among
men. However, once women enter the labour market, inequality across
households will also depend on the correlation between the income of a
husband and that of his wife. Household income inequality will increase or
decrease depending on whether there is a positive or a negative correlation
between the earnings of spouses. Existing evidence indicates that there is
a strong positive correlation between the labour earning of husbands and
wives, with high-earning men marrying high-earning women. As a result,
increases in female participation rates result in a more unequal distribution
of household income. Moreover, in the US this correlation increased in the
last two decades of the 20th century and was part of the cause of the increase
in income inequality across household over the period (Burtless, 1999).
6 Conclusions
In this paper I have discussed recent developments in the theory of growth
and distribution, focussing on those approaches that are most relevant for
modern industrial economies. I have argued that a country￿ s growth rate
can be decomposed into the growth rates of technology, physical capital, hu-
man capital, and labour supply, and that each of these represents a channel
through which inequality and growth are related.
27The revival of interest in the relationship between inequality and growth
in the early 1990s by papers such as Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion and
Bolton (1997) led to two conclusions. First, these models postulated a causal
relationship from distribution to growth. Second, they predicted that greater
inequality would result in slower growth, at least in countries with highly
imperfect capital markets. The literature I have reviewed contrasts with this
approach. Most of the mechanisms proposed in the paper imply a correlation
between our variables of interest, rather than a causal relationship. This
correlation can operate through various mechanisms. On the one hand, I
have argued that technology and preference parameters a⁄ect both growth
and the distribution of income. On the other, policy choices may be at its
heart. The mechanisms I have discussed predict that faster growth will be
associated with a more unequal distribution of income. Nevertheless, in some
cases, the sign of the correlation may depend on the income concept that
we use. For example, policies aimed at fostering growth through increased
female participation will reduce wage inequality across genders but probably
increase it across households.
Where does this leave us in our understanding of the relationship be-
tween distribution and growth? I draw two conclusions from this literature.
The ￿rst one is that, unlike the Kuznets hypothesis of the 1950s, we can-
not expect the growth process to autonomously bring about a reduction of
inequality. As a result, redistribution will remain a policy concern even in
a› uent societies. The second is that despite the fact that we cannot sin-
gle out one particular mechanism as the main factor relating growth and
distribution, these theories can help us understand ex post the causes of a
particular episode of increasing inequality. This understanding is essential
for the design of suitable redistributive policies.
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Source: Lebre de Freitas (2000). The growth decomposition uses a Cobb-Douglas
production function, where the labour share is country speci￿c and equal to the
average over the period.
35Table 2: Labour supply and income inequality: 1993-96
Per person, relative to US
Hours worked Output 1￿￿w
1+￿c Gini coe¢ cient
US 100 100 0.40 0.35
France 68 74 0.59 0.29
Germany 75 74 0.59 0.27
Source: Relative hours, output and the tax rate are from Prescott (2004), table
1; the Gini coe¢ cients are computed on household disposable income and are from
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This paper examines the long-run determinants of income inequality using 
a newly assembled panel of 16 developed countries over the entire twenti-
eth century. We find that economic growth disproportionately benefits the 
top percentile income earners (“the rich”), at the expense of the rest of the 
top decile (“the upper middle class”). Financial development is also signifi-
cantly pro-rich, particularly in the early stages of a country’s development. 
Openness to trade has no clear distributional impact. If anything openness 
reduces top income shares. Tax progressivity significantly reduces top in-
come shares whereas government spending has almost no effect on inequal-
ity at all. 
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1  Introduction 
The relationship between inequality and development is a central issue in the study of 
economics. From fundamental concerns about whether markets forces have an innate 
tendency to equalize or increase differences in economic outcomes to much debated 
questions about the effects of “globalization” distributional concerns are always pre-
sent: Does economic growth really benefit everyone equally or does it come at the 
price of increased inequality? Is the effect perhaps different over the path of develop-
ment? Is it the case that increased openness benefits everyone equally, is it perhaps 
especially the poor that gain, or is it the case that it strengthens the position only of 
those who can take full advantage of increased international trade? Does financial de-
velopment really increase the opportunities for previously credit constrained individu-
als or does it only create increased opportunities for the already rich? What is the role 
of government in all this? Theoretically such questions are difficult to resolve as there 
are plausible models suggesting equalizing effects from these developments, as well 
as models suggesting the opposite.
1 Empirically problems often arise because these 
effects should be evaluated over long periods of time and data is typically only avail-
able for relatively short periods.  
 
This paper empirically examines the long-run associations between income inequality 
and economic growth, financial development, trade openness, top marginal tax rates, 
and the size of government.
2 While these variables are not direct measures of typically 
suggested causes of changes in income distribution, such as globalization, technologi-
cal change or social norms, their relation to the development of inequality seem an 
important step toward understanding such broader concepts. The main novelties of 
our study lie in the uniquely long time period for which we have data and in the focus 
                                                 
1 Just to give some examples: one may distinguish between theories that predict markets to be innately 
equalizing, disequalizing or both (depending on initial conditions). Mookherjee and Ray (2006) give a 
useful overview of the literature on development and endogenous inequality based on such a division. 
Winters et al. (2004) give an overview of evidence on the relation between trade and inequality, Cline 
(1997) summarizes different theoretical effects of trade on income distribution, while Claessens and 
Perotti (2005) provide references for the links between finance and inequality, presenting theories 
which suggest both equalizing effects as well as the opposite. We will discuss some of the suggested 
mechanisms in more detail in Section 2 below. 
2 As our focus is on pre-tax income we do not explicitly address questions of redistributive policy but 
rather the effects of taxes and government size on income before taxes and transfers. See Bardhan, 
Bowles and Wallerstein (eds.), 2006, for several contributions on the relation between various facets of 
globalization and their impact on the possibilities to redistribute income).  3
on top income shares. We use a newly compiled dataset for 16 countries over the 
whole of the twentieth century.
3 While previous studies have only had comparable 
data from the 1960s (at best), our series start at the end of the “first wave” of global-
ization (1870–1913), continues over the interwar de-globalization era (1913–1950), 
the postwar “golden age” (1950–1973) and ends with the current “second wave” of 
globalization.
4 Hence, in contrast to relying on shorter periods of broader cross-
country evidence, our dataset allows us to study how inequality has changed over a 
full wave of shifts in openness as well as several major developments in the financial 
sector. In terms of the role of government, our long period of analysis implies that we 
basically cover the entire expansion of the public sector and the same is true for the 




The focus on top incomes and concentration within the top means that we can address 
a special subset of questions regarding the extent to which economic development is 
particularly pro-rich.
6 In particular, our data allows us to distinguish between the ef-
fects on, broadly speaking, the “rich” (top executives and individuals with important 
shares of capital income), the “upper middle class” (high income wage earners), and 
the rest of the population.
7 As has frequently been pointed out in the recent top in-
come literature, the lower half of the top decile typically consists of employed wage 
earners while there are major differences in both composition of income and in fluc-
                                                 
3 Even though the choice of countries - mostly developed economies - is mainly a result of data avail-
ability it has some positive side effects. We are, for example, able to trace a fixed set of relatively simi-
lar countries as they develop rather than letting different countries represent stages of development. 
Having similar countries is also important especially when thinking about theoretical predictions from 
openness which are often diametrically different for countries with different factor endowments, tech-
nology levels etc. 
4 These periods are quoted in, for example, O’Rourke and Williamson (2000), O’Rourke (2001), and 
Bourguignon and Morrison (2002). These studies discuss various aspects of globalization and inequal-
ity over these early periods but they did not have sufficient data to analyze developments in detail. Also 
see Cornia (2003) for a discussion of differences in within-country inequality between the first and 
second globalization. 
5 In fact, the introduction of a modern tax system is typically what limits the availability of data on in-
come concentration.    
6 Examples include, models of how aspects of these developments creates extreme returns to “super-
stars”, or models of capitalists and workers where capitalists benefit disproportionately would, when 
taken to the data, translate to isolated effects for a small group in the top of the income distribution.  
7 A similar classification but with respect to wealth is made in Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal 
(2007).   4
tuations over time higher up in the distribution.
8 Depending on whether developments 
seem to affect everyone in the top of the distribution in similar ways or, if there are 
clear differences within the top, holds important keys to what is driving developments 
of inequality. 
 
Our empirical analysis exploits the variation within countries to examine how changes 
in top income shares are related to changes in economic development, financial de-
velopment, trade openness, government expenditure, and taxation. Using a panel data 
approach allows us to take all unobservable time-invariant factors, as well as country 
specific trends into account. We also allow the effects to differ depending on the level 
of economic development, between Anglo-Saxon countries and others, and between 
bank- and market-oriented financial systems.
10 
 
Several findings come out of the analysis. First, we find economic growth to be 
strongly pro-rich. In periods when a country’s GDP per capita growth has been above 
average, the income share of the top percentile has increased. By contrast, the next 
nine percentiles (P90-99) seem to loose out in these same periods. As we find this re-
lation to be similar at different stages of economic development, it could indicate that 
recent findings of high productivity growth mainly benefiting the rich in the U.S. 
postwar era (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2005, 2007), is a more general phenomenon 
across both countries and time. This result is in line with top incomes being more re-
sponsive to growth (e.g., through compensation being related to profits).  
 
Furthermore, we find that financial development, measured as the relative share of the 
banking and stock market sectors in the economy, also seems to increase the income 
share of the top percentile. When interacted with the level of economic development it 
                                                 
8 For evidence on much of changes in top income concentration stemming from the very top, see 
Piketty (2003), Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006), and Atkinson and Piketty (2007). 
10 As we will discuss in more detail below, these are some of the dimensions in which we may expect 
differences in development of inequality either on theoretical ground or based on previous empirical 
findings.  
12 We do also find weak support for positive effects of financial development spreading down the dis-
tribution over the path of development.  5
turns out that the result is mostly driven from a strong effect in the early stages of de-
velopment. This result is in line with the model suggested by Greenwood and Jovano-
vic (1990) where financial markets initially benefit only the rich but as income levels 
increase (and with them the development of financial markets) the gains spread down 
through the distribution.
12 It is also of particular interest since a recent study by Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007) finds that financial development disproportion-
ately benefits the poor.
13  
 
Our results with respect to the role of government indicate that higher marginal taxes 
have a robustly negative, though fairly modest short-term effect on top income shares, 
both in the top and the bottom of the top decile.
14 However, this effect could be size-
able over time. Our simulations of cumulative effects of taxation indicate that they, 
especially in combination with shocks to capital holdings, can explain large long-run 
drops in top income shares.
15 Government spending as share of GDP, however, has no 
clear effect on the incomes of the top percentile, but seem to be negative for the upper 
middle class and positive for the rest of the population. 
 
Finally, with respect to the elusive concept of globalization there are at least two find-
ings that relate to its effects on income inequality. First, openness to trade (the trade 
share of GDP), which is often used as a measure of ‘globalization’, does not have a 
clear effect on inequality, but if anything, seems to have a negative effect on top in-
come shares. Second, the effects of growth can be interpreted as casting doubt on the 
idea that top income earners have their incomes set on a global market while others 
have theirs set locally. Assuming that domestic development determines incomes on 
the local labor market while global growth determines the compensation for the elite, 
                                                 
13 These findings are not necessarily conflicting. For example, both the poor and the richest group can 
benefit at the expense of the middle. IMF (2007) also finds that financial development is related to in-
creases in income inequality.  
14 Atkinson and Leigh (2007c) find slightly stronger negative effects of marginal taxation on top in-
come shares in their study focusing on Anglo-Saxon countries. 
15 The combination of shocks to capital holdings and increased marginal taxes have been suggested to 
be a major sources of decreasing top income shares after World War II (see in particular Piketty, 2003, 
and Piketty and Saez, 2003). Our simulations indicate that our estimated effects are well in line with 
this type of explanation.   6
domestic economic growth (above the world average) should decrease inequality be-
tween the two groups, not increase it as we find.
16 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines some common 
theoretical arguments linking the incomes of the rich and the variables included in the 
study. Section 3 describes the data and their sources while Section 4 provides a brief 
overview of the relationships between the different variables. Section 5 presents the 
econometric framework and Section 6 presents the main results and a number of ro-
bustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
2  Potential determinants of trends in top income shares 
A number of recent contributions to the study of income inequality have increased the 
availability of comparable top income data over the long-run. Following seminal con-
tributions by Piketty (2001, 2003) on the evolution of top income shares in France, 
series on top income shares over the twentieth century have been constructed for a 
number of countries using a common methodology.
18 The focus in this literature has 
mainly been on establishing facts and to suggest possible explanations for individual 
countries. To the extent that general themes have been discussed these have focused 
on accounting for some common trends such as the impact from the Great Depression 
and World War II (on countries that participated in it) and on the differences between 
Anglo-Saxon countries and Continental Europe since around 1980. Broadly speaking 
the explanations for the sharp drop in top income shares in the first half of the twenti-
eth century have revolved around shocks to capital ownership, leading to the top in-
come earners losing much of the wealth that provided them with much of their in-
                                                 
16 Note that our result is not in conflict with Gersbach and Schmutzler (2007) or Manasse and Turrini 
(2001) that emphasize the distribution of incomes within the elite group (rather than the average) and 
predict that globalization leads to an increased spread in incomes for the elite. Others such as Gabaix 
and Landier (2007) emphasis the firm size effect, while Kaplan and Rauh (2007) stress technological 
change, superstar effects (Rosen, 1981), and scale effects as plausible explanations for increasing top 
incomes. 
18 Other recent studies include Australia (Atkinson and Leigh, 2007), Canada (Saez and Veall, 2005), 
Germany (Dell, 2005), Ireland (Nolan, 2007), Japan (Moriguchi and Saez, 2006), the Netherlands (At-
kinson and Salverda, 2005), New Zealand (Atkinson and Leigh, 2007), Spain (Alvaredo and Saez 
2006), Sweden (Roine and Waldenström, 2007) and Switzerland (Dell, Piketty and Saez, 2007). Much 
of this work is summarized and discussed in Atkinson and Piketty (2007).  7
come, thus decreasing their income share substantially. High taxes after World War II 
(and the decades thereafter) prevented the recovery of wealth for these groups. As we 
will show, our estimates of the effect of top marginal taxes are compatible with this 
type of explanation. After roughly 1980 top income shares have increased substan-
tially in Anglo-Saxon countries but not in Continental European countries. However, 
this has not been due to increases in capital incomes but rather due to increased wage 
inequality (see Piketty and Saez, 2006 for more details on the proposed explanations 
for the developments).  
 
Even though a number of plausible explanations have been suggested in this literature 
it is fair to say that so far no attempts at exploiting the variation across countries and 
across time in an econometrically rigorous way has been made. In fact, in overviews 
(Piketty 2005 and Piketty and Saez 2006) of this literature it is suggested that – even 
though there will always be severe identification problems – cross country analysis 
seems a natural next step. A first question when contemplating such an analysis is, of 
course, what variables that could be expected to have a clear relationship to top in-
come shares. Beside variables suggested in the top income literature, such as growth, 
taxation and the growth of government, we think variables capturing financial devel-
opment and openness to trade, are especially interesting. 
 
The next question is; what should we expect these relationships to look like? When it 
comes to the impact of financial development, it is fair to say that standard theory 
typically predicts that financial development should decrease inequality, at least if we 
think of financial development as increasing the availability for previously credit con-
strained individuals to access capital (or that financial markets allow individuals with 
initially too little capital to “pool their resources” to be able to reach a critical mini-
mum level needed for an investment).
19 This is the standard mechanism in growth 
theories where a country can be caught in a situation where badly developed financial 
markets make it impossible for much of the population to realize projects that would 
increase growth (as, for example, in Galor and Zeira, 1993, and in Aghion and Bolton, 
1997). The situation would be one of low growth (compared to the country’s poten-
tial), high inequality and badly developed financial markets. With the development of 
                                                 
19 Recent evidence for financial development being pro-poor is given in Beck et al. (2007).  8
financial markets, increased growth goes hand in hand with less inequality as the fi-
nancial markets improve the allocation of resources. A larger fraction of individuals 
are then given the possibility to realize profitable projects.  
 
There are, however, a number of suggested mechanisms that could turn this prediction 
around. In an overview of the links between finance and inequality, Claessens and Pe-
rotti (2005) give a number of references (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 2003 and Perotti 
and Volpin, 2004) to theory, as well as evidence, of financial development, which 
benefits insiders disproportionately (consequently leading to increased inequality). 
The idea, in various garbs, is that understanding the potential threat to their position 
from certain types of development of capital markets, the political elites, implicitly 
the top income earners, would block such developments, possibly to the detriment of 
the economy. Hence, these theories agree that in principle the development of finan-
cial markets could have an equalizing effect but in practice only developments that 
disproportionately benefit the elite will materialize.  
 
Beside theories suggesting either increased equality or increased inequality from fi-
nancial development there are also a number of theories suggesting that financial de-
velopment, much like the classic Kuznets curve, leads to increased inequality in early 
stages of development but at later stages also benefits the poor, leading to increased 
equality. An influential article suggesting precisely this is Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990). Their idea is that at low levels of development when capital markets are non-
existent or at an early stage of development only relatively rich individuals can access 
the benefits of these (as there are certain fixed costs involved). At this stage further 
developments of financial markets increase growth but disproportionately benefit the 
rich. However, as the economy grows richer, a larger and larger portion of the popula-
tion will be able to access the capital market and more and more individuals will 
benefit. Consequently resource allocation improves even more, growth continues to 
increase, but now accompanied by decreasing inequality. Eventually the economy 
reaches a new steady state where financial markets are fully developed, growth is 
higher and inequality has gone through a cycle of first increasing and then decreasing 
over the path of development. 
  9
When it comes to standard trade theory the inequality effect of openness varies de-
pending on relative factor abundance and productivity differences, and also on the ex-
tent to which individuals get income from wages or capital. Easterly (2005) provides a 
good overview of the arguments, stressing the importance between differences (be-
tween countries) stemming from variations in endowments or productivity. Assuming, 
which seems realistic, that our sample contains countries that (over the whole of the 
twentieth century) have been relatively capital rich compared to the global average 
and are places where capital owners coincide with the income rich, we should, in gen-
eral, expect trade openness to increase the income shares of the rich in our sample.
20 
Even if theory is far from clear cut in its predictions, the basic argument that trade 
openness – as well as other aspects of globalization – may somehow “naturally” bene-
fit the rich underlie calls for political intervention whereby a “loosing majority” could 
be compensated given that the total gains are large enough (as shown in Rodrik, 
1997). The importance for such compensation has recently forcefully been argued in 
Scheve and Slaughter, 2007 (see also the recent collection of articles in Bardhan, 
Bowles and Wallerstein (eds), 2006). 
 
Looking at the possible effects of taxation the theoretical predictions are again am-
biguous. Higher taxes have immediate effects on work incentives and on capital ac-
cumulation (and hence on capital income over time) and if these are relatively more 
important for the top income groups we should expect higher taxes to be negatively 
related to top income shares.
21 However, as pointed out in Atkinson (2004), there are 
theoretical reasons to expect gross income inequality to increase as a result of in-
creased taxation. Even in the simplest model, an increased tax for the rich (or in-
creased progressivity) has a substitution effect causing a decrease in effort but also an 
                                                 
20 An example of when this is not the case would be if differences between countries are due to produc-
tivity differences that are so large that the richer countries (the ones in our sample) can export labor 
intensive goods (productivity advantage offsets labor scarcity). Then trade would reduce inequality in 
the rich countries. Another potentially important point is the fact that these countries have largely 
traded with each other, and therefore the predictions could still be different for different countries in 
our sample.  
21 It should be emphasized that the dynamic effects on capital accumulation, stressed in the literature on 
top incomes (see Piketty, 2003, and Piketty and Saez, 2003), are not captured well in the econometric 
estimates (as the impact from these are cumulative). As we discuss the results below we will therefore 
combine our results with simulations to get a better sense of the order of magnitude over time.  10
income effect pulling in the other direction. Unless this is zero, such an increase 
should be expected to increase gross income inequality.
22  
 
Overall, the conclusion we draw from reviewing the literature on possible determi-
nants of top income shares is that theory provides us with many plausible alternatives. 
The main contribution we can make lies in using the uniquely long period for which 
we have data to test whether there are robust relationships over time as well as to ad-
dress issues of changing relationships along the path of development (such as testing 
whether financial market development has a different effect in early stages of devel-
opment compared to later stages).    
3  Data description 
This section outlines our data, describing the variables included in the analysis and 
their sources. Further details can be found in the appendix. 
 
Top income shares. In income inequality research, top income earners are often de-
fined as everyone in the top decile (P90–100) of the income distribution. However, 
recent studies by Piketty (2001) and others have shown that the top decile is very het-
erogeneous.
23 For example, the income share of the bottom nine percentiles of the top 
decile (P90–99) has been remarkably stable over the past century in contrast to the 
share of the top percentile (P99–100), which fluctuated considerably. Moreover, while 
labor incomes dominate in the lower group of the top decile, capital incomes are rela-
tively more important to the top percentile. In order to analyze the determinants of top 
income shares in detail we will differentiate between these groups of income earners 
within the top decile.  
 
Based on the work of several researchers following the methodology first outlined in 
Piketty (2001, 2003), we have constructed a new panel dataset over top income shares 
                                                 
22 Atkinson (2004) also point to taxes having ambiguous effects in “tournament theory” (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981) where an increased tax decreases the return of advancement to the next level but also 
reduces the risk of attempting such advancement, and in the “winner-take-all” context considered in 
Frank (2000) where progressive taxation reduces the expected returns of entry. See Atkinson (2004) 
pages 135-138.  
23 See Atkinson and Piketty (2007).  11
for 16 countries covering most of the twentieth century.
24 The main source is personal 
income tax returns, and income reported is typically gross total income, including la-
bor, business and capital income (and in a few cases realized capital gains) before 
taxes and transfers. Top income shares are then computed by dividing the observed 
top incomes by the equivalent total income earned by the entire (tax) population, had 
everyone filed a personal tax return. In most countries only a minority of the people 
filed taxes before World War II and the computation of reference totals for income 
regularly include both tax statistics and various estimates from the national accounts. 
For this reason the reference total income is likely to be measured with some error. 
Despite the explicit efforts to make the series consistent and comparable there remain 
some known discrepancies in the data that are potentially problematic.
25  
 
We use three income variables to capture what we think are key aspects of the whole 
income distribution given the data limitations. Top1 (P99–100) measures the fraction 
of total income received by the percentile with the highest incomes, Top10-1 (P90–
99) is the share received by the next nine percentiles, and Bot90 (P0–90) is the resid-
ual share received by the lowest ninety percent of the population. As already men-
tioned we think there are good reasons to approximate the rich by Top1, in that their 
income share is of a different makeup in terms of sources compared to the rest of the 
population and also shows considerable variation over time. Similarly it is fair to de-
scribe Top10-1 as the upper middle class since this group, with remarkable consis-
tency across countries and over time, has been composed of mainly (highly) salaried 
wage earners.
26 Finally, Bot90 consists clearly not of a homogenous group of income 
                                                 
24  See the Table B2 in the Appendix for specific references and Atkinson and Piketty (2007) for de-
tails. 
25 Some differences in both income and income earner (tax unit) definitions remain. For example, real-
ized capital gains are excluded from the income concept in all countries except for Australia, New Zea-
land and (partly) the UK. Tax unit definitions vary even more. In Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, 
India and Spain they are individuals but in Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
the United States they are households (i.e., married couples or single individuals). Moreover, in Japan, 
New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom the tax authorities switched from household to indi-
vidual filing. In Germany there is a mixture of the two, with the majority of taxpayers being household 
tax units whereas the very rich filing as individuals. For a longer and more detailed discussion of these 
problems, see Atkinson and Piketty (2007, ch. 13). 
26 Needless to say, this division is as artificial as the classical distinction between workers and capital-
ists and it is likely that the precise division between the rich (whatever one means by this term) and the 
upper middle class is different across time and between countries. Nevertheless, the results from the top 
income literature indicate a surprisingly stable relation in that at least the lower half of the top decile is 
very different from the top percentile. We therefore use this terminology hoping that it invokes key 
distinctions between the very top and the group just below.     12
earners. Nonetheless this group, by construction, captures the aggregate outcome for 
the rest of the population and, as we will show, there seem to be some clear patterns 
of outcomes for “the top” and “the rest” of the population. 
 
Beside the measures of shares out of total income we also use some measures of ine-
quality within the top of the distribution. Specifically we use Top1/10, defined as the 
share of the top percentile in relation to the top decile, i.e., P99–100/P90–99, as well 
as  Top01/1, the top 0.1 percentile income share divided by the rest of the top 
percentile’s income share, P99.9–100/P99–99.9. These measures serve two purposes. 
First, they measure the inequality within the top of the distribution, which is different 
from inequality overall especially when considering theories that predict a widening 
gap among high income earners. Second, these measures are not sensitive to meas-
urement error in the reference total income mentioned above.
27  
 
Financial development. The challenge in estimating financial sector development over 
the whole twentieth century is to find variables that are available and comparable for 
all countries for such a long period. We use three different measures aimed at captur-
ing the relative importance of private external finance: Bank deposits (deposits at pri-
vate commercial and savings banks divided by GDP), Stock market capitalization (the 
market value of listed stocks and corporate bonds divided by GDP), and Total market 
capitalization (the sum of the first two, which is also our preferred measure). The 
variable  Bank deposits closely matches private credit in the economy.
28 By using 
these three different measures, we are also able to address possible distributional dif-
ferences between bank-based and market-based financial development. 
 
Our sources for bank deposits are Mitchell (1995, 1998a, 1998b) for the pre-1950 pe-
riod and International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Financial Structure Database 
(FSD) for the post-1950 period. Data on stock market capitalization before 1975 come 
from Rajan and Zingales (2003), who present data for the years 1913, 1929, 1938, 
1950, 1960 and 1970. We linearly interpolate between these years (but not over the 
world wars) to get 5-year averages which we then link to post-1975 data from FSD. 
                                                 
27 To see this in the case of Top1/10, note that P99–100 = IncTop1/IncAll and P90–100 = IncTop10/IncAll, 
which means that Top1/10 = (IncTop1/IncAll)/(IncTop10/IncAll – IncTop1/IncAll) = IncTop1/(IncTop10 – IncTop1).  
28 We use bank deposits instead of private credit since we have much longer series of deposit data. For 
the country-years when the two measures overlap, however, the correlation is high (0.82).  13
One problem with the stock market capitalization measure is its potentially close con-
nection to our income measure, which includes capital income (although not realized 
capital gains), i.e., returns on stocks and bonds. Hence, there could be a mechanical 
relation between top income shares and financial development if, for example, divi-
dends tend to be high when stock market capitalization is high. This potential problem 
is, however, considerably smaller in the case of bank deposits, which hence also 
serves as a robustness check on the market capitalization results. 
 
Openness. We use a standard measure of trade openness: the sum of exports and im-
ports as a share of GDP. Data on trade for the pre-1960 period come from Mitchell 
(1995, 1998a, 1998b), Rousseau and Sylla (2003) and López-Córdoba and Meissner 
(2005), and for the post-1960 period we use data from IFS. 
 
Central government spending. In order to account for the activity and growth of gov-
ernment over the period, we include a measure of Central government spending, de-
fined as central government expenditure as a share of GDP. Data are from Rousseau 
and Sylla (2003). Ideally we would have liked to include both central and local gov-
ernments since the spending patterns at these two administrative levels may both vary 
systematically across countries and within countries over time. For example, Swedish 
municipalities and counties have gradually taken over the state’s responsibility for the 
provision of traditional public sector goods such as health care and schooling, thereby 
potentially causing a decrease in central government spending but not in total gov-
ernment spending. However, lacking a measure of total government spending, we 
think that our chosen alternative is the best available measure for capturing the growth 
of government over time.
29  
 
Top marginal tax rate. We use two measures of top marginal tax rates. Our first 
measure, called Margtax1, combines data on the statutory top marginal tax rates with 
some newly created series on marginal tax rates paid by those with incomes equal to 
five times GDP per capita, an income level approximately equal to the 99th income 
percentile. The reason for not only using the statutory top rates is that we know that 
                                                 
29 Rousseau and Sylla (2003) use this variable in their study of the determinants of economic growth in 
an historical context. Central government spending to GDP is also the variable that is available in data-
bases such as the Penn World Tables, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and the IMF:s 
International Financial Statistics.  14
they are binding to quite varying degrees both across countries and over time.
30 The 
new datasets on marginal tax rates are available thanks to previous efforts by Bach et 
al. (2005) for Germany (since 1958), Roine and Waldenström (2007) for Sweden 
(whole period), and Rydqvist et al. (2007) for Canada, the UK, and the US (postwar 
period). These series were calculated from national tax schedules for each of these 
countries. Our second measure of marginal tax rates, Margtax2, consists simply of the 
full set of statutory rates from all countries for which such data are available. 
 
GDP per capita and Population. For the variables GDP per capita and Population 
size we use data from Maddison (2006).
33  
4  A first look at the data 
To get a sense of the relationships between our variables of interest it is useful to just 
look at the trends over time. After all, when it comes to some of the main findings in 
the individual country studies on top incomes, such as the effects of the Great Depres-
sion and World War II, these are apparent just from looking at the data. Figure 1 
shows the development of our main dependent variable, Top1, over the Twentieth 
Century for all countries in our sample.  
 
Besides clearly showing the impact of the depression and World War II for many 
countries, another striking feature of the series is the strong common trend. With the 
exception of a few countries the development is remarkably similar over time, at least 
until around 1980. The same is, in varying degree, true for the main right-hand-side 
variables (at least for the development of GDP/capita, top marginal tax rates and cen-
tral government spending). The panels in Figure 2 show the development of these 
since 1900.  
 
                                                 
30 For example, Roine and Waldenström (2007) shows for Sweden that over the entire century the top 
income percentile only paid a marginal tax rate equal to the statutory top rate in the years around 1980. 
More generally, the statutory top rates have been relatively more binding to larger groups of income 
earners in Scandinavia and the U.K than in, e.g., Japan or the U.S.  
33 When computing GDP shares for financial development and trade volumes, however, we use nomi-
nal GDP series in Bordo et al. (2001), Mitchell (1995, 1998a, 1998b) and Rousseau and Sylla (2003).   15
These signs of interdependencies are perhaps not so surprising given our focus on 
economies that have been relatively closely interconnected through events such as the 
Great Depression affecting top incomes in many of these countries in similar ways. 
One may also think of broad policies (taxation, liberalization, etc.) or changes in tech-
nology (financial innovation, factor flows, etc.) as being reflected in common trends 
of top income shares across countries. In the extreme this could be a problem for our 
econometric approach since we rely on within country changes in the relevant vari-
ables to identify effects, holding common trends constant. If there are changes across 
time in the explanatory variables but these are exactly the same everywhere, we 
would not find any effect even if there may be a relation. In other words, by taking out 
common trends, we run the risk of falsely rejecting a hypothesis because the patterns 
are too similar across countries. However, since no two countries are affected in ex-
actly the same way by the developments throughout the 20th century, there should be 
enough variation in the data to disentangle the effects (see section 5 below). This 
problem is not unique to our study; exploiting the residual variation after having con-
trolled for common effects is the standard way of approaching cross-country data.  
 
Can we by just looking at the data find any clear patterns between the top income 
shares and the proposed explanatory variables over time? The short answer would 
have to be “no”. As can be seen in Figure 2 the level of financial development is quite 
volatile up until the middle of the postwar period when it starts to increase. Trade 
openness, on the other hand, exhibits a more monotonic increase (except for the dras-
tic drop in the Netherlands during World War I), and a similar pattern goes for GDP 
per capita. Government spending is increasing in all countries, with the well-known 
war-related spike in the 1940s. Top marginal taxation increases before World War II, 
but continues to be high throughout the postwar period up to its peak around 1980 
when it mostly starts to decrease. Overall, there are no obvious links between any of 
these variables and the top income shares, although there is quite notable cross-
country variation to use in a more sophisticated analysis of the panel. Piketty (2005) 
makes a similar simple eyeballing exercise to provide some suggestive evidence on 
the inequality-growth links in the specific case of France, but in the end he concludes 
that “Using all countries in the database might allow to produce more convincing re- 16
sults”.
34 The natural next step, therefore, is to study these relationships more rigor-
ously. 
5  Panel estimations: Econometric method  
The theoretical discussion concerning the potential determinants of top income shares 
is suggestive, but inconclusive. Financial development has been suggested to increase 
as well as to decrease top income shares and the same goes for trade openness and the 
effect of economic growth. Even if theory on the effect on taxation is ambiguous, we 
do, however, expect to find that a larger government and higher tax rates (especially 
higher top marginal taxes) are associated with lower top income shares.
35 When it 
comes to finding possible relations between variables based on simply eye-balling the 
time series, we have concluded that there are no obvious links to be suggested. We 
therefore proceed with panel estimates of the effects on these variables on top income 
shares. Panel estimations allow us to take all unobservable time-invariant factors into 
account. Further, it allows us to control for both common and country specific trends. 
Thus, we can test for specific hypotheses regarding the relation between different 
variables on top income shares.  
 
When estimating the determinants of top income shares using a long and narrow panel 
of countries, the assumptions underlying the standard fixed effects model are likely to 
be violated. In particular, serial correlation in the error terms can be expected. We 
therefore apply the less demanding first difference estimator which relies on the as-
sumption that the first differences of the error terms are serially uncorrelated. This 
means that we start with the following regression: 
  
  1 it t i it yb γ με ′ Δ =Δ + + + it X  (1) 
  
This is a standard first difference regression including fixed time effects γt and coun-
try specific trends (here captured by a country specific effect μi). Further, ΔXit is the 
vector of (first-differenced) variables that we are interested in as well as other control 
                                                 
34 Piketty (2005), p. 8. 
35 This is partly assuming that disincentive effects dominate, but also based on the potential dynamic 
effects on capital accumulation. Some of the individual country studies on top incomes have also found 
that higher marginal taxes have indeed lowered top income shares.    17
variables. Of course, the assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms does 
not necessarily hold, even after first-differencing. Indeed, some preliminary tests sug-
gest that serial correlation is a problem in this setting.
36 To account for serial correla-
tion, we follow two different strategies. Our main approach is to estimate (1) using 
GLS and directly allow for country specific serial correlation in the error terms.  
 
As an alternative approach, one could include the lagged dependent variable, thereby 
explicitly allowing for the dynamics that give rise to serial correlation. This means 
that we estimate the following regression: 
 
  01 1 it it t i it yb y b γ με − ′ Δ =Δ + Δ ++ + it X  (2) 
 
Applying the same test as above shows that serial correlation is no longer a problem 
when using a dynamic specification. However, the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable is not unproblematic since it is correlated with the unobserved fixed effects. 
Thereby, we could get biased estimates. This bias is reduced when T is large (Nickell, 
1981). T does in this case depend on the actual time horizon on which the data is 
based. In other words, in our case where T is 100 years, the bias is not likely to be a 
major problem even if we only use 20 periods based on 5-year averages. Furthermore, 
the standard way of dealing with the dynamic panel data problem is to use GMM-
procedures along the lines of Arellano and Bond (1991) or Arellano and Bover 
(1995).
37 But these GMM-procedures are not appropriate in a setting with small N and 
large T such as ours (Roodman, 2007). For these reasons we run regression (2) with-
out any adjustments or instrumentation. Both when using dynamic first differences 
and first differenced GLS, we allow for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. In order 
to limit the number of tables, we only report the GLS results in the main paper, but all 
regressions are also run using the first difference approach.  
 
The fact that we control for trends and time invariant country factors does not mean 
that we have fully addressed potential endogeneity problems. First of all, we could 
                                                 
36 The test procedure follows Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 10.6): We run regression (1) and keep the 
residuals. We then rerun the regression and include the lagged residuals in the estimation. Since the 
coefficient on the lagged residual is positive and significant, we can conclude that serial correlation is a 
problem even after taking first differences. 
37 Lagged levels and differences of the endogenous variable/s are used as instruments.  18
have direct reverse causality from top income shares to our explanatory variables. 
This would be the case if, for example, top income shares would have a direct effect 
on economic growth, rather than the other way around. Similarly, high top income 
shares could affect financial development positively if individuals in the top of the 
income distribution are relatively prone to make use of the financial markets for sav-
ing and investment. It is more difficult to see a problem of reverse causality from top 
incomes to trade and government spending, but a high income concentration can of 
course affect the political trade-offs facing a government. This, in turn, can affect 
trade policies, government spending and how the tax system is structured. Second, it 
is possible that some uncontrolled factor affects both top income shares and the re-
spective control variables. This would then give rise to an omitted variable bias of our 
estimates.  
 
The ideal way of dealing with these endogeneity problems is to find some credible 
instrument for each respective explanatory variable. Since our approach here is to take 
an agnostic view on several potential explanations for top incomes over a long period, 
instrumentation is not feasible. Therefore, we will be analyzing partial correlations 
between top incomes and a set of explanatory variables, and we do not claim to estab-
lish causality. Rather, we regard our contribution as being a first systematic take on 
the various explanations of top income shares that have been proposed in the litera-
ture.       
6  Results 
In this section, we report the results from panel regressions using the above estimation 
methods. Throughout, we have used both first differenced GLS (FDGLS) and dy-
namic first differences (DFD), but as these give very similar results we only display 
the FDGLS results in our main tables while showing the DFD output in Appendix C.
38 
In all tables showing the results, the dependent variables are the five different income 
shares presented in the data section: the top percentile (Top1), the next nine percen-
tiles in the top decile (Top10–1), the bottom nine deciles (Bot90), the top percentile 
                                                 
38 We choose to present the results from FDGLS because it deals more directly with serially correlated  
errors.   19
divided by the rest of the top decile (Top1/10) and, finally, the top 0.1 percentile di-
vided by the rest of the top percentile (Top01/1).   
 
The presentation of the results starts by looking at average long-run effects over the 
whole income distribution. We then allow for: different effects across levels of devel-
opment, differences between Anglo-Saxon and other countries and differences be-
tween bank- and market-oriented financial systems. Thereafter we show that our re-
sults are robust to restricting the sample in a number of ways as well to using 
alternative marginal tax measures.  
6.1  Main results 
Table 1 presents the results from our baseline FDGLS regressions. The explanatory 
variables in all regressions are growth in GDP per capita, financial development (as 
measured by total capitalization), population size, central government spending, and 
openness to trade. The difference between odd and even numbered columns is that the 
latter also includes top marginal tax rates.  
 
Table 1 shows a number of clear and interesting results. First, there is a strong posi-
tive relation between GDP per capita growth and the income share of the top. The re-
gression coefficients for Top1, Top1/10 and Top01/1 are all significantly positive sug-
gesting that growth has been “pro-rich” over the entire 20th century and that it has 
been relatively more so the higher up the distribution one gets. In sharp contrast to 
those results is the negative relationship between growth and income share for the 
next nine percentiles in the top decile, Top10–1, which we think of as the upper mid-
dle class group. The most plausible explanation for this finding is perhaps simply that 
the top percentile group has a larger share of their income tied to the actual develop-
ment of the economy, while the following nine, as pointed out in much of the top in-
come literature, are mainly highly salaried workers but with relatively limited bonus 
programs, stock options, and other performance related payments. Their capital in-
come share is also significantly lower than that of the rich.
40 The unclear result for the 
                                                 
40 One should of course note that some of these stylized facts have changed over time. For example, the 
capital share is less significant in the top today as compared to the beginning of the twentieth century. 
However, the characterization that the top percent is different from the following nine percent in in-
come composition is still valid.  20
rest of the population is likely to reflect the heterogenous experiences within this 
group. Quantitatively the estimated effects suggest that an average growth rate of 10 
percent, which seems reasonable over a five year period, increases the income share 
of the top percentile by about 0.6 percentage points (the mean of Top1 is 10.6). As for 
the effects within top income earner, columns 7 and 8 shows an increase of approxi-
mately 0.03 (the mean of Top1/10 is 0.45).  
 
Financial development also turns out to have been pro-rich over the past century, with 
increases in total capitalization being significantly associated with increases in the top 
income percentile. Unlike the growth effects, however, the effect for the following 
nine percentiles is statistically insignificant, while the effect on the nine lowest deciles 
seems to be negative (although with varying degree of statistical certainty). It is not 
trivial to gauge the size of the estimated effects, but the following exercise can be use-
ful. Increasing total capitalization by one standard deviation (0.5, or 50 percent of 
GDP), is related to an increase in income share of the top percentile by about 0.5 per-
centage points. As the mean income share of this group is about 10 percent, this effect 
is quite small. If we instead use the estimates from within the top decile (columns 7 
and 8), we see that the same increase in is related to an increase in the income share of 
the top percentile by about 0.15. As the top percentile on average has an income share 
of 0.45 of the top90-99 group, this effect must be considered very large. In other 
words, financial development has large redistributive consequences within the group 
of high-income earners, but the consequences for the overall distribution of income 
are more limited.  
 
Looking at the role of the state, the effects on inequality are in line with what one 
might expect. Central government expenditures increases the income share of the nine 
lowest deciles, decreases the share of the upper middle class group, but has no signifi-
cant effect on the top percentile. Increasing central government spending by one stan-
dard deviation (about 0.07) is related to a reduction in the income share of the upper 
middle class by about 1.6 percentage points. As the average income share of this 
group is about 23 percent. The most surprising finding regarding the amount of gov-
ernment spending.is that the highest income earners appears to be unaffected.  
  21
Furthermore, top marginal taxes have a negative effect on the whole top group, both 
the top percentile and the following nine percentiles, while the effect for the lower 
nine deciles is strongly positive. As our income shares are pre-tax this suggests that 
high marginal tax rates have an equalizing effect beyond the direct impact of taxation, 
something which is not theoretically obvious.
41 The direct effects of taxation are rela-
tively small. Increasing top marginal taxes from 50 to 70 percent (approximately one 
standard deviation), reduces the income share of the top percentile by 0.86 percentage 
points. Within the top decile, the same increase in taxes leads to a reduction of the 
earnings of the top percentile by 0.03 which should be compared to the mean of 0.45. 
However, when taking the cumulative effects of taxation into account may still be im-
portant in explaining changes in inequality. Appendix B contains results from simple 
simulations of the dynamic effects under different assumptions about capital accumu-
lation in response to tax increases and shocks to the capital stock (as well as their 
combined effect).
42 Assuming that capital owners (overrepresented in the top of the 
distribution) use some of their capital to uphold consumption the tax increase will not 
only affect disposable income in the current period but also future (capital) income. 
Piketty and Saez (2006) argue that the tax increases in the 1940s and 1950s had pre-
cisely this type of effect when combined with the shocks to capital during World War 
II. Our stylized simulations show that tax increases in the order of magnitude that took 
place in many countries around the 1950s could indeed have important cumulative 
effects. For example, in response to a tax increase from 0.3 to 0.5, the income share of 
the top percentile would decrease from 15 percent to 14.2 percent in five periods (as-
suming they uphold consumption by decreasing savings). After ten periods it would 
be 13.5 percent and after 15 periods 12.6 percent. When combined with a shock to 
capital the numbers would be 12.3, 11.2, and 9.9 percent after 5, 10, and 15 periods 
respectively. As illustrated in Appendix B changing the consumption response or al-
tering the level of tax increase or capital shock does not alter the basic insight: Small 
short term effects – of the size that we find in our panel estimation – can be significant 
over time through their effect on capital accumulation.  
 
Finally, contrary to what is often asserted openness, i.e., the trade to GDP-ratio, is if 
anything negatively related to top income shares. As we include time fixed effects and 
                                                 
41 See e.g., Atkinson (2004) 
42 These simulations are very similar to those in Piketty (2001b).  22
thereby control for any general changes in globalization it is still possible that while 
“general globalization” increases income inequality country specific trade openness 
does not. However, the mechanism behind such a result would be quite difficult to 
spell out. 
6.2  Different effects depending on the level of economic development 
As discussed in section 2, the effect of several variables on top income shares could 
theoretically be expected to depend on the level of economic development. In this 
section, we analyze this possibility by splitting the sample into three similar sized 
groups based on per capita GDP. Thereafter we interact these groups with the respec-
tive variable of interest. Table 2 presents the results from this exercise.  
 
Overall, there is little evidence that the effect of GDP growth on top incomes depends 
on the level of development. The point estimates have the same signs and levels of 
significance in almost all cases and F-tests of equal coefficients across development 
groups are mostly not rejected. 
 
When it comes to the effect of financial development depending on the level of eco-
nomic development, however, a more interesting variation is observed. According to 
the basic idea of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), financial development should 
benefit the rich in early stages of development, but then spread to benefit everyone as 
the economy becomes more developed. Our results seem to be in line with this idea; 
the very richest among the top income earners benefit more from financial develop-
ment especially at low levels of development. Note that once again it seems to be 
primarily the rest of the top decile (P90-99) that loose out on this development.  
 
We also analyzed the effects on inequality coming from trade openness and central 
government spending over the level of economic development but could not find any 
observable differences and therefore suppress these results in our tables. 
6.3  Are Anglo-Saxon countries different? 
Based on the different developments from 1980 and onwards, it has been suggested 
that the evolution of top income shares in Anglo-Saxon countries differs from that of  23
continental Europe.
44 Empirically speaking, there are two possibilities: Anglo-Saxon 
countries may either have had a different development in the underlying determinants 
of top income shares, or the response of top incomes to the underlying determinants 
differs – for some reason – between the two groups of countries. In Table 3, we ad-
dress this issue by interacting a dummy variable indicating that a country is Anglo-
Saxon with the main variables of interest.
45 We can then directly answer the question 
if the slope coefficients differ between Anglo-Saxon and other countries.  
 
The results do not indicate any systematic distributional effects from either economic 
growth or trade openness that differ between the two country-groups. In a few cases 
the estimated coefficients are statistically significant, but they fail to provide a consis-
tent pattern.
46 Another possibility that has been discussed in the literature is that the 
different groups of countries differ in their acceptance of inequality.
47 One, admittedly 
quite weak, way to test this hypothesis is to analyze if government spending is rela-
tively pro-rich in Anglo-Saxon countries. When we interact government expenditures 
with the Anglo-Saxon indicator the interaction term is, however, not statistically sig-
nificant (suppressed in the table). We can therefore not see any indication that the dis-
tributional impact of government spending is different in the two country groups. 
 
6.4  Does type of financial system matter? 
Anglo-Saxon countries tend to have more stock market based financial systems, while 
most of continental Europe and the rest of the world have relatively more bank based 
financial systems (see, e.g., Boot and Thakor, 1997, Allen and Gale, 2000, and Le-
vine, 2005). Hence, if there are differences between these systems in terms of allocat-
ing capital and generate returns to savings that would give rise to differences in the 
relative size of capital income and hence the development of income inequality across 
Anglo-Saxon and other countries.
48  
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Atkinson and Piketty (2007). 
45 Anglo-Saxon countries are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US. 
46 See, e.g., the negative effects of openness and growth in anglo-saxon countries on both Bot90 and 
Top01/1 while at the same time Top1/10 in these countries is positively affected by openness. 
47 See, for example the discussion in Piketty and Saez (2005). 
48 As mentioned above, this difference is one of the main findings in the recent research on top in-
comes. Indeed, the title of the recent volume edited by Anthony Atkinson and Tomas Piketty, collect-
ing much of this work is Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast between European and 
English-Speaking Countries.   24
 
In Table 4, we analyze this issue explicitly by breaking up our combined measure of 
financial development, total capitalization, into its components. In odd-numbered col-
umns we use Bank deposits and in even-numbered columns we use Stock market capi-
talization to measure financial development. Besides their potentially differential ef-
fect on capital income shares, these alternatives are partly used due to a possibility of 
a rather mechanical relationship between the capital incomes of the rich and stock 
market capitalization. The main findings in Table 4 show, however, that there are no 
systematic differences in distributional influences across the two types of financial 
systems. While playing down both the role of a capital income differential and the 
possibility of a mechanical effect on income inequality, this result also complements 
to the previous section’s findings on fairly small differences between Anglo-Saxon 
and other countries in this context.  
6.5  Sample restrictions and robustness of the results  
In Table 5, we conduct a set of robustness tests, based on sample restrictions and al-
ternative measures used. The first restriction focuses on the post World War II-period, 
with all observations prior to 1945 dropped. The main reason for doing this is that the 
pre-war period includes the great depression era, during which the volatility of growth 
rates and changes in the income distribution were quite extreme. Further, top income 
shares declined rapidly during the Second World War, possibly for reasons unrelated 




The second restriction is to drop Japan from the sample. One reason behind this ex-
clusion is that we do not have data on the top decile for Japan and have replaced it 
with the top five percent, which affects most of our inequality metrics. Another reason 
is that Japan integrated with the world economy quite late compared to the other 
countries in the sample. It is therefore possible that the evolution of top incomes were 
affected by other factors than in other countries. However, excluding Japan does not 
change the main results.  
                                                 
50 The change in the umber of observations between the two samples is larger when using Bank depos-
its to measure financial development. The results are, however, similar using this measure.  25
 
Finally, our third restriction is to replace the main marginal tax rate measure, 
Margtax1, by the alternative Margtax2, which is based solely on statutory top rates. 
The correlation between the two series 0.80 (in first differences), which is fairly high. 
Table 5 also reports basically the same negative relation between marginal taxes and 
income inequality as were reported in Table 1 for all income groups but the bottom 
nine decile where the relation is positive. Yet the alternate measure, Margtax2, pro-
duces notably smaller coefficient sizes as well as somewhat lower degrees of statisti-
cal significance. Overall, however, as a robustness check the switch of measures do 
not alter the conclusions drawn from our main analysis.  
7  Conclusions  
This paper set out to empirically analyze the long-run relationships between top in-
come shares and financial development, trade openness, the size of government, and 
economic growth. While these relationships, of course, have been extensively studied 
before, the unique contribution of this paper lies in the long time period for which we 
have data. Combining findings from a number of recent studies on top incomes with 
other historical data, our results are based on developments over the whole of the 
twentieth century. Using a panel data approach allows us to take all unobservable 
time-invariant factors, as well as country specific trends into account. 
 
Two findings stand out as being significant and robust across all specifications. First, 
economic growth seems to have been pro-rich over the twentieth century. More pre-
cisely, in times when a country has grown faster than average, top income earners 
have benefited more than proportionally. A likely reason for this result is simply that, 
top incomes are (and have been) more closely related to actual performance than in-
comes on average. This result is similar at different levels of development and is not 
different between Anglo-Saxon and other countries. Second, we also find financial 
development to have been pro-rich over the twentieth century. This effect is also simi-
lar in Anglo-Saxon countries and elsewhere, it does not depend on whether financial 
development is proxied using bank deposits or stock market capitalization (often said 
to be a difference between Continental Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries), but it 
seems to depend on economic development. In line with the model in Greenwood and  26
Jovanovic (1990) we find that the effect is strongest at relatively low levels of eco-
nomic development. 
 
When it comes to the much debated distributional effects of trade openness we do not 
find any evidence of this being disproportionately beneficial for top income earners 
on average. If anything the relationship is negative in some specifications. However, 
here there is a difference across groups of countries. Increased trade is associated with 
increased top incomes in Anglo-Saxon countries; but not in continental Europe. The 
difference is large enough to explain a substantial part of the different development of 
top incomes in the two country groups since 1980. While we can only speculate about 
the causes behind these different responses to trade, it is possible that labor market 
institutions might play a role.
51  
 
Finally, when it comes to government spending and top marginal tax rates these seem 
to have been equalizing as increases in both these variables are associated with dis-
proportionate gains for the nine lowest deciles. Higher marginal tax rates have been 
negative for both the rich and the upper middle class, but interestingly government 
spending seems to have been neutral for the top percentile but negative for the next 
nine percentiles.  
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Table 1. The determinants of top income shares 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop10-1  Δtop10-1  Δbot90  Δbot90  Δtop1/10  Δtop1/10  Δtop01/1  Δtop01/1 
ΔGDPpc  5.766*** 6.416***  –8.783***  –6.902*** 5.563**  –1.301  0.284*** 0.358*** 0.232*** 0.257*** 
  (1.03) (1.34) (1.73) (2.61) (2.73) (3.53)  (0.052)  (0.062)  (0.053)  (0.060) 
ΔPop  –4.619  –12.98**  –0.567  –12.20  9.833  24.09**  –0.232 –0.660*** 0.0242  –0.368* 
  (5.03) (5.62) (6.31) (8.04) (11.5) (12.0) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) 
ΔGovspend 5.767  3.347  –16.28***  –23.40***  22.39***  23.96***  –0.101  0.116  –0.203  –0.252 
  (4.62) (4.66) (4.99) (7.11) (8.53) (8.89) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) 
ΔFindev  0.985***  1.270***  0.156  0.193  –0.530 –1.890***  0.0333***  0.0626*** 0.0189 0.0343*** 
  (0.32) (0.30) (0.33) (0.44) (0.62) (0.66)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
ΔOpenness  –8.833***  –2.459  –0.244  0.413 3.291 0.145  –0.00704  –0.0636  –0.0747  0.142 
  (2.26) (2.55) (2.42) (3.75) (4.40) (5.05)  (0.085)  (0.093)  (0.089)  (0.11) 
ΔMargtax1   –4.344***    –3.223**    10.22***   –0.146***  –0.304*** 
   (1.21)  (1.56)  (2.21)   (0.045)    (0.050) 
Obs  126  92 99 77 99 77  109  87  126  92 
N  countries  14 12 12 10 12 10 13 11 14 12 
Notes: FDGLS estimations allowing for country specific AR(1) processes and heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.   33
Table 2. The effects at different levels of economic development 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop10-1  Δtop10-1  Δbot90  Δbot90  Δtop1/10  Δtop1/10  Δtop01/1  Δtop01/1 
ΔGDPpc   5.392***   –8.515***    4.921*   0.258***  0.171*** 
   (1.06)  (1.71)  (2.80)   (0.051)    (0.049) 
ΔPop  –4.902 –5.859 –2.784  4.157  9.842  5.087  –0.255  –0.553**  0.0668  –0.0545 
  (5.03) (5.18) (6.64) (6.44) (12.0) (11.9) (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) 
ΔGovspend  3.381  5.752  –17.79***  –18.87***  23.87***  23.37***  –0.185 0.0143 –0.162 –0.289 
  (4.72) (4.65) (5.39) (4.83) (9.15) (8.56) (0.18) (0.17) (0.21) (0.19) 
ΔFindev  1.051***    0.204    –0.553   0.0350***   0.0163   
  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.63)   (0.012)    (0.013)   
ΔOpenness  –9.147***  –8.494***  –0.344 –0.783  3.795  3.964 –0.0115  0.0426  –0.0595  –0.0302 
  (2.26) (2.26) (2.45) (2.31) (4.44) (4.42)  (0.084)  (0.086)  (0.091)  (0.087) 
ΔGDPpc×Lowdev  5.037***   –9.016***    4.560   0.321***  0.231***  
  (1.13)  (2.08)  (3.27)   (0.056)    (0.056)   
ΔGDPpc×Meddev  6.373***   –7.319***    5.980   0.236***  0.216***  
  (1.50)  (2.40)  (3.98)   (0.067)    (0.072)   
ΔGDPpc×Highdev  2.449    –9.773***   8.332*  0.143*   0.279***   
  (2.26)  (2.69)  (4.43)   (0.084)   (0.10)  
ΔFindev×Lowdev    1.672*   –3.274**   2.084   0.161***  0.141*** 
   (0.94)  (1.37)  (2.06)   (0.036)    (0.037) 
ΔFindev×Meddev   0.878*   0.329   –1.015   0.0263*   0.0123 
   (0.52)  (0.63)  (0.99)   (0.015)    (0.018) 
ΔFindev×Highdev   0.864*   0.379   –0.868   0.00791    0.00219 
   (0.44)  (0.37)  (0.79)   (0.016)    (0.017) 
F-test: Low=Med
a  0.31 0.45 0.52 0.02 0.74 0.18 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 
F-test: Low=High
a  0.25 0.42 0.80 0.01 0.45 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.62 0.00 
F-test: Med=High
a  0.07 0.98 0.34 0.94 0.59 0.90 0.22 0.36 0.50 0.67 
Obs  126 126  99  99  99  99  109 109 126 126 
N  countries  14 14 12 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 
Notes: Interactions between low, medium and high GDP per capita and ΔGDPpc and ΔFindev. See also the notes of Table 1. 
a P-value of an F-test of equality of coefficients.   34
Table 3: Are Anglo-Saxon countries different? 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop10-1  Δtop10-1  Δbot90  Δbot90  Δtop1/10  Δtop1/10  Δtop01/1  Δtop01/1 
ΔGDPpc  5.616*** 5.496***  –9.442***  –9.212*** 7.532**  6.808**  0.259*** 0.281*** 0.304*** 0.236*** 
  (1.13) (1.04) (1.98) (1.73) (3.03) (2.71)  (0.058)  (0.051)  (0.057)  (0.054) 
ΔPop  –4.786 –4.421 –0.291  1.789  8.245  0.555  –0.283 –0.100  –0.00320  0.0534 
  (5.06) (4.94) (6.29) (6.42) (11.3) (11.3) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
ΔGovspend  5.866  5.645  –15.61***  –16.78***  20.40** 23.91*** –0.0819  –0.0357  –0.276  –0.247 
  (4.63) (4.61) (4.91) (5.00) (8.32) (8.38) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) 
ΔFindev 0.996***  0.983***  0.176  0.183  –0.592  –0.435  0.0343***  0.0324***  0.0183  0.0177 
  (0.32) (0.31) (0.33) (0.33) (0.63) (0.62)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
ΔOpenness  –8.836***  –9.906*** 0.412  –1.509  1.114  6.109  0.00701 –0.0621 –0.0541  0.145 
  (2.26) (2.42) (2.69) (2.50) (4.57) (4.33)  (0.087)  (0.092)  (0.089)  (0.11) 
ΔGDPpc×Anglo-Saxon  0.421  1.954   –6.617*    0.0504    –0.197***   
  (1.59)  (2.27)  (3.52)   (0.067)    (0.066)   
ΔOpenness×Anglo-Saxon   3.084  5.965   –16.49***    0.265**    –0.292*** 
   (2.56)  (3.98)  (6.18)  (0.11)   (0.099) 
Obs  126 126  99  99  99  99  109 109 126 126 
N  countries  14 14 12 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 
Notes: Interacting a dummy for Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.K. and U.S.) and ΔGDPpc and ΔOpenness. See also the notes of Table 1. 
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Table 4. Does type of financial system matter? 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop10-1  Δtop10-1  Δbot90  Δbot90  Δtop1/10  Δtop1/10  Δtop01/1  Δtop01/1 
ΔGDPpc  4.617*** 5.585***  –9.205***  –8.606***  6.155***  5.577**  0.184*** 0.275*** 0.155*** 0.229*** 
  (0.96) (1.12) (1.35) (1.73) (2.04) (2.73)  (0.040)  (0.054)  (0.042)  (0.054) 
ΔPop  0.998 –4.880 3.361 –1.071  –6.925 9.532  0.106 –0.203  –0.0162  0.0674 
  (3.45) (5.27) (5.07) (6.32) (7.42) (11.6) (0.11) (0.22) (0.14) (0.22) 
ΔGovspend  2.931  4.426 –15.43***  –16.01***  19.30**  23.26*** –0.207  –0.135 –0.472** –0.240 
  (4.58) (4.78) (5.20) (5.03) (7.59) (8.56) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) 
ΔOpenness  –1.965 –8.334*** –0.355  –0.325  2.366  3.043  –0.0660  0.0174  –0.0687  –0.0661 
  (1.34) (2.33) (1.67) (2.42) (2.60) (4.39)  (0.048)  (0.086)  (0.045)  (0.089) 
ΔBankdeposits  3.006***   0.296   –3.391**   0.0982***   0.119***  
  (0.80)    (0.89)    (1.37)   (0.028)  (0.031)  
ΔMarketcap    0.876**    0.329    –0.693   0.0276**   0.0101 
   (0.38)  (0.39)  (0.71)   (0.013)    (0.014) 
Obs  168 128 129 101 129 101 140 109 167 128 
N  countries  16 15 13 13 13 13 14 13 16 15 
Note: Splitting up Findev into the GDP shares of total bank deposits (Bankdeposits) and stock market capitalization (Marketcap). See also the 
notes of Table 1.   36
Table 5. Sample restrictions and alternative measures 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12) (13)  (14)  (15) 
  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop10-1  Δtop10-1  Δtop10-1 Δbot90 Δbot90  Δbot90  Δtop1/10 Δtop1/10 Δtop1/10 Δtop01/1 Δtop01/1  Δtop01/1 
ΔGDPpc 5.159*** 6.858***  6.372*** –7.031*** –8.783*** –9.981*** 4.462*  5.563**  6.691**  0.265*** 0.402*** 0.329*** 0.263*** 0.327***  0.186*** 
  (1.02)  (1.12)  (1.31)  (1.84)  (1.73)  (1.95)  (2.55) (2.73)  (2.78)  (0.057) (0.060) (0.052) (0.052) (0.061) (0.060) 
ΔPop  –7.645 –9.627  –4.456  –5.368  –0.567 –12.42*  6.978 9.833  32.10*** –0.309 –0.135  –0.578** –0.0936  –0.363  0.166 
  (5.09) (5.96)  (5.24)  (6.52)  (6.31)  (6.94)  (11.1)  (11.5)  (11.2) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) 
ΔGovspend –1.494  3.476 13.41*** –17.04*** –16.28*** –17.02***31.57***22.39*** 17.11**  –0.194  0.0447  0.134  –0.667*** –0.336  0.0317 
  (4.23) (5.07)  (4.98)  (4.98)  (4.99)  (6.40)  (8.14)  (8.53)  (8.66) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.22) 
ΔFindev 0.627** 0.918***  1.250*** 0.363 0.156  –0.00766 –0.720  –0.530  –1.294*  0.0348***0.0369***0.0554*** 0.0180*  0.0243*  0.0213 
  (0.28)  (0.35)  (0.32)  (0.31)  (0.33)  (0.42)  (0.58) (0.62)  (0.67)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
ΔOpenness  –0.780  –9.382***  –8.350*** –0.00979  –0.244  0.767  –0.0103 3.291  1.048  0.00474 –0.0160 –0.0457  0.0727  –0.100  –0.0606 
  (2.34)  (2.35)  (2.53)  (2.57)  (2.42)  (3.19)  (4.26) (4.40)  (4.57)  (0.090) (0.091) (0.092) (0.096) (0.090) (0.097) 
ΔMargtax2     –2.232**     –3.464***     6.589***     –0.0506      –0.135*** 
      (1.00)      (1.14)    (1.71)     (0.036)    (0.046) 
Restriction Postwar ~Japan  Margtax2 Postwar  ~Japan Margtax2 Postwar ~Japan  Margtax2 Postwar ~Japan Margtax2 Postwar ~Japan  Margtax2 
Obs 112  114  103  93  99  82  93  99  82  103  99  92  112  114  103 
N  countries  14 13  12  12  12  10  12  12  10 13 12 11 14 13 12 
Note: Postwar = sample is 1945 onwards, ~Japan = Japan excluded from sample and Margtax2 = Margtax2 replaces Margtax1. See also the notes of Table 1.  37
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Figure 2: Variables included in the regression analysis, all countries, 1900–2000. 
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Appendix A: Definitions and sources 
Table A1: Variable definition 
 
Variable Variable  definition  Source 
Top1  Share of total income earned by those with the 
1% highest incomes (P99–100). 
See Table A2. 
Top10–1  Income share of top 10% less share of top 1% 
(P90–99). 
See Table A2. 
Bot90  Income share of bottom nine deciles of the 
entire income distribution (P0–90). 
See Table A2. 
Top1/10  Top1/Top10–1 (P99–100/P90–99).  See Table A2. 
Top01/1  Income share of top 0.1% divided by income 
share earned by the rest of top 1% (P99.9–
100/P99–99.9). 
See Table A2. 
Findev  Financial development: Total capitalization as 
the sum of Bankdeposits and Marketcap. 
-1950: Mitchell, RZ, Bordo; 
1950-: IFS, FSD, RZ. 
Bankdeposits  Bank deposits: Share of commercial and sav-
ings bank deposits in GDP. 
-1950: Mitchell, Bordo; 
1950-: IFS, FSD. 
Marketcap  Stock market capitalization: Market value of 
publicly listed stocks divided by GDP. 
-1975: RZ;  
1975-: IFS, FSD. 
Openness  Trade openness: Imports plus exports divided 
by GDP. 
-1950: Mitchell, LM, Bordo; 
1950-: IFS, FSD. 
Govspend  Central government expenditure divided by 
GDP. 
-1950: Mitchell, RS, Bordo; 
1950-: IFS, FSD. 
Margtax1  Top marginal tax rate: Margtax2 except for 
Germany, Japan, Sweden, UK and US where 
it is calculated for incomes ≈ 5×GDPpc. 
Table A2, OECD, BCS, RW 
and RSS. 
Margtax2  Top marginal tax rate (statutory top rates)  Table A2, OECD 
GDPpc  GDP per capita  Maddison (2006) 
Pop Population  Maddison  (2006) 
Note: BCS = Bach, Corneo and Steiner (2005); Bordo = Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-
Peria (2001); FSD = Financial Structure Database; IFS = International Financial Statistics; LM = 
López-Córdoba and Meissner (2005); Mitchell = Mitchell (1995, 1998a, 1998b); OECD = OECDE 
world tax database; RS = Rousseau and Sylla (2003); RSS = Rydqvist, Spizman and Strebulaev (2007); 
RW = Roine and Waldenström (2006), RZ = Rajan and Zingales (2003). 
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Table A2: Income inequality data* 
 
No. of 5-year periods in... 
Country  Source  Full sample period 
Top10_1 Top1 Top10_01
Argentina
  Alvaredo (2006)  1932-73
a,1997-2004 0  9  0 
Australia  Atkinson and Leigh (2007a)  1921-2002  13  17  13 
Canada  Saez and Veall (2005)  1920-2001  13  17  13 
Finland  Riiehlä et al. (2005)  1966-85
a,1990-2002 8  8  7 
France Piketty  (2003)  1915-1998  18  18  18 
Germany Dell  (2007)  1925-38,1944-98  13  13  13 
India
  Banerjee and Piketty (2005)  1922-1999  0 16  0 
Ireland Nolan  (2007)  1938,-43,-65,1973-2000 8  8  8 
Japan  Moriguchi and Saez (2007)  1886-2002  17
b  21 17
b 
Netherlands  Atkinson and Salverda (2005)  1914-1999  17  17  17 
New Zealand  Atkinson and Leigh (2007b)  1921-2002  17  17  17 
Spain Alvaredo  and  Saez  (2006) 1981-2002  5  5  5 
Sweden  Roine and Waldenström (2007) 1903-35
a,1941-2004 20  20  20 
Switzerland  Dell et al. (2007)  1933-1996  14  14  14 
United Kingdom  Atkinson and Salverda (2005)  1908-1999  14  14  14 
United States  Piketty and Saez (2003)  1913-2002  18  19  18 
a There are years with missing values in this subperiod 
b The shares-within-shares data for Japan is based on the top five percent (P95–100).  
* Due to data limitations for some of the variables, the actual country coverage for the main specifica-
tions is shown in Table A3. 
 
 
Table A3. Actual country sample for main regressions 
  Top10_1  Top 1  Top 10_1 (w/ taxes)
b 
 DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS 
Argentina
a     X
  X
    
Australia  X X X X X X 
Canada  X X X X X X 
Finland  X X X X X X 
France  X X X X X X 
Germany  X X X X X X 
India     X  X    
Ireland  X  X      
Japan  X X X X X X 
Netherlands X  X  X  X    
New  Zealand  X X X X X X 
Spain  X X X X X X 
Sweden  X X X X X X 
Switzerland X  X  X  X    
UK  X X X X X X 
US  X X X X X X 
a Argentina is included in the non-reported regressions using Top 1 as the dependent variable and Bank 
deposits as the measure of financial development. 
b Sample of countries for which top marginal taxes data are also available.  41
 
Appendix B: Simulations of dynamic effects of taxation and shocks to capital 
 
The tables below show the cumulative effects on top incomes from increases in taxa-
tion and shocks to the capital stock under very stylized assumptions. In all cases we 
assume that there are two groups of income earners; a top group that derives half their 
income from capital (the rate of return is assumed to be 5 percent) and the other half 
from wages, while the rest only have a wage income. Initially the income share of the 
top group is 15 percent of all income and their consumption is such that their capital 
stock remains unchanged. These assumptions are of course not calibrated to fit a par-
ticular economy but they are at the same time approximate representations of the rela-
tionship between the top percentile and the rest of the population, both in terms of the 
importance of capital (with a broad interpretation) and the income share around World 
War II. 
 
Gross wage income is assumed to be unchanged when taxes change implying that the 
(gross) income remains the same over time but they are forced to alter consumption in 
accordance with tax increases (alternatively one could think of this as a case where 
their effective consumption can be maintained through taxes being redistributed back 
to them). The rich group, however, can consume part of their capital stock so as to 
maintain their consumption level. This of course erodes their capital stock, giving rise 
to a decreasing capital income share, and also a lower top income share overall. 
 
Table A4 shows the effects of a tax increase from 0.3 to 0.5 in period 0 (columns 1-3), 
the effects of a shock to the capital stock causing 30 percent of it to disappear in pe-
riod 0 (columns 4-6) and finally the combined effect of these changes given that the 
rich group does not alter consumption. With respect to the effects of taxation it illus-
trates that a one time change can have a small effect in the short run but through its 
cumulative effect can be important over time. The effect on the top income share from 
one period to the next is only 0.13 percentage points, but over 5 periods it has grown 




Cumulative effect of one time changes affecting capital accumulation and capital income (percent 
changes) 
                             
   Tax increase only  Shock to the capital stock only   Combined tax increase and shock 
to the capital stock 





























0  100.0 50.0 15.00  100.0 50.0 15.00 100.0 50.0 15.00 
1  98.0 49.5  14.87  70.0 41.2 13.04 70.0  41.2 13.04 
2  96.0 49.0  14.74  69.0 40.8 12.97 67.3  40.2 12.86 
3  93.8 48.4  14.61  67.9 40.4 12.90 64.4  39.2 12.67 
4  91.7 47.8  14.47  66.7 40.0 12.83 61.5  38.1 12.48 
5  89.5 47.2  14.32  65.6 39.6 12.75 58.6  36.9 12.27 
6  87.2 46.6  14.18  64.4 39.2 12.67 55.5  35.7 12.07 
7  84.9 45.9  14.03  63.1 38.7 12.58 52.4  34.4 11.86 
8  82.5 45.2  13.87  61.8 38.2 12.50 49.2  33.0 11.64 
9  80.1 44.5  13.71  60.5 37.7 12.40 46.0  31.5 11.41 
10  77.6 43.7  13.55  59.1 37.2 12.31 42.6  29.9 11.18 
11  75.0 42.9  13.38  57.7 36.6 12.21 39.2  28.2 10.94 
12  72.4 42.0  13.20  56.2 36.0 12.11 35.7  26.3 10.69 
13  69.7 41.1  13.02  54.7 35.3 12.01 32.1  24.3 10.44 
14  67.0 40.1  12.84  53.1 34.7 11.90 28.4  22.1 10.17 
15  64.1 39.1  12.65  51.4 34.0 11.79 24.6  19.7  9.90 
16  61.2 38.0  12.46  49.7 33.2 11.67 20.7  17.1  9.62 
17  58.3 36.8  12.25  48.0 32.4 11.55 16.7  14.3  9.34 
18  55.2 35.6  12.05  46.2 31.6 11.42 12.6  11.2  9.04 
19  52.1 34.3  11.83  44.3 30.7 11.29  8.4  7.8  8.73 
20  48.9 32.8  11.61  42.3 29.7 11.16  4.1  4.0  8.42 
21  45.6 31.3  11.39  40.3 28.7  11.02  0  0  8.11 
22  42.3 29.7  11.15  38.2 27.7  10.87  0  0  8.11 
23  38.8 28.0  10.91  36.1 26.5  10.72  0  0  8.11 
24  35.3 26.1  10.67  33.8 25.3  10.56  0  0  8.11 
25  31.7 24.1  10.41  31.5 24.0  10.40  0  0  8.11 
In period 0 there is a one time change which has cummulative effects. Columns (1)-(3) show the effects of a tax increase 
from 30 to 50 percent, columns (4)-(6) the effects of a shock to the capital stock such that it decreases to 70 percent of it's 
initial value, and columns (7)-(9) show the effects of these two changes in combination.  
 
 
Table A5 shows the results of the same exercise but changing the increases in taxation 
up and down and also changing the size of the capital shock, as well as when con-
sumption is changed. The results are intuitively clear: higher tax increases cause the 
capital to shrink faster as does larger shocks to capital under the assumption that con-
sumption is to remain unchanged and decreasing consumption can lead to a recovery  43
of the capital stock. Again what is important to note is the potential cumulative effect 
of taxation when interpreting our coefficients.  
 
Cumulative effects of different changes to taxes and the capital stock (percent changes) 
               
   Tax increase  Shock to the capital stock  Combined tax increase and 
shock to the capital stock 
   (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) 


























0 100.0  50.0  15.00  100.0  50.0 15.00 100.0  50.0 15.00 
                          
   Tax increase from 0.3 to 0.4  Capital shock, 90  remaining   Combined effect 
5 95.8  48.9  14.73  88.5  47.0 14.26  84.6  45.8 14.00 
10 89.8  47.3  14.35  86.4  46.3 14.12  76.8  43.4 13.49 
15 82.9  45.3  13.90  83.8  45.6 13.96  67.8  40.4 12.90 
20 74.9  42.8  13.37  80.8  44.7 13.76  57.3  36.4 12.19 
25 67.5  40.3  12.88  77.9  43.8 13.57  47.8  32.3 11.54 
                          
   Tax increase from 0.3 to 0.6  Capital shock, 50  remaining   Combined effect 
5 87.6  46.7  14.20  42.6  29.9 11.18  33.5  25.1 10.54 
10 70.7  41.4  13.09  31.9  24.2 10.42  11.0  9.9  8.92 
15 52.1  34.2  11.83  19.1  16.0  9.51  0  0  8.11 
20 31.5  23.9  10.40  3.9  3.7  8.40  0  0  8.11 
25  8.7  8.0  8.75  0 0  8.11  0 0  8.11 
                     
   Changing consumption to 0.9 of previous level 
   Tax increase from 0.3 to 0.5  Capital shock, 70  remaining   Combined effect 
5 96.5  49.1  14.78  70.5  41.3 13.08  63.4  38.8 12.60 
10 92.6  48.1  14.52  72.1  41.9 13.18  55.1  35.5 12.04 
15 88.1  46.8  14.23  74.0  42.5 13.31  45.7  31.4 11.39 
20 83.0  45.3  13.90  76.2  43.2 13.46  35.0  25.9 10.64 
25 77.2  43.6  13.52  78.9  44.1 13.63  23.0  18.7  9.79 
                   
   Changing consumption to 0.7 of previous level 
   Tax increase from 0.3 to 0.5  Capital shock, 70  remaining   Combined effect 
5  79.0 44.1  13.64  71.8 41.8  13.16 
10 
Consumption decrease exceeds tax 
increase    94.2 48.5  14.63  76.4 43.3  13.47 
15  Capital stock grows      Capital stock recovered  81.5  44.9  13.81 
20                  87.3  46.6  14.19 
25                    93.9  48.4  14.61   44
Appendix C: Results using Dynamic First Differences (DFD)  
Table C1. The determinants of top income shares 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop10-1  Δtop10-1  Δbot90  Δbot90  Δtop1/10  Δtop1/10  Δtop01/1  Δtop01/1 
ΔGDPpc  6.026*** 6.921***  –10.44*** –8.084*  4.599  1.767  0.293*** 0.355***  0.208  0.336** 
  (1.85) (1.83) (3.03) (4.79) (3.75) (5.46)  (0.098)  (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) 
ΔPop  –14.15 –16.75* –8.161  –11.36  25.17  35.59**  –0.681*  –0.900** 0.107  –0.329 
  (8.99) (8.81) (9.18) (9.49) (15.6) (14.2) (0.35) (0.36) (0.30) (0.31) 
ΔGovspend 5.290  9.779  –20.46***  –22.71**  28.91***  24.43*  0.0257 0.241 –0.139 0.140 
  (7.63) (7.72) (7.29) (9.45) (9.69) (12.9) (0.27) (0.34) (0.40) (0.51) 
ΔFindev  1.045*  1.354***  0.0314 0.0581 –1.126  –1.643**  0.0447**  0.0715***  0.00924  0.00396 
  (0.56) (0.42) (0.41) (0.45) (0.69) (0.64)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.017) 
ΔOpenness –7.187 –0.431  0.703  4.092  –0.949 –3.967 0.0414  –0.0501  –0.0000176  0.246 
  (4.57) (3.00) (3.73) (5.49) (5.35) (7.26) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.16) 
ΔMargtax1    –5.615***   –4.991*   11.37***   –0.136    –0.299*** 
   (1.72)  (2.75)  (3.94)   (0.083)    (0.096) 
Δ2top1  –0.0262  –0.0198          
  (0.12)  (0.18)          
Δ2top10-1     0.206  0.237        
     (0.13)  (0.15)        
Δ2bot90      0.203*  0.284**      
       ( 0 . 1 1 )   ( 0 . 1 1 )       
Δ2top1/10         0.0616  –0.00757    
         (0.14)  (0.21)    
Δ2top01/1           0.164  0.0879 
           ( 0 . 1 3 )   ( 0 . 1 8 )  
Obs  123 91  96  76  96  76 106 86 123 91 
R–squared 0.54 0.68 0.53 0.49 0.58 0.67 0.71 0.64 0.59 0.62 
Notes: DFD estimations which allow for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   45
Table C2. The effects at different levels of economic development 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop10-1  Δtop10-1  Δbot90  Δbot90  Δtop1/10  Δtop1/10  Δtop01/1  Δtop01/1 
ΔGDPpc   5.970***   –10.83***    5.056   0.276***   0.187 
   (1.92)  (3.01)  (3.77)   (0.090)   (0.13) 
ΔPop  –14.82  –15.78*  –7.894 –3.040  23.85  24.32 –0.665*  –0.948**  0.100  –0.152 
  (9.08) (8.89) (9.20) (11.4) (15.7) (17.7) (0.37) (0.37) (0.30) (0.29) 
ΔGovspend 3.166  5.597  –21.10***  –21.95***  30.99***  29.42***  –0.0418  0.184  –0.167  –0.0878 
  (7.85) (7.76) (7.77) (7.51) (10.1) (10.4) (0.30) (0.27) (0.38) (0.39) 
ΔFindev  1.094*  0.0507  –1.178   0.0466**   0.0102  
  (0.59)  (0.42)  (0.72)   (0.020)    (0.019)   
ΔOpenness  –7.632 –7.260  0.833  0.442  –1.635 –0.934 0.0284 0.0947  –0.00380  –0.000574 
  (4.61) (4.66) (3.89) (3.77) (5.50) (5.54) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) 
ΔGDPpc×Lowdev  5.838***  –9.625**   1.466    0.329**    0.221   
  (1.86)  (3.71)  (4.73)  (0.12)  (0.16)  
ΔGDPpc×Meddev  6.886***   –10.72***    6.391   0.271***   0.167   
  (2.30)  (3.43)  (4.31)   (0.096)   (0.12)  
ΔGDPpc×Highdev  4.087   –11.93***    9.871*   0.162  0.135  
  (3.52)  (4.05)  (5.81)  (0.14)  (0.13)  
ΔFindev×Lowdev    1.747   –1.970  –0.678   0.211***    0.116** 
   (1.39)  (2.13)  (3.00)   (0.056)    (0.058) 
ΔFindev×Meddev    1.286**   –0.215  –0.776   0.0301*   0.0110 
   (0.54)  (0.59)  (0.82)   (0.018)    (0.020) 
ΔFindev×Highdev    0.739  0.706   –1.560    0.0300    –0.0103 
   (0.75)  (0.51)  (0.99)   (0.024)    (0.036) 
Δ2top1  –0.0189  –0.0174          
  (0.12)  (0.12)          
Δ2top10-1     0.217  0.207        
     (0.15)  (0.13)          46
Δ2bot90       0.236**  0.199*      
       (0.11)  (0.11)      
Δ2top1/10         0.0509  0.0592    
         (0.16)  (0.12)    
Δ2top01/1           0.158  0.162 
           (0.14)  (0.12) 
F-test: Low=Med
a 0.56 0.74 0.73 0.45 0.17 0.97 0.67 0.00 0.60 0.06 
F-test: Low=High
a  0.64 0.48 0.60 0.23 0.20 0.77 0.24 0.00 0.60 0.10 
F-test: Med=High
a  0.40 0.49 0.70 0.21 0.50 0.51 0.29 0.99 0.79 0.61 
Obs  123 123  96  96  96  96  106 106 123 123 
R–squared  0.55 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.71 0.74 0.59 0.60 
Notes: Interactions between low, medium and high GDP per capita and ΔGDPpc and ΔFindev. See also the notes of Table 1. 
a P-value from an F-test of equality of coeffi-
cients. 
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Table C3: Are Anglo–Saxon countries different? 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8)  (10)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop10-1  Δtop10-1  Δbot90  Δbot90  Δtop1/10  Δtop1/10  Δtop01/1  Δtop01/1 
ΔGDPpc  6.172***  5.925***  –9.727***  –10.74***  3.336 6.024  0.279**  0.262***  0.231 0.227 
  (1.85) (1.82) (3.52) (3.15) (4.51) (3.89) (0.12)  (0.094)  (0.17) (0.15) 
ΔPop  –14.10 –13.86 –8.433 –7.176  25.48  20.80 –0.681*  –0.583* 0.121  0.0572 
  (9.19) (8.70) (9.26) (9.75) (15.7) (16.3) (0.35) (0.34) (0.31) (0.31) 
ΔGovspend  4.994  5.417 –21.16***  –20.74***  30.34***  30.37*** 0.0321  –0.0273  –0.170  –0.159 
  (6.94) (7.46) (7.38) (7.28) (10.3) (9.72) (0.27) (0.26) (0.36) (0.37) 
ΔFindev  1.032* 1.044* 0.0228 0.0193 –1.103 –1.071  0.0451**  0.0420**  0.00785  0.00950 
  (0.56) (0.56) (0.40) (0.41) (0.67) (0.69)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
ΔOpenness  –7.178 –7.707  –0.0267 0.204  0.212  1.311  0.0621  –0.0401  0.00139  0.0948 
  (4.60) (4.89) (4.14) (3.88) (5.75) (5.27) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.19) 
ΔGDPpc×  Anglo-Saxon  –0.580  –2.000   3.148   0.0519   –0.0857   
  (3.99)  (3.37)  (4.56)  (0.12)  (0.13)  
ΔOpenness×Anglo-Saxon    1.116    2.179   –9.919*  0.317**   –0.203 
   (6.23)  (4.62)  (5.66)  (0.15)  (0.20) 
Δ2top1  –0.0311  –0.0253          
  (0.12)  (0.12)          
Δ2top10-1     0.217  0.210        
     (0.14)  (0.14)        
Δ2bot90       0.198*  0.218*      
       (0.11)  (0.11)      
Δ2top1/10         0.0819  0.0740    
         (0.18)  (0.14)    
Δ2top01/1           0.139  0.157 
           ( 0 . 1 5 )   ( 0 . 1 3 )  
Obs  123 123  96  96  96  96  106 106 123 123 
R–squared  0.55 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.59 0.59 0.71 0.72 0.59 0.59 
Notes: Interacting a dummy for Anglo–Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.K. and U.S.) and ΔGDPpc and ΔOpenness. See also the notes of Table 1.   48
Table C4. Does type of financial system matter? 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop10-1  Δtop10-1  Δbot90  Δbot90  Δtop1/10  Δtop1/10  Δtop01/1  Δtop01/1 
ΔGDPpc 4.124**  6.024***  –8.106***  –10.50***  4.576  4.283  0.242***  0.303***  0.154  0.202 
  (1.80) (1.86) (2.86) (3.07) (4.36) (3.77)  (0.080)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) 
ΔPop  –1.716 –14.44 –5.544 –8.569  5.301  25.08  0.0886 –0.634  0.273  0.140 
  (7.25) (9.29) (6.48) (9.32) (9.92) (16.7) (0.22) (0.38) (0.22) (0.31) 
ΔGovspend –1.513  6.288  –21.82***  –21.09***  33.26***  28.17***  –0.116 0.0215 –0.203 –0.133 
  (6.64) (7.71) (7.42) (7.41) (10.7) (9.70) (0.27) (0.27) (0.37) (0.40) 
ΔOpenness  –3.759 –5.113 –2.166 –0.456 6.835*  –0.907 –0.130** 0.0665 –0.00499 0.0655 
  (2.35) (3.80) (2.05) (2.42) (3.48) (3.54)  (0.065)  (0.082)  (0.069)  (0.10) 
Dbankdeposits  2.506    1.813   –5.155*  0.132**   0.0537   
  (1.61)  (1.45)  (2.64)   (0.051)    (0.048)   
Dsmcap   1.018*  –0.132  –0.768   0.0307*    0.00180 
   (0.54)  (0.45)  (0.63)   (0.017)    (0.021) 
Δ2top1 0.0201  –0.0416          
  (0.076)  (0.12)          
Δ2top10-1     0.148  0.200        
     (0.11)  (0.13)        
Δ2bot90       0.172*  0.190*      
       (0.099)  (0.11)      
Δ2top1/10         0.0263  0.0620    
         (0.13)  (0.14)    
Δ2top01/1           –0.00582  0.159 
           ( 0 . 1 1 )   ( 0 . 1 3 )  
Obs  153  125  120 98 120 98 130  108  152  125 
R–squared  0.52 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.63 0.69 0.57 0.58 
Note: Splitting up Findev into the GDP shares of total bank deposits (Bankdeposits) and stock market capitalization (Marketcap). See also the notes of Table 1.   49
Table C5. Sample restrictions and alternative measures 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop1  Δtop10-1 Δtop10-1 Δtop10-1 Δbot90  Δbot90  Δbot90  Δtop1/10 Δtop1/10 Δtop1/10 Δtop01/1 Δtop01/1 Δtop01/1 
ΔGDPpc 5.240***6.924***  6.753*** –9.287*** –10.44*** –9.748** 2.506  4.599  4.454  0.294** 0.456*** 0.328*** 0.238 0.240  0.265* 
  (1.83) (2.48) (1.59)  (3.39)  (3.03)  (4.06) (4.18) (3.75) (4.48) (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.17) (0.18) (0.14) 
ΔPop  –13.28  –24.32**  –5.679 –7.215 –8.161 –8.559 23.50 25.17 30.13*  –0.683* –0.559  –0.825** –0.143  –0.252 0.141 
  (8.65) (10.9) (8.18)  (8.95)  (9.18)  (10.4) (15.2) (15.6) (16.8) (0.35)  (0.41)  (0.37)  (0.32) (0.34) (0.35) 
ΔGovspend 2.334 3.099  15.96**  –20.36*** –20.46*** –17.77*  28.91*** 28.91***  17.79 0.0161 0.0303  0.260 –0.334  –0.146 0.386 
  (6.47) (8.78) (7.56)  (7.25)  (7.29)  (9.17) (9.90) (9.69) (12.2) (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.36)  (0.39) (0.43) (0.50) 
ΔFindev 0.741  1.009*  1.589*** 0.0431  0.0314  –0.0900  –1.149* –1.126  –1.346* 0.0450** 0.0463** 0.0672*** 0.00446  0.00767  0.00599 
 (0.47)  (0.55)  (0.56)  (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.48)  (0.68)  (0.69)  (0.75)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.019) 
ΔOpenness 2.033  –9.025*  –8.478 1.557  0.703  4.378 –2.148  –0.949  –4.938  0.0322  0.0592  –0.00328 0.155  –0.0539  –0.0108 
  (3.08) (4.67) (5.19)  (3.82)  (3.73)  (5.69) (5.58) (5.35) (7.60) (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
ΔMargtax     –2.920*      –4.916***     8.960***     –0.0605      –0.181** 
     (1.47)      (1.76)    (2.71)     (0.086)    (0.076) 
Δ2top1  –0.0331 –0.0120  –0.0922                   
  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.11)                   
Δ2top10-1      0.190  0.206  0.240*              
      (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)              
Δ2bot90            0.176  0.203*  0.322***         
             (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)             
Δ2top1/10                   0.0539  0.123  0.0352       
                   (0.18)  (0.14)  (0.17)       
Δ2top01/1                    0.134  0.214*  0.143 
                    (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.15) 
Restriction Postwar ~Japan  Margtax2 Postwar ~Japan Margtax2 Postwar ~Japan  Margtax2 Postwar ~Japan Margtax2 Postwar ~Japan  Margtax2 
Obs 111  111  101  92  96  80  92  96  80  102  96  90  111  111  101 
R–squared 0.63  0.58 0.62  0.43  0.53  0.59 0.59 0.58 0.65 0.63  0.75  0.72 0.61 0.62 0.57 
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In this paper we examine the impact of public spending, education, and institutions on 
income distribution in advanced economies. We also assess the efficiency of public 
spending in redistributing income by using a DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) non-
parametric approach. We find that public policies significantly affect income distribution, 
notably via social spending, and indirectly via high quality education/human capital and 
via sound economic institutions. Moreover, for our set of OECD countries, and within a 
two-step approach, several so-called non-discretionary factors help explaining public 
social spending inefficiencies. 
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Non-technical summary 
 
Income distribution and the role of the market, the public sector and globalisation have 
gained increasing attention in recent years. In this paper we examine the impact of public 
spending, education, and institutions on income distribution in advanced economies from 
a cross-country perspective. This is, to our knowledge, an important and remarkable gap 
in the literature.  
 
This study examines empirically the role and efficiency of public spending policies in 
affecting income distribution from a cross-country perspective. The study first discusses 
conceptually the determinants of income equality: initial conditions and public policies 
affect income distribution directly (via the effect of taxes and spending) or indirectly (via 
the effect on earning opportunities, human capital and institutions). It then studies 
empirically the relation between distribution indicators on the one hand and public 
spending and policy outcomes on the other. To assess the efficiency of public spending in 
promoting and achieving more equalization of income, the study uses a non-parametric 
DEA approach, following, for instance, the analytical framework by Afonso, Schuknecht, 
and Tanzi (2005) for public sector performance expenditure in the OECD and by Afonso 
and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006a, b) for the education and health sectors. 
 
The study finds that redistributive public spending (except pensions) and education 
performance have a significant effect on income distribution as reflected in stylised facts 
and in the regression analysis. Results for the role of institutions and personal income 
taxes point in the right direction but are not robust while more open countries do not have 
less equal income distribution.  In addition, DEA analysis suggests that while some 
Southern and large continental European countries show a relatively consistent picture of 
low efficiency and some Nordic countries report relatively high efficiency, the picture is 
very variable for Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, effectiveness and efficiency of 
public social spending is enhanced in countries with a strong education performance (and 
to a less robust extent education spending. The direct link from the institutional 
framework to income distribution appears more tenuous in regressions while the two-step 
analysis point to a strong indirect role with favourable institutional indicators 
significantly correlated with the efficiency of social spending.  
   4
We must point to a number of caveats, notably the quality of data, the measurement of 
income distribution and the factors that influence it (including the appropriate measure of 
public spending) and the small number of observations. 
 
The analysis of exogenous factors has another caveat which implies some careful 
interpretation of the results. Treating non-discretionary factors such as PISA scores, 
institutions and GDP as exogenous explanatory variables in explaining efficiency, is 
certainly interesting and more policy relevant from a short-term perspective as it can help 
to gage their quantitative relevance. However, this should not serve as an excuse for poor 
income distribution indicators and efficiency but rather as an enticement to do better. The 
policy implication of this study is hence to improve on all these factors that are 
endogenous in the long run: keep spending as low and well-targeted as possible, improve 
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1. Introduction 
Income distribution and the role of the market, the public sector and globalisation have 
gained increasing attention in recent years. This study examines empirically the role and 
efficiency of public spending policies in affecting income distribution from a cross-
country perspective. This is, to our knowledge, an important and remarkable gap in the 
literature in advanced economies. The study first discusses conceptually the determinants 
of income equality: initial conditions and public policies affect income distribution 
directly (via the effect of taxes and spending) or indirectly (via the effect on earning 
opportunities, human capital and institutions). It then studies empirically the relation 
between distribution indicators on the one hand and public spending and other factors on 
the other.  
 
To assess the efficiency of public spending in promoting and achieving more 
equalization of income, the study uses a non-parametric approach based on Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), following, for instance, the analytical framework by 
Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005) for public sector performance expenditure in the 
OECD and by Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006a, b) for the education and health 
sectors. 
 
The study finds that redistributive public spending (except pensions) and education 
performance have a significant effect on income distribution as reflected in stylised facts 
and in the regression analysis. Results for the role of institutions and personal income 
taxes point in the right direction but are not robust while more open countries do not have 
less equal income distribution. In addition, DEA analysis suggests that while some 
Southern and large continental European countries show a relatively consistent picture of 
low efficiency and some Nordic countries report relatively high efficiency, the picture is 
very variable for Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, effectiveness and efficiency of 
public social spending is enhanced in countries with a strong education performance (and 
to a less robust extent education spending. The direct link from the institutional 
framework to income distribution appears more tenuous in regressions while the two-step 
analysis point to a strong indirect role with favourable institutional indicators 
significantly correlated with the efficiency of social spending.  
   6
The effectiveness and efficiency of policies to affect income distribution should not be 
seen as “God given” and the findings of the paper suggest significant scope for reform 
(and further work). The functioning of the institutional framework and the effectiveness 
and competence of government in providing education or in attaining the objectives of 
redistributional policies can be improved by appropriate policy reforms. In some cases, 
when policy targets are well-achieved efficiency gains may nevertheless be reached by 
spending less money (e.g. via better targeting). In some other cases, targets may not be 
achieved but a better use of existing funds might already be sufficient to improve things.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two provides conceptual 
considerations and reviews the literature on the determinants of income distribution and 
the role and efficiency of public policies in this regard. Section three provides some 
correlation and regression analysis in this regard. Section four and five set up and 
conduct the efficiency analysis public policies in equalizing income, using both DEA and 
Tobit analysis. Section six concludes. 
 
2. Income distribution and its determinants: some conceptual considerations 
What determines the distribution of income in a given country and at a given time? Why 
is the income distribution more even in some countries than in others? Can the 
distribution of income be changed through the intervention of the government? These 
and similar questions have been raised with increasing frequency by economists and 
political scientists. In the often undemocratic societies of the past, in which oligarchies 
ran governments, the distribution of income was seen as an almost natural condition of 
society. However, in modern, democratic societies, in which most adult citizens, rich or 
poor, have the right to vote for those who will represent them in the government, there is 
less tolerance for, or acceptance of, high inequality. As a consequence policymakers are 
pressured to introduce policies intended to make the distribution of income or of 
consumption more equal. Over the years the focus of attention has shifted form the 
distribution of (real) wealth to that of income and, more and more, to that of 
consumption. 
 
Robert W. Fogel, the 1993 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, has argued that until 
the last third of the 19th century, the concern of economists had been with equality of 
opportunities. Then over the next hundred years the attention shifted to the equality of   7
material conditions such as food, clothing, lodging and so on. This objective could be 
achieved by taxing the rich with high and progressive income taxes while subsidizing the 
incomes or the consumption of the poor. However, progressively, because of the 
potential disincentive effects that taxes could generate and because of the concentration 
of income taxes on dependent workers, taxes lost some or much of their potential impact 
on income distribution. They acquired the characteristic of “fiscal churning” that is 
reshuffling of income that changes only marginally the whole distribution. At the same 
time the income transfers that had been focused on the poor were largely replaced by 
universal entitlement programs, especially in health and education, which benefited all 
citizens and not just the poor. Fogel (2000) argues that because material goods account 
for a progressively smaller share of total spending for most people, in the future the fight 
for more equality or equity will be directed to the distribution of immaterial goods.  
 
Overall, one should be aware of the fact that rising income inequality matters, as 
discussed, for instance, by Atkinson (1997), notably via its potential impact on economic 
growth. Additionally, and according to the results reported by Barro (2000), the effect of 
income inequality on economic growth may differ in developed and developing 
economies, somewhat in line with the Kuznets curve – whereby inequality first increases 
and later decreases during the process of economic development. Therefore, by focussing 
our empirical analysis on OECD countries we manage to address a more homogeneous 
country sample in that respect.
1  
 
This paper deals mainly with the role that the government has played in promoting more 
income equality, than it would exist without its intervention, at a given time. It thus 
attempts to link policies at a given time with measures of income distribution at the same 
time. However, it must be recognized that past government policies have also played 
some role in determining the current income distribution. These policies have contributed 
to the determination of so-called initial conditions. This means that it may not be possible 
to isolate completely the impact of past and present public policy on income distribution. 
This must be kept in mind when assessing the econometrically determined impact of 
these policies in the later parts of this paper. 
 
                                                           
1 See also Garcia-Peñalosa (2007), Castello-Climent (2007) and Thomas Harjes (2007) for a discussion of 
various aspects of the income distribution growth nexus.   8
At a given point in time, and in a given country, without the current intervention of the 
government, through taxation, spending policies, and regulations, the income distribution 
that would emerge would be largely determined by the following factors: 
 
(a) The inheritance of tangible and financial wealth; 
(b) The inheritance of human capital, including within-the-family learning as well as 
the inheritance of attitudes toward learning, work, risk and so on. Whether 
inherited, genetic factors can play a role in this process is still a highly controversial 
area; the inheritance of useful connection, positional rents, and other valuable assets 
that determine a person’s social capital; 
(c) Societal arrangements and norms, such as whether individuals tend to marry 
individuals with similar wealth or educational background; real or de facto caste 
systems, and so on (see Tanzi, 2000); 
(d) Individual talent; 
(e) Past government policies. 
 
In addition to the initial conditions mentioned above, that are largely determined by 
inheritance and societal traditions and norms, there are more individually-nested, or 
random factors, which also play important roles. These are (a) the distribution of skills, 
intelligence, and even look not directly inherited and (b) what could be called luck, or the 
role that randomness plays in determining incomes in non-traditional and market-
oriented economies.  The chance that someone will end up with the skills or acumen of 
Tiger Woods, Bill Gates, or Warren Buffett cannot be determined by the initial 
conditions or by government policies. In a market economy, individuals with exceptional 
skills in various areas (entertainment, sport, economic or financial activities, and so on) 
are more likely to end up with exceptional incomes. In many cases luck (or a randomness 
factor) will also play a role.  Some of these individuals may end up in the annual Forbes 
or similar lists of the world richest individuals and will have an impact on Gini 
coefficients or on other measures of inequality. 
 
Initial conditions, exceptional skills, luck, and past public policies will combine with the 
working of the market to determine the distribution of income that prevails in a society 
before the current intervention of the government. Afterwards, to determine the 
distribution of spending power among the population the government steps in with taxes,   9
public expenditures, tax expenditures, and some relevant regulatory policies. Relevant 
regulations will be (a) those that control prices or rents; (b) that determine hiring quotas 
for some categories of individuals; (c) that establish property rights for patents or for 
other forms of intellectual property; (d) that pursue anti-trust policies and so on. We shall 
not be able to take into account regulations in our empirical work and will also ignore the 
impact that progressive tax systems can have on the after tax distribution of income. 
Much of the focus of this paper will be on public spending and policy outcome and their 
impact on inequality. 
 
It may be worthwhile to stress that the impact of the government on the income 
distribution may be direct or indirect and that this distinction is in part linked with the 
current and past impact of the government. 
 
The direct and current impact of the government can come through taxes and through 
spending and other public policies. The level of taxation and its progressivity is the most 
direct factor. This factor, per se, can make the distribution of after-tax incomes different, 
and presumably more equal than the pre-tax distribution. However, various forms of “tax 
expenditures” that indirectly subsidize some categories of private spending – education, 
health, training, expenses connected with mobility, etc. – will undoubtedly, over time, 
have some impact on income distribution. Through its features, the tax system can also 
influence the retirement age, the size of families, and individual effort, which are all 
features with a direct impact on income distribution. 
 
On the expenditure side of public policies we can also identify direct and indirect effects.  
Public spending that injects income or spending power in the hands of individuals, 
through cash payment or direct support for spending that is important for poorer 
individuals (food stamps, subsidized housing, free child care for working mothers, 
subsidized tariffs for low levels of consumption of public utilities, etc.) has a clear effect 
on income distribution. However, public spending can have indirect but still significant 
effects on the distribution of income in other ways that mainly improve productivity and 
opportunities to find a job disproportionately for the less well off. For example an 
efficient public transportation system can widen the area in which poorer individuals can 
search for jobs by reducing travel costs. Spending for job training or retraining can move 
individuals from the unemployed to the employed category. Spending on education can   10
benefit the poor disproportionately if it improves their relative endowment with human 
capital. Free access to health facilities can keep people healthy and make possible for 
them to be in the labour force.  
 
In addition to the above, it has to be recognized that a good institutional set up that 
guarantees rule of law and fair and quick access to justice will also contribute to a better 
distribution of income by reducing abuses and corruption. Some studies have, for 
example, linked corruption with higher Gini coefficients. When rule of law is not fair or 
is not respected, poorer people are more likely to be exploited through lower 
compensation for their work and higher costs for some services, as for example in the 
case of usury when they borrow money.  
 
The above description suggests clearly that while some public actions or policies have an 
immediate and direct impact on the distribution of income or on the income of some 
groups, others have an indirect impact or an impact only over time. Thus the empirical 
work that follows reflects some of these limitations because it is focused largely on 
current public spending on income distribution. 
 
3. Cross-country and historical assessment 
In this section, we first take a look at the data that underpins our analysis of income 
distribution, before providing some first descriptive statistics, correlations and regression 
analysis of the determinants of income distribution. We focus in particular on the impact 
of redistributional expenditure policies, education as a provider of human 
capital/opportunities and some tax policy and institutional issues.  
 
3.1. Income distribution data: a brief stock-taking 
Income distribution data reflects the different objectives of measurement.
2 We have 
identified five overall indicators. 1) The Gini coefficient is probably the most famous 
indicator where a low number suggests more equality and a high number inequality. 2) 
The income share per quintile is another popular indicator with the income share of the 
poorest or the poorest two quintiles being typically examined. Other indicators include 3) 
                                                           
2 Different measurements may not only have different objectives but also implicitly reflect the value-
judgement of analysts. The Gini coefficient for example measures the relative distribution within one 
society. A measure of per capita GDP for the poorest quintile across countries puts more weight on the 
absolute situation of the poor and the presumed trade-offs between income distribution and growth.   11
the poverty rate as the share of people with less than 50% (or any other share) of median 
income. These three indicators also allow cross-country comparisons with relative ease. 
4) The absolute poverty rate which looks at the share of people living below some pre-
defined threshold of income and 5) the absolute per-capita income of the poorest (or 
poorest two) quintile(s) are further alternatives. They are only reasonably comparable if 
they are adjusted (for the consumption basket or purchasing power parity). In addition, 
there are indicators that refer to segments of the population like 6) child poverty, 7) 
absolute child poverty or 8) old age poverty, to name only a few. 
 
A few further caveats are worth mentioning. Indicators can refer to gross income, factor 
income or disposable income. They can look at families, households, individuals or 
taxpayers. They can include or exclude the self-employed. The sources can be surveys, 
censuses, tax or social security records. This illustrates that great care needs to be 
applied, especially when comparing indicators across countries and over time. Finland, 
for example, reported for the year 2000 a Gini coefficient for disposable income of 26.4, 
of factor income of 47.2 and of gross income of 31.2. 
 
In a first step we would like to take stock of some of the available income distribution 
indicators and their distribution over time and countries. The largest dataset of Gini 
coefficients is to our knowledge published by WYDER which covers many countries and 
in some instances starts in the 19
th century.
3 Chart 1a illustrates the data distribution for 
the period 1950 until most recently. It shows a trend towards greater equality until the 
1980s followed by a more ambiguous pattern thereafter. But the chart also shows the 
enormous diversity of data for the reasons mentioned above. A reasonably homogenous 
and comparable dataset for Gini coefficients and disposable income is compiled by the 
Luxembourg income dataset in which, however, observations before 1980 are rather rare. 
Nevertheless, for the past 25 years the ambiguous pattern of the WYDER dataset is 
broadly confirmed (Chart 1b). From a global perspective, the World Development Report 
provides data for Gini coefficients and the income share per quintile for many countries 




                                                           
3 For an overview of historic developments also see Atkinson (2007).   12
The most important data source for income distribution indicators for advanced countries 
seems to be the OECD. Foerster and d’Ercole (2005) have put together an excellent set of 
cross-country data for the period 1985 to 2000, including for sub-groups of society. 
Taking a glimpse also at this dataset, it is interesting to note that the only group which 
experienced an unambiguous further fall in poverty rates since the 1980s is the elderly 
while child-poverty has tended to increase (Chart 1c-d).  
 
Changes over the past two decades can also be illustrated by plotting the Gini coefficient 
for 1980, 1990 and 2000, as in Chart 2. Observations below the 45 degree line reflect an 
equalisation in income distribution over this decade while those above suggest a 
tendency towards less equality. For instance, for the period 1990-2000, while all 
countries are relatively close to the 45 degree line, equality appears to have increased 
most notably in Denmark, the Netherlands, France and Switzerland while it decreases in 




3.2. Determinants of income distribution: some correlations 
Consistent with our earlier discussion of the likely determinants of income distribution, 
we conducted two types of quantitative analysis. This aims to get a better feel for the data 
and their interrelation. In this sub-section we conduct correlation analysis before, in the 
next one, we look at some simple regression analysis. We look at levels of indicators in 
recent years and at their changes over recent decades, as presented in Table 1 (for an 
overview of basic descriptive statistics see the Annex). 
 
Starting with the role of public finances, there is a relatively strong correlation between 
public expenditure and income distribution in recent years (Table 1a). This correlation, 
however, is somewhat weaker for total expenditure (correlation coefficients of about 0.5) 
than for redistributional components, i.e. social spending, transfers and subsidies and 
family benefits (about 0.5-0.7). The correlation between pensions and old-age poverty is 
relatively weak (see Foerster and Mira d’Ercole, 2005, for a discussion). There is also a 
much weaker correlation between public spending and absolute income indicators. This 
is illustrated in the fourth column which shows the correlation between public spending 
and PPP-based per-capita GDP of the poorest quintile across countries.   13
 
There is a relatively strong correlation between the change in income distribution as 
measured by the change in the income share of the poorest 40% of households and the 
change in public spending between 1960 and 2000 (Table 1b). However, this relationship 
is already significantly weaker for the change in the Gini coefficient. Moreover, initial 




The magnitude of interrelations between income distribution and public spending can be 
illustrated very roughly by the bi-variate regressions displayed in Chart 3. To attain a 1% 
higher income share of the poorest 40% of households, it is necessary to rise social 
spending by roughly 3.3% of GDP (Chart 3a).
4 The correlation between the change in 





The picture changes significantly when looking at the past 20-25 years only. There is 
virtually no correlation between the change in total or social spending and income 
distribution since the 1980s (Table 1b).  Chart 4, as quoted from Heipertz and 
Warmedinger (2007) confirms this picture with part a) confirming the positive 
correlation of levels and part b) showing an even negative correlation between changes in 




This picture is consistent with the findings of two of the authors in an earlier study 
(Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2006) where countries that undertook ambitious expenditure 
reform and notably lowered social spending did not experience much adverse effects on 
                                                           
4 A 1% income share for the poorest two quintiles reflects an increase in relative per capita GDP in this 
group by about US$ 600 (given an average per capita GDP ppp across sample countries in 2000 of slightly 
below US$ 25000). A 3.3% of GDP spending increase implies roughly US$ 800 per capita. Perfect 
targeting would imply an increase in spending by US$250 per capita (fully spent on the poorest 40% and 
financed by the richest 60%). 
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the income share of the poorest quintile of households. At the same time, absolute 
incomes of the poor increased most strongly in the group of countries that undertook 
early and ambitious reforms, starting already in the 1980s (Table 2). This may be due to 
the elimination of poorly targeted benefits (that helped poor little) and the improvement 




Synthesizing this first set of results, one can safely say that public and notably social 
spending matters for income distribution both in terms of levels and, perhaps a bit less 
strongly, for changes over the past 30-40 years. The picture, however, seems to have 
changed in recent decades when the correlation of changes in public social spending and 
income distribution may have broken down. We will come back to this issue in the next 
sub-section. 
 
Turning to human capital as contributor to income distribution, there is also a 
surprisingly strong relationship between some measures of educational achievement 
(OECD PISA) and various income distribution indicators across countries (Table 1c). It 
is noteworthy that correlation coefficients between mathematical and problem solving 
skills and various income distribution indicators except old age poverty show high values 
above 0.4. Although the correlation coefficient with public education spending is 
similarly high, this may be spurious and reflect more the correlation of education and 
social spending than the human-capital related effects (as will also be shown in the next 
section). The correlation between public education spending and educational 
achievements is in fact very limited (see e.g., Hauptmeier et al., 2006). 
 
We only undertook a very tentative and limited glimpse at the effect of taxation by 
looking at personal income taxes which should have an equalising impact on income 
distribution through progressivity as also implied by correlation coefficients of above 0.4 
for personal income tax revenue and income shares and Gini coefficients (1d), assuming 
a link between the level of income taxes to GDP and tax progressivity. 
 
The effect of initial conditions on today’s income distribution can be assessed by 
correlating recent indicators with those of some decades ago. While the income share of   15
the poorest two quintiles in 1960 and 2000 are not correlated, the 2000 Gini coefficient is 
still strongly related to that prevailing in about 1970 (1e).    
 
Finally we look at institutional indicators and globalisation/openness (Table 1f). A strong 
correlation of better institutions and more income equality is confirmed for two of the 
four indicators, i.e., the degree of independence of the judiciary and the amount of red 
tape. Regulation quality and the size of the shadow economy appear to be less strongly 
correlated. The correlation between openness as measured by exports plus imports over 
GDP and income distribution is relatively high between 0.3 and 0.4 with more open 
economies having a more equal income distribution (contrary to some conjectures in the 
debate). 
 
3.3. Determinants of income distribution: a first regression analysis 
In this section, we undertake some simple cross-section regression analysis. The 
hypotheses are that public spending and notably redistributional spending and the tax 
system affect income inequality directly. Education/human capital and the institutional 
framework of a country do so indirectly via equalising the human capital endowment and 
providing a level playing field. In the literature is has also sometimes been claimed that 
globalisation may undermine equality. Our findings from regression analysis support the 
hypotheses on the role of public redistributive spending and education/human capital, 
results are mixed for institutional indicators and insignificant for personal income taxes 
and openness. 
 
In a first set of equations, we look at income distribution across countries in recent years 
(about 2000) as measured by the income share of the poorest 40% of households and by 
the Gini coefficient (equations 1-4 in Table 3a). It is not very surprising that transfers and 
subsidies and social spending are highly significant in affecting income distribution. 
Coefficients around 0.3 suggest that 1% of GDP higher redistributive spending raises the 
income share of the poorest two quintiles by 0.3%. Despite the significant positive 
correlation, there is no significant correlation between personal income taxes and income 
distribution in any specification (including when replacing spending variables), although 
this could be largely due to multicollinearity with social spending. 
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Institutional variables have the right sign but they do not show a robust and significant 
direct relation with income distribution with variables reflecting red tape/bureaucracy, 
the size of the shadow economy and independent judiciaries being significant in some 
specifications. As mentioned, the positive relation between openness and income 
distribution is also supported in regression analysis but it is not significant (not 
indicated). The inclusion of GDP per capita and unemployment as additional control 
variables (proxying the possible growth-distribution trade off and the fact that the poor 
are typically disproportionately affected by unemployment) does not yield significant 
results in this set of equations (not indicated). 
 
In line with the earlier correlation analysis, education achievement on average and 
notably for mathematics and problem solving is significantly related to income 
distribution. About 25 points more in PISA imply a 1% higher income share of the 
poorest 40% of households (for reference, the largest difference in our sample countries 
is 75 points between Finland and Portugal, and the largest difference in the income share 
is 7.6% between Finland and the US). Ten PISA points improve the Gini coefficient by 
one point according to these regressions. The inclusion of education achievement also 
significantly enhances the overall fit (adjusted R-square) of the models. Education 
spending, by contrast, does not significantly affect income distribution. 
 
We also tested for the role of initial income distributions in 1960s/70s as reflecting initial 
conditions (wealth patterns, social norms and other factors that may change only very 
slowly over time). While this did not show up significantly in the equation on income 
shares for the poorest two quintiles (not indicated) it appears to be relevant for today’s 
Gini coefficients (in line with the findings on correlations above). 
 
There are two additional findings worth reporting which perhaps point to the need for 
more analysis. In equation 3 we use public education spending (an input indicator) 
instead of achievements (=output). This does not turn out to be a significant determinant 
of income distribution. In the same equation, however, regulatory quality becomes 
significant. The finding of insignificant institutional indicators in the other equations may 
hence be due to a correlation between education achievement and institutional quality 
(which may result in better policies including more efficient public education spending).    17
 
A second finding worth commenting on is represented in equation 5 where we regressed 
the Gini coefficient on social spending and an interaction term between social spending 
and educational attainment. While the former reverses sign and is now highly positive 
(suggesting a negative effect on income distribution) the latter is strongly significant and 
negative, implying that only high social spending coupled with good education positively 
affects income distribution. We will come back to this point in the DEA analysis. 
 
A further equation 6 examines per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted) of the poorest quintile of 
households across sample countries, and suggests that each % of GDP of social spending 
raises per capita GDP of the 20% poorest households by US$232.
5 A higher 
unemployment rate is a significant factor in lowering the absolute income of the poorest 
quintile (a 1% higher unemployment rate lowers the income by 275$). Each additional 
PISA point raises income of the poor by about US$ 30. 
 
A first tentative effort to explain changes in income distribution is reflected in equations 
(1)-(4) of Table 3b. These equations have to be seen with even more caution than the 
earlier ones as indicators may be less comparable over time and as the number of 
observations are very limited. Nevertheless, the results are broadly consistent with the 
earlier correlation analysis. Over long horizons, rising redistributive spending mattered 
and, for example, the change in the social spending ratio between 1960 and 2000 had a 
significant impact on the change in the income share of the poorest 40% of households 
(equation 1) while the finding is less robust for the Gini coefficient (equation 2). Personal 
income tax receipts have an equalising but non-robust effect on income distribution while 





                                                           
5 This implies that if the growth effect of lower social spending is 2 ½ times as high as the income effect, 
then the poor would be absolutely better off from reform. If reforms are designed in a manner that the 
income effect is smaller (e.g. through better targeting) then the threshold for the poor to benefit from higher 
growth will also be lower. 
6 While we do not have time series data for education attainment, including the 2000 value is not very 
meaningful as this assumes no change in education quality. Doing so just for illustrative purposes in 
equations (2) and (4) suggests borderline significance. 
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When looking at changes over the past 20 years, public spending variables do not provide 
a robust picture. This is in line with the earlier findings from correlation analysis and the 
literature. Unlike for the longer horizon, initial income distribution is also not relevant for 
explaining subsequent changes. The results for education achievements (despite the 
above-mentioned caveat) are fully consistent with the earlier cross-section results.  
 
All in all, income distribution appears to be significantly affected by public redistributive 
spending and education achievements. This relationship, however, does not appear to be 
very robust for changes, especially over the past 20 years. Moreover, there are hints that 
the beneficial effects of such spending may interact with better education quality. Results 
for the role of institutions and personal income taxes are not robust while more open 
countries do not have less equal income distribution.  Further analysis beyond these very 
preliminary findings is certainly needed. 
 
4. Efficiency of public spending  
4.1. Literature 
Previous research on the performance and efficiency of the public sector that applied 
non-parametric methods find significant divergence of efficiency across countries. 
Studies include notably Fakin and Crombrugghe (1997) for the public sector, Gupta and 
Verhoeven (2001) for education and health in Africa, Clements (2002) for education in 
Europe, St. Aubyn (2003) for education spending in the OECD, Afonso, Schuknecht, and 
Tanzi (2005, 2006) for public sector performance expenditure in the OECD and in 
emerging markets, Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006a, 2006b) for efficiency in 
providing health and education in OECD countries.
7 De Borger and Kerstens (1996), and 
Afonso and Fernandes (2006) find evidence of spending inefficiencies for the local 
government sector. Most studies apply the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method 
while Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006a) undertook a two-step DEA/Tobit analysis, in the 
context of a cross-country analysis of secondary education efficiency. Nevertheless, little 
or no work has been done using such non-parametric methods to assess the efficiency of 
public policies in affecting income distribution. 
 
Another relevant issue for the analysis of public spending inefficiencies is the fact that 
public expenditure financing must rely on distortional taxation. This implies that both 
                                                           
7 See also Joumard et al. (2004) for additional information on OECD countries.   19
direct and indirect costs are relevant when estimating the economic impacts of 
inefficiency in public services provision. Indeed, the relative importance of indirect costs 
of public sector provision inefficiency, linked to financing through distortional taxation, 
increases with the magnitude of the inefficiency. Afonso and Gaspar (2007), in simple 
numerical exercises, with a calibrated model, found that indirect costs, associated with 
excess taxation burden, amplify the cost of inefficiency by between 20 and 30 per cent. 
 
4.2. Non-parametric and parametric analysis 
Non-parametric approach 
Together with the set of already identified outputs, a set of inputs will be used to assess 
efficiency regarding income distribution measures. Among such inputs we can mention, 
as potential candidates, social spending, transfers and subsidies, spending on pensions, 
health, and education, tax and institutional indicators. Sometimes, principal component 
analysis may prove useful to reduce the number of variables used in the input side. In 
order to perform the efficiency study we use the DEA approach. 
 
The DEA methodology, originating from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work and popularised 
by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), assumes the existence of a convex production 
frontier. The production frontier in the DEA approach is constructed using linear 
programming methods. The term “envelopment” stems from the fact that the production 
frontier envelops the set of observations.
8 
 
Regarding public sector efficiency, the general relationship that we expect to test can be 
given by the following function for each country i: 
 
  ) ( i i X f Y = , i=1,…,n   (1) 
 
where we have Yi – a composite indicator reflecting our output measure; Xi – spending or 
other relevant inputs in country i. If ) ( i i x f Y < , it is said that country i exhibits 
inefficiency. For the observed input level, the actual output is smaller than the best 
attainable one and inefficiency can then be measured by computing the distance to the 
theoretical efficiency frontier.  
                                                           
8 Coelli et al. (1998) and Thanassoulis (2001) offer introductions to DEA. 
   20
 
The analytical description of the linear programming problem to be solved, in the 
variable-returns to scale hypothesis, is sketched below for an input-oriented specification. 
Suppose there are k inputs and m outputs for n Decision Management Units (DMUs). For 
the i-th DMU, yi is the column vector of the inputs and xi is the column vector of the 
outputs. We can also define X as the (k×n) input matrix and Y as the (m×n) output 
matrix. The DEA model is then specified with the following mathematical programming 





s. to    0
           0

















 .  (2) 
 
In problem (2), δ is a scalar (that satisfies δ≤1), more specifically it is the efficiency 
score that measures technical efficiency. It measures the distance between a country and 
the efficiency frontier, defined as a linear combination of the best practice observations. 
With δ<1, the country is inside the frontier (i.e. it is inefficient), while δ=1 implies that 
the country is on the frontier (i.e. it is efficient). 
 
The vector λ is a (n×1) vector of constants that measures the weights used to compute 
the location of an inefficient DMU if it were to become efficient, and 1 is an n-
dimensional vector of ones. The inefficient DMU would be projected on the production 
frontier as a linear combination of those weights, related to the peers of the inefficient 
DMU. The peers are other DMUs that are more efficient and are therefore used as 
references for the inefficient DMU.. The restriction  1 ' 1 = λ n  imposes convexity of the 
frontier, accounting for variable returns to scale. Dropping this restriction would amount 
to admit that returns to scale were constant. Problem (2) has to be solved for each of the n 
DMUs in order to obtain the n efficiency scores. 
 
 
                                                           
9 We simply present here the equivalent envelopment form, derived by Charnes et al. (1978), using the 
duality property of the multiplier form of the original programming model.   21
Using non-discretionary factors 
The analysis via composite performance indicators and DEA analysis assumes that 
expenditure efficiency is purely the result of discretionary (policy and spending) inputs. 
They do not take into account the presence of “environmental” factors, also known as 
non-discretionary or “exogenous” inputs. However, such factors may play a relevant role 
in determining heterogeneity across countries and influence performance and efficiency. 
Exogenous or non-discretionary factors can have an economic and non-economic origin.  
 
As non-discretionary and discretionary factors jointly contribute to country performance 
and efficiency, there are in the literature several proposals on how to deal with this issue, 
implying usually the use of two-stage and even three-stage models (see Ruggioero, 
2004). Using the DEA output efficiency scores, we will evaluate the importance of non-
discretionary factors below in the context of our new member and emerging market 
sample. We will undertake Tobit regressions by regressing the output efficiency scores, 
δι, on a set of possible non-discretionary inputs, Z, as as follows 
 
  i i i Z f ε δ + = ) ( .   (3) 
 
5. Efficiency analysis results 
5.1. Relative efficiency via a DEA approach 
As a starting point of our efficiency analysis we computed the DEA efficiency scores 
from a one input and one output specification. As an input measure we use total public 
social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, as an average for the period 1995-2000.
10 
Our output measure is based on the Gini coefficient data, also as an average for the 
period 1995-2000. Since in the DEA programme we need to insert increasing outputs as 
the desired objective, and given that higher Gini coefficients imply a bigger inequality in 
terms of income distribution, our output variable, Gini
T, is constructed by transforming 
the Gini coefficient observations as follows:  
 
  100
T Gini Gini =− .   (4) 
 
                                                           
10 Social expenditure includes public and  (mandatory and voluntary) private social expenditure at 
programme level and the main social policy areas are: old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, 
health, family, active labor market programmes, unemployment, housing, and other social policy areas. See 
the Data Annex and OECD (2007) for more details on how the OECD defines social expenditures.    22
Table 4 reports the results for the input and output oriented efficiency scores for the 
above described one input-one output model for a set of 26 OECD countries. From an 
output oriented perspective the most efficient countries in terms of influencing income 
distribution via social expenditure appear to be the Nordic countries, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and Slovakia while Anglo-Saxon and Southern European countries, 
Germany and France appear to be less efficient. On the other hand, and even if it may be 
more difficult to act in the short-run on the input side, it should be noticed that input 




th, and Australia 9
th) than the Nordic countries, apart from Denmark, which is on 
the frontier in both cases (Finland ranks 10
th, Norway 13





More concretely, the production possibility frontier is constructed with three countries: 
Denmark, Japan and the Slovak Republic, which envelop all the other countries (see also 
Chart 5).
11 Additionally, in Table 4 we report the ranking of the countries, given their 
respective efficiency scores (Rank 1) and taking into account, for the countries on the 
frontier, the number of times each of those countries is a peer of a county outside the 




Still from Table 4 we conclude for the existence of both input and output inefficiencies 
when relating the use of public social spending to assess the inequality in income 
distribution. The average input efficiency score is 0.76 implying that for the overall 
country sample it would be theoretically possible to attain the same level of income 
distribution, as measured by the Gini coefficient, with roughly 24 percent less public 
social spending. The average output efficiency score is 0.93, which means that with the 
same level of public social spending one could in principle increase income equality 
indicators by 7 percent. (This reflects the very low marginal product of higher spending 
in terms of equality as reflected in the rather flat production possibility frontier.) 
                                                           
11 Note that we did not consider Korea in the sample since it biases the findings (however, results with 
Korea area available upon request). Indeed, social spending-to-GDP ratio for Korea was extremely 
(roughly four times) below the sample average. 
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Naturally, such averages encompass rather heterogeneous realities. For instance, several 
individual input efficiency scores are closer to the production possibility frontier (the US, 
the Czech Republic, Ireland, Canada, Luxembourg or Australia) while there are also 
situations were the room for improvement seems to be larger (France, Belgium, Italy, 
Germany, and Poland). On the other hand, output efficiency scores exhibit overall lower 
volatility with the relative positioning of the countries showing some differences vis-à-
vis the results for the input oriented case (the correlation between the two rankings is 
around 0.6). 
 
We also specified two alternative models that consider one input (social spending as 
before) and two output indicators, both income inequality measures: the Gini coefficient 
and the poverty rate or the income share of the poorest 40% of the population. Again as 
in the case of the Gini coefficient we had to transform the poverty rate data in the same 
fashion. Tables 5 and 6 report the results of these two one input and two outputs models. 
 




The estimation of these models shows two things. First, input efficiency scores are 
somewhat higher. Second, in the models with two outputs, Southern European countries, 
the UK, France and Germany continue to show low efficiency of social expenditure. But 
a few countries, including a number of Anglo-Saxons (Canada, Ireland, the US and 
Australia) are now rather efficient and the Nordic countries do not drop dramatically..  
 
Among the 22 country sample as reported in Table 5, six countries are on the production 
possibility frontier: Canada, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg and the US. Ireland 
is efficient by default in the output oriented specification since it is never a peer of any 
other country outside the frontier. Moreover, the US is a bit of a special case since it has 
in this country sample both the lowest public social spending as a % of GDP and the 
worst values for the two output indicators, Gini and poverty rate. 
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For the estimation presented in Table 6, there are seven countries on the production 
possibility frontier: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway and the 
US. Interestingly, we can also observe that both Finland and the US are labelled as 
efficient by default, respectively for input and output orientation. Finland is not the 
highest spending country in terms of the social spending-to-GDP ratio but it has one of 
the best Gini indicators and the best performance in terms of the income share of the 
poorest 40%.  
 
As an additional illustration, Chart 6 shows in two dimension the production possibility 
curve for the output-oriented case, for the model involving a single input (social 
spending) and two outputs (Gin and income share of the poorest 40%). From the picture 
it is possible to notice that Ireland has done the best in the income share of 40%-to-social 
spending ratio while the US has done better in the Gini-to-social spending ratio. Together 
these two countries form the efficiency frontier in the context of constant returns to scale, 
as also shown in Table 6, putting an upper bound on the production possibilities for this 




Overall, the results of this analysis should be seen as illustrative. While they reflect the 
significant data and measurement problems they are perhaps a first useful step in this 
largely unexplored domain. We summarise in Table 7 the main findings of our non-
parametric efficiency analysis, confirming the very different degrees of efficiency across 





5.2. Explaining inefficiencies via non-discretionary factors 
As an additional step, we extend our analysis to exogenous (non-discretionary) factors 
that might explain expenditure efficiency. The output efficiency score outcomes of the 
first two models as reflected in tables 4 and 5 serve as dependent variables.  
 
As to exogenous factors, it is probably reasonable to conjecture that expenditure 
efficiency depends on the “technology” applied and skills available in the public sector,   25
on institutional factors that influence, for example, the ability of private agents to protect 
their resources from public claims, on the monitoring capacities of public and private 
agents, and on international constraints. We proxy these considerations with the 
following independent variables: Education levels and education spending stand for 
human capital endowment that should increase the productivity of the public sector and 
facilitate its monitoring. Competence of the civil services more concretely proxies public 
sector “technology”. Institutional variables (independent judiciary, red tape, shadow 
economy, regulation quality) should signal the security of property rights and sound 
checks and balances that boost efficiency in public spending. Amongst other control 
variables, the population share above 65 aims to capture “competition” over public 
resources while openness aims to gauge international influences. Per capita GDP is an 
indicator of capital stock in the economy (that should lead to better technology) but we 
also face a causality problem: rich countries may be rich because they are more efficient 
in their redistribution (by discouraging rent seeking and other wasteful activities).  
 
As a first step we look at correlations across dependent and independent variables. We 
report the correlation matrix for efficiency scores and several potentially relevant non-
discretionary factors in the Annex. In a nutshell there seems to be significant correlation 
between expenditure efficiency on the one hand and PISA scores and several institutional 
variables on the other. Correlations are less high with education spending (consistent 
with the earlier regression analysis) and openness. When looking at correlations across 
independent variables (exogenous factors) it appears that the same institutional variables 
that are correlated with efficiency also show a strong relation with PISA scores and 
public sector competence while again public spending and openness show relatively 
lower coefficients. This observation points to multicollinearity problems for our 
regression analysis for certain variables with the economic intuition that countries with 
strong institutions are also likely to have efficient public sector policies in both the 
education and social domain. 
 
Keeping this caveat in mind, regression analysis is broadly supportive of the above 
claims. More specifically, Tables 8 and 9 report the results from the Tobit analysis using 
the previously computed output efficiency scores from the DEA models respectively in   26
Tables 4 (1 input and 1 output) and 5 (1 input and 2 outputs).
12 It is noteworthy that PISA 
scores, the competence of civil servants, the quality of the judiciary and a small shadow 
economy are significant variables for explaining social expenditure efficiency. In 
addition high public education spending (only model 1), low property tax revenue and 
high per capita GDP contribute to explaining efficiency scores. Other variables are 
insignificant except for the elderly population ratio in model 2. Note, however, that the 
sample size ranges from only 18 to 22 countries, hence again suggesting to treat the 






In Tables 10 and 11 we report output efficiency score corrections for specifications 1 and 
5 in Table 9 for the variables detected as statistically significant in the Tobit analysis 
(i.e., per capita GDP, PISA indicator, public spending in secondary education and the 
extent of shadow economy). The corrections were computed by considering that the non-
discretionary factors varied to the sample average in each country, and countries’ 
efficiency scores are then being corrected downwards if they have an above average per 
capita GPD and PISA scores. The output scores corrected for non-discretionary or 
environmental effects (truncated to one when necessary) are presented in columns four 
and five of Tables 10 and 11 respectively as a result of the sum of the previous three and 
four columns. One should also notice that, for instance in Table 11, the number of 
countries considered decreased from twenty-three in the DEA calculations to eighteen in 
the two-step analysis, since data for public spending in secondary education and the 






                                                           
12 We try to explain output inefficiency via exogeneuos factors given that policy makers are sometimes 
input constrained, being therefore more feasible to improve ouptut and outcomes using the same inputs.   27
The findings suggest a revision of efficiency scores and a reshuffle of the ranking of 
countries. Some inefficient countries appear to be so mainly due to exogenous factors, 
notably Greece, Portugal or New Zealand (to name only a few) where low per capita 
GDP results in a big adjustment parameter. Additionally, we illustrate in Chart 7 the 
changes in the efficiencies scores after taking into account the corrections prompted by 
the non-discretionary factors identified for models in Tables 10 and 11. Again, this is 





This study examines empirically the role and efficiency of public spending policies in 
affecting income distribution from a cross-country perspective. The study first discusses 
conceptually the determinants of income equality: initial conditions and public policies 
affect income distribution directly (via the effect of taxes and spending) or indirectly (via 
the effect on earning opportunities, human capital and institutions). It then studies 
empirically the relation between distribution indicators on the one hand and public 
spending and policy outcomes on the other. To assess the efficiency of public spending in 
promoting and achieving more equalization of income, the study uses a non-parametric 
DEA approach, following, for instance, the analytical framework by Afonso, Schuknecht, 
and Tanzi (2005) for public sector performance expenditure in the OECD and by Afonso 
and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006a, b) for the education and health sectors. 
 
The study finds that redistributive public spending (except pensions) and education 
performance have a significant effect on income distribution as reflected in stylised facts 
and in the regression analysis. Results for the role of institutions and personal income 
taxes point in the right direction but are not robust while more open countries do not have 
less equal income distribution.  In addition, DEA analysis suggests that while some 
Southern and large continental European countries show a relatively consistent picture of 
low efficiency and some Nordic countries report relatively high efficiency, the picture is 
very variable for Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, effectiveness and efficiency of 
public social spending is enhanced in countries with a strong education performance (and 
to a less robust extent education spending. The direct link from the institutional 
framework to income distribution appears more tenuous in regressions while the two-step   28
analysis point to a strong indirect role with favourable institutional indicators 
significantly correlated with the efficiency of social spending.  
 
We must point to a number of caveats, notably the quality of data, the measurement of 
income distribution and the factors that influence it (including the appropriate measure of 
public spending) and the small number of observations. 
 
The analysis of exogenous factors has another caveat which implies some careful 
interpretation of the results. Treating non-discretionary factors such as PISA scores, 
institutions and GDP as exogenous explanatory variables in explaining efficiency, is 
certainly interesting and more policy relevant from a short-term perspective as it can help 
to gage their quantitative relevance. However, this should not serve as an excuse for poor 
income distribution indicators and efficiency but rather as an enticement to do better. The 
policy implication of this study is hence to improve on all these factors that are 
endogenous in the long run: keep spending as low and well-targeted as possible, improve 
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Data annex 
 
Table A1 – Descriptive statistics and sources 
   Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Source 
Income distribution           
Income share, poorest 2 quintiles, 2000  20.5  23.7  16.1  2.8 
Income share, poorest 2 quintiles, 1980  18.4  21.2  15.7  1.5 






Gini coefficient, 2000  29.3  36.8  24.7  4.6 
Gini coefficient, 1970  29.8  35.1  22.4  4.7 




Poverty rate, 2000  9.7  17.0  5.4  3.9  All other OECD 
Per capita income poorest quintile, 2000, PPP  10240.6  12989.9  7369.7  1696.7   
Child poverty  10.7  21.9  2.8  6.8   
Poverty rate in old age  13.5  25.6  5.9  6.4   
Fiscal data (all public, % of GDP)           
Total expenditure, 2000  45.8  57.1  32.5  8.0  AMECO 
Social expenditure, 2000  24.2  29.5  14.2  4.3  OECD 
Transfers and subsidies, 2000  16.1  21.3  8.6  3.8  AMECO 
Total expenditure, 1960  17.7  30.6  3.0  7.1  AMECO, T&S 
Social expenditure, 1960  12.9  20.5  6.9  4.0  OECD 
b 
Transfers and subsidies, 1960  6.0  9.7  1.3  2.9  AMECO, T&S 
Family benefits, 2000  2.1  3.7  0.4  1.0  OECD 
Pension spending, 2000  9.1  11.8  5.2  2.5  OECD 
Public education spending  5.3  7.7  3.8  1.0  OECD 
Personal income tax receipts  12.1 26.9 5.4 5.2  OECD 
Education achievement/PISA (2003)           
Average 505.9  545.9  461.7  23.3  OECD 
Maths 507.1  544.0  445.0  29.6  OECD 
Problem solving  507.1  548.0  448.0  28.5  OECD 
Institutions          
Judiciary 
$ 6.0  6.7  4.5  0.7 
Regulation 
$ 3.6  5.3  2.4  0.9 
Bureaucracy 




Other controls           
Openness ((X+M)/GDP)  79.9  256  22.4  51.1  WEO 
Per capita GDP, 2000, PPP  24294.8  31741.0 14979.0  3834.6  OECD 
Unemployment rate (%), 2000  6.7  11.7  2.5  3.0  OECD 
 
Notes: 
a – Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Income distribution data, http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm. 
b – Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure.  
The OECD defines social expenditures as “The provision by public and private institutions of benefits to, 
and financial contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support during 
circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and financial 
contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service nor an individual contract 
or transfer.” Still according to the OECD, “social benefits include cash benefits (e.g. pensions, income 
support during maternity leave, and social assistance payments), social services (e.g. childcare, care for the 
elderly and disabled) and tax breaks with a social purpose (e.g. tax expenditures towards families with 
children, or favourable tax treatment of contributions to private health plans)” (see OECD, 2007). 
$ - Scale from 1 to 7 base don survey data. 
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Table A2 – Correlation matrix for output efficiency scores and non-discretionary factors 








ation  Rights Open 
E F O 1   1                   
EFO2  0.69  1                 
EFO3  0.69  0.91  1                
GDP  0.47  0.70  0.70  1               
PISA  0.64  0.63  0.51  0.37  1              
PIT  0.41 0.52 0.39 0.43 0.60  1              
Edu 0.29  0.28  0.15  -0.07  0.24  0.41  1            
Comp  0.65 0.81 0.63 0.55 0.75 0.62  0.26  1           
Judic  0.70 0.79 0.71 0.57 0.81 0.55  0.15  0.81  1         
Shadow  -0.48 -0.72 -0.61 -0.64 -0.80 -0.53 -0.05 -0.71  -0.79  1           
Pop65  -0.04 -0.61 -0.58 -0.35 -0.39 -0.11 0.16  -0.42  -0.49 0.60  1         
Redtape  -0.55 -0.50 -0.45 -0.45 -0.50 -0.19 -0.29 -0.42  -0.63 0.41 0.12  1       
Regulat. 0.38 0.43 0.56 0.35 0.53 0.22 0.12  0.32 0.53 -0.57 -0.42 -0.56  1     
Rights  0.56 0.66 0.53 0.79 0.61 0.28  -0.09 0.67  0.69  -0.80 -0.29 -0.40  0.25  1   
Open  0.45 0.31 0.32 0.23 0.25 0.44 0.08 0.30 0.24  0.05 -0.09 -0.46  0.11  0.07  1 
 
Notes: 
EFO1, EFO2 and EFO3, output efficiency scores from the DEA models 1, 2 and 3, reported respectively in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6. 
GDP – per capita GDP, ppp, 2000. 
PISA – OECD PISA indicators on secondary performance, 2003. 
PIT – Personal income tax revenues as a % of GDP, 2000. 
Edu – public spending in education as % of GDP, average for 2000-2001. 
Comp – index of competence of public officials, 2001/02. 
Judic – index for the quality of judiciary, 2000/01. 
Shadow – index of the informal sector in the economy, 2001/02. 
Pop65 – share of population aged 65 years and above, 2000. 
Redtape – index for bureaucracy, 2000/01. 
Regulat – index of the burden of regulation, 2000/01. 
Rights – index of property rights protection, 2001/02. 
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Tables and charts 
 
Table 1 – Income distribution, public expenditure, education achievements, taxes,  initial 













(less than 50% 
of median 
income), 2000 















   DI4000  GI00  POTO00  PABS00  POCH00  POCH200  POLD00 
a)  Public spending, % 
of GDP            
Transfers and subsidies, 
2000  0.60 -0.57 -0.59  0.29       
Social spending 2000  0.61  -0.56  -0.65  0.46       
Total spending, 2000  0.52  -0.49  -0.48  0.18       
Family benefits, 2000          -0.73  -0.73   











1980-2000    
b) Change in public 
spending, % of GDP             
Social spending, change 
1960-2000  0.73          
Social spending, change 
1970-2000   -0.31  
Social spending, 
change 1980-
2000 0.14  -0.04   
Total spending, change 
1960-2000  0.72          
Total spending, change 
1970-2000   -0.68  
Total spending, 
change 1980-
2000 -0.20  -0.09   
Transfers and subsidies, 
1960-2000  0.70          
Transfers and subsidies, 
1970-2000   -0.39  
Transfers & 
subs. 1980-2000  0.31 0.20   
   DI4000  GI00  POTO00  PABS00  POCH00  POCH200  POLD00 
c) Education 
achievements and 
spending             
  Mathematics  0.46  -0.49  -0.57 0.35  -0.50  -0.49  -0.23 
  Projects  0.45  -0.43  -0.60    -0.55  -0.55  -0.27 
  Science  0.20  -0.14  -0.46   -0.37  -0.37  -0.22 
  Reading  0.31  -0.27  -0.32    -0.35  -0.34  -0.02 
Public education 
spending 0.51  -0.53      -0.67     
   DI4000  GI00        DI4000  GI00   
d) Taxation      
f) Institutions  
and openness1/      
Personal income tax 
receipts, % of GDP  0.41  -0.46   
Independ. 
Judiciary 0.45  -0.48   
e) Initial conditions      
Regulation 
quality 0.10  -0.09   
Income share poorest 
40% households, 1960  -0.16     
Size shadow 
econ. -0.25  0.30   
 Gini coefficient 1970     0.57      Red tape  -0.49  0.42    
       Openness  0.36  -0.39   
 
1/ A higher index number implies a more independent judiciary and higher quality regulation but more red 
tape and a larger shadow economy. 
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Table 2 – Income distribution and expenditure reform 
 
a. Gini coefficient      
   Mid-1980s  Mid-1990s  2000  mid-1980s-2000 
Average, all countries  28.0  29.0  29.4  1.3 
Euro area  28.7  29.5  29.6  0.9 
b. Income share of poorest quintile of households 
   Mid-1980s Mid-1990s  2000  mid-1980s-2000 
Average, all countries  8.6%  8.4%  8.2%  -0.4% 
Euro area  9.0%  8.7%  8.5%  -0.4% 
      
Ambitious reformers, early  9.4%  8.9%  8.9%  -0.5% 
Ambitious reformers, late  9.9%  10.0%  9.4%  -0.5% 
Timid reformers, early  8.3%  8.0%  7.8%  -0.5% 
Timid reformers, late  8.3%  8.1%  7.9%  -0.4% 
Non reformers  7.9%  7.6%  7.6%  -0.3% 
c. Per-capita GDP poorest quintile, 1995 prices, PPP US$ 
   Mid-1980s  Mid-1990s  2000  mid-1980s-2000 
       %  change 
Average, all countries  7374  8677  9893  34.2 
Euro area  6917  8128  9458  36.7 
      
Ambitious reformers, early  7273  8456  10400  43.0 
Ambitious reformers, late  9213  10532  11813  28.2 
Timid reformers, early  6936  8141  9036  30.3 
Timid reformers, late  7735  9047  9860  27.5 
Non reformers  4299  4984  5819  35.4 
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poorest 40% of 
households, 2000 







 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 








(-3.93)      
Social spending 2000 













(-1.17)      
Per capita income 
ppp, 2000           
0.41 
(7.12)*** 
Amount of red tape/ 
bureaucracy   
-1.90 
(-1.72)       
Gini 1970 
    
0.47*** 
(4.85)    
Unemployment 




achievement, total     
-0.86***






(2.56)          
Education, problem 
solving      
-0.90*** 
(-6.13)    
Education, public 
expenditure   
0.53 
(1.38)       
Social spending 
education        
-0.004*** 
(-4.22)   
No. of observ. 
17 18  22  11  22  18 
R² adj.  0.58 0.52  0.56  0.92  0.66  0.86 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent.  
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Change in income share, 
poorest 40% of households, 
1980-2000 
 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Social spending change 
1960-2000 
0.39* 
(1.91)      
Transfers and subsidies, 
change 1970-2000   
-0.57 
(-0.24)    
Social spending change 
1980-2000    
0.08 
(0.81)   
Transfers & Subsidies 
change 1980-2000      
0.23** 
(2.76) 







(-3.34)    
Education achievements, 











No.of observations  15 10  19  16 
R² adj.  0.79 0.59  0.11  0.38 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent.  
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Table 4 – Model1, DEA results of income distribution efficiency, 1995-2000 
(1 input, public social expenditure; 1 output, Gini coefficient) 
 
Input oriented  Output oriented   
Country  VRS 
TE 
Rank 1  Rank 2  VRS 
TE 
Rank 1  Rank 2 
Peers 




Australia  0.808 9  9 0.923 16  16  JAP / SVK, JAP  0.799 
Austria 0.644  19  19  0.938  11  11  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.580 
Belgium 0.607  25  25  0.932  13  13  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.549 
Canada  0.833 7  7 0.941 10  10  JAP, SVK / SVK, JAP  0.803 
Czech  Republic 0.903 5  5 0.974  7  7  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.790 
Denmark  1.000 1  3 1.000  1  2  -  0.537 
Finland 0.797  10  10  0.981  4  4  DNK, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.571 
France 0.549  26  26  0.912  18  18  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.513 
Germany 0.618  23  23  0.936  12  12  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.553 
Greece 0.640  20  20  0.854  24  24  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.604 
Hungary 0.708  15  15  0.905  19  19  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.703 
Ireland  0.888 6  6 0.929 14  14  JAP / JAP, SVK  0.856 
Italy 0.608  24  24  0.861  22  22  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.581 
Japan  1.000 1  1 1.000  1  3  -  1.000 
Luxembourg  0.827 8  8 0.980  5  5  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.703 
Netherlands 0.774  11  11  0.972  8  8  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.662 
New Zealand  0.746  14  14  0.876  21  21  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.714 
Norway 0.747  13  13  0.975  6  6  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.630 
Poland 0.633  22  22  0.903  20  20  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.632 
Portugal 0.751  12  12  0.845  26  26  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.694 
Slovak Republic  1.000 1  2 1.000  1  1  -  0.836 
Spain 0.700  16  16  0.856  23  23  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.657 
Sweden 0.655  18  18  0.966  9  9  DNK, JAP / DNK, SVK  0.506 
Switzerland 0.637  21  21  0.928  15  15  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.590 
United Kingdom  0.656  17  17  0.854  25  25  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.618 
United  States  0.982 4  4 0.913 17  17  JAP / JAP, SVK  0.902 
Average 0.758      0.929       0.676 
 
Notes: 1) Social expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, annual average for the period 1995-2000; Gini coefficient, 
annual average for the period 1995-2000. 2) VRS TE is variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 3) Rank 2, 
countries in the production possibility frontier are ranked taking into account the number of times they are peers of 
countries outside the frontier. 4) Countries in bold are located on the VRS efficiency frontier. 5) CRS TE is constant 
returns to scale technical efficiency. 
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Table 5 – Model2, DEA results of income distribution efficiency, 1995-2000 




Input oriented  Output oriented 
 VRS 
TE 
Rank 1  Rank 2  VRS 
TE 




Australia 0.966  7  7  0.988  10  10  0.886 
Austria  0.795 15  15 0.978 14  14  0.643 
Belgium  0.748 18  18 0.973 15  15  0.609 
Canada  1.000 1  1 1.000  1  4  0.890 
Finland  1.000 1  4 1.000  1  1  0.633 
France  0.714 22  22 0.980 12  12  0.569 
Germany  0.747 19  19 0.970 17  17  0.613 
Greece  0.718 21  21 0.910 22  22  0.672 
Hungary  1.000 1  2 1.000  1  3  0.810 
Ireland  1.000 1  5 1.000  1  6  0.949 
Italy  0.721 20  20 0.927 20  20  0.651 
Luxembourg  1.000 1  3 1.000  1  1  0.779 
Netherlands  0.935 10  10 0.991  9  9  0.734 
New Zealand  0.960  8  8  0.985  11  11  0.824 
Norway 0.937  9  9  0.994  7  7  0.699 
Poland  0.855 11  11 0.972 16  16  0.710 
Portugal  0.851 12  12 0.943 18  18  0.792 
Spain  0.785 16  16 0.922 21  21  0.735 
Sweden  0.838 13  13 0.994  8  8  0.561 
Switzerland  0.811 14  14 0.979 13  13  0.654 
United  Kingdom  0.784 17  17 0.933 19  19  0.705 
United States  1.000 1  3 1.000  1  4  1.000 
Average 0.871      0.971    0.733 
 
Notes: 1) Social expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, annual average for the period 1995-2000; Gini coefficient, 
annual average for the period 1995-2000; Poverty rate, data for 2000. 2) VRS TE is variable returns to scale technical 
efficiency. 3) Rank 2, countries in the production possibility frontier are ranked taking into account the number of 
times they are peers of countries outside the frontier. 4) Countries in bold are located on the VRS efficiency frontier. 5) 
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Table 6 – Model3, DEA results of income distribution efficiency 





Input oriented  Output oriented 
 VRS 
TE 
Rank 1  Rank 2  VRS 
TE 




Australia 0.963  8  8  0.983  10  10  0.895 
Austria  0.830 10  10 0.953 11  11  0.691 
Belgium  0.768 16  16 0.941 13  13  0.645 
Canada  1.000 1  2 1.000  1  3  0.924 
Denmark  1.000 1  6 1.000  1  2  0.626 
Finland  1.000 1  7 1.000  1  5  0.701 
France  0.660 21  21 0.916 16  16  0.587 
Germany  0.806 13  13 0.949 12  12  0.667 
Greece  0.700 19  19 0.871 21  21  0.697 
Ireland  1.000 1  1 1.000  1  6  1.000 
Italy  0.673 20  20 0.875 19  19  0.666 
Luxembourg  1.000 1  4 1.000  1  1  0.812 
Netherlands 0.935  9  9  0.988  8  8  0.758 
New  Zealand  0.829 11  11 0.926 15  15  0.808 
Norway  1.000 1  5 1.000  1  4  0.783 
Portugal  0.781 14  14 0.895 18  18  0.779 
Spain  0.775 15  15 0.901 17  17  0.767 
Sweden  0.824 12  12 0.984  9  9  0.608 
Switzerland  0.766 17  17 0.939 14  14  0.674 
United  Kingdom  0.706 18  18 0.874 20  20  0.700 
United States  1.000 1  3 1.000  1  7  1.000 
Average 0.858      0.952    0.752 
 
Notes: 1) Social expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, annual average for the period 1995-2000; Gini coefficient, 
annual average for the period 1995-2000; Income share of poorest 40% of the population, data for 2000. 2) VRS TE is 
variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 3) Rank 2, countries in the production possibility frontier are ranked 
taking into account the number of times they are peers of countries outside the frontier. 4) Countries in bold are located 
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Table 7 – Descriptive statistics of DEA efficiency scores and model specification 
 
 Model1  Model2  Model3 
Average Input 0.758  0.871  0.858 
  Output 0.929  0.975  0.952 
Maximum 1  1  1 
Minimum Input 0.549  0.714  0.660 
 Output  0.845 0.910 0.871 



















Output 0.049  0.029  0.048 
Nº of DMUs  26  22  21 
Nº of efficient DMUs  3  6  7 
 
DMUs on the frontier 
DNK, JAP, SVK  CAN, FIN, 
HUN, IRL, LUX, 
USA 
CAN, DNK, 





- public social 
expenditure as a 
% of GDP 
- public social 
expenditure as a 
% of GDP 
- public social 
expenditure as a 




- Gini coefficient  - Gini coefficient 
- Poverty rate 
- Gini coefficient 
- Income share of 
poorest 40% 
DMUs efficient by 
default 
  IRL (out)  FIN (in), USA 
(out) 
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Table 8 – Censored normal Tobit results 
(dependent variable: output efficiency scores from Model 1 in Table 4) 
 











































   0.034* 
(1.69) 
   
Quality of 
judiciary  
      
Shadow 
economy 
    -0.021 
(-0.99) 
  
% of pop. aged 
65 and over 
      - 0 . 0 0 5  
(-1.08) 
ε σ ˆ   0.042 0.038 0.037 0.040 0.037 0.047 
Nº  of  observ.  22 20 19 19 20 22 
 
ε σ ˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of ε. 
The z statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.  
  
 
Table 9 – Censored normal Tobit results 
(dependent variable: output efficiency scores from Model 2 in Table 5) 
 















































    0.030*** 
(3.11) 





     
Shadow 
economy 
     -0.024*** 
(-2.11) 
  
% of pop. aged 
65 and over 
       -0.009*** 
(-3.68) 
ε σ ˆ   0.019 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.018 0.016 
Nº  of  observ.  20 19 19 18 18 19 20 
 
ε σ ˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of ε. 
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Table 10 – Corrected output efficiency scores (for specification 1 in Table 9)  


















Australia 0.988  0.003 -0.014 0.978  9 
Austria 0.978  -0.007 0.002 0.973  13 
Belgium 0.973  0.000 -0.009 0.965  15 
Canada 1.000  -0.008 -0.017 0.977  10 
Finland 1.000  0.004 -0.025 0.981  7 
France 0.980  0.007 -0.004 0.983  6 
Germany 0.970  0.006 0.000 0.976  12 
Greece 0.910  0.048 0.023 0.979  8 
Ireland 1.000  -0.013 -0.002 0.985  4 
Italy 0.927  0.009 0.016 0.951  18 
Luxembourg 1.000  -0.090 0.037 0.947  19 
Netherlands 0.991  -0.004 -0.012 0.976  11 
New Zealand  0.985  0.030 -0.013 1.000  1 
Norway 0.994  -0.016 0.006 0.984  5 
Portugal 0.943  0.045 0.018 1.000  1 
Spain 0.922  0.029 0.010 0.961  16 
Sweden 0.994  -0.002 -0.004 0.988  3 
Switzerland 0.979  -0.015 -0.007 0.957  17 
United Kingdom  0.933  0.010 -0.015 0.929  20 
United States  1.000  -0.037 0.009 0.972  14 
Average  0.973 0.000 0.000 0.973   
Note: the corrected scores do not always add up to the indicated sum since for the cases were the result 
was above one it was truncated to the unity. 
 























Australia 0.988  -0.006  0.006  -0.014  0.973  10 
Austria 0.978  -0.010  -0.006  0.000  0.963  13 
Belgium 0.973  -0.003  -0.006  0.010  0.973  9 
Canada 1.000  -0.012  0.000  -0.012  0.977  7 
Finland 1.000  0.001  -0.007  -0.014  0.980  6 
France 0.980  0.001  -0.005  -0.005  0.971  11 
Germany 0.970  0.000  0.007  -0.002  0.975  8 
Greece 0.910  0.031  0.015 0.027 0.982 4 
Ireland 1.000  -0.037  0.009  -0.002  0.970  12 
Italy 0.927  0.002  0.006  0.012  0.947  16 
Netherlands 0.991  -0.007  0.005  -0.007  0.981 5 
New Zealand  0.985  0.026  -0.010  -0.012  0.989  3 
Portugal 0.943  0.037  -0.005  0.029  1.000  1 
Spain 0.922  0.021  -0.009  0.010  0.944  17 
Sweden 0.994  0.004  -0.014  0.005  0.989  2 
Switzerland 0.979  -0.010  0.003  -0.012  0.960  14 
United Kingdom  0.933  0.002  0.008  -0.005  0.939  18 
United States  1.000  -0.039  0.004  -0.009  0.955  15 
Average 0.971  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.971   
Note: the corrected scores do not always add up to the indicated sum since for the cases were the result 
was above one it was truncated to the unity. 
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Chart 1 –  Income distribution data: an overview 
 
1a 1b 
   
1c 1d 
 
Notes: POCH50 – Child poverty, 2000; POLD50 – old-age poverty, 2000.  











































































LOESS Fit (degree = 1, span = 0.3000)  44
 Chart 2 – Gini coefficient, 
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Chart 3a – Social spending and income share of poorest 40% households, 2000 
 
y = 0.3064x + 13.222
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Chart 3b – Social spending & income share, poorest 40% households, change 1960-2000 
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Chart 6 – Production possibility frontier, constant returns to scale, one input (social 
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Chart 7 – Change in efficiency scores after correction: +(-), DMU moves closer to 
(further away from) the production frontier 
































































































































































































































































































































































































Distribution and growth in Europe – the empirical picture: a long-
run view of the distribution of income 
 
A B Atkinson, Nuffield College, Oxford 
 
1.  Methodological introduction 
2.  The evolution of the overall distribution 
3.  Top incomes over the long-run: Evidence from income tax data 
4.  Earnings: Episodes of change? 
5.  Wealth: A return of the rich? 
6.  Factor shares and the macro-economy 
7.  Conclusions 
 
 
1.  Methodological introduction 
 
The literature on income distribution over the past half century has been 
dominated by the Presidential Address given in 1955 to the American Economic 
Association by Simon Kuznets. This dominance is both surprising and unsurprising. It 
is surprising since the element for which the Address is best known – the “Kuznets 
curve” – has proved to have limited empirical relevance. According to the Kuznets 
curve, as an economy goes through a structural transformation, income inequality 
follows an inverse U-shape, inequality first rising and then falling as labour is 
transferred from low-productivity agriculture into high-productivity industry. In fact, 
as is well known, a period of falling income inequality has been succeeded in recent 
decades in most industrialised countries by rising income inequality. If there was an 
inverse U, the pattern has now become a U.   
 
  The influence of Kuznets (1955) is unsurprising because he seized on a central 
question concerning the development of the modern capitalist economy – does it lead 
to rising inequality? The long-run evolution of the distribution of income is a highly 
salient indicator, and one with which individual citizens and political leaders are 
much concerned. It is important to understand the past history in order to form a view 
about where we are headed and about the implications for policy. Is there – in the 
advanced economies of the twenty-first century - a natural tendency for income 
differences to increase? `Are the rich securing a disproportionate share of the fruits of 
growth?  Were previous periods of equalisation achieved only by government 
intervention? 
 
  In 1955, the distributional data available to Kuznets were very limited. His 
inverse-U was based on observations for just three countries (United States, United 
Kingdom, and Germany); for the United States he only compares 1929 and the “years 
after World War II (average for 1944, 1946, 1947 and 1950). The longest series is that 
for the United Kingdom, where he refers to evidence for 1880, 1910, 1913, 1929, 
1938 and 1947.  The first aim of this paper is to describe the long-run evolution of the 
income distribution using the much richer data now available. The data are richer 
because we can draw on fifty more years, with differing macro-economic experience.  
How for instance did inequality evolve during the “Golden Age” of the 1950s and 
early 1960s?  The data are also richer because recent research has provided new evidence concerning the period about which Kuznets was writing. The paper 
summarises what we know about income inequality over the twentieth century, 
covering a selection of OECD and EU countries.  
 
The second aim of the paper is to bring together different elements in the 
explanation of income inequality. Much of the recent literature has concentrated on 
individual earnings, and the rise in wage dispersion, but this is only one ingredient. 
The account given by Kuznets went much wider than employment in different sectors. 
He described a variety of mechanisms affecting the distribution of income, including 
the concentration of capital incomes and the impact of the political and social system. 
In what follows, I seek to link the explanation of the distribution of income to the 
mainstream of economics. If the Kuznets curve was an application of a dual economy 
model of development, then we need to make similar links to growth theory, macro-
economics, modern labour economics, and political economy. 
 
 
Review of empirical evidence 
 
There are three distinctive features of the review of the evidence in sections 2 
and 3: emphasis on high-frequency (annual) data, explicit recognition that data quality 
varies, and use of different sources.  Examination of a full run of years is important in 
understanding the kind of explanation that we should be seeking.  Not only has the 
Kuznets curve been confounded by more recent events, but it has become clear that it 
is misleading to talk of “trends” when describing the evolution of income inequality. 
As argued in Atkinson (1997), it is better to think in terms of “episodes” when 
inequality rose or fell. To distinguish such episodes, we need data covering more than 
a few years.  Indeed, there are considerable dangers in relying on a small number of 
isolated observations. For example, stability has been regarded as a long-standing 
feature of the British earnings distribution: “thus in a period [1886 to 1966] when the 
level of earnings of adult male manual workers increased by a factor of nearly 16, it 
appears that their dispersion (measured in percentage terms) changed very little” 
(Thatcher, 1968, page 163).  But this was based on simply five observations, 
separated in all cases except the last by more than 20 years.  Here, I attach a high 
priority to covering as many years as possible and to extending the coverage back in 
time.   
 
In seeking to extend the data coverage, the second consideration becomes 
important: adopting a graded approach to data quality.  Economists tend to swing 
between two extreme positions with regard to data quality.  They either use any data 
that can be downloaded, without any consideration of their quality, or they reject any 
data that depart in any respect from their ideal. In my view, we need to adopt an 
intermediate position, classifying data according to their suitability for the purpose in 
hand, in the present case the measurement of changes over time in the distribution of 
income. As a first step in this direction, I have applied a three-fold classification, 
parallel to that used in some areas of the national accounts: A denotes data that are 
most appropriate, B denotes acceptable, if not ideal, data that may be applied faute de 
mieux, and C denotes data that should not be used. In effect, this divides the useable 
data into two classes, not perhaps a radical step, but one that serves to extend the 
period covered, while not losing sight of the data quality issue.  
 
  2The adoption of this grading reflects the third distinctive feature of the 
approach followed here: the use of a variety of sources. Over the past 30 years, there 
has been an explosion of research in economics based on household surveys. The 
exploitation of household micro-data has been very fruitful, but we should not lose 
sight of other data sources.  In what follows, I make particular use of data from 
income tax records in section 3 on top incomes, of data from employer surveys in 





My central concern is with the distribution of family or household income, 
after transfers and direct taxes (i.e. disposable income), taking account of differences 
in family or household size and structure (i.e. adjusted by an equivalence scale). In 
seeking to explain this distribution, we have to consider several ingredients. Total 
household income depends on the earnings of individual members, which are the 
subject of section 4; indeed these are the single most important element for most 
households.  But the distributional consequences of earnings depend on household 
composition: the number of earners in the household, and the correlation of their 
earnings. Household incomes have been affected by the increased labour force 
participation of married women, and by the reduced participation of younger workers, 
quite independently of any changes on the dispersion of individual earnings.  
Conversely, an increase in the skilled earnings differential may lead to greater 
household income inequality, but it may be moderated where skilled workers are 
married to unskilled. Educated workers may have seen an increased premium, but 
their children may be those who are remaining longer in education rather than 
entering the labour force. We cannot therefore read directly from the distribution of 
individual earnings to the distribution of household incomes. 
 
To earned incomes are added incomes from capital, examined in section 5.  In 
classical analyses of distribution, the factor incomes were also functional incomes, 
with workers receiving wages, capitalists receiving profits, and landlords receiving 
rents. But while such a strict class division may have been appropriate in nineteenth 
century England, it has clearly ceased to be a realistic assumption.  As developed, by 
Meade (1964), we need a theory of individual income distribution, where individuals 
both work and receive capital income, in differing proportions. The distribution of 
income depends on the correlation between the two sources.  The class model 
assumed a correlation of minus 1. At the opposite extreme is a situation where all 
saving stems from earned income, as in a life-cycle savings model, and the 
distribution of wealth simply mirrors the distribution of earnings.  At this point, I 
should note that the life-cycle perspective also draws our attention to the fact that the 
distribution of annual income may be influenced by changes in the time profile of 
accumulation or in demographic structure. Increased dispersion of incomes may 
reflect the presence of more elderly persons, with reduced incomes, and should not be 
regarded as an increase in inequality. In the case of inheritance, another important 
source of wealth, the timing of transmission will also affect the annual distribution. 
Where parents pass on wealth before death, there may be an apparent reduction in the 
concentration of wealth. 
 
  3  The impact of earnings and of wealth depends on the relative magnitudes of 
earned and capital incomes. This brings us to the factor shares considered in section 6.  
There is however a crucial difference between the shares that feature in the national 
accounts (the returns to factors of production) and the shares recorded in the personal 
distribution of income.  To begin with, the aggregate share of employee remuneration 
(wages and salaries, plus employer contributions to social security and private 
welfare) is more extensive than the total wages and salaries that typically appears in 
the personal distribution. Employer contributions and welfare payments are usually 
not recorded, and their significance has been growing over time, particularly in the 
US.  Profits and property income involve key intervening institutions, notably the 
company sector, pension funds, and the state.  Moreover, the state creates classes of 
personal income – transfer payments and interest on the national debt – that have no 
counterpart in national income. These mean that the share of wages differ, since they 
are expressed as a proportion of a different total. As considered further in section 6, 
we need to track the relationship between the components of total personal income 
and the macro-economic aggregates. 
 
  Transfer payments and the national debt remind us that on seeking to explain 
the distribution of income we need to consider issues of political economy. The recent 
emphasis on global trade and new technology as causes of higher earnings dispersion 
has tended to create the impression that rising inequality is outside the control of 
governments, at least of national governments. But such external forces can be 
moderated or offset through the use of tax and transfer policy. The state can affect 
market returns through its macro-economic policy, and through its role as an 
employer and purchaser. Government intervention may shift the distribution of 
rewards.  
 
  As should be clear from this account, there are a number of branches of 
economics that are highly relevant to the explanation of the distribution of earnings, 
and we need to build bridges in several directions.  Earnings remain the single most 
important determinant of incomes, and we need to draw on labour economics. But we 
need also to relate the evolution of capital to theories of economic growth and to take 
account of recent developments in political economy.  
 
 
2.  The evolution of the overall distribution 
 
The empirical evidence is summarised in this section in terms of the Gini 
coefficient. A single summary measure is clearly inadequate and may miss the 
differing experience of different income groups, but in the next section I look 
specifically at the top of the distribution.  In assembling the data, I have tried to make 
them as comparable as possible, but this has not always been possible. Breaks in 
continuity are signalled, and differences are noted where this affects the examination 
of changes over time, but I have not commented on the comparability across 
countries.  The reader should not therefore use the graphs to draw conclusions about 
the relative degrees of inequality on different countries. The fact that the Gini 
coefficient for country X lies below that for country Y may reflect a systematic 
difference in the data source or in the definition of either income or income unit. 
 
  4I begin with the experience of the three Nordic countries shown in Figure 1.  I 
start with this group because they illustrate very clearly the U-shape that has come 
now to be the conventional wisdom.  Cornia and Court have described how “the 
Golden Age, a period of stable global economic growth between the 1950s and early-
mid 1970s, witnessed declines in income inequality in a number of countries (with 
some exceptions). This trend was reversed over the last two decades as country after 
country has experienced an upsurge in income inequality” (2001, page 7). In Finland 
and Sweden, the Gini coefficient for disposable income fell by more than 10 
percentage points between the mis-1960s and 1980.  To attach some significance to 
this change, suppose that the tax and transfer system were approximately linear, as 
with a uniform tax credit and a constant tax rate. Then, if government spending on 
goods and services absorbs 20 percent of tax revenue, a redistributive tax of 16 
percentage points would reduce a market Gini of 50 percent by 10 percentage points.
1 
Raising the tax rate from 20 percent to 36 percent would be a major political shift. 
After a period when the Gini remained more or less stable, inequality began to rise in 
the 1990s. The increase was some 6 percentage points on all three countries, more 
than half reversing the previous fall. (It should be noted that there have been breaks in 
the series for Norway and Sweden, as definitions were changed, which have to be 
taken into account.)   
 
The Nordics appear therefore to provide evidence for a “great U-turn”, as it 
was described by Harrison and Bluestone (1988). But a note of caution should be 
sounded.  As far as the downward arm is concerned, there is no clear evidence for 
Norway,
2 and in the case of Sweden a lot rests on the observation for 1967.  
Gustafsson and Uusitalo say that “because of some differences between the two data 
sets the comparability is less satisfactory” (1990, page 84), and the official Statistics 
Sweden series only starts in 1975. Gustafsson and Johansson (1999) exclude the 1967 
observation from their analysis of changes in inequality over time; here I have 
adopted the alternative procedure of grading it B, and for this reason the section from 
1967 to 1975 is shown by a dashed line. From 1975 to 1981 the fall was less than 2 
percentage points. In the case of the upward arm, it is not clear that there is a 
continuing trend; in the cases of Finland and Sweden, the rise seems to have been 
concentrated in the 1990s. 
 
The U-turn is more usually associated with the Anglo-Saxon countries.  Figure 
2 shows the Gini coefficients for the United States and the United Kingdom. Here the 
series go back further – before the Second World War – but the data are even more of 
a patchwork rather than a single series, reflecting in this case differences in the 
underlying data sources as well as different definitions. It should also be noted that 
the US estimates relate to income before direct taxation.  The US Gini fell by more 
than 10 percentage points between 1929 and 1944, was broadly level until the late 
1970s, and then rose by some 6 percentage points (taking half of the increase in 1993 
                                                 
1 A gross income of Y becomes a net income of (1-t)Y+A, where A is the value of the tax credit. Since 
A is the same for everyone (with appropriate equivalisation), the Gini is (1-t) times the value for gross 
income divided by the mean net income relative to the mean gross income, which is assumed to be 0.8.  
2 Those commentating on the Norwegian experience have reached different conclusions.  According to 
Bojer, the period 1970-1984 in Norway showed “great stability in the distribution of personal income” 
(1987, page 257).  According to Ringen, the distribution from 1970-1986 “has not been stable” with 
first a rise and then a fall in inequality (1991, pages 6 and 7). 
  5as being a genuine increase – see Weinberg, 1996, footnote 3).  Again, we should note 
that the period of the large decline is covered only by a small number of data points.  
   
For the earlier years in the UK, we have a synthetic series, based on income 
tax and other data, which suggests a fall in the Gini coefficient up to the end of the 
1940s parallel to that in the US. The pattern later departs from that in the US in that 
there appears in the UK to have been a fall of some 5 percentage points between the 
mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. This fall was more than reversed in the 1980s: between 
1980 and 1992 the Gini coefficient in the UK rose by 10 percentage points. If, in 
terms of percentage points of the Gini, the story of the Nordic countries and the US 
was -10, followed by +6, that in the UK was -10, followed by -5, followed by +10. 
Moreover, in contrast to the US, the Gini coefficient for the UK has levelled of in the 
past 15 years: the figure for 2005 is below that for 1990.  Any theory must explain 
why the evolution of income inequality in the UK was twice as severely affected as 
the US, and the episodic nature of the rise. A clue is provided by the difference 
between the two UK series for the latter part of the period, which distinguish between 
disposable income (bottom line) and market income (top line). The difference 
between them is, in arithmetic terms, the impact of transfers and direct taxes. 
Inequality in market income began to rise steadily in the UK in the 1970s, reflecting 
the decline in employment rates and the ageing of the population.  Taxes and transfers 
held this in check until the mid-1980s: the Gini for net income in 1986 was effectively 
no higher than 10 years previously. But the mid-1980s saw major changes in tax and 
transfer policy, and the Gini for net incomes rose by 7 percentage points in four years.  
Public policy must be part of the explanation. 
 
In Continental Europe (Figures 3 and 4), we find a marked decline from 1959 
to 1977 in the Netherlands: “the CBS [Central Bureau of Statistics] figures show quite a 
marked fall in inequality from 1962 onwards, a fall which continues into the first half of 
the seventies. About ten years of stability followed, after which a slight increase in 
inequality can be registered, starting in 1983. ... Thus the long-term fall in income 
inequality which had run through the 20
th century seems to have come to an end half 
way through the 1980s” (van Zanden, 1998, page 177). The rise from 1983 to 1990 was 
3 percentage points, but the 1990s indicate no continuation of the rise:  the Gini 
coefficients for 1991 and 1999 are identical. As in the UK, there was an episode of rising 
inequality in the 1980s, not continued into the 1990s.  In West Germany, the earlier 
period is surrounded by uncertainty. Both the budget survey (EVS) based estimates 
and the DIW synthetic estimates show falls in the Gini coefficient of more than 3 
percentage points, but the timing is quite different. The EVS estimates show a fall 
from 1962 to 1973, but this is not mirrored in the DIW synthetic estimates, which 
show a rise. The preference today is to use household survey data, but it is not evident 
that we should simply believe one series and not the other. The EVS is based on a 
quota sample, and a lot of weight attaches to the first observation in reaching the 
conclusion that inequality fell significantly. The DIW estimates incorporate 
information from other sources, notably the tax returns.  In the more recent period, the 
EVS and the German Socio-Economic Panel survey show a similar upward trend. The 
increase in the Gini coefficient indicated by the GSOEP data should be noted: even 
allowing for some year-to-year variation, the overall rise from 1990 has been some 5 
percentage points. A U-shape in Germany is now beginning to be more apparent. 
  
  6The graphs for France and Italy (Figure 4) show declines in the 1960s (France) 
and 1970s (both countries). (It should be noted that the Italian estimates are compiled 
from the same source – the Bank of Italy household survey – but different series, with 
different income definitions, reflecting changes in the underlying survey; the French 
data are drawn from the fiscal records (ERF).)  In France, the Gini fell by 5 
percentage points between 1970 and 1984; in Italy, there was a fall of more than 10 
percentage points between 1973 and 1982. Subsequently, the pattern in Italy was 
variable. As summarised by Brandolini, “from the early 1970s until 1982 ... the 
inequality of household incomes fell dramatically. In the mid-1980s, it showed some 
tendency to grow; a further decline in 1989-91 was soon reversed, and in 1995 the 
Gini coefficient was back to the value of 1980” (1999, page 222). The Gini coefficient 
in 2004 was essentially the same as in 1993.  Similarly, in France there is little sign of 
an upward trend over the period from 1996 to 2005.  This may change if President 
Sarkozy achieves a “rupture” with the past. 
 
  The final graph (Figure 5) shows the changes in income inequality in three 
Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004.  There is again a 
U-shape, but the underlying causes are likely to be different. It was under a 
Communist government that the Gini coefficients in Czechoslovakia and Hungary fell 
by some 5 percentage points from the 1950s to 1980.  The upward arm of the U was 
associated with the transition to a market economy. The reader may note that only one 
of the series is graded as B: the early part of the series for Poland, which is down-
graded because it is limited to worker households.  The quality of the data for Eastern 
Europe is examined at length by Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), where we 
conclude that the data for the three countries shown (although not the Soviet Union) 
were of comparable quality with those for the United Kingdom. The Eastern 
European sources had significant deficiencies, and there were undoubtedly aspects not 
adequately covered such as private incomes that were of increasing magnitude over 
time, but there were also respects in which they were superior. As was noted by 
Večernik, the Communist governments commissioned large surveys and response 
rates were high, and the “income surveys were highly reliable – at least with regard to 





  The popular view of a U-turn in income inequality finds some foundation in 
the evidence for 12 OECD countries presented above.  The recent upturn is evident in 
the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries, and, now, in Germany. But the conclusion has 
to be qualified. In the case of the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and possibly the Nordic 
countries, the increase in the Gini looks more like an episode than a continuing 
upward trend. In the Eastern European countries, the increase was associated with the 
transition to a market economy. Moreover, the timing of the downward arm of the U 







  73.  Top incomes over the long-run: Evidence from income tax data 
 
  The review of evidence about overall income inequality in the previous 
section has shown the importance of viewing recent changes in historical perspective; 
it has also shown how our view of earlier decades is based in some cases on a small 
number of isolated observations. In this section, I consider how we can flesh out the 
picture, and go back further in time, using data from income tax administrative 
statistics. The fact that they cover, particularly in the early years of the last century, 
only a small fraction of the population (here I focus on the top 1%), limits their 
usefulness. The UK super-tax provides an extreme example.  When the tax was 
introduced, super-tax payers were a small minority of the population: 11,328 tax units, or 
broadly the top 0.05 % of the total. But, although small as a percentage of the total 
population, this group typically receives a significant fraction of total income – 
between 5 and 20 per cent – and this can materially affect the overall Gini coefficient. 
As an approximation, a difference of 10 per cent in the share of the top 1 per cent 
adds (1-G-)10 to the Gini coefficient, where G- is the Gini coefficient among the 
remaining 99 per cent of the population. So that where G- is, say, 30 per cent, the 
difference in the Gini is 7 percentage points.  
  
  The use of income tax data is often regarded with considerable disbelief. The 
index to Morgenstern’s book On the Accuracy of Economic Observations (1963) 
contains the entry “income tax, as reason for lying”, and this summarizes well his 
general – if not very specific - skepticism. Richard Titmuss wrote a book-length 
critique of the income tax-based statistics on distribution, concluding, “we are 
expecting too much from the crumbs that fall from the conventional tables” (1962, 
page 191).  These doubts are well justified for at least two reasons.  The first is that 
income tax data are collected as part of an administrative process, which is not 
tailored to our needs, so that the definition of income, of income unit, etc are not 
necessarily those that we would have chosen. This causes particular difficulties for 
comparisons across countries, but also for time-series analysis where there have been 
substantial changes in the tax system, such as the move from joint taxation of couples 
to individual taxation in the UK in 1990. Secondly, it is obvious that those paying tax 
have a financial incentive to present their affairs in such a way that reduces tax 
liabilities. There is tax avoidance and tax evasion.  But these do not mean that the data 
are worthless. Like all economic data they measure with error the “true” variable in 
which we are interested. Moreover, we can compensate for some of the shortcomings of 
the income tax data. In particular, we can set the tax data in context by making use of 
independent estimates of the total population and the total income. These control totals 
are typically based on Censuses of Population and on national accounts estimates of the 
total income of persons.  The control totals require a number of adjustments and are 
surrounded by a margin of error, but the important point is that when I refer to the top 
1% having x% of income, this means the top 1% of the total population (aged 15 and 
over) and x% of the total income of all these individuals, whether or not they are 
taxpayers. It is not the top 1% of taxpayers. 
  
The attraction of income tax evidence is that it is available for long runs of 
years, typically on an annual basis, and that it is available for wide variety of 
countries. For example, Banerjee and Piketty (2005) have made use of Indian income 
tax data from the days when the British King was Emperor of India. It is however 
with OECD countries that these top income studies started. In 1914, Bowley used the 
  8British super-tax data to publish estimates in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Kuznets pioneered the use of control totals in his 1953 study for the US, Shares of 
Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings. The recent revival of interest in income 
tax data is due to Piketty (2001) when he published a 800 page study for France, 
covering the period since 1915. When I saw his results, I immediately set to work to 
make use of the super-tax data for the UK that I had been collecting, and produced 
estimates starting in 1908 (published in Atkinson, 2005). Piketty and Saez (2003) then 
developed the analysis for the US, starting in 1913. The interest in making cross 





English-speaking and Continental European countries compared  
 
  The evolution of the share of the top 1 per cent in five English-speaking and 
five Continental European countries is demonstrated in Figures 6 and 7. The data 
allow us to go back in all cases before the Second World War and, in 8 cases, to the 
the First World War or earlier. The graphs show the share of the top 1% in total gross 
income: i.e. income before tax but including taxable transfers.  
 
Starting with the English-speaking countries, we may note the high initial 
values: approaching 20% in the UK and the US, and being above 15% in Canada. 
Even in the more egalitarian Australia, the share in 1921 was around 10%, so that this 
top group of 1% received ten times their proportionate share of total gross income. 
This was to change. Over the next 50 years, from 1920 to the late 1970s, top income 
shares fell sharply in all five English-speaking countries. They differ in the timing of 
the fall.  In the case of the US, the annual income tax data allow us to learn much 
more about the timing of the pre-war fall (1936 – the year in Figure 2 – does indeed 
appear to be out of line).  Between a peak in 1928 and 1940, the share of the top 1% 
fell from around 20 per cent to around 15 per cent. But there was no comparable fall 
in Canada or Australia (although there was in New Zealand). In the US, from 1940 to 
1945 there was a further fall of 4 percentage points, and there were falls during the 
Second World War on Canada and the UK, but not in Australia and New Zealand, 
which also saw a post-war spike associated with the Korean War boom in wool 
prices. In Canada and the US, there was limited change in the period 1955 to 1975, 
whereas Australia, New Zealand, and the UK all exhibited significant peacetime falls 
in the share of the top 1%. At the end of the 1970s, in North America, the share of the 
top 1% was around 8%, whereas in the other countries it was some 5-6%. But all of 
the countries saw a reversal of this decline in the 1980s and 1990s. Here we have a 
very clear U-turn. Between 1980 and 2000, the share of the top 1% doubled in the US 
and the UK, and rose by between a half and three-quarters in the other countries. In all 
cases, we ended up broadly in the position immediately after the Second World War – 
and in some cases similar to the position at the end of the 1930s. 
 
  Figure 7 shows, in contrast, the shares of the top 1% for the five Continental 
European countries. We may note first the high initial values: the shares are around 
20% for France or higher for the Netherlands and Sweden. (The vertical scale is 
                                                 
3 At this point I should like to acknowledge how much I am drawing on the work of the team. The 
figures used here in Figures 6 and 7 is based on the research of Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, 
Michael Veall, Fabien Dell, Andrew Leigh, Wiemer Salverda, Jesper Roine and Daniel Waldenström. 
  9smaller than in the previous Figure.)  As Piketty has noted in the case of France, this 
is surprising. Some 125 years after the French Revolution, France had much the same 
inequality at the top as the UK that had no such overthrow of the aristocracy. The 
shares then fell, as in Anglo-Saxon countries. But the time paths are different. In 
France, the falls were largely concentrated in the war periods and the depression. In 
the Netherlands and Sweden, there were falls of some 6-7 percentage points between 
1945 and 1980, whereas in Germany the share in 1980 was within 1 percentage point 
of that in 1950. For four of the five countries, there has not been a U-shaped pattern 
over the twentieth century. The shares in France and Germany are virtually the same 
at the end of the period as in 1980, and those in the Netherlands and Switzerland are 
lower. In Sweden, the share of the top 1 per cent has risen – from around 3½ per cent 
to 6 per cent – but the rise appears more as a jump in 1991.  The series shown for 
Sweden in Figure 7, like those for other countries, does not include capital gains.  
Roine and Waldenström show that there is a clearer upward trend over time in the 
data including capital gains, Sweden resembling more closely the Anglo-Saxon 





  The income tax data provide only a restricted view of the distribution of 
income, but they allow the changes over time, at least at the top, to be tracked more 
closely. These reveal a broad commonality over the first three-quarters of the 
twentieth century, although differences in timing that reflect national specificities. 
Over the last quarter of the century, however, there were marked differences between 
the Anglo-Saxon countries and Continental Europe, with Sweden closer to the former.  
 
 
4.  Earnings: Episodes of change? 
 
I turn now to the components of total income. At the top of the distribution, 
capital income plays an important role, but for the mass of the population earned 
income is the single most important component. As observed in Employment in 
Europe 2005, “earnings inequalities are one of the most tangible subjects … with real 
implications for each and every individual” (European Commission, 2005, page 164).  
It is also a subject about which there are many myths.  It has been suggested, for 
example, that the recent rise in dispersion is noteworthy because it comes after a long 
period of “remarkable stability” in the earnings distribution. On this basis, the 
downward arm of the U was due, not to earnings equalization in the fashion of 
Kuznets, but to the reduction in the inequality of capital income and the growth of the 
welfare state financed by progressive taxation. In the US, Jones and Weinberg noted 
that “the earnings distribution for men remained stable, with a few exceptions, 
between 1967 and 1980” (2000, page 3). Writing about the U.K., Machin says “after 
showing relative stability for many decades (and a small compression in the 1970s) 
there has been [since the late 1970s] an inexorable upward trend in the gap between 
the highest and lowest earners in the labour market.” (Machin, 1996, page 62).  
Writing about the US, Morris and Western in their survey article for the Annual 
Review of Sociology state that “the postwar years of prosperity were marked by … 
relative stability in earnings inequality. The benefits of economic growth were large 
and widely distributed” (Morris and Western, 1999, page 625). This characterization 
  10in terms of “relative stability” is in fact a long-standing one, at least in the U.K.  
Commenting on the data for 1886 and 1978, Phelps Brown notes how “the average 
wage in money … has been multiplied by a factor of 64. Differentials between 
occupations and grades and regions have changed – mostly they have contracted. The 
distribution of manpower between different jobs and different places has altered 
radically. Trade unionism has greatly extended its power. … Yet, after 91 years of 
these changes … the dispersion of individual earnings remains very closely the same” 
(1979, p. 4).  
 
  The “stability” view has been challenged by other researchers, particularly in 
the US have emphasized the degree of change in earnings dispersion. “Great 
Compression” is the term used by Goldin and Margo to describe the narrowing in the 
US wage structure in the 1940s: “when the United States emerged from war and 
depression, it had not only a considerably lower rate of unemployment, it also had a 
wage structure more egalitarian than at any time since. Further, the new wage 
structure remained somewhat intact for several decades” (1992, page 2). On this basis, 
there was an episode of equalization in the 1940s followed by a period of stability in 
the 1950s and 1960s, before a widening of the earnings distribution starting in the 
1970s. Lydall, after recording “the substantial fall in dispersion of employee earnings 
in the United States from 1939 to 1949” (1968, page 177), went on to note that “when 
we turn to the period 1949 to 1959 we find a quite different picture. The general 
picture is one of stability, with a slight tendency to widening dispersion” (1968, page 
178).  
 
Evidence about the changes in the distribution of earnings in the US since 
1939 is brought together in Figure 8. In each of Figures 8 to 11, the solid symbols 
denote the upper percentiles, shown on the left hand axis, and the hollow symbols 
show the lower percentiles, shown on the right hand axis. The symbols get larger as 
one moves away from the median, so that the top decile is larger than the upper 
quartile. Where the data are graded B in terms of quality, rather than A, they are 
shown by dashed lines.  In the case of Germany, for example, I have classified the 
wage tax series prior to 1939 as B, on the grounds that the median has to be obtained 
from another source.  
 
 
The Great Compression and the Golden Age 
 
The points marked “Goldin and Margo” in Figure 8 show their results from 
the Census of Population, which began collecting earnings information for 1939.  The 
top decile fell from 195 per cent of the median in 1939 to 166 per cent in 1949.  This 
compression was however in part reversed from 1949 to 1959, when the top decile 
rose to 176 per cent of the median. In fact, from the annual data provided by the CPS 
tabulations, we can see the time path more clearly. The top decile began to rise 
immediately in 1952 and the rise continued unchecked until 1964. The path initiated 
by the great compression in the United States was not a flat-bottomed U but a V. This 
puts a different complexion on the 1950s and early 1960s, often regarded as a 
“Golden Age”. At the same time, these findings for the distribution of earnings in the 
Golden Age need to be reconciled with the observed changes in the distribution of the 
total income of households shown in Figure 2 earlier. For more recent years, 
Gottschalk and Danziger found that the distribution of hourly wages of men and the 
  11distribution of adjusted family incomes for the period 1975 to 2002 “follow 
remarkably similar patterns” (2005, page 232).  But this need not happen. In his 1972 
study, Henle (1972) addressed the divergent movement of the distributions of 
individual earnings and of total income by families. He concluded that these different 
trends could largely be accounted for by changes in other sources of income, notably 
increased transfer payments, and by the increasing proportion of families with two or 
more earners.    
 
Was a similar pattern found in Europe?  In France, the period 1946-1975 was 
described by Fourastié (1979) as Les Trentes Glorieuses, thirty years of growth and 
redistribution. Figure 9 shows that the upper percentiles were indeed increasing. The 
top decile rose from 186 per cent of the median in 1950 to 205 per cent in 1962. In the 
UK (Figure 10), we see both a rise in the top decile and a fall in the lower percentiles 
from 1954 to the mid-1960s. In the UK case, the data are drawn from different 
sources.  The employer survey (the New Earnings Survey) began in 1968; for earlier 
years the data are based on income tax records, which differ in relating to annual 
incomes and including part-year workers, which is why the bottom decile is lower. 
With the annual observations provided by these two sources, we can see that 
“stability” is a poor description of the UK earnings distribution before 1979. Between 
1954 and 1965, the top decile rose from 171 per cent of the median to 185 per cent.  
Between 1968 and 197, the bottom decile rose from 48 per cent of the median to 58 
per cent, a rise more than twice as large as the subsequent fall up to 1989. The 
German data in Figure 11 draw on wage tax, employer survey and household survey 
data. (They also cover the period when the Nazi party came to power.)  The different 
sources differ in level and (on occasion) in direction of change - see the series marked 
by arrows. They are however agreed in not showing a widening of earnings dispersion 
during the Golden Age. Germany appears to have followed a different path. 
 
Is there evidence for other countries?  For Australia, Lydall, using income tax 
data, had found that the “dispersion [of earnings] of both males and females was 
growing steadily from 1952-3 to 1962-3” (1968, page 190). In the case of Ireland, 
there was a fall in the top decile from the 1930s that was reversed in the latter part of 
the 1950s; although, there is no corresponding fall in the bottom decile. For New 




1968 and the 1970s 
 
Moving on in time, we can see from the graphs that Germany also appears to 
have differed from France and the UK in the later 1960s and 1970s.  The evolution of 
earnings dispersion in France up to the late 1980s was summarized by CERC in terms 
of three phases: “from 1950 to 1966 one sees, despite certain irregularities, a tendency 
for dispersion to increase. [The period 1966-1985] saw, on the contrary, a significant 
and regular reduction in inequality, at a stronger rate than the previous rise. Finally, 
since 1985, one sees a return to widening” (1990, page 1, my translation). The jump 
in the bottom decile in 1969 stands out in Figure 9. According to Piketty, “the rupture 
... arises from the “events” of May 1968 and the resulting social measures” (2001, 
page 165, my translation). He goes on to say that this break was “the result of breaks 
in the wages policy of the state, and notably in policy towards the minimum wage” 
  12(2001, page 165, my translation). The bottom decile fell back after 1969 but after 
1972 continued an upward climb that was reinforced by the Mitterrand election in 
1981. 
 
  The May 1968 effect was not limited to France.  According to Erickson and 
Ichino, “during the 1970s, Italy experienced an impressive compression of wage 
differentials” (1995, page 265). This is borne out by the evidence in Figure 13 from 
the Bank of Italy household survey for the upper quartile and top decile (data for Italy 
are shown by squares). The top decile fell from 177 per cent of the median in 1973 to 
143 per cent in 1981, a fall of a fifth. A major element in this compression was the 
Scala Mobile (SM), a negotiated wage indexation “escalator”, notably following the 
agreement between workers and employers in 1975. According to Manacorda, “the 
SM had a considerable equalizing effect and that it was largely responsible for the fall 
in inequality between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s” (2004, page 609). From the 
UK series in Figure 10 we can see that between 1970 and 1977, the bottom decile rose 
by 18 per cent, reflecting, among other elements, the impact of redistributive incomes 
policies and of Equal Pay legislation. The top decile fell over that period by 5 per 
cent. 
 
The same was true in Nordic countries. The data assembled for Sweden by 
Gustavsson (2004) show the quintile ratio for men as falling from 1.86 in 1968 to 1.7 
in 1976. As he notes, the period coincided with the heyday of the “solidarity wage 
policy” followed by the major trade union confederation, Landsorganisationen (LO).  
In their study of the earnings distribution, Eriksson and Jäntti describe how in Finland 
“earnings inequality dropped dramatically between 1971 and 1975, and continued to 
decrease until 1985 (Eriksson and, 1997, page 1763).  
 
 
Fanning out post-1980 
 
The rise in earnings dispersion in recent decades has been widely documented. 
As has been increasingly recognized (Atkinson, 1999), this has been particularly 
associated with the upper part of the distribution. Indeed a feature exhibited in the 
graphs – apart from France - is the “fanning out” of the upper part of the earnings 
distribution. The top vintile (P95) has increased more than the top decile and the top 
decile in turn has increased more than the upper quartile.  This is shown clearly for 
the United States in Figure 8, and rather less clearly for Germany in Figure 11.  In the 
case of the UK, the deciles have been increasing progressively more, the higher up the 
distribution one looks. Between 1977 and 2001, the lower quartile rose by 8 per cent, 
the top decile by 17 per cent, and P95 by 33 per cent.  
 
This feature is illustrated for a range of countries in Figure 12. These include, 
in addition to the three just discussed, Australia, Italy, Switzerland and Portugal, and 





   If one is seeking a single-letter summary of the changes in the earnings 
distribution over the period examined here, then a “W” seems more appropriate than a 
  13“U”. The 1930s and 1940s experienced a reduction in wage differentials – called the 
Great Compression in the US.  This was reversed in the 1950s and early 1960s: with 
the exception of Germany, this “Golden Age” saw a rise in earnings dispersion. The 
later 1960s, following the events of May 1968, in France and other countries 
governments and unions achieved a narrowing of the earnings distribution. The rise in 
dispersion in recent decades has to be seen in this context.   
 
  These observations raise immediate questions for the possible explanatory 
hypotheses.  If rising earnings dispersion was a feature of the 1950s, as well as of the 
1980s, then we may have to consider other explanations than those currently in 
favour, which emphasise the advent of Information and Communication Technologies 
and the impact of globalization. The reversal in the late 1960s and 1970s means that 




5.  Wealth: A return of the rich?  
 
  The second part of the decomposition is that for capital income, where I 
examine the underlying distribution of wealth.  As is well known, wealth is more 
concentrated than income, In Figure 13, I have drawn on data from a study by 
Ohlsson, Roine and Waldenström (2006), covering the France, the UK and US, and 
the Nordic countries. The graph shows the share of the top 1 per cent in total personal 
wealth. Interestingly, this shows, at the beginning of the last century, higher wealth 
concentration in all the “old” countries than in the US. The share of the top 1 per cent 
in the US before the First World War was under 40 per cent, whereas it was above 50 
per cent in France and Sweden (and almost certainly in the UK). But in considering 
this, we need to bear in mind that the share of the top 1% depends on what is 
happening both to the distribution between rich and poor and to the distribution 
among the rich. The share of the top 1% may be lower because the bottom 99%, in 
the richer US, had acquired more wealth by that time. In the UK the historian Richard 
Tawney once remarked of the soldiers of the First World War that most of them went 
off to war with their possessions on their back. Fewer than 1 person in 5 owned their 
homes. The share of the top 10% in total recorded wealth in 1923 was 89%.  Since 
then, we have seen a great expansion in “popular wealth”: housing, consumer 
durables, cars, and small savings. In a time series analysis of the share of the top 1%, 
a popular wealth variable is highly significant (Atkinson and Harrison, 1978).  In the 
US, the average wealth of the bottom 99 per cent rose by a factor of some 2½ between 
1916 and 1982, whereas the average wealth of the top 1 per cent was little higher in 





Rising “popular” wealth may be one of the causes of the fall in the share of the 
top 1 per cent over the first three-quarters of the twentieth century shown in Figure 
13.  In broad terms, shares that had been 40 per cent to 50+ per cent fell to 15 to 20 
per cent.  Reduction to around a third of their initial value still left the top 1 per cent 
with a disproportionate share.  With the approximate formula used earlier, and 
assuming a Gini of 40 per cent for the rest of the population, a fall of 25 percentage 
  14points in the share of the top 1 per cent would reduce the overall Gini coefficient for 
wealth by 15 percentage points. The fall appears to have been common across 
countries, but the timing differs. The fall in the US was sharper following the Great 
Crash in 1929 and during the 1930s; in France and Denmark the decline is marked 
during the World Wars.  In the UK, the decline continues during the 1950s. 
 
The expansion of popular wealth reduced the relative share of the top 1 per 
cent, but does not explain reductions in real wealth levels. In the case of France, 
Piketty shows that the average estate left by the top 0.01 per cent in 1992 was in real 
terms only a quarter of that left by the top 0.01 per cent before the First World War. 
He argues that the wealthy incurred severe shocks to their capital during the period 
1914-1945: two World Wars, inflation, and destruction of physical capital. These 
shocks had a permanent effect because progressive taxation prevented wealth-holders 
from restoring their capital. To quote Piketty, “the introduction of high income and 
estate tax progressivity [between 1914 and 1945] made it impossible for top capital 
holders to fully recover” (2007, page 10). The division of estates is also a factor. In 
the accumulation model described by Meade (1964), where there is equal division of 
an estate between the children, individual wealth accumulation depends on whether 
the internal rate of return exceeds the rate of demographic increase. The internal rate 
of return is governed by the saving rate and by the rate of return net of tax. The 
cumulative effect of high progressive rates of taxation could account for the 
continuing fall in top wealth shares in Denmark, Sweden and the UK: between 1945 





The recent reductions in top tax rates could have led to a reversal of this 
process. Inspection of Figure 13 shows that there was an increase, of 7 percentage 
points, in Norway, but that in the other countries the increase was less than 2 
percentage points.  This finding has caused some surprise in the US, given that the top 
income shares have risen, and the widely-held perception that there are more wealthy 
people (as indicated by the Forbes List of Billionaires and other journalist srudies). 
This has led to some questioning as to whether the estate method fully captures recent 
increases in wealth holding (although, as stressed by Kopczuk and Saez, 2003, the 
estate-based estimates are not in this respect out of line with the Survey of Consumer 
Finances).  It is possible that the increased top income shares arising from 
remuneration have not yet fed through into corresponding increases in wealth. But we 
have also to allow for the overall increase in wealth.  As Kopczuk and Saez show, the 
average wealth of both the top 1 per cent and the bottom 99 per cent have risen by 
some two-thirds in real terms between 1982 and 2000. Over the same period, the 
average real income per tax unit rose by 28 per cent (Piketty and Saez, 2007, Table 
5A.0). 
 
The wealth income ratio has risen. In view of this, we can perhaps square the 
popular perceptions with the wealth distribution data by defining the “rich” as those 
who have wealth in excess of a threshold defined as a multiple of mean income per 
person (or per tax unit). (There is an evident analogy with the definition of a relative 
poverty line.) In Atkinson (2007a), I treated as rich those individuals whose wealth 
exceeds 30 times mean income. In the year 2000, in the US, on which I concentrate 
  15here, the mean income per tax unit was $42,500.  In what follows, I apply a simple 
adjustment of 1.5 to convert tax units to adult population, which implies a cut-off for 
the US in 2000 of some $850,000 per person. The choice of a multiplier of 30 is based 
on the fact that at a real yield of 3⅓ per annum this level of wealth generates an 
amount equal to mean income per person. A person with W* could live off the 
interest at an average standard of living. An assumed return of 3⅓% does not seem 
unreasonable as a measure of the long-run real return. A higher rate of 4% is used by 
some institutions as a measure of the long-run sustainable expenditure while 
maintaining the real value of their endowment (US charitable foundations are required 
to take the still higher rate of 5%), but I have applied a lower figure to take account of 
the importance of owner-occupied housing and its incomplete representation in 
personal income. The cut-off is not dissimilar to the Cap Gemini definition of High 
Net Worth Individuals, which in 2006 is $1 million excluding home real estate 
(website of Capgemini, 21 February 2006).
4
 
In Figure 14 is shown the estimated number of rich people, on this definition, 
as well as the “super-rich”, defined as having wealth in excess of 30 x 30 x mean 
income, or some $25 million in 2000. The scale for the proportion of super-rich is 100 
times that for the rich, and the position of the graphs indicates that the super-rich were 
about 1 in 200 of the rich. If all wealth holdings are increasing faster than income, 
then the shares may remain constant, while the proportion of rich, and super-rich, is 
increasing. As may be seen from the graph, this is what appears to be happening. In 
1982, some 1.25% of US adults are classified as rich according to the criterion 
adopted here; by 2000, this had risen to close to 1.75%. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
the super-rich were 1 in 25,000; at the end of the century, they were 1 in 11,000.  
 
  Judged in relation to the aggregate economy, top wealth holdings have been 
becoming more dominant in the US. Moreover, as noted by Kopczuk and Saez 
(2004), among the rich wealth is becoming more concentrated. Figure 14 shows on 
the right hand axis the percentage of the wealth of the rich owned by the top quarter. 
This began around 60%, and rose from 1950 up to the mid-1960s; there was then a 
fall in concentration, reversed from 1982 (although with a pause in the 1990s). The 
Gini coefficient among the rich shows a similar pattern. In 1965, the Gini was 48.6%; 





  Over the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, the reduction in wealth 
concentration followed a similar path to that of overall income inequality, and 
specifically the top income shares. The fall in concentration reflected the positive 
force of the acquisition of popular wealth by the bottom 99 per cent, and the negative 
incidence of progressive income and estate taxation. In recent decades in Anglo-
Saxon countries there has been a rise in the proportion of rich, but that has taken place 
against a background of a general rise in the wealth-income ratio, so that the impact 
on wealth shares is less marked. 
                                                 
4 On the other hand, it is considerably higher than the level taken for the US by Danziger, Gottschalk 
and Smolensky (1989) to define “rich” in their article “How the Rich Have Fared, 1973-87”, where the 
cut-off was 9 times the poverty line, or $95,000 for a family of four in 1987 dollars (my definition 
would have yielded a figure around $475,000). 
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6.  Factor shares and the macro-economy 
 
Does the rise in the wealth-income ratio correspond to a rise in the capital-
labour ratio?  Or does it simply reflect a revaluation of unchanged income streams?  
In considering the link with the macro-economy, as recorded in the national accounts, 
we have to bear in mind several crucial measurement issues. 
 
  The income from capital recorded in the distributional statistics used in earlier 
sections of this paper suffers from two major shortcomings. The first is that, with a 
few exceptions, capital gains and losses are not covered. If we adopt a Haig-Simons 
comprehensive definition of income, then accrued gains and losses should enter total 
income. In practice, gains are measured only when realised and in most distributions 
they are omitted altogether.
5 Of course, capital gains do not appear in the national 
accounts, but for the personal sector they are the counterpart of retained earnings not 
distributed by the company sector.  At the same time, the Haig-Simons definition only 
points to the inclusion of real capital gains; we would not want to include the purely 
inflationary element. This brings me to the second shortcoming. As recorded in 
distributional statistics, capital income is money income, not adjusted for inflation. To 
this extent, capital income has been overstated in an inflationary age; and this over-
statement applies to all capital incomes, including fixed price assets such as savings 
bank accounts.  To my mind, insufficient attention has been paid to the implications 
for the measurement of income inequality of the fall in inflation (and in expected 
inflation).  It could well be that income from capital was over-stated in the 1970s, 
when inflation was high and real gains smaller, and is under-stated today when 
inflation is low and real gains, averaged over recent years, are substantial. If this is the 
case, then the role of capital income in the growth of inequality, and indeed the 
growth of inequality itself, may be under-stated. 
 
  The complement of capital income is the remuneration of workers.  Here too 
the picture is incomplete. The standard distributional analysis is based on total wages 
and salaries but does not include employer contributions to social security or to 
private welfare.  As has been emphasised by Burtless (2007), in the United States in 
recent years money wages have increased less rapidly than total compensation. 
Between 2000 and 2005, total compensation per worker rose by 5.6 per cent, but only 
29 per cent of the increase in took the form of higher money wages. Increased 
payments into employer health insurance (35 per cent), increased pension 
contributions (24 per cent), and social insurance (10 per cent) accounted for almost all 
of the rest.  Over the long-run there has been a general tendency for total 
compensation to rise faster.  In the estimates of Feinstein (1972) for the UK, in 1920 
wages plus salaries plus Forces’ pay accounted for 98 per cent of the total 
remuneration; by 1965 this had fallen to 92 per cent. 
 
                                                 
5 A number of studies of top incomes show series with and without capital gains: see the chapters on 
the US, Canada and Germany in Atkinson and Piketty (2007). 
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the income distribution statistics, to factor shares in national income, we need to 
decompose the changes: 
 
Share of Earnings in Total personal income 
 
=  Earnings /Total compensation x National income /Total personal income 
 
  x Total compensation/National income  
 
The different versions of the wage share are shown for the UK in Figure 15. The left 
hand side (personal income share) is shown by the hollow diamonds; the factor share 
is shown by the larger squares. The century, leaving aside the world wars, may be 
divided into three periods: before the Second World War, 1945 to 1980, and after 
1980.  In the first period, both shares rose. At the outbreak of the Second World War, 
the labour share was some 10 percentage points higher than at the outbreak of the 
First World War. From 1945 to 1980 there was a further 10 percentage point increase 
in the factor share, but there was no corresponding rise in the share of earnings in total 
personal income. The rise was in employer contributions: wages fell as a percentage 
of total compensation (see the solid line).  Indeed, the ratio of wages to national 
income was broadly stable in this period (see the line marked by crosses). In the final 
period, from 1980 to the present, there was a fall in the share of total compensation of 
some 10 percentage points. By 2006 the share had fallen back to its 1950 level. Self-
employment income has risen as a percentage, but even the allocation of the greater 
part of self employment income to labour would not make more than a couple of 
percentage points difference to the downward movement. There is a contrast in this 
respect with the situation in the US, where Dew-Becker and Gordon conclude that 
“there were substantial fluctuations in labor’s share prior to 1984 but little movement 
since then” (2005, page 7). 
 
  The UK experience shows that the share of earnings in total household income 
may move together with the share of labour in national income (as since 1980) or may 
move differently (as in the period from 1945 to 1980). We cannot read directly across 
from one wage share to another. In the case of the US, the estimates of Piketty and 
Saez show the stability of the factor shares (in the corporate sector) noted above, but 
that the share of earnings in total personal income fell between 1979 and 1989 by 
some 5 percentage points, and that about half of that gain had been lost  by 2003 
(2007, Figure 5.6).  In the case of France, Piketty (2007, Figure 3.4) shows that the 
labour share in corporate value added rose in the 1970s but then fell in the 1980s. 
Over the same period, the earnings share in household income fell steadily by some 7 





  The macro-economic theory of distribution has been little discussed in recent 
years, but should be revived. At the same time, once cannot read across directly from 
factor shares to the personal distribution. The experience of the UK, US and France 
suggests that the relation is one of some complexity.  
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7.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have shown evidence about the evolution of the distribution of 
income in a selection of countries, focusing on the comparison of time paths, not on 
comparisons across countries.  The evidence has highlighted the variety of these 
historical experiences. Indeed the first conclusion is that to any conclusion (including 
this one) there is always at least one exception.   
 
•  There has indeed been a U-turn in overall income inequality, which is evident 
in Anglo-Saxon countries, Finland, Sweden, Germany and Netherlands, but in 
a number of cases, the recent increase in inequality looks more like a limited 
episode rather than a continuing upward trend. 
•  Top income shares show a marked U over the twentieth century in Anglo-
Saxon countries and Sweden, with top shares rising over the last quarter of the 
century (although not in Continental Europe). 
•  For individual earnings, if one is seeking a single-letter summary of the 
changes in the earnings distribution over the period examined here, then a 
“W” seems more appropriate than a “U”.  
•  The 1930s and 1940s experienced a reduction in wage differentials – called 
the Great Compression in the US.  This was reversed in the 1950s and early 
1960s: with the exception of Germany, this “Golden Age” saw a rise in 
earnings dispersion. The later 1960s, following the events of May 1968, saw 
governments and unions achieving a narrowing of the earnings distribution. 
The rise in dispersion in recent decades has to be seen in this context.  
•  Over the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, the reduction in wealth 
concentration followed a similar path to that of overall income inequality, and 
specifically the top income shares. The fall in concentration reflected the 
positive force of the acquisition of popular wealth by the bottom 99 per cent, 
and the negative incidence of progressive income and estate taxation.  
•  In recent decades in Anglo-Saxon countries there has been a rise in the 
proportion of rich, but that has taken place against a background of a general 
rise in the wealth-income ratio, so that the impact on wealth shares is less 
marked. 
•  The macro-economic theory of distribution has been little discussed in recent 
years, but should be revived. At the same time, once cannot read across 
directly from factor shares to the personal distribution. The experience of the 
UK, US and France suggests that the relation is one of some complexity.  
 
The variety of experience points to the need for a variety of explanations. The 
distribution of personal income is a subtle combination of different mechanisms, each 
subject to exogenous and endogenous forces.  
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This paper investigates empirically the eﬀect of income and human capital
inequality on economic growth in diﬀerent regions of the world. In the estima-
tion of a dynamic panel data model that controls for country speciﬁc-eﬀects an
takes into account the persistency of the inequality indicators, the results show
ad i ﬀerent eﬀect of inequality on growth depending on the level of development
of the region. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd a negative eﬀe c to fi n c o m ea n dh u m a nc a p i t a l
inequality on economic growth in the whole sample for which there are available
data as well as in the low and middle income economies, an eﬀect that vanishes
or becomes positive when it comes to higher income countries. Nevertheless, a
more exhaustive analysis of the encouraging inﬂuence of inequality on growth
in the high income economies suggests that it is not stable over time and is
highly aﬀected by atypical observations.
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11 Introduction
Does more inequality encourage or discourage economic growth? A large body of em-
pirical evidence has tried to answer this question over the years, however, the literature
so far has not provided a conclusive answer to the query. In the early nineties, the
results of the theoretical models that formalized a negative eﬀect of wealth inequality
on growth and investment rates gained signiﬁcant relevance since their conclusions
were supported by the empirical evidence that used data on income inequality.1 In
particular, the empirical literature found that, other things equal, those countries
with higher inequality in the distribution of income in 1960 experienced, on average,
lower per capita income growth rates during the period 1960-1985. With the appear-
ance of Deininger and Squire’s (1996) data set, the quantity and quality of income
inequality data improved considerably with respect to previous sources. This new
data set allowed more recent empirical studies to use the temporal dimension of the
data to estimate panel data models. However, the estimation of panel data models
have challenged the cross-sectional results. For instance, in a panel of countries Barro
(2000) ﬁnds little association between income inequality and economic growth for a
broad number of countries. Moreover, he ﬁnds a negative relationship between both
variables in poor countries and a positive association in richer places. The most sur-
prising results are those by Forbes (2000). This study controls for country-speciﬁc
eﬀects and the ﬁndings suggest that in the medium and short term an increase in
the level of inequality in the distribution of income in a country has a positive and
signiﬁcant relationship with its subsequent economic growth rates.2 Some studies
have argued that the lack of consistency in the results is due to the fact that empir-
1Speciﬁcally, part of the literature focused on the political approach in which a median voter
chooses the level of redistribution in the economy. Assuming that such redistributive policies are
ﬁnanced by distortionary taxes aﬀecting investment, a more unequal society, in which the median
voter favours more redistribution, will experience lower growth rates (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994;
Bertola, 1993; Persson and Tabellini 1994). Other studies argued that under the presence of imper-
fect credit markets poor individuals with no collateral may not undertake a proﬁtable investment
project, which implies that the greater the number of restricted individuals, the lower the average
investment rate in the society (Galor and Zeira, 1993). See Benabou (1996), Perotti (1996) or Aghion
et. al (1999) for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
2Also estimating a dynamic panel data model but using regional data of the American States,
Panizza (2002) ﬁnds no evidence of a positive correlation between changes in income inequality and
changes in growth. In addition, he ﬁnds that the relationship between income inequality and growth
is not robust. He shows that the relationship depends on the econometric speciﬁcation and the
method used to measure inequality.
2ical studies estimate a linear model whereas the true relationship is not linear (e.g.
Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2003). Other papers object that income inequality data may be
a poor proxy for wealth inequality and, in order to palliate this shortcoming, they
use the distribution of other assets to analyze the eﬀe c to fi n e q u a l i t yo ng r o w t h( e . g .
Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Deiniger and Squire, 1998; Castelló and Doménech, 2002).
Recently, Voitchosky (2005) has argued that previous studies have used aggregate
measures of inequality, such as the Gini coeﬃcient, which mask the diﬀerent eﬀect
that the lower and upper part of the income distribution have on growth. And it is
a tt h i ss t a g et h a tt h ed e b a t ei nt h ee m p i r i c a ll i t e r a t u r et h a ta n a l y z e st h ee ﬀects of
inequality on growth remains.
In this paper we analyze the eﬀect of income and human capital inequality on eco-
nomic growth in diﬀerent regions of the world according to their level of development,
paying special attention to the Advanced economies or high income OECD countries.
This exercise is informative because according to Barro´s (2000) result, the eﬀect of
income inequality on economic growth may diﬀer in poor and rich economies. In
fact, most of the theoretical channels that predict a negative eﬀect of wealth, income
and human capital inequality on growth (e.g. political instability, credit market im-
perfection, fertility and life expectancy mechanisms) might have a stronger support
in developing economies. Therefore, including all countries in the analysis may give
misleading conclusions about the real eﬀect of inequality on the per capita income
growth rates.
Mainly, we depart from the previous literature in two ways. In the ﬁrst place,
from a methodological point of view, we use the system GMM estimator to control
for country speciﬁce ﬀects. The reason is that the traditional ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM
estimator used by Forbes (2000) may not be appropriate when variables are highly
persistent, as it is the case of income and education inequality measures. For example,
in a sample that includes all regions in the world more than 90 per cent of the
variation in income and human capital inequality measures is cross-sectional, whereas
the explanatory power of time dummies in regressions where the dependent variables
are the income and human capital Gini coeﬃcients is less than 1 per cent. Thus, by
taking ﬁrst diﬀerences most of the variation in the data, which comes from variability
across countries, disappears. The beneﬁts of using the system GMM estimator in
this context is that, in addition to controlling for unobservable heterogeneity, by
estimating an equation in levels, the system GMM estimator keeps the information in
3the data coming from variability across countries. In fact, in Monte Carlo simulations
Blundell and Bond (1998) have shown that under some conditions the system GMM
performs better than the ﬁrst diﬀerence when variables are highly persistent. In
addition, Hauk and Wacziarg (2006) also show in Monte Carlo simulations that the
system GMM estimator has better properties in the estimation of growth equations
than the ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM counterpart.
By using the system GMM estimator we ﬁnd that the inﬂuential results of Forbes
(2000) are not robust to this econometric technique. In a sample that includes 56
countries for the period 1965-2000 we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient for the income Gini
index in the estimation of a conventional growth equation. This result implies that
the strong positive eﬀect of income inequality on economic growth, found by Forbes,
might not be due to the proper control of country speciﬁce ﬀects. Alternatively, the
high persistency of the income Gini coeﬃc i e n ta n dt h ef a c tt h a ti ti sm e a s u r e dw i t h
error (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001) may rise some doubts whether the ﬁrst
diﬀerence GMM is an appropriate estimator in this context.
In the second place, in addition to analyzing the relationship between income
inequality and economic growth, we also use human capital inequality measures. In
fact, the role played by human capital inequality on economic growth is present in
most of the models that analyze the eﬀect of inequality on growth under imperfect
credit markets (e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993; Mookherjee and Ray, 2003). Moreover, the
latest advances in the theoretical literature also point out to human capital inequality
and its inﬂuence on demographic variables as alternative channels that predict a
negative relationship between inequality and growth. In particular, Castelló-Climent
and Doménech (2007) examine how human capital inequality may discourage growth
by reducing life expectancy and investment in education, rather than by increasing
fertility, as in De la Croix and Doepke (2003) and Moav (2005). Nevertheless, it is
worthy to point out that these mechanisms should have more support in developing
countries where diﬀerences in fertility and life expectancy among individuals are more
pronounced. On the contrary, in rich economies, the role of human capital inequality
on growth could be diﬀerent and might respond to the demand of highly educated
individuals in a rapid process of technological change.
Interestingly, the results found in this paper are in accordance with these predic-
tions. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that more human capital inequality discouraged the per
capita income growth rates in most parts of the world during the period 1965-2000.
4Mainly, in less developing countries where the life expectancy and fertility channels
seem that played an outstanding eﬀect. On the contrary, this negative eﬀect vanishes
when it comes to higher income economies. In particular, we ﬁnd that greater human
capital inequality encouraged the per capita income growth rates of the European
economies during the period 1980-2000. Nevertheless, a robustness check suggests
that this result is highly inﬂuenced by atypical observations.
Likewise, we also ﬁnd a diﬀerent eﬀect of income inequality on the per capita
income growth rates depending on the level of development. Using an updated version
of the Deiniger and Squire´s (1996) data set, we ﬁnd that the negative inﬂuence of
a more unequal distribution of income on growth in developing countries becomes
positive in the Advanced and European economies. Moreover, the use of a higher
quality data set from the Luxemburg Income Study for the higher income economies
displays similar results.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next Section we discuss the
data and the model. In Section 3 we display the results about the inﬂuence of income
and human capital inequality on economic growth in several samples that include
the total available data, Developing, Advanced and European Economies. In Section
4 we focus on the Advanced economies and use alternative inequality indicators to
examine whether the diﬀerent parts of the distribution have diﬀerent eﬀects on eco-
nomic growth. Moreover, we split the whole sample into diﬀerent sub periods to see if
the diﬀerent eﬀect of inequality on growth found in the European economies is stable
over time and if it has been inﬂuenced by the European Monetary Union. Section 5
contains the conclusions reached.
2 Econometric Model and Data
2.1 Econometric Model
Most of the empirical studies that have analyzed the relationship between income
inequality and economic growth have focused on cross-section growth regressions in
which an income inequality variable is added to the set of explanatory variables in
a convergence equation. One of the main criticisms of these kind of regressions is
that they suﬀer from two inconsistency sources. On the one hand, cross-section es-
timations fail to control for speciﬁc characteristics of countries, such as diﬀerences
5in technology, tastes, climate or institutions, whose omission may bias the coeﬃcient
of the explanatory variables. On the other hand, they do not address properly the
treatment of some explanatory variables that, according to the theory, should be con-
sidered to be endogenous. Both remarks seem extremely important in the relationship
between inequality and growth as suggested by Forbes´s (2000) results. Therefore,
we propose to analyze the eﬀect of income and human capital inequality on economic
growth by estimating the following standard growth equation:
(lnyi,t − lnyi,t−τ)/τ = β lnyi,t−τ + γInequalityi,t−τ + Xi,t−τδ + ξt + αi + εit (1)
Reorganizing we can rewrite equation (1) as a dynamic model:
lnyi,t = e β lnyi,t−τ + e γInequalityi,t−τ + Xi,t−τe δ +e ξt + e αi +e εi,t (2)
If we consider τ diﬀerent from one, we have that e β = τβ+1 , e γ = τγ, e δ = τδ,
e ξt = τξt, e αi = ταi and e εi,t = τεi,t. The deﬁnition of variables is as follows, yi,t
is the real GDP per capita in country i measured at year t, τ is a ﬁve-year span,
Inequalityi,t−τ measures income and human capital inequality in country i at the
beginning of the period, β, γ and δ represent the parameters of interest that are
estimated, ξt is a time speciﬁce ﬀect , αi stands for speciﬁc characteristics of every
country that are constant over time and  it collects the error term that varies across
countries and over time.
In order to reduce any omitted variable bias, matrix Xi,t−τ includes k explanatory
variables, suggested in the literature as important determinants of the growth rates
(e.g. Barro, 2000). The empirical studies analyzing growth usually estimate a broader
version of the neoclassical growth model that includes the convergence property as
well as other variables that determine the steady state. In this line, the model to
be estimated will control for initial conditions and for some variables, chosen by the
government or private agents, which characterize the steady-state conditions. The
variables that account for the initial conditions are the level of per capita income
(lny) and the initial stock of human capital, proxied by the average years of male sec-
ondary and tertiary education of the population aged 25 years and over (Educ).3 The
3Evidence suggests that higher male levels of education accounts more for growth than primary
6determinants of the steady state include some variables that answer for government
policies and others that refer to optimal decisions by private agents. These variables
include the government share of real GDP (G/GDP); total trade, measured as ex-
ports plus imports divided by real GDP (Trade)a n dt h ei n ﬂation rate, measured as
the annual growth rate of consumer prices (Inﬂation). Human and physical capital
accumulation are ruled out from the set of controls because they are endogenous in
the model; most of the mechanisms that predict a negative eﬀect of inequality on
growth work through a discouraging eﬀect on the investment rates.
The most common approach to estimate a dynamic panel data model has been
the ﬁrst diﬀerence Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991). The idea of this estimator is to take ﬁrst diﬀerences to
eliminate the source of inconsistency, that is αi, and use the levels of the explana-
tory variables lagged two and further periods as instruments. In order for the ﬁrst
diﬀerence GMM estimator to be consistent we need to assume that the errors are
not second order serially correlated and that the explanatory variables are weakly
exogenous.
However, although the ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM estimator deals properly with the
problem of unobservable heterogeneity, it has some shortcomings in the estimation
of equation (2). The ﬁrst has to be with the characteristic of persistency of the
variables included in this equation. These variables, particularly income and human
capital inequality measures, vary signiﬁcantly across countries but remain quite stable
within a country. For instance, Table 1 shows that more than 90 per cent of the
variation in income and human capital inequality measures is cross-sectional, whereas
the explanatory power of time dummies in regressions where the dependent variables
are the income and human capital Gini coeﬃcients is less than 1 per cent. Thus, by
taking ﬁrst diﬀerences most of the variation in the data, which comes from variability
across countries, disappears. This fact may indeed increase the measurement error
bias by increasing the variance of the measurement error relative to the variance of
the true signal (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Moreover, Blundell and Bond (1998)
point out that when explanatory variables are persistent, the lagged levels of the
explanatory variables are weak instruments for the variables in diﬀerences. They
show that in small samples the shortcoming of weak instruments translate into a
large ﬁnite sample bias.
and female education (see for example Barro, 2000).
7Therefore, an econometric technique that exploits the bulk of the variation in the
data would be preferable in order to improve the precision of the estimated coeﬃcients.
By adding the original equation in levels to a system of equations that also include
equations in ﬁrst diﬀerences, the system GMM estimator is particularly useful in
our context since, in addition to controlling for country-speciﬁce ﬀects, it preserves
the cross-country dimension of the data that is lost when only the ﬁrst diﬀerenced
equation is estimated (e.g. Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) .
In the system GMM estimator the equations in ﬁrst diﬀerences eliminate the
ﬁxed eﬀect in the model. Moreover, the diﬀerence equations are combined with
equations in levels, which are instrumented with the lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences of the
corresponding explanatory variables. In order to use these additional instruments, we
need the identifying assumption that the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the explanatory variables
are not correlated with the speciﬁce ﬀect, that is, although the speciﬁce ﬀect may
be correlated to the explanatory variables, the correlation is supposed to be constant
over time. If the moment conditions are valid, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that
in Monte Carlo simulations the system GMM estimator performs better than the ﬁrst
diﬀerence GMM estimator. We can test the validity of the moment conditions by using
the conventional test of overidentifying restrictions proposed by Sargan (1958) and
Hansen (1982) and by testing the null hypothesis that the error term is not second
order serially correlated. Furthermore, we will test the validity of the additional
moment conditions associated with the level equation with the diﬀerence Hansen
test.
2.2 Data
The sources of the data used are as follows. The data on real GDP per capita (lny),
government spending (G/GDP), measured as government share of real GDP, and
total trade (Trade), measured as exports plus imports to real GDP, are taken from
PWT 6.2 by Heston, Summers and Aten. The latest version of the PWT has updated
the measures of per capita income up to 2005, which allows as to use one more period
in the sample, 1960-2005. Inﬂation rate (Inﬂation), measured as the annual growth
rate of consumer prices, is taken from the Global Development Growth Data Base
compiled by Easterly and Sewadeh (2002).
The income Gini coeﬃcient (Giniy) is from Deininger and Squire’s (1996) data
8set and updated by the World Bank. Under the same premise of including only “high
quality” data, we broaden the observations used by Forbes (2000) in two directions.
On the one hand, we extend the income inequality data up to 1995. On the other
hand, we add a few more countries. The observations used by Forbes (2000) and the
new sample used in this study are displayed in Table A. Even though we can include
only twelve more countries, Table A shows that most of them are developing countries
and six of them are in Africa. This enlargement is one step further in achieving a
data set that represents all areas in the world, some of them with no observations
in Forbes’ sample. On balance, there is a total of 56 countries with at least two
observations of the income Gini index.
I nt h es e c o n dp a r to ft h ep a p e rw ef o c u so nt h ee ﬀect of inequality on growth
in a sample of economically Advanced economies and European countries. Thus, we
use the Luxemburg Income Study that provides improved data for income inequality
measures with regard to quality and comparability across countries. The main draw-
back of the LIS data set is that it only contains data for a reduced sample of wealthy
economies starting in 1980.
A more comprehensive data set on inequality measures is that for human capital
inequality variables (Ginih, Quintileh), which are available for 108 countries during
the period 1960-2000. The source of human capital inequality measures is Castello
and Domenech (2002) and the education variable (Educ)i st a k e nf r o mt h el a t e s t
Barro and Lee’ (2001) data set.4
3 Empirical Results
The role played by human capital accumulation is present in most of the models that
analyze the relationship between inequality and growth. Furthermore, inequality in
education is highly related to inequality in opportunities, which can be very acute
i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fc r e d i tm a r k e tc o n s t r a i n t s . F o ri n s t a n c e ,u n d e ri m p e r f e c tc r e d i t
markets and indivisibilities in the accumulation of human capital, Galor and Zeira
(1993) ﬁnd that the greater the share of the population credit constrained, the lower
the average human capital in the economy. In this model wealth transmission from
4Table A reports data on 12 countries that were not included in Forbes’ sample. These countries
are Algeria, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Ghana, Mauritaia, Mauritius, South Africa, Uganda, Honduras,
Jamaica and Taiwan. However, unlike Forbes´ study, Table A does not report data on Bulgaria
because this country is not included in Castello and Domenech’s (2002) data set.
9parents to children depends on the parents´ human capital. As a result, the initial
distribution of wealth is mainly driven by the initial distribution of human capital.
Mechanisms that point out diﬀerent fertility patterns among individuals with
diﬀerent levels of education also predict that the distribution of education on one side
and decisions on human capital investment and fertility on the other are highly related
(e.g. De la Croix and Doepke, 2003; Moav, 2005). In these models parents with lower
human capital choose to have a higher number of children and less education for
them, which hampers the number of skilled individuals in the future and therefore
the average level of human capital and growth rates in the economy. Recently, other
papers have also pointed out that the initial distribution of education may hamper
the human capital investment rates by reducing the average life expectancy. Castello-
Climent and Doménech (2007) show that when parents education inﬂuences oﬀspring
life expectancy, as it is shown by empirical evidence (e.g. Case et al., 2002; Currie
and Moretti, 2003), the initial distribution of education, by aﬀecting life expectancy,
has outstanding eﬀects on a country´s average rate of investment in human capital.
Therefore, in the ﬁst place we check whether the distribution of education has had
any eﬀect on the per capita income growth rates in diﬀerent regions of the world. In
fact, we should expect that the negative eﬀect of human capital inequality on growth,
predicted from the theoretical models, should be more acute in developing countries,
where the diﬀerence between life expectancy and fertility patterns among the strata
of the population are more acute. On the contrary, the role that the demographic
channels are expected to play in richer economies is likely to be less important.
Using available data for the distribution of education, computed by Castello and
Domenech (2002), we examine the eﬀect of human capital inequality on economic
growth during the period 1965-2005. The results, displayed in Table 2, show a clear
negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the human capital Gini coeﬃcient on
the per capita income growth rates in a sample of 102 countries that include all
countries in the world for which there are available data. Moreover, this eﬀect is
not only statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level but it is also considerable in
quantitative terms; an increase in 0.1 points in the human capital Gini index reduces
the annual growth rate by 0.51 per cent. The results of the other variables are also as
expected; a negative coeﬃcient of the initial per capita income, showing conditional
convergence, a positive eﬀect of the educational variable and a negative one of the
government expenditure. Moreover, we ﬁnd that more openness, measured through
10the share of total trade, has had a positive inﬂuence on a country´s per capita income
growth rate whereas more inﬂa t i o nh a sh a dan e g a t i v eo n e .
Once we have examined the eﬀect of human capital inequality on the growth rates
in the whole sample, we focus on diﬀerent regions of the world to test whether the
inﬂuence of human capital inequality on growth diﬀers in countries with diﬀerent
levels of development. The results show that the estimated coeﬃcient in the whole
sample practically holds when we reduce the countries to include only developing
economies, as displayed in column (2).5 Likewise, when we restrict the sample to
OECD countries the estimated coeﬃcient of the human capital Gini index continues
having a negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact at the 1 per cent level on the
per capita income growth rate, though the economic impact is smaller in absolute
value. Nevertheless, once we remove the countries that are not classiﬁed as high
income economies from the OECD sample the negative eﬀect on the growth rates
of an increase in human capital inequality is no so evident. The results displayed
in column (4) for the Advanced or high income OECD economies show that the
estimated coeﬃcient of the human capital Gini index reduces more than half and
stops being statistically signiﬁcant at the standard levels.6 Moreover, the absence of
an e g a t i v ee ﬀect from human capital inequality on growth is even more clear in the
European economies. Column (5) displays a positive coeﬃcient of the human capital
Gini index, though it is not statistically signiﬁc a n t ,f o ras a m p l eo f2 0E u r o p e a n
economies.
A c c o r d i n gt os o m et h e o r e t i c a lm o d e l s , human capital inequality could aﬀect eco-
nomic growth rates through its inﬂuence on demographic variables. Thus, in the
remaining columns we include the fertility rates and a measure of the life expectancy
in the set of controls. In line with the theoretical predictions, columns (6-8) show that
once we control for demographic variables the negative and statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient of the human capital Gini index disappears in the World sample as well as
in the Developing and OECD economies. In fact, we ﬁnd that longer life expectancy
h a sh a das t r o n gp o s i t i v ei n ﬂuence on the growth rates whereas more fertility rates
5Developing countries include low and middle income countries ($11,115 or less) as classiﬁed by
the World Bank in 2007. Income groups are classiﬁed according to 2006 gross national income per
capita.
6The Advanced economies include the high income OECD economies as classiﬁed by the World
Bank. OECD cuntries not classiﬁed as high income economies in our sample inlcude Hungary,
Mexico, Poland and Turkey.
11have had a discouraging eﬀect on growth. Moreover, as expected, the non existent
inﬂuence of human capital distribution on growth in the Advanced and European
economies is not aﬀected by controlling for the demographic measures.
Up to now we have examined the eﬀect of human capital inequality on economic
growth. However, it may be possible that the human capital inequality measure
is picking up an income inequality eﬀect. Therefore, in Table 3 we examine the
individual and joint eﬀect of income and human capital inequality on the per capita
income growth rates in diﬀerent regions of the world. Nevertheless, whereas there
are data for human capital inequality measures for 108 countries over the period
1960-2000, the availability of data of income inequality measures for a broad number
o fc o u n t r i e sa n dp e r i o d si ss c a r c e . S p e c i ﬁcally, by controlling for income inequality
measures the number of countries halves and in many of these countries there are
only data for two periods.
Table 3 displays the results of the eﬀect of human capital and income inequality on
economic growth in the reduced sample of 56 countries for which there are available
data on income inequality measures. With regard to human capital inequality, the
results display a negative coeﬃcient of the human capital Gini index in all samples,
though in the Advanced and European economies this coeﬃcient is not statistically
signiﬁcant at the standard levels. Also in line with the previous ﬁndings, the lower
part of the table shows that the negative coeﬃcient of the human capital Gini index
in the World, Developing and OECD samples stops being statistically signiﬁcant once
we control for the life expectancy and the fertility rates, suggesting that some of this
negative eﬀect is driven through the demographic variables.
The independent eﬀect of income inequality on growth is displayed in the second
column of every group of countries. With regard to the whole sample, column (2)
shows that an increment in income inequality has hampered the growth rates in the
whole sample that includes all countries for which there are available data. This
result is very important because it highlights that the striking ﬁndings of Forbes
(2000), who ﬁnds a strong positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the
income Gini index by using the ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM estimator, could be driven by
t h ef a c tt h a ti n e q u a l i t ym e a s u r e sa r eh i g h ly persistent and measure with error and
not by the omission of country speciﬁce ﬀects in the model.
The results also suggest that the inﬂuence of income inequality on economic growth
in the Advanced and European countries is diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a tf o u n di nt h er e s to f
12the world. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient in the sample of Developing and
OECD countries, though the coeﬃcient is only statistically signiﬁcant in the latter.
Interestingly, in line with the demographic channels, we also ﬁnd that the negative
eﬀect of income inequality on growth, if any, disappears once the measures of life
expectancy and fertility rates are accounted for (see lower part of the Table). On the
contrary, the estimated coeﬃcient of the Gini index is positive, though not statistically
signiﬁcant at the standard levels, for the Advanced and European economies.
Finally, we control for both human capital and income inequality to test whether
they have any independent eﬀect on growth (results are displayed in the third column
of every group of countries). The results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the
coeﬃcient of the human capital and income Gini indexes are negative and statistically
signiﬁcant in the sample that includes all countries, which suggests that income and
education inequality have had a negative and independent eﬀect on the per capita
income growth rates. Moreover, the fact that these coeﬃcients stop being statistically
signiﬁcant once fertility and life expectancy are included in the set of controls gives
support to the predictions of the demographic mechanisms. Secondly, whereas the
negative eﬀect of a more unequal distribution of education holds, the coeﬃcient of the
income Gini index is close to zero in the sample of Developing countries. Moreover,
once the demographic variables are included, the estimated coeﬃcient of income Gini
index is even positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. Finally, in
the Advanced and European economies we also ﬁnd a diﬀerent eﬀect of income and
human capital inequality on growth. Speciﬁcally, the estimated coeﬃcient of the hu-
man capital Gini index continues being negative, though not statistically signiﬁcant.
However, the evidence suggest that a greater inequality in the distribution of income
has had a beneﬁcial eﬀect on the per capita income growth rates of the Advanced
and European economies; the coeﬃcient of the income Gini index is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 and 5 per cent signiﬁcance level respectively.
To sum up, when we control for both, income and human capital inequality,
whereas we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient of the human capital Gini index in all sam-
ples the eﬀect of income inequality on growth diﬀers across regions. Speciﬁcally,
more income inequality seems to be related to higher growth rates in rich economies.
The diﬀerential eﬀect of human capital and income inequality in the Advanced and
European economies is analysed in more detail in the remaining part of the paper.
134 Income and Human Capital Inequality in the
Advanced Economies
In this section we examine in more detail the evolution of income and human capital
inequality over time and its eﬀect on the per capita income growth rates in the high
income OECD economies and in the European countries.
In Figure 1 we plot the income Gini coeﬃcient for the Advanced economies. For
the few countries for which there are available data in the seventies, we observe a
reduction in the income Gini coeﬃcient over this 10 year span. The reduction in
income inequality is found not only in higher inequality countries such as the United
States and Canada but also in lower income inequality economies such as Germany or
Sweden. However, the behaviour of the income Gini coeﬃcient changes dramatically
in the eighties. In particular, from 1980 to 1990 we observe an increase in the income
Gini coeﬃcient in most of the Advanced economies. The greater increase is found in
the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Sweden. Moreover, Figure 1 also
shows that the tendency of increasing income inequality continues in the nineties as
well. Some exceptions are Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Ireland and Greece,
which slightly reduced income inequality over this period. However, in spite of the
general increment in income inequality in the Advanced economies since 1980, in year
2000 there are noticeable diﬀerences among these countries. Speciﬁcally, income Gini
coeﬃcients above 0.33 can be found in the United States, United Kingdom, Spain
and Greece. On the other extreme are Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway
or Sweden, with income Gini coeﬃcients below 0.26.
The pattern of human capital inequality over this period diﬀe r sf r o mt h a to b s e r v e d
with income inequality. Broadly, human capital inequality has remained constant over
the whole period. In fact, Figure 2 shows that from 1990 to 2000 most of the countries
have maintained their relative positions, being located very close to the diagonal line.
Nevertheless, the variation in human capital inequality across countries is higher than
that observed with income inequality. For instance, in year 2000 Portugal and Italy
d i s p l a y e dah u m a nc a p i t a lG i n ic o e ﬃcient close to 0.4 and 0.35, respectively. On
the other extreme are Norway, the United States, Canada and New Zealand with a
Gini coeﬃcient close to 0.1. As a result, human capital inequality displays a lower
average and greater variation than income inequality. In particular, the statistics for
the Advanced economies in year 2000 show an average human capital Gini coeﬃcient
14of 0.20 with a standard deviation equal to 0.07, whereas the average income Gini
coeﬃcient is 0.29 with a standard deviation of 0.04.
Next, we examine the eﬀect of human capital and income inequality on the per
capita income growth rates in diﬀerent samples that include higher income countries.
In the ﬁrst place, we will split the whole sample into diﬀerent subperiods. This will
allow us to check if the eﬀect of inequality on growth has been stable over time and if
the European Monetary Union has had any inﬂuence on the diﬀerential eﬀect found
in the European countries. In particular, we will compare the eﬀect of inequality
on growth in the Euro area with that observed in countries with similar levels of
development such as the whole European region and other Advanced or high per
capita income economies.7
Moreover, we will complement the information provided by the Gini coeﬃcient
with additional measures of the diﬀerent parts of the distribution such as the distrib-
ution of education by quintiles or ratios of several income percentiles. The use of these
additional measures is helpful because the Gini coeﬃcient is an aggregate measure
of inequality and it does not provide any information on whether the lower an upper
part of the distribution have diﬀerent eﬀects on the growth rates. In fact, Voitchosky
(2005) states that the use of a unique and aggregate measure of inequality, such as the
Gini coeﬃcient, may mask the complex eﬀe c tt h a tt h ed i ﬀerent parts of the income
distribution may have on economic growth. Speciﬁcally, using the Luxemburg Income
Study data set she ﬁnds that inequality at the top end of the income distribution is
positively related to economic growth, whereas inequality at the bottom end of the
distribution has a negative impact on subsequent growth rates.
Table 4 displays the results for human capital inequality, measured through the
Gini coeﬃcient and the distribution of education by quintiles. In these regressions
we also control for the standard determinants of growth and for time dummies, in
line with the previous tables. However, to save space we only show the estimated
coeﬃcients for the inequality variables. The ﬁrst column shows the results for the
human capital Gini coeﬃcient and for the distribution of education by quintiles for
the Advanced, European and Euro economies for the whole period, 1965-2005. In
the remaining columns we have split the whole period into subperiods of equal length
to test whether the eﬀect of human capital inequality diﬀers over time.
7The countries that belong to the Euro Area in our sample are: Austria, Belgium, France,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
15The results regarding the Advanced economies show an eﬀect of human capital
inequality on economic growth that is not stable over time, in some periods the
estimated coeﬃc i e n to ft h eG i n ii n d e xi sn e g a t i v ew h e r e a sa tt h ee n do ft h ee i g h t i e s
and nineties it is positive, though in any case it is statistically signiﬁcant at the
standard levels. In fact, the estimated coeﬃcient of the human capital Gini index
is only statistically signiﬁcant in the recent years. In particular, during the period
1995-2005 the results suggest that more human capital inequality discouraged the
growth rates of the Advanced economies; the estimated coeﬃcient of the Gini index
is -0.157 and it is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. Likewise at diﬀerent
parts of the distribution, the results with the quintiles show that a greater share of
the education attained by the majority of the society had a beneﬁcial eﬀect on the
per capita income growth rates, whereas a greater share of education concentrated
on the top 20 per cent of the highest educated individuals discouraged growth.
Nevertheless, the results for the European economies are somehow diﬀerent. Al-
though the estimated coeﬃcient of the human capital Gini index is also negative
during the period 1995-2005, it is not statistically signiﬁcant at the standard levels.
Moreover, the Gini coeﬃcient and the quintiles suggest that human capital inequality
had a positive instead of a negative eﬀect on the economic growth rates during the
period 1980-1995.
A positive eﬀect of a more unequal distribution of education on the growth rates
is also found in the Euro Area, mainly from 1980 to 2000. In fact, even for the whole
period the estimated coeﬃcient of the 5th Quintile in the distribution of education
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level, which leads to the
suggestion that the European Monetary Union is not the cause of such an eﬀect.
However, given the high disparities in the inequality measures (e.g. the average
human capital Gini index in Portugal (0.474) is almost 3 times higher than that in the
N e t h e r l a n d s( 0 . 1 7 0 ) )i ti sp o s s i b l et h a ta ne x t r e m ev a l u ei si n ﬂuencing these results.
Thus, to check the robustness of the positive eﬀect of human capital inequality on
the growth rates we have repeated the previous exercise removing one country at a
time. Interestingly, Table 5 shows that the results are quite sensitive to the inclusion
of Portugal in the sample. In particular, the positive and statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient of the human capital Gini coeﬃcient and the top quintile for the period
1985-2000 disappears once Portugal is excluded from the sample. For example, once
we rule out Portugal the estimated coeﬃcient for the ﬁfth quintile for the period 1990-
162000 found in Table 4 (0.163 (st. dv. 0.064) reverse sign and stops being statistically
signiﬁcant (-0.154 (st. dv. 0.154)), which leads to the suggestion that the positive
inﬂuence of human capital inequality on economic growth is not robust and is highly
inﬂuenced by one of the countries with extreme values in the inequality indicator.
As for the eﬀect of income inequality on economic growth, we have analysed the
stability over time with diﬀerent measures from the Luxembourg Income Study data
set. Nevertheless, in spite of its improvement in the quality of the data, one of the
main drawbacks of the LIS data set is the lack of observations for a broad number
of countries during a long time period. For example, there are no data for Portugal
or New Zealand and for most countries the ﬁrst observation starts in 1980. As a
result, we are forced to divide the whole period into two subperiods: 1975-1990 and
1990-2005.
The results, displayed in Table 6, show a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient of the income Gini index in the sample of Advanced economies during
the whole period 1975-2005.8 H o w e v e r ,t h ef a c tt h a tt h ee s t i m a t e dc o e ﬃcient of the
income Gini index is negative in the period 1975-1990 suggests that this eﬀect is
mainly driven by the positive eﬀe c to ng r o w t ho fa ni n c r e a s ei ni n c o m ei n e q u a l i t yi n
the latest period of the sample, 1990-2005. Among the percentile ratios, this result is
also reﬂected in a positive an statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the ratio between
the income reached by the 20 per cent of individuals with the highest income by the
20 per cent of individuals with the lowest income, that is, this ratio accounts for how
may times the richest 20 per cent have more income than the poorest 20 per cent.
A similar result is found in the European countries and in the Euro Area during
the period 1990-2005.9 In particular, the estimated coeﬃcient of the Gini index is
0.079 for the Advanced economies, 0.076 for the European countries and 0.071 for
the Euro Area. Likewise, the estimated coeﬃcient of the percentile ratio between the
richest 20 per cent and the poorest 20 per cent is 0.010 in the sample of the Advanced
economies, 0.012 in the European region and 0.015 in the Euro Area.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀe c to fi n c o m ei n e q u a l i t yo ng r o w t hf r o m1 9 9 0o n -
wards is also found in the broader sample of the Advanced economies, which includes
countries such as the United States with high income inequality and high per capita
8Note that this result diﬀers of that found in Table 3 for the period 1965-2000 for 20 Advanced
economies using the World Bank data set.
9D u et oal a c ko fs u ﬃcient observations we can not report any result for the period 1975-1990
for the Euro Area.
17income growth rates, minimizes the possibility that the European Monetary Union
has inﬂuenced the results. Moreover, we have also tested the robustness of the re-
sults to diﬀe r e n tt i m ep e r i o d s .W eﬁnd similar results for the period 1985-2005 and
for the period 1980-2005, which suggests that the positive eﬀect was previous to the
establishment of the EMU. Nevertheless, in line with the analysis of human capital
inequality we have also analysed whether any country belonging to the Euro Area
may be the responsible of this positive eﬀect. Results displayed in Table 7 show that
when we remove one country at a time the estimated coeﬃcient of the Gini index is
always positive and quite stable in the sample of the Advanced economies, though
it is sensitive to the countries included in the reduced sample of European and Euro
Area countries.
Overall, in view of these results we can not conclude that a more uneven distribu-
tion of human capital or income may rise the growth rates of the European economies
since the eﬀect has not been stable over time. Moreover, we have found that the pos-
itive inﬂuence of human capital inequality on the growth rates is driven by atypical
observations. Furthermore, the scarcity of available data for income inequality mea-
s u r e sm a k ei td i ﬃcult to carry out a proper empirical test.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have analysed the eﬀect of income and human capital inequality
in diﬀerent regions of the world that include developing as well as rich economies.
The estimation of a dynamic panel data model that controls for country speciﬁc
characteristics suggests that income and human capital inequality have a diﬀerent
eﬀect on growth in regions with diﬀerent levels of development.
Using data for human capital Gini coeﬃcients and the distribution of education
by quintiles we ﬁnd that more human capital inequality has discouraged the growth
rates in most of the regions in the world. In accordance to some theoretical models,
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect is found in less developed countries where the relationship between
human capital inequality and demographic variables is stronger. On the contrary, we
do not ﬁnd a clear eﬀect in the sample of higher income economies. In particular,
whereas we obtain a positive eﬀect of a more unequal distribution of human capital
on the growth rates of the European economies during the period 1980-2000, a simple
test of atypical observations shows that this result is not robust.
18With regard to the eﬀect of income inequality on growth, we ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬀects
a c c o r d i n gt ot h el e v e lo fd e v e l o p m e n t ;an e g a t i v ee ﬀect in the less developed countries
and a positive one in the higher income economies. Moreover, the positive eﬀect in the
richer countries is found not only with the World Bank income inequality measures
but also with the higher quality LIS data set, which shows that a greater share of
income accruing to the richest twenty per cent of individuals regarding to the poorest
20 per cent has had a positive and statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the growth
rates of the Advanced and European economies in recent years.
Overall, the results suggest that income and education inequality have had a
diﬀerent eﬀect on the growth rates of several economies depending on their level of
development. In particular, the results seem to be negative for low and middle income
countries and in some cases positive for higher income economies. Nevertheless, the
positive eﬀect of inequality on economic growth found in the Advanced and European
countries is not robust to atypical observations and is not stable over time, which
suggest that a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency might not be a concern in these
economies.
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21Figure 1- Income Gini coeﬃcient 1970-2000
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0Figure 2- Human Capital Gini coeﬃcient 1960-2000
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Income and Human Capital Inequality
R2 from regressions on country and time dummies
Dependent variable Country dummies Time dummies Country and time dummies Obs. Countries
Giniy 0.920 0.019 0.924 256 56
Ginih 0.901 0.042 0.952 919 105
Note: Pooled OLS estimation.Table 2
Human Capital Inequality and Economic Growth
Whole Sample. System GMM
World Developing OECD Advanced Europe World Developing OECD Advanced Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ginih
t−τ -0.050a -0.048a -0.034a -0.015 0.012 0.008 0.010 -0.000 -0.024 0.016
(0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
lnyt−τ -0.006a -0.005a -0.025a -0.034a -0.026a -0.018a -0.011a -0.039a -0.038a -0.033a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educt−τ 0.002 -0.000 0.002c 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 0.003a 0.002 0.002c
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(G/GDP)t−τ -0.037 -0.033 -0.052b -0.063a -0.046c -0.031 -0.040 -0.053b -0.060a -0.035
(0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027)
Trade t−τ 0.010a 0.013a 0.011a 0.008b 0.015a 0.005c 0.009b 0.012a 0.008b 0.015a
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Inﬂationt−τ -0.002a -0.002a -0.035a -0.026 -0.026a -0.002a -0.002a -0.030a -0.012 -0.024a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.019) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.020) (0.009)
lnFERTt−τ -0.040a -0.043a -0.012a -0.012b -0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
lnLEt−τ 0.047a 0.034c 0.129a 0.014 0.121b
(0.018) (0.020) (0.036) (0.050) (0.059)
Constant 0.105a 0.086c 0.279a 0.359a 0.277a 0.049 0.052 -0.145 0.347c -0.174
(0.038) (0.047) (0.030) (0.032) (0.038) (0.074) (0.887) (0.133) (0.186) (0.223)
Countries 102 70 27 23 20 101 70 27 23 20
Obs 744 474 236 204 172 732 470 236 204 172
AR (2) test [0.129] [0.117] [0.558] [0.094] [0.728] [0.171] [0.139] [0.605] [0.011] [0.690]
Hansen J test [0.001] [0.001] [0.209] [0.444] [0.839] [0.001] [0.005] [0.782] [0.981] [0.995]
Diﬀ Hansen [0.029] [0.597] [1.000] [0.999] [1.000] [0.270] [0.457] [1.000] [0.999] [1.000]
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance level respectively. The set of controls also include
period dummies. The period of analysis is 1965-2000. The instruments are the levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods and further
lags until a maximum of 4. In addition to these variables, the system-GMM also uses as instruments for the level equation the explanatory
variables in ﬁrst diﬀerences lagged one period. Developing countries include low and middle income countries as classiﬁed by World Bank in
2007 and Advanced countries include OECD countries except Hungary, Mexico, Poland and Turkey.Table 3
Human Capital Inequality, Income Inequality and Economic Growth
Reduced Sample. System GMM
World Developing OECD Advanced Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Ginih
t−τ -0.028c -0.025c -0.036b -0.036b -0.031b -0.022 -0.011 -0.011 -0.004 -0.021
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021)
Gini
y
t−τ -0.053c -0.061b -0.017 0.000 -0.042b -0.028 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.054c
(0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.030)
Additional controls: lnyt−τ, Educt−τ, (G/GDP)t−τ, Trade t−τ, Inﬂationt−τ and time dummies
Countries 56 56 56 31 31 31 24 24 24 20 20 20 16 16 16
Obs 244 244 244 119 119 119 125 125 125 104 104 104 79 79 79
AR (2) test [0.076] [0.079] [0.064] [0.046] [0.042] [0.098] [0.912] [0.992] [0.968] [0.954] [0.979] [0.954] [0.960] [0.964] [0.934]
Hansen J test [0.045] [0.121] [0.115] [0.773] [0.709] [0.852] [0.857] [0.857] [0.961] [0.969] [0.969] [0.989] [0.987] [0.987] [0.997]
Diﬀ Hansen [0.879] [0.977] [0.967] [0.986] [0.948] [0.998] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
Controlling for fertility rates and life expectancy
World Developing OECD Advanced Europe
Ginih
t−τ -0.002 -0.004 0.009 0.011 -0.009 -0.015 -0.020 -0.027 -0.006 -0.030
(0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.028) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023)
Gini
y
t−τ 0.021 0.024 0.066b 0.068b 0.011 0.022 0.046 0.051c 0.043 0.066b
(0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033)
Additional controls: lnyt−τ, Educt−τ, (G/GDP)t−τ, Trade t−τ, Inﬂationt−τ,lnFERTt−τ, lnLEt−τ and time dummies
Countries 55 55 55 31 31 31 24 24 24 20 20 20 16 16 16
Obs 237 237 237 119 119 119 125 125 125 104 104 104 79 79 79
AR (2) test [0.048] [0.053] [0.054] [0.025] [0.039] [0.019] [0.856] [0.833] [0.779] [0.923] [0.983] [0.990] [0.947] [0.945] [0.889]
Hansen J test [0.300] [0.333] [0.444] [0.933] [0.933] [0.975] [0.988] [0.988] [0.996] [0.977] [0.997] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [1.000]
Diﬀ Hansen [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance level respectively. The period of analysis is
1970-2000. The instruments are the levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods and further lags until a maximum of 4. In addition to
these variables, the system-GMM also uses as instruments for the level equation the explanatory variables in ﬁrst diﬀerences lagged one period .Table 4
Human Capital Inequality and Economic Growth
Dependent variable: per capita income growth rate. System GMM
1965-2005 1965-1975 1970-1980 1975-1985 1980-1990 1985-1995 1990-2000 1995-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Advanced Countries
Ginih -0.015 -0.024 0.001 -0.041 -0.001 0.013 0.004 -0.157b
(0.014) (0.050) (0.053) (0.037) (0.053) (0.040) (0.054) (0.067)
1st Quintileh 0.041 -0.044 0.035 0.201 0.034 0.052 0.004 0.145
(0.028) (0.116) (0.094) (0.143) (0.086) (0.081) (0.079) (0.090)
3rd Quintileh 0.015 0.024 -0.041 0.012 -0.037 -0.085 0.054 0.199b
(0.018) (0.067) (0.061) (0.041) (0.058) (0.080) (0.085) (0.084)
5th Quintileh -0.016 -0.116 -0.028 -0.024 0.027 0.073 0.071 -0.270b
(0.024) (0.107) (0.078) (0.059) (0.063) (0.070) (0.070) (0.121)
Obs. 204 66 68 69 69 69 69 69
C o u n t r i e s2 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 3
European countries
Ginih 0.012 -0.012 -0.030 -0.001 0.081b 0.050 0.048 -0.046
(0.015) (0.044) (0.037) (0.048) (0.031) (0.035) (0.037) (0.042)
1st Quintileh -0.009 0.156 0.091 0.039 -0.149b -0.063 -0.067 0.077
(0.031) (0.106) (0.077) (0.076) (0.064) (0.072) (0.082) (0.082)
3rd Quintileh -0.017 -0.006 0.019 0.002 -0.122b -0.044 -0.015 0.102
(0.021) (0.054) (0.058) (0.000) (0.046) (0.074) (0.059) (0.069)
5th Quintileh 0.026 -0.081 -0.032 0.012 0.138a 0.104c 0.087 -0.012
(0.026) (0.091) (0.077) (0.064) (0.048) (0.056) (0.053) (0.051)
Obs. 172 52 56 60 60 60 60 60
C o u n t r i e s2 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 0
Euro Area
Ginih 0.019 0.013 0.025 0.017 0.058b 0.106a 0.091c 0.029
(0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.077) (0.024) (0.032) (0.045) (0.049)
1st Quintileh -0.042 -0.088 -0.057 -0.034 -0.085c -0.135b -0.124 -0.043
(0.030) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.045) (0.055) (0.075) (0.081)
3rd Quintileh -0.012 -0.012 -0.038 -0.034 -0.083b -0.159a -0.099 -0.009
(0.021) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.036) (0.049) (0.071) (0.072)
5th Quintileh 0.054c 0.003 0.059 0.029 0.117a 0.147a 0.163b 0.058
(0.028) (0.046) (0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.047) (0.064) (0.070)
Obs. 97 31 32 33 33 33 33 33
C o u n t r y 1 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 1
Additional controls: lnyt−τ, Educt−τ, (G/GDP)t−τ, Tradet−τ, Inﬂationt−τ and time dummies
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance level respectively.Table 5
Human Capital and Growth in the Euro Area
Dependent variable: per capita income growth rate. System GMM
Robustness check: rule out one country at a time
1980-1990 1985-1995 1990-2000
Ginih 5th Quintileh Ginih 5th Quintileh Ginih 5th Quintileh
Austria 0.057b 0.109a 0.104a 0.147b 0.097c 0.181b
(0.025) (0.038) (0.035) (0.053) (0.050) (0.072)
Belgium 0.052c 0.111b 0.109a 0.159a 0.093b 0.173a
(0.026) (0.039) (0.034) (0.050) (0.042) (0.059)
Finland 0.060b 0.124a 0.095a 0.127a 0.105b 0.182b
(0.027) (0.038) (0.031) (0.044) (0.049) (0.068)
France 0.059b 0.122a 0.124a 0.177a 0.108b 0.200a
(0.026) (0.038) (0.033) (0.048) (0.047) (0.066)
Germany 0.065b 0.123a 0.113a 0.150a 0.090c 0.168b
(0.025) (0.036) (0.034) (0.049) (0.049) (0.070)
Greece 0.047c 0.103b 0.080c 0.109c -0.009 -0.008
(0.026) (0.039) (0.039) (0.055) (0.046) (0.074)
Ireland 0.056c 0.181a 0.102a 0.180a 0.072c 0.132b
(0.032) (0.055) (0.034) (0.055) (0.037) (0.055)
Italy 0.057b 0.096a 0.132a 0.140b 0.127b 0.178b
(0.022) (0.028) (0.042) (0.050) (0.058) (0.072)
Netherlands 0.058b 0.117a 0.106a 0.144a 0.094c 0.170b
(0.024) (0.034) (0.033) (0.049) (0.049) (0.070)
Portugal 0.059 0.250a 0.011 -0.161 -0.154 -0.053
(0.048) (0.081) (0.067) (0.162) (0.114) (0.267)
Spain 0.058b 0.132a 0.108a 0.176a 0.103b 0.163b
(0.024) (0.036) (0.034) (0.049) (0.048) (0.069)
Obs. 30 30 30 30 30 30
C o u n t r i e s1 01 0 1 01 0 1 01 0
Additional controls: lnyt−τ, Educt−τ, (G/GDP)t−τ, Trade t−τ, Inﬂationt−τ and time dummies
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance level
respectively.Table 6
Income Inequality and Economic Growth
Dependent variable: per capita income growth rate. System GMM
LIS Giniy 90/10 90/50 80/20 Obs. Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Advanced Economies
1975-2005 0.077c 0.003 0.017 0.010b 80 17
(0.046) (0.002) (0.011) (0.005)
1975-1990 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 31 14
(0.053) (0.003) (0.014) (0.006)
1990-2005 0.079 0.002 0.018 0.010c 62 17
(0.051) (0.002) (0.012) (0.006)
European Countries
1975-2005 0.055 0.001 0.014 0.097 69 16
(0.051) (0.002) (0.010) (0.064)
1975-1990 -0.032 -0.006 -0.000 -0.011 23 12
(0.088) (0.006) (0.020) (0.014)
1990-2005 0.076 0.003 0.019c 0.012c 57 16
(0.053) (0.003) (0.011) (0.006)
Euro Area
1975-2005 0.117 0.001 0.028 0.021 39 10
(0.088) (0.062) (0.018) (0.014)
1975-1990
1990-2005 0.071 -0.003 0.021 0.015 34 10
(0.099) (0.006) (0.019) (0.015)
Additional controls: lnyt−τ, Educt−τ, (G/GDP)t−τ,
Trade t−τ, Inﬂationt−τ and time dummies
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent
signiﬁcance level respectively.Table 7
Income inequality and Growth 1990-2005
Dependent variable: per capita income growth rate. System GMM
Robustness check: rule out one country at a time
Euro Area European countries Advanced economies
Giniy Giniy Giniy
Austria 0.078 0.079 0.068
(0.108) (0.054) (0.055)
Belgium 0.007 0.048 0.076
(0.113) (0.056) (0.052)
Finland 0.233b 0.109c 0.098
(0.111) (0.059) (0.056)
France -0.010 0.073 0.072
(0.109) (0.055) (0.053)
Germany 0.065 0.097c 0.060
(0.107) (0.054) (0.053)
Greece 0.112 0.083 0.084
(0.086) (0.052) (0.050)
Ireland 0.007 0.021 0.003
(0.008) (0.052) (0.043)
Italy 0.044 0.081 0.073
(0.108) (0.054) (0.052)
Netherlands 0.068 0.067 0.072
(0.119) (0.056) (0.053)
Spain 0.067 0.074 0.074
(0.111) (0.056) (0.053)
Additional controls: lnyt−τ, Educt−τ, (G/GDP)t−τ, Trade t−τ, Inﬂationt−τ and
time dummies
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent
signiﬁcance level respectively. There are not income inequality data for PortugalTABLE A
INCOME GINI COEFFICIENTS FOR 56 COUNTRIES
Country 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Mean St.dv.
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria - - - - - 0.453 0.419 0.436 0.024
Tunisia - - 0.506 0.496 0.496 0.468 - 0.492 0.016
Iran - 0.521 0.489 - - - - 0.505 0.022
Israel - - - - - 0.309 0.305 0.307 0.003
Jordan - - - - - 0.427 0.473 0.450 0.032
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana - - - - - 0.359 0.340 0.350 0.014
Mauritania - - - - - 0.491 0.444 0.468 0.033
Mauritius - - - - - 0.462 0.433 0.448 0.021
South Africa - - - - - 0.630 0.623 0.627 0.005
Uganda - - - - - 0.396 0.474 0.435 0.055
Latin America and the Caribbean
Costa Rica - - 0.444 0.450 0.470 0.461 - 0.456 0.012
Dominican R. - - - 0.450 0.433 0.505 0.490 0.470 0.035
Honduras - - - - - 0.540 0.540 0.540 0.000
Jamaica - - - - - 0.484 0.445 0.465 0.027
Mexico 0.555 0.577 0.579 0.500 0.506 0.550 0.570 0.548 0.033
Trinidad & Tobago - - 0.510 0.461 0.417 - - 0.463 0.046
Brazil - 0.576 0.619 0.578 0.618 0.596 0.637 0.604 0.025
Chile - 0.456 0.460 0.532 - 0.547 0.556 0.510 0.048
Colombia - 0.520 0.460 0.545 - 0.512 0.513 0.510 0.031
Peru - - - - 0.493 0.494 0.515 0.501 0.012
Venezuela - - 0.477 0.394 0.428 0.538 - 0.459 0.063
East Asia and the Paciﬁc
Hong Kong - - 0.398 0.373 0.452 0.420 0.450 0.419 0.034
Indonesia 0.399 0.373 - 422 0.390 0.397 0.383 0.394 0.017
Korea 0.343 0.333 0.360 0.386 0.345 0.336 0.382 0.355 0.022
Malaysia - 0.500 0.518 0.510 0.480 0.484 - 0.498 0.016
Philippines - - - - 0.461 0.457 0.450 0.456 0.006
Singapore - - 0.410 0.407 0.420 0.390 0.378 0.401 0.017
Taiwan 0.322 0.294 0.312 0.280 0.292 0.301 0.308 0.301 0.014
Thailand 0.413 0.426 0.417 - 0.431 0.488 0.515 0.448 0.042
South Asia
Bangladesh 0.373 0.342 0.360 0.352 0.360 0.355 0.349 0.356 0.010
India 0.377 0.370 0.358 0.387 0.381 0.363 0.386 0.375 0.011
Pakistan 0.387 0.365 0.381 0.389 0.390 0.380 0.378 0.381 0.009
Sri Lanka 0.470 0.377 0.353 0.420 0.453 0.367 0.410 0.407 0.044
Advanced Countries
Canada 0.316 0.323 0.316 0.310 0.328 0.276 0.277 0.307 0.022
United States 0.346 0.341 0.344 0.352 0.373 0.378 0.379 0.359 0.017
Japan 0.348 0.355 0.344 0.334 0.359 0.350 - 0.348 0.009
Belgium - - - 0.283 0.262 0.266 0.269 0.270 0.009
Denmark - - - 0.310 0.310 0.332 0.332 0.321 0.013
Finland - 0.318 0.270 0.309 0.308 0.262 0.261 0.288 0.026
France 0.470 0.440 0.430 0.349 0.349 - - 0.408 0.055
Germany 0.281 0.336 0.306 0.321 0.322 0.260 0.274 0.300 0.029
Greece - - - - 0.399 0.418 - 0.409 0.013
Ireland - - 0.387 0.357 - - - 0.372 0.021
Italy - 0.380 0.390 0.343 0.332 0.327 0.322 0.349 0.029
Netherlands - - 0.286 0.281 0.291 0.296 0.294 0.290 0.006
Norway 0.375 0.360 0.375 0.312 0.314 0.331 0.333 0.343 0.027
Portugal - - 0.406 0.368 - 0.368 0.356 0.374 0.022
Spain - - 0.371 0.334 0.318 0.325 0.350 0.340 0.021
Sweden - 0.334 0.273 0.324 0.312 0.325 0.324 0.316 0.022
Turkey - 0.560 0.510 - - 0.441 0.415 0.481 0.066
United Kingdom 0.243 0.251 0.233 0.249 0.271 0.323 0.324 0.271 0.038
Australia - - - 0.393 0.376 0.412 0.444 0.407 0.028
New Zealand - - 0.300 0.348 0.358 0.402 - 0.352 0.042
Transitional Economies
China - - - 0.320 0.314 0.346 0.378 0.340 0.029
Hungary 0.259 0.229 0.228 0.215 0.210 0.233 0.279 0.236 0.025
Poland - - - 0.249 0.253 0.262 0.331 0.274 0.038
Mean 0.369 0.395 0.393 0.375 0.377 0.400 0.401 0.403 0.025
Std. dv. 0.079 0.097 0.093 0.085 0.083 0.095 0.097 0.088 0.015
C o u n t r i e s 1 72 63 64 04 05 24 5 5 6 5 6
Gini coeﬃcients are taken from the latest available data closest to the corresponding period. A value
of 0.066 has been added to the Gini coeﬃcients based on expenditure. Source: Deininger and Squire
(1996) and UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Data Base (2000) . 
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The final stage of the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union is an unprecedentedly 
strong form of economic integration among independent countries. By enhancing 
market competition, it should in theory foster production efficiency and also make 
it difficult for National governments not only to conduct independent 
macroeconomic policies, but also to enforce income redistribution schemes. In 
practice, the information conveyed by available data confirms that the Eurozone’s 
aggregate production and employment performances have improved in 
comparison to other EU15 countries, and that its member countries have 
implemented less generous social policies accepting, as a consequence, an 
increase in disposable income inequality.  
 
                                                 
∗ This version of the paper benefits from comments received during and after the “Growth and 
income distribution in an integrated Europe: Does EMU make a difference?” DG ECFIN Annual 
Research Conference (Brussels, 11-12 October 2007). Only the author is responsible for the views 
expressed, and for any errors.  
1.  Introduction 
Inequality is an important concern for European citizens, income redistribution is intense at the 
National level within European Union countries, and feelings of economic insecurity are an 
important factor in the recent stasis of the European integration process. European countries’ 
economic woes had many causes in the early 2000s, including the worldwide cyclical downswing, 
competition from newly industrializing trading partners, and slow adoption of new technologies. 
But it has often been easiest for public opinion and National politics to blame them on the most 
novel and most apparently avoidable aspect of recent experience: the euro and, more generally, 
deeper and wider economic integration in the European Union (EU).
 1   
For researchers, economic integration has been a fertile field. Much has been written about the 
macroeconomic, trade, and productivity implications of economic and monetary integration.
2 And 
an extensive if somewhat inconclusive body of theoretical and empirical work has dealt with 
interactions between economic integration and income inequality within and across countries at 
vastly different levels of development.
3 But little attention has been paid by researchers to 
inequality issues in the context of the European economic and monetary union experience or of any 
other experiment of single currency adoption. The early stages of the European process of economic 
integration focused on deregulation and production efficiency.  
This paper analyzes the implications for growth and income inequality of Stage Three of the 
European economic and monetary integration process, i.e. adoption of the euro as the single 
currency (EMU, for brevity, in what follows). Section 2 outlines the relevant theoretical effects of 
EMU, through macroeconomic channels and, especially, because of its implications for market and 
policy reactions to tight and irrevocable integration of goods and financial markets. Section 3 
computes simple statistics in order to try and assess the empirical association between EMU, 
                                                 
1 Eurobarometer (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl171_en.pdf) found that top 
reasons for a ‘no’ vote to the European Constitution referendum by French citizens included ‘loss of 
jobs’ (31%), ‘too much unemployment’ (26%), ‘economically too liberal’ (19%) and ‘not enough 
social Europe’ (16%).  Opposition to the first draft of the Services directive was similarly rooted in 
the fear that supply of cheap, unregulated labor in Continental European countries would endanger 
their social welfare models.  
2 See for example the papers in Baldwin, Bertola, Seabright (2003), and their references to other 
studies of the impact of EMU on a variety of structural features and economic outcomes, notably 
the intensity of trade.  
3 See, e.g., Spilimbergo, Londoño, and Székely (1999), Sala-i-Martin (2006). 
  2economic performance, inequality, and social policy. Section 4 concludes outlining the policy 
implications of the paper’s theoretical perspective and results. 
2.  Income distribution, market integration, and policy 
Monetary union’s main consequence is the removal of independent macroeconomic policy tools 
from the member countries. By renouncing its own currency and monetary policy, countries can no 
longer conduct an independent monetary policy, and exchange rates cease to affect competitiveness. 
To the extent that the Growth and Stability pact is a binding constraint, fiscal policy instruments are 
also less than fully available under EMU.  As discussed in more detail by Sapir et al (2004), 
macroeconomic policies can stabilise an economy in the face of imperfectly co-ordinated savings 
and investment decisions and imperfectly flexible price and wage arrangements. The same fiscal 
and monetary instruments that can be useful in that context, however, can also generate and 
propagate aggregate shocks if used in pursuit of objectives different from macroeconomic stability, 
and can precipitate crises if implemented in unsustainable ways. Monetary union has undoubtedly 
allowed member countries to achieve stability: in some cases by granting previously elusive 
credibility; in the case of countries that already implemented sound macroeconomic policies, by 
preventing spillovers from trading partners’ unstable policies.  
Stability can clearly foster growth, in that long-horizon investment and innovation decisions are 
easier and better informed in a more predictable environment. Its relationship with income 
inequality is less obvious. Of course, macroeconomic volatility can influence incomes differently 
across different individuals. Wage and unemployment developments are very important 
determinants of personal income inequality, and labour market features, such as the structure of 
contracting and the influence of unions in wage setting, affect distribution as well as 
macroeconomic developments.
4 If nominal prices and wages are rigid, for example, foregoing 
devaluations may require sharper activity slowdowns, unemployment increases, and consumption 
wage reductions for the purpose of restoring competitiveness. Credibly ruling out devaluation 
options may however enforce wage moderation at any given level of unemployment, while in 
conditions of poor monetary policy credibility wage negotiations would routinely discount 
devaluation and imply real wage rigidity, attempting to shift purchasing power losses toward 
bondholders or to fixed-income earners other than workers.  
                                                 
4 Arpaia and Pichelman’s (2007) careful analysis uncovers a number of differences in wage 
adjustment mechanisms across European countries. It would be interesting in future work to see 
assess the extent to which country-specific patterns of adjustment reflect institutional and/or 
economic structure features. 
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would be able to support favorable income dynamics within an integrated economic area. Activity 
is still less regionally specialized in Europe than in a fully integrated economy like that of the 
United States. As economic integration proceeds, however, regions and sectors will typically span 
national borders, blunting national monetary and fiscal policies as stabilization tools. When most 
labour market shocks occur at the regional or industry level, the fiscal policy independence 
suppressed by EMU would likely be a source rather than a remedy for national economic 
fluctuations (Darvas, Szapáry, and Rose, 2005). And as macroeconomic stability and tight market 
integration calls for wage an employment flexibility in response to sector- and regions-level shocks, 
the coordinated wage bargains that proved useful in order to cope with country-specify adjustments 
to shocks may hinder the necessary adjustments, as centralization tends to compress wages. 
From this market-oriented perspective, EMU does not only deprive its member countries’ of 
macroeconomic policy independence: it also opens the way to new market forces and new sources 
of shocks. Adopting a single currency is also an extremely important step towards full integration of 
microeconomic market interactions. The absence of currency risk improves price transparency, 
reduces the extent to which price and wage stickiness may blur  relative productivity signals, and 
supports economies of scale in deeper, no longer segmented markets for goods, services, and 
financial products. Wider and deeper market integration fosters efficiency both through such direct 
channels, and also by exerting pressure towards efficiency-enhancing reforms, which may also be 
spurred by the absence of devaluation and other macroeconomic escape routes towards at least 
temporarily better competitiveness (Belke, Herz, and Vogel, 2007, review the relevant theoretical 
channels and evidence). 
2.1 Integration, distribution, and risk 
Like any change, economic integration affects not only the aggregate amount but also the 
distribution of income and welfare. Diversion of trade from within to across countries’ borders can 
benefit some producers and damage others. Most intuitively, integration with poorer countries may 
increase inequality in rich countries, as their poor citizens’ incomes are bid down by competition 
from substitutable workers in poor countries. More generally, however, factors of production can be 
complementary rather than substitutable across borders.
5 And factors can move or accumulate over 
time, in ways that influence patterns of production and income across countries and individuals 
interacting in integrated markets. If income is higher and returns to investment lower where more 
capital is available, integration should reduce inequality as production grows faster where it is 
                                                 
5 See O’Rourke (2001) for a very clear overview of mechanisms and evidence. 
  4initially low; but if production exploits increasing returns instead, market integration can increase 
income inequality.
6
The interplay between these channels implies that the inequality impact of integration is 
theoretically ambiguous overall, and amenable to empirical investigation. In practice, inequality in 
most advanced countries has been increasing since the 1970s, bringing to an end a long decline in 
the earlier part of the 20
th century.
7 This pattern broadly parallels that of global economic 
integration indicators, but it is difficult to identify the effects of economic integration separately 
from those of technological change. On the one hand, because the extent of economic integration is 
shaped by progress in transportation and communication technologies, as well as by trade 
liberalization and other policy trends. On the other hand, because the two phenomena have similar 
effects on the distribution of incomes in advanced countries. A portion of the observed increase in 
income inequality is accounted for by widening pay differentials across education levels, and may 
be explained by mechanisms whereby unskilled workers are substituted (and skilled workers 
complemented) by machines and/or by less developed countries’ labour.  
A particularly welfare-relevant portion of income inequality, however, may reflect ex post 
random events rather than ex ante, permanent factors. The volatility of each worker’s income over 
his or her lifetime may also be related to economic integration: as more widely integrated markets 
react more promptly and more sharply to differences in prices, small cost shocks can have dramatic 
effects on production. Survey evidence indicates that perceived labour market risk is higher for 
workers working in more internationalized sectors (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004), and that, even 
though integration is expected to be beneficial on average, the average individual is against 
immigration and trade in most countries.  Higher aggregate production levels are not 
unambiguously beneficial when markets (especially financial markets) are imperfect and 
incomplete, making it impossible to assess welfare on a “representative individual” basis. As 
integration changes the distribution of income and of consumption across heterogeneous agents, 
attitudes towards it depend on whether individual agents expect to find themselves above or below 
the average of income changes. In surveys, opposition to economic integration is indeed sensibly 
stronger on the part of individuals who are theoretically more likely to be damaged by it, such as 
low-skilled workers in countries that receive low-skilled migration inflows (see Mayda, O’Rourke, 
and Sinnott, 2007). 
                                                 
6 Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimueller (2006) offer an exhaustive introduction to the relevant 
interaction channels, with particular emphasis on the role of financial market structure in 
determining convergence or divergence across individuals as well as across countries and regions. 
7 See Piketty and Saez (2006) and their references. 
  5Studies of such channels of interactions have mostly focused on economic integration between 
countries at vastly different levels of development, as in the case of North/South globalization 
patterns or of the EU’s enlargement to transition countries. Economic integration among countries 
with similar endowments, such as the original six members of what is now the European Union and 
the current Eurozone members, has often been supposed to yield mostly economies of scale and of 
variety, with little (if any) implications for within-country income distribution. Different aspects 
coexist in all economic integration experiences, however, and there is no reason to expect any 
income-volatility implications of economic integration to be less pronounced in the case of 
Eurozone countries than in that of more diverse, but less tightly integrated economies. And in light 
of Continental Europe’s pervasive Welfare State tradition, it is particularly interesting in the EMU 
context to consider interactions between integration of the markets where individual agents’ 
decisions take place, and implementation of collective policies. 
2.2 Social policy 
People do not only interact through markets. Reducing ex ante inequality can be desirable in order 
to foster social cohesion, and redistribution policies can offset ex post income shocks when 
information and implementation problems prevent insurance markets from smoothing out they 
welfare impact. If imperfect and incomplete information does not make it possible to distinguish 
random events from the effects of individual efforts, however, then redistribution decreases 
production efficiency at the same time as it reduces the role of luck in the determination of 
individual welfare. 
Thus social policy, like all policies, has desirable and undesirable effects, whose relative 
strength depends on the economy’s characteristics. The impact of economic integration on its 
implementation is twofold. On the one hand, new cross-border sources of risk increase the appeal of 
policies meant to buffer the welfare implications of uninsurable risk, and may explain why more 
open countries’ governments are more deeply involved in economic matters (Rodrik, 1998). On the 
other hand, international economic integration also affects on the viability of National redistribution 
policies. Wider, less constrained market interactions improve efficiency because they offer more 
choices to individual economic agents. But they also make it more difficult for policies to shape 
individual choices differently from what would be implied by unavoidably imperfect market 
mechanisms. Depending on whether demand or supply influences dominate, accordingly, 
integration may in practice increase or decrease the intensity of collective redistribution and other 
interferences with laissez fair markets at the country level (Agell, 2002; Bertola and Boeri, 2002). 
Survey evidence indicates that attitudes towards economic integration are also shaped by their 
impact on redistribution policies (Facchini and Mayda, 2006). Hence, economic integration’s 
  6political sustainability may well require coordination of social policies at the same level as that of 
market interactions (Bertola, 2006).  
3.  Income distribution in EMU 
The previous section’s review of theoretical insights suggests that the impact of integration on 
inequality is ambiguous overall, but plays out through well-defined and policy-relevant channels of 
interaction. Identifying such channels and assessing overall inequality effects is an essentially 
empirical problem, albeit a very difficult one, which this section explores focusing on the possible 
effects of EMU on social policy and inequality.  
For a useful set of countries and periods, Eurostat publishes the “quintile ratio” inequality 
indicator, i.e. the ratio of income earned by the top quintile of the population to that earned by the 
bottom quintile, for household equivalised disposable income.  This statistic, which would be equal 
to one in the case of perfect equality, ranges up to infinity as less income accrues to the bottom fifth 
of the households, and more to the top fifth. It is far from an ideal indicator of the phenomena of 
interest, as it may fail to capture important changes in the middle of the income distribution and 
need not be tightly related to income volatility and consumption dispersion. However, and despite 
comparability and measurement problems (discussed below), no other data appear nearly as suitable 
for this paper’s purposes. 
As shown in figure 1, a rather sharp swing occurred in EU-level inequality indicators around 
adoption of the euro. According to the Eurostat indicator, inequality was declining until 2000, 
remained flat through 2001, and increased very sharply back to its 1996 level by 2004. The swing is 
if anything sharper, in both directions, for the aggregate of the first 12 Eurozone countries. The 
latest available data refer to 2005, when Eurostat reports that inequality declined in the Eurozone 
and remained flat across all the EU15.  
The picture painted by figure 1 makes a forceful case for exploring the relationship between 
EMU and inequality. However, it can be very misleading for several reasons. First, the 
measurement of inequality has changed in terms of definitions and underlying data, again roughly at 
the same time as EMU. 
8 Between 1995 and 2001, indicators were computed from the now 
discontinued European Community Household Panel (ECHP) survey’s data. Beginning in 2003, 
Eurostat gradually adopted the Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
methodology. The quintile ratio indicator still refers to disposable household income, the definition 
of which is broadly similarly with a few exceptions (EU-SILC included in income in-kind income 
                                                 
8 I am grateful to Carmen Raluca Ipate and Erich Ruscher of DG-ECFIN for researching and 
forwarding this information. 
  7from work, imputed rent from owner-occupation, payments made to other households and interest 
payments on loans) which may or may not matter depending, for example, on how home ownership 
varies systematically across income groups. Available country-specific observations are plotted in 
figure 2, with different symbols depending on the methodology, for each of EU15 countries 
between 1995 and 2005. The change in measurement procedure occurs at different times in 
different countries, and typically implies a missing observation. The new data do not appear 
systematically different from the old data. The dynamics across the methodological change are 
similar to those observed in other periods, and in several cases within-country inequality dynamics 
follow a U-shaped path around the turn of the millennium.   
Second, inception of EMU (the impact of which is obviously difficult to time precisely, due to 
anticipation effects and adjustment lags) is not the only factor driving inequality in this period. A 
global recession and EU enlargement both took place at roughly the same time as EMU, and 
inflation, budget balances, and other aggregates ceased to converge across its member countries. 
One reason why individual incomes may become more unequal is, of course, increasing inequality 
across countries. As figure 3 shows, however, country-level incomes have continued to converge in 
Europe (Luxembourg is omitted, to reduce the size the horizontal axis and improve legibility). 
Convergence rates, as measured by the slope of the regressions of growth on initial income shown 
in the figure, are very similar before and after EMU, and for countries that did and did not join the 
Eurozone. Thus, there is no indication that tighter economic integration fosters convergence, as is 
theoretically possible in the absence of strong agglomeration effects; more detailed studies paint a 
similarly pessimistic picture of macroeconomic variables’ convergence in EMU (see Roubini, 
Parisi-Capone, and Menegatti, 2007, and its references). The data in figure 3 also make it clear that 
growth has certainly slowed down rather uniformly after 2000. Slower and/or more variable growth 
in the cyclical slowdown phase may or may not be affected by EMU, as both fiscal and monetary 
policy were already blunt in the after-Maastricht run-up to EMU when individual countries faced 
stringent exchange rate and budget constraints. But it will be important in what follows account for 
aggregate dynamics when characterizing the association between EMU membership and within-
country inequality.
9
                                                 
9 Countercyclical variation in wage inequality and volatility has been documented by many authors, 
including Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), mainly on American data. The regressions below 
assess inequality developments controlling for both income and unemployment fluctuations and 
trends. In European countries wages tend to be inflexible and cyclical fluctuations might instead be 
reflected in unemployment, which however tends to reflect structural and institutional as well as 
cyclical factors. Detailed analysis of the influence of labour market institutions on wage dispersion 
  8The third and most important reason why the dynamics shown in figure 1 may motivate but not 
satisfy curiosity as regards the relationship between inequality and EMU is that inequality, even if 
correctly measured, is not really interesting per se. What is important is the relationship between 
inequality and other dimensions of economic performance and policy that may also be affected by 
EMU, such as income and unemployment, and labour market and redistribution policies.  The data 
shown in figure 2 indicate that cross-country differences in inequality levels dwarf dynamic 
developments.
10 Apparently small changes in broad inequality statistics are important, however, 
because the aggregate efficiency effects of integration are similarly small,
11  and because they can 
hide dramatic changes in individual circumstance. Ex ante uncertainty about who exactly will lose 
out can foster resistance to reforms (inducing in policy choices the “status quo bias” of Fernandez 
and Rodrik, 1991). And to the extent that higher inequality across individuals results from more 
pronounced instability over time of individual incomes, the associated increase in uninsurable 
consumption volatility may well be such as to more than compensate higher levels and faster 
growth of consumption and income (see Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney, 2005, for a model and some 
relevant evidence). 
3.1 Configurations 
In order to set the stage for empirical assessment of the joint dynamics of EMU, economic 
performance, and country-specific inequality developments, it is important to examine broad 
relationships between the variable of interest. Table 1 displays summary statistics for a sample of 11 
yearly observations in 14 countries.
12  All 154 observations are available for the measures of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and more general inequality measures and may be found in Checchi and Garcia Peñalosa (2005) 
and Koeniger, Leonardi, and Nunziata (2007). 
10 A portion of the impressive swing in Figure 1 is accounted for by composition effects, i.e., by 
high-inequality countries growing in importance within the aggregate at times of increasing 
inequality and vice versa, but the available data are too scarce to ascertain whether any such 
composition effects may be structural. 
11 The Single Market Program was estimated in the 1988 Cecchini Report to increase European 
GDP by some 2-6%, and in 1996 the effects of the first four years was estimated to be some 1.1-
1.5% higher GDP; completion of a single market in services, according to the European 
Commission’s revised Lisbon Strategy communication ( COM(2005) 24 ),  would increase GDP by 
0.6% and employment by 0.3% in the medium run. 
12 Luxembourg observations are outliers, and excluded for the sake of sample homogeneity. While 
Luxembourg’s inequality indicator is very similar to that of Belgium and of the Netherlands in 
Figure 3, that country’s small size, very high per capita GDP, and peculiar financial specialization 
may spuriously affect  relationships between these and other relevant variables, which are different 
enough from those prevailing across the countries to affect the results’ significance. 
  9income, unemployment, inequality, and country size defined in the table’s notes. In the sample, the 
inequality indicator ranges between 2.9 and 8.2 across countries and over time. These and other 
summary statistics may be useful in order to assess the quantitative relevance of the coefficients in 
the following tables.   
It is also useful to inspect the available data graphically in order to assess the character of 
variation across relevant dimensions of cross-country heterogeneity. Figure 4 displays the 
remarkably strong negative relationship between the available inequality indicator and real per 
capita income. In these data, there is a strong tendency for richer countries to feature lower 
disposable inequality (conversely, as the regressions below document, the relationship of inequality 
to country size not as strong as one might expect).  
As shown in figure 5, richer countries also devote a larger fraction of their larger income to 
redistribution. In this and the other figures it is possible to detect well-known patterns of clustering 
across countries: Nordic ones such as Sweden, Denmark, and Finland feature particularly generous 
social spending and particularly low inequality; Mediterranean  ones such as Portugal and Greece 
are at the opposite extreme in both respects; and the Anglo-Saxon observations for Ireland and the 
United Kingdom tend to feature more inequality and lower social spending than would be expected 
on the basis of their income and of overall cross-country relationships.  
The strong positive relationship between income and social spending across EU member 
countries, of course, need not imply that the latter causes the former. Taxes and subsidies may in 
principle perform efficiency-enhancing roles that are beyond reach of imperfectly and incompletely 
informed markets. As mentioned above, however, if governments’ attempts to do so encounter the 
same information and incentive problems as private market participants, more social spending 
improves equality at the expense of efficiency and aggregate production. Countries may well differ 
not only in terms of the political appeal of movements along such trade-offs, but also in terms of 
their ability to produce aggregate income. As the negative side effects of social policy are less 
serious for countries that are richer to begin with for geographical and historical reasons, such 
countries may well implement more extensive redistribution than poorer ones where strenuous 
effort is absolutely necessary.  
Figure 6 shows that across States of the US there is a strong negative relationship between per 
capita income and (net) transfers, financed in good part by uniform taxes and contributions. This is 
doubtlessly also the case across regions within European countries, and indeed across households 
within each. But over a roughly comparable range of income levels (the United States 2002 data are 
in current dollars, while the EU income variables in the various years are in 1995 euro) citizens of 
the EU receive more generous subsidies when they live in richer member countries, for reasons that 
  10are obvious in light of the National character of social policy in the EU, and will be discussed 
further in the conclusions below. 
While the strong relationship between income and social policy cannot easily be interpreted in 
structural terms, social policy does matter for inequality. Figure 7 shows that more generous social 
spending is negatively associated with disposable income inequality. And the same is also true after 
accounting for the relationship between (partly exogenous) income levels and inequality, as shown 
in figure 8. In these as in all other bivariate relationships illustrated by this section’s figures, 
observations where pooled over time as well as across countries. It is however clear, particularly in 
figure 8, that not only income but also social policy and inequality feature interesting time-series 
variation along these relationships, and that there is substantial variation around each of the 
regression lines that might be driven through the data. This makes it interesting to explore next how 
such variation may be related to EMU membership along both the time-series and cross-sectional 
dimensions. 
3.2 What has happened? 
The effects of EMU are hard to gauge on inequality, and any other outcome of interest, because 
many confounding factors may affect observed correlations. The coincidence of EMU 
developments with enlargement and global cycles, the limited time elapsed from adoption of the 
euro, the uncertain timing of the latter; all makes it difficult to rely on statistical methods. But the 
issues are sufficiently important to warrant investigation, albeit on the basis of imperfect data and 
imprecise assessments. The empirical exercises below are in the spirit of Barr, Breedon, and Miles 
(2003), who focus on trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and financial market activity and 
also briefly consider aspects of macroeconomic performance. In that and other papers in Baldwin, 
Bertola, Seabright (2003), difficult choices are necessary as regards the definition of EMU in terms 
of the country composition and dating of the newly integrated economic entity. The analysis and 
results of this subsection have the same important limitations and qualifications, but also have the 
advantage of a longer post-EMU observation span, and offer a novel set of findings on income 
distribution and social policy indicators.  
The time interval covered by the data set introduced above is conveniently symmetric around 
dates that might correspond to adoption of the euro. Available data also span a boom-bust episode, 
and this makes it possible to control for cyclical influences on inequality and social spending. 
Unfortunately, lack of comparable data for earlier cycles makes it impossible to assess whether the 
relationship between inequality and macroeconomic conditions has been affected by EMU. 
Needless to say, countless other high-order issues cannot be addressed by these data, which 
  11however appear to be the best available, and prove suitable to provide useful insights into very 
important issues. 
In the spirit of the “differences in differences” methodology, two dummy variables account 
for the common characteristics of countries that have so far joined the Eurozone, and for the 
changes in those countries after joining. EMU0 is equal to unity throughout the available sample for 
all the countries that have adopted the single currency as of 2005, and equal to zero for the other 
EU15 countries.
  Some specifications allow for country-specific intercepts, and omit the (redundant) 
EMU0 dummy. Another dummy variable, denoted EMU in the tables, is equal to unity in 1999 and 
later years for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, and in 2001 and later years for Greece. It is meant to capture variation associated, for a 
given country and in comparison to countries that remain out, with adoption of the common 
currency. Anticipation and lags may be relevant to those effects, of course, but one-year changes in 
the dating of the EMU=1 observations make very little difference to the results reported below.  
Thus, in each of the regressions below the coefficient of the EMU0 dummy variable captures 
the effect of being a country that (sooner or later, in the sample) joins the Eurozone, and the 
coefficient of the EMU dummy captures the effect (for a country of that type, if EMU0 also appears 
among the regressors) of actually having joined the Eurozone. The presence in the sample of 
countries that did not adopt the euro (and were not ‘treated’ by EMU) makes it possible controls, to 
the limited extent possible, for the influence of the global cycle, of EU enlargement, and of other 
developments occurring at roughly the same time as EMU: the coefficient of the EMU dummy may 
be influenced by events occurring over the period it identifies only to the extent that such events 
affects Eurozone countries differently from Denmark, Sweden, and the UK. While this comparison 
group is of course far from ideal, the results are reassuringly robust to exclusion of any one of these 
three countries, and to inclusion in the non-EMU group of EFTA countries for which reasonably 
complete data are available.
13
Closer economic integration is expected to foster productivity and growth. The regression 
coefficients reported in the first two columns of table 2 indicate that economic performance, both in 
terms of per capita income and in terms of unemployment, does improves significantly with EMU 
                                                 
13 Data for Norway (available from 1997) and for Iceland (only available in 2004-05) make a small 
difference to the results when included in the regressions below as part of the non-EMU control 
group. Inequality data are not available for Switzerland. Data for EU27 countries other than the 
EU15 and for Turkey offer interesting additional insights into the relationship between inequality, 
income, and social spending. But new member states’ data only begin to be available in 2000, and 
as of 2005 do not as yet include any Eurozone member. Hence, they are not useful for this paper’s 
purpose of assessing empirical patterns before and after EMU.  
  12for countries that, as indicated by the coefficient of the EMU0 dummy, tend as a group to do worse 
than the comparison group of Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  The estimates of the 
EMU0 and EMU coefficient are robust in terms of sign and significance when country dummies are 
included among the explanatory variables in columns (3) and (4). The striking improvement of the 
regression’s fit indicates that, not surprisingly, a very large proportion of the variation is across 
countries rather than over time. Examining the data from this perspective will prove informative, in 
different ways, in many of the regression specifications that follow: the variables of interest vary 
mostly across countries, within as well as across EMU and non-EMU groupings; but while time-
series within-country variation is modest, it is sufficient and sufficiently related to the EMU dummy 
to yield significant coefficients in most cases for that dummy and for interesting control variables 
below. 
The estimates in the table 2 indicate that Eurozone countries’ output is higher after joining 
than that of countries that opted out. Higher output may result from lesser interference with efficient 
market interactions unemployment, which is over the full sample higher in current Eurozone 
countries, has after their adoption of the single country indeed declined more than in the control 
group.  Higher efficiency is also expected to result from deeper integration itself. Columns (5-7) 
regress indicators of economic integration, in the form of ‘openness’ ratios for goods, services, and 
FDI, on the EMU and EMU0 dummies as well as on country population, as a rough control for the 
fact that larger countries are naturally less open to international transactions. The significantly 
negative coefficient of population confirms this prior, and the positive coefficient of the EMU 
dummy indicates that the economic effects of adopting the single currency do work through 
international channels.
14 The effect on FDI is especially strong and (in results not shown) remains 
roughly as large and highly significant also when controlling for income. 
Integration is expected to make it more difficult for countries to implement uncoordinated 
policies interfering with market outcomes. Evidence of lower unemployment may indicate that high 
unemployment was previously a consequence of attempts to achieve credibility on the part of 
National macroeconomic policy maker in the run-up to EMU. But lower output and higher 
unemployment could also be side effects of interference with market outcomes that is meant to 
reduce labour income dispersion and instability: from this perspective, economic integration may 
foster efficiency and “growth” at the expense of equality or “cohesion”, an example of the tension 
between different policy objectives of the type discussed in Sapir et al (2002).  
                                                 
14  There is a vast literature on the trade effects of the euro and other common currency: see e.g. 
Micco, Stein, and Ordonez (2003) and its references. 
 
  13To assess the relationship between euro adoption on the one hand, and the level and changes 
of inequality on the other hand, tables 3 and 4 apply the same approach of table 2 to the quintile 
ratio indicator of income inequality as the dependent variable of descriptive regressions. The choice 
of explanatory variables included along with EMU dummies is inspired by observation of broad and 
theoretically sensible empirical associations. Inclusion of per capita income is suggested by figure 
4; population is included as a rough control for the likely higher heterogeneity of larger countries; 
and unemployment begs to be included in light of its large variation across countries and EMU 
status in table 2 (and, as we shall see, has significant and interesting coefficients).  
Social policy, as we saw in figures 5 and 8, is also significantly associated with inequality, but 
is not yet included table 3’s regression: accordingly, the association between social policy and 
inequality is absorbed by the coefficients of EMU, and of other included variables (unemployment, 
population, and per capita income) to the extent that they co-vary with social policy. The estimates 
in the first two columns of table 3 use and interpolate all available inequality data, disregarding 
definitional and measurement problems. The results in column (1) confirm the impression conveyed 
by figure 1: the EMU membership dummy is significantly associated with higher inequality. The 
specification reported in column (2) includes the EMU0 dummy, which enters with a positive 
coefficient and reduced the statistical relevance of EMU membership, indicating that higher 
inequality is to some extent a permanent characteristic of the group of countries that eventually 
joined EMU, rather than an effect of EMU in those countries after joining. In these descriptive 
regressions, the coefficient of the EMU dummy is influenced by the association detected in table 2 
between EMU, unemployment, and income, and the coefficients of these variables also deserve to 
be discussed briefly. Countries with larger and possibly more heterogeneous population have higher 
inequality. Income’s coefficient is very significantly negative, consistently with the strong bivariate 
relationship shown in figure 4 above. Interestingly, the coefficient of unemployment is negative: 
inequality of household disposable income, after controlling for the other variables in the 
regression, is lower when a country’s average unemployment rate is higher.
15 This may indicate 
that most of the variation in unemployment is due to institutional features that keep wages higher 
than the market clearing level, rather than to differences in the efficiency of worker-job matching. 
The impact on household-level inequality may well be negative when employed workers earn 
higher wages, tend to be older, and live in the same households as unemployed youth.
16  
                                                 
15 Experimenting with indicators of regional unemployment dispersion yielded no significant 
results. 
16 The relationship between unemployment and inequality is indeed interestingly different when the 
latter is measured in terms of wages rather than of equivalised income. Bertola, Blau, and Kahn 
  14As mentioned above and illustrated in figure 2, the definition and underlying data of the 
quintile-ratio dependent variable of these regressions have changed in subtle but precisely timed 
ways over the sample. Random measurement errors in the left-hand side variable of a regression 
would not bias the estimates: in the diff-in-difference specifications considered, the definitional 
change would affect the estimated coefficients of EMU dummies only if it had systematically 
different implications for the relevant groups of countries. There is little reason a priori to suspect 
this to be true (and, as mentioned, the results of regressions on all available data are remarkably 
robust to exclusion of individual countries from the ‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups). But it is 
possible to allow for the possibility that inequality provide completely (if additively) different 
information before and after the definitional change. The next two columns of table 3 include a 
dummy that takes value 1 when the inequality indicator is computed by Eurostat on the basis of the 
new methodology, and drops (instead of interpolating) all observations where Eurostat does not 
publish it. In this specification, it is no longer possible to detect a statistically significant association 
between EMU and inequality: the EMU coefficient is small and insignificant in column (3), and 
almost exactly zero when the EMU0 dummy is also included in column (4). This negative result is 
driven in practice by the fact that too few homogeneously defined inequality observations are 
available across the relevant divide. Taken at face value, however, it is consistent with theoretically 
ambiguous direct impact of economic integration on inequality; definitional problems, as we shall 
see, do not prevent empirical procedures from detecting less ambiguous and more interesting 
indirect effects, through government policies. 
Another indicator that may be affected by economic integration and is potentially relevant to 
personal inequality is the share of labour income. As discussed in Section 2, economic integration 
may affect income distribution by allowing private agents to exploit cross-border opportunities. The 
higher mobility of capital may make it better able to do so (consistently with the large FDI effects 
measured in table 2), and this may affect personal income distribution if, as is realistic, financial 
wealth is more unequally distributed than labour earnings, and/or workers have limited access to 
financial instruments. A readily available proxy variable for the relevance of this phenomenon is the 
share in GDP of gross wages and salaries, provided by Eurostat for all countries and years in the 
sample of interest (with the exception of Portugal 1999-2005). As shown in column (4) of table 3, 
the wage income share does decline with the EMU dummy, and rather sharply so (almost 3 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(2002), for example, find that when wage inequality and unemployment are measured in terms of 
deviations from country means, so as to control at least roughly for other factors influencing both, 
they are negatively related, consistently with the idea that tighter wage compression generates more 
unemployment among low-productivity workers. 
  15percentage points in the specification reported, and up to 5 p.p. in similar regressions – not reported 
- with different sets of control variables). Interestingly, however, the wage share is completely 
irrelevant to personal income inequality when included in the regression of column (6), and is only 
very mildly and positively associated with the different inequality definitions accounted for by an 
additive dummy in the regression of column (7) of table 3. Thus, the share of wages in aggregate 
income may be influenced by integration, but appears unrelated to household income inequality. 
The share of social expenditure in aggregate income, conversely, is very relevant to 
inequality. The regression reported in column (1) of table 4 estimates a significant negative 
coefficient for public social expenditure as an explanatory variable for inequality, consistently with 
figures 7 and 8. After accounting for heterogeneity in that respect, the EMU dummies are no longer 
at all significant in regressions that are otherwise similar to those reported in table 3. EMU is 
negatively associated with inequality when unemployment (and population) is omitted in column 
(2), and only very mildly positive and insignificant in column (3) when that variable’s coefficient is 
allowed to absorb the EMU-associated variation detected in table 2. The estimates in the first three 
columns of table 3 again use and interpolate all available inequality data, which is appropriate if 
their variation is not dominated by definitional and measurement problems. But it is also possible to 
allow the inequality measure to differ across definitions both in levels, and in terms of association 
with social policy.  Columns (4-6) of table 4 exclude observations whenever Eurostat does not 
publish a quintile ratio, and include the dummy that accounts for the definitional change as well as 
its interaction with the social policy indicator. The completely insignificant level effect and the 
marginally positive slope effect of the definitional change absorb a portion of the broad inequality 
increase observed in figure 1, while the EMU dummies remain insignificant, and public social 
expenditure remains negatively associated with inequality (if only insignificantly so within the new-
definition subsample, whose observations are very sparse as shown in figure 2, and further reduced 
in this regression by unavailability of 2005 social expenditure data). 
The direct association between the EMU dummy and Eurostat inequality statistics is small 
and ambiguous, consistently with the similarly ambiguous implications of theory as regards the 
inequality impact of economic integration. But the negative and rather significant coefficient of 
social spending in inequality regressions begs the question of whether EMU may influence 
inequality indirectly, through differences in social spending in the aftermath of euro adoption. 
Indeed, the regressions in table 5 document a negative association between social expenditure and 
EMU status. After controlling for per-capita income (as strongly suggested by the data plotted in 
figure 5), the share of GDP spent on social policies (other than old age pensions) is lower on 
average in Eurozone countries after adoption of the euro than in the comparison group, according to 
  16the estimated coefficient of the EMU dummy which is negative and highly significant in column (1) 
and is left unchanged in column (2) by inclusion of unemployment and population among the 
regressors.
17  It is still negative if less significantly so in column (3), where the EMU0 dummy is 
included to account for the overall character of social policies in the group of countries that 
eventually joined EMU. The regressions of columns (4) and (5) include the government budget 
balance, which enters with a negative sign,  is highly significant, and absorbs much of the EMU 
dummy’s statistical significance. This may indicate that the reduction of social policy expenditure 
was in this period associated in EMU countries with improvement of government budgets (rather 
than lower taxes, or reduction of other expenditures).  
 The association of lower social spending with EMU’s fiscal policy constraints and market 
competitiveness concerns is consistent with the theoretically obvious limitations of each country’s 
ability to conduct vigorous (and possibly misguided) independent policies in an integrated market 
environment. Of course, countries were not forced by an experimenter to join EMU, but chose to do 
so, and the choice was presumably influenced by the relationships detected in the data, which do 
imply that countries wishing maintain their own (whether Danish or British) social policy standards 
were well advised not to integrate with others as tightly as EMU implies.  
4.  Concluding comments 
The various pieces of evidence reported and discussed in this paper paint a picture of post-EMU 
evolution that is intriguingly consistent both with economic theory, and with concerns expressed by 
citizens in Eurobarometer surveys. EMU appears to be associated with better aggregate economic 
performance, but also with somewhat higher inequality, and with lower social spending. Economic 
integration’s inequality effects appear to be mediated by (comparatively, in comparison to pre-EMU 
and non-EMU status)  less generous social policy in countries joining the Eurozone, and a portion 
of their better economic performance  may reflect smaller incentive effects of redistribution rather 
than more efficient international market interaction.  
Whether such developments should be viewed as good news depends of course on the side of 
redistribution budgets one finds himself on, and on whether one views redistribution as a suitable or 
a misguided tool for pursuing goals that markets could in principle but might in practice fail to 
achieve. Interestingly, declines in unemployment and wage shares appear to play a minor role in 
determining inequality developments, which are presumably driven instead by variation in the 
heterogeneity and correlation of earnings and capital income.  EMU and other structural and policy 
                                                 
17 The negative coefficient of population size may perhaps reflect administrative difficulties or 
political problems due to ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al, 2004). 
  17developments may be inducing substitution of private financial instruments for the labour market 
regulations and decentralized public redistribution schemes that are less viable in a tightly 
integrated system of markets. Financial market development can indeed fulfil some of the needs 
addressed by social policy in theory, and it would be interesting to find out whether it does so 
within EMU countries as well as at the global level (see Bertola, 2007b, for further discussion and 
evidence).  
Like all empirical results, those reported here can be relied upon only to the extent of their 
statistical significance. Changes in the definition and measurement of inequality at times that 
broadly coincided with advent of EMU are an additional obstacle in the way of the results’ 
reliability for the purpose of assessing extremely important and topical issues.  But even if the data 
are treated as wholly incomparable before and after changes in definition, the qualitative character 
(if not the statistical significance) of the results is unchanged. The theoretically ambiguous direct 
impact of integration on inequality cannot be detected, while the data continue to support the 
implications of market and budgetary discipline for the feasibility of redistribution policies, and 
those of redistribution policies for household income inequality. The data that do exist tell an 
intriguing and theoretically consistent story that is not likely to be driven by measurement 
problems.
18  
Better and more abundant future data may of course yield different results. In the meantime, it 
would be wrong to disregard linkages between economic integration and not only growth, but also 
the sources and remedies of income inequality.  While this paper focuses on inequality within rather 
than across countries, the two are related in obvious and less obvious ways. Within the EU and 
within EMU, richer countries tend to feature higher social spending. Hence, any lack of 
convergence of relatively poor countries’ per capita incomes also hinders decline of their within-
country inequality: high incomes are associated with generous social policies across EU member 
countries (see figure 6) and, as argued by Sapir et al (2004), aggregate income growth is also a 
necessary condition for the feasibility of redistributive social policy. When trying to speculate about 
                                                 
18 For simplicity of interpretation, the specifications reported above include on/off EMU 
membership dummies (and the results are  remarkably robust to the timing of such EMU switches). 
While inclusion of unrestricted country-specific dummies absorbs much of the empirical variation 
as to make EMU dummies insignificant, specifications where EMU and non-EMU countries are 
assigned different trends yield similar (and statistically more significant) results as regards the 
association between inequality, social spending, and EMU. Countries that join EMU during the 
sample period display slower (more negative) social spending  trends, and  faster (more positive) 
inequality trends. This is quite consistent with a structural effect of EMU developing slowly over 
time through anticipation and lagged reactions, and is not as likely to be driven by point-in-time 
definitional changes. 
  18the possible evolution of the EMU project as regards inequality and social policy, it is very 
interesting to consider the contrast between the EU and United States configurations in terms of the 
relationship between income levels and transfer levels. As shown in figures 6 and 7, the sign of the 
income-transfers correlation is the opposite in the US, where residents of poor States receive more 
from a largely Federal welfare system, and in the EU, where country-specific welfare systems are 
more generous in poorer member countries. The overall generosity of the United States welfare 
system is also lower than that of comparably rich EU countries, as Federal co-financing schemes 
may not suffice to prevent race-to-the-bottom tendencies in a tightly integrated economy with high 
labour mobility.  
Can EU countries continue to develop an ever tighter web of private markets without reforming and 
integrating their social policy systems, possibly to the lower levels and Federal configuration of 
their United States counterparts? In the current configuration of the EU, free mobility of goods and 
factors, local decision-making powers in the social protection area, and inequality prevention 
similarly coexist uneasily (Bertola, 2007b). All three are desirable goals of the European Union’s 
system of policies: unfettered market interactions foster efficiency and growth; country-level social 
policy decisions have obvious appeal in light of the vast variety of configurations and historical 
traditions across member countries; and effective poverty-prevention policies are needed, in Europe 
as in the US, both to foster social and political peace, and to remedy the efficiency consequences of 
financial market imperfection. But pursuing two of the three goals implies forsaking the third, just 
as before EMU uncoordinated macroeconomic policies, fixed exchange rate, and free trade with 
capital mobility could not be consistent with each other: one had to be abandoned.  
In the Eurozone, macroeconomic policy independence was given up, and the tight and 
irrevocable integration of its markets may call for forms of effective policy integration in the social 
policy area as well. Difficulties arise from the fact that different countries approach similar 
problems differently, in ways that reflect their own history and economic structure and lack of 
common grounds for political debate. So far, effective economic integration has been limited, 
especially as regards labour mobility and trade in services. Over time, as ever deeper integration 
takes place in all markets, solidarity schemes may develop across the European Union as they did in 
the United States. As long as some risk management pertains to policy rather than markets, the 
scope of policy should coincide with that of markets to the extent possible, and it is no less 
inconsistent to imagine a Single Market without a coherent welfare policy system as it was to try 
and run independent macroeconomic policies under fixed exchange rates in conditions of free 
capital mobility. But the very wide heterogeneity of economic circumstances and social traditions 
across the Eurozone and the EU may well make it difficult to build a harmonious common welfare 
  19infrastructure. And the importance of redistribution policy may well have to decline relative to that 
of markets, perhaps approaching a configuration similar to that of the United States where, for 
example, interstate private financial flows play an important consumption-smoothing role alongside 
local and Federal taxes and transfers (see Salemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha, 2004, and its 
references).  
  20REFERENCES 
Agell, J. (2002) “On the Determinants of Labour Market Institutions: Rent Seeking vs. Social 
Insurance,” German Economic Review 3:2 107-135. 
Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat and R. Wacziarg (2004) 
“Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth 8:2 pp. 155-194. 
Arpaia, A. and K. Pichelmann (2007) “Nominal and real wage flexibility in EMU,” European 
Economy Economic Papers Number 281. 
Atkinson, A.B. (2003) “Income Inequality in OECD Countries: Data and Explanations,” CESifo 
Economic Studies 49:4 479-513. 
Baldwin, R., G. Bertola, and P. Seabright eds. (2003) EMU: Assessing the impact of the euro, 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Barr, D., F. Breedon and D. Miles (2003) “Life on the outside: economic conditions and prospects 
outside euro land,” Economic Policy 37, pp. 573–613; also in Baldwin, Bertola, Seabright eds. 
(2003). 
Belke, A., B. Herz, and L. Vogel (2007) “Reforms, Exchange Rates and Monetary Commitment: A 
Panel Analysis for OECD Countries,” Open Economies Review 18, 369–388. 
Bernanke, B. S. (2006), “Opening Remarks,” in Economic Geography: Effects and policy 
implications, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Thirtieth Annual Economic Symposium. 
Bertola, G. (2006) “Social and Labour Market Policies in a Growing EU,” Swedish Economic 
Policy Review 13:1 189-232. 
Bertola, G. (2007a) “Welfare Policy Integration Inconsistencies,” in Helge Berger and Thomas 
Moutos (eds.) Designing the New European Union, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 91-120. 
Bertola, G. (2007b) "Finance and Welfare States in Globalising Markets" in Christopher Kent and 
Jeremy Lawson (eds.), The Structure and Resilience of The Financial System, Sydney: Federal 
Reserve Bank of Australia, 167-195. 
Bertola, G., F. D. Blau and L. M. Kahn (2002) “Comparative Analysis of Employment Outcomes: 
Lessons for the United States from International Labour Market Evidence,” in A. Krueger and R. 
Solow (eds.), The Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment Be Sustained?, Russell Sage and 
Century Foundations, 159-218. 
Bertola, G. and T.  Boeri (2002) “EMU Labour Markets Two Years On: Microeconomic Tensions 
and Institutional Evolution,” in M. Buti and A. Sapir (eds.), EMU and Economic Policy in 
Europe: The Challenge of the Early Years, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 249-280. 
Bertola, G., R. Foellmi and J. Zweimueller (2006) Income Distribution in Macroeconomic Models, 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 440 pp. 
  21Checchi, D., and C. García Peñalosa (2005) “Labour Market Institutions and the Personal 
Distribution of Income in the OECD,” IZA Discussion Papers 1681. 
Darvas, Z., A. K. Rose and G. Szapáry (2005) “Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle 
Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic,”  NBER Working Paper 11580. 
Facchini, G. and A. M. Mayda (2006) “Individual Attitudes towards Immigrants: Welfare-State 
Determinants Across Countries,” IZA Discussion Papers 2127. 
Fernandez, R., and D. Rodrik (1991) “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of 
Individual-Specific Uncertainty,” American Economic Review 81(5), 1146-55. 
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., B. E. Sorensen and O. Yosha (2004) ”Asymmetric Shocks and Risk Sharing in a 
Monetary Union: Updated Evidence and Policy Implications for Europe,” CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. 4463, in H. Huizinga and L. Jonung, eds. The Internationalisation of Asset Ownership in 
Europe, Cambridge University Press 2005, New York. 
Koeniger, W., M. Leonardi and L. Nunziata (2007) “Labour Market Institutions and Wage 
Inequality,” Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 60:3, 340-356. 
Krebs, T., P. Krishna, and W. Maloney (2005), “Trade Policy, Income Risk and Welfare,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Number, 11255. 
Mayda, A. M., K. H. O’Rourke and R. Sinnott (2007) “Risk, Government and Globalization: 
International Survey Evidence,” CEPR Discussion Paper 6354. 
Micco, A., E. Stein, and G. Ordoñez (2003) “The currency union effect on trade: early evidence 
from EMU,” Economic Policy 37, pp. 315-356; also in Baldwin, Bertola, Seabright eds. (2003). 
O’Rourke, Kevin H. (2001) “Globalization and Inequality: Historical trends,” NBER WP 8339. 
Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez (2006) “The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and 
International Perspective,” American Economic Review P&P 96:2 200-205. 
Rodrik, Dani (1998) “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of 
Political Economy 106:5, pp.997-1032. 
Roubini, Nouriel, Elisa Parisi-Capone, and Christian Menegatti (2007) “Growth Differentials in the 
EMU: Facts and Considerations,” working paper, Roubini Global Economics. 
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (2006) “The world distribution of income: falling poverty and… 
convergence, period,” Quarterly Journal of Economics CXXI:2, 351-397. 
Sapir, André, Philippe Aghion,  G. Bertola, Martin Hellwig, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Dariusz Rosati, José 
Viñals, Helen Wallace, and others (2004) An Agenda for a Growing Europe - The Sapir Report, 
Oxford University Press. 
Scheve, Kenneth, and Matthew J. Slaughter (2004) “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of 
Production,” American Journal of Political Science 48:4 662-674.  
  22Spilimbergo, Antonio, Juan Luis Londoño, and Miguel Székely (1999) “Income distribution, factor 
endowments, and trade openness,” Journal of Development Economics 59, 77-101. 
Storesletten, Kjetil, Chris I. Telmer, and Amir Yaron (2004) “Cyclical Dynamics in Idiosyncratic 
Labour Market Risk,” Journal of Political Economy 112, 695–717. 
















1995 2000 20051995 2000 2005















































Figure 1 - Evolution of inequality, as measured by the income quintile ratio, in the EU15 
and Euroarea12 aggregates (2002 is the average of data reported for 2001 and2003; 
methodology varies). Source: Eurostat.  



















1995 2000 20051995 2000 2005
1995 2000 20051995 2000 2005
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Ireland






Figure 2  - Yearly 1995-2005 income quintile ratios for EU 15 countries. Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 3 - Relation between initial per capita GDP and subsequent growth across  EU15 
countries (Luxembourg is excluded); GDP is measured in constant 1995 euro, its growth in 
annual percentage points. The slope of the regression lines gauges the strength of 
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Figure 4 - Per capita GDP in constant 1995 euro  and contemporaneous income quartile 
ratio; EU15 countries (except Luxembourg), 1995, 1999, 2004 (interpolation of 2001 and 
2005 for German quintile ratio). Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 5 -Per capita GDP in constant 1995 euro and public  social protection expenditure 
(ESSPROS definition, excluding old-age pensions) as a percentage of GDP; EU15 countries 
(except Luxembourg), 1995, 1999, 2004. Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 6  - Personal income in current dollars and Federal+State+local transfers to persons 
as a fraction of personal income; States of the US, 2002. Source: Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
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Figure 7 - Social protection expenditure (ESSPROS definition, excluding old-age and 
survivors pensions) as a percentage of GDP in 1995, 1999, 2004, and contemporaneous 
income quartile ratio as in Figure 2. Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 8 - Residuals from regressions of public  social protection expenditure (as in Figures 
5 and 7) and of income quintile ratios (as in Figures 4 and 6) on a constant and per capita 
GDP (as in Figures 4 and 5). The regression is run on 1995-2005 annual data, but only 1995, 
1998, 2001, 2004 residuals are plotted to reduce clutter.   
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Table 1: Summary statistics. 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDPp.c.  20.4  6.11 8.5 31.6
Unemp.  7.9  3.10 2.2 18.4
Ineq.  4.6  1.17 2.9  8.2
Pop.  27.0 26.01 3.6 82.5
 
Variable definitions:   
GDPp.c.: GDP at market prices, Euro thousands per inhabitant at 1995 prices.  
Unemp.:  Harmonized unemployment rates,  -/+ 25 years, yearly averages, in percentage 
points.  
Ineq.: Inequality of income distribution, “income quintile share ratio: The ratio of total 
income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income (top quintile) to 
that received by the 20 % of the population with the lowest income (lowest quintile). 
Income must be understood as equivalised disposable income.” Missing values are 
interpolated for the purpose of computing these statistics. 
Pop.: total population as of Jan 1st, millions.  
Sample: 1995-2005 annual data for Austria,  Belgium,  Germany,  Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom,   Greece,  Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden.  
Source: Eurostat. 
  32                 Table 2: Growth, unemployment, integration and EMU. 
     Economic  integration   
GDPp.c. Unemp. GDPp.c. Unemp. Goods  Services  FDI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Pop.          -0.22     -0.11       -0.03  
            -2.43        -2.70         -2.06  
EMU  3.42  -2.44  7.91 -1.10      5.89       2.86        2.16  
  4.88  -4.16  4.73 -2.07        2.37         1.95          3.77  
EMU0  -6.35  3.78       0.87     -1.16       -2.51  
  -1.80  3.30         0.19        -0.87         -3.14  
        
        
Constant  23.72  6.07      31.81      12.03        6.20  
  7.89  13.08        12.55         8.94          9.91  
BEL     18.65 9.08    
DEU     20.33 9.15    
DNK     29.26 5.22    
ESP     8.49 13.77    
FIN     18.70 11.47    
FRA     17.13 10.77    
GBR     17.18 5.91    
GRC     6.35 10.83    
IRL     15.47 7.36    
ITA     11.19 10.50    
NLD     18.60 4.82    
PRT     4.93 6.57    
SWE     24.73 7.08    
N  154 154 154 154  147  147  133 
r2  0.14 0.21 0.92 0.95  0.26  0.31  0.11 
Robust t statistics (accounting for country clustering  when no fixed effects are included) in italics 
below the slope coefficients.  
Variable definitions (in addition to those given in Table 1):  
Economic integration, Goods: imports plus exports of goods in percent of GDP;  
Economic integration, Services: imports plus exports of services in percent of GDP;  
Economic integration, FDI: inward plus outward foreign direct investment flows in percent 
of GDP.   
EMU0: dummy, equal to unity for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal.   
EMU: dummy, equal to unity in 1999-2005 for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and in 2001-2005 for Greece. 
The specification of columns (3) and (4) include a full set of country-specific dummies. 
Sample: as in Table 1, except:  no economic integration data for Belgium are available before 2000 
(the results are very similar if all Belgium observations are omitted). Some other 
observations of FDI flows are also missing: Denmark in 2004, Greece in 1995-99 and 2002-
05, and Sweden in 2000 and 2002.  
Source: Eurostat. 
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                   Table 3: Inequality and EMU. 
 Ineq.  Ineq.  Ineq.  Ineq.  wage 
s. 
Ineq. Ineq. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Unemp. -0.08  -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.20 -0.08  -0.07 
  -2.74 -2.60  -2.93  -2.84  -0.66 -2.15 -2.29 
Pop. 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00 
  1.71 1.91  1.13  1.48  1.37 2.30 2.25 
GDPp.c. -0.19  -0.19 -0.20 -0.19 0.59  -0.18  -0.19 
  -15.48 -15.62  -16.26  -15.96 3.27  -15.48 -19.61 
wage s.                                                 0.00  0.01 
                                                 0.39 1.26 
EMU 0.28 0.20  0.08  -0.01  -2.71  0.14  -0.06 
  2.40 1.47  0.74  -0.11  -2.52  1.18  -0.44 
EMU0             0.18           0.19  -4.80  0.24  0.30 
             0.79           1.07  -1.82  0.89  1.37 
IneqDef     0.56  0.59     0.58 
     4.91  5.32                    5.60 
            N   154  154  133  133  147  147  126 
           r2   0.85  0.85  0.89  0.90  0.66  0.84  0.89 
Robust t statistics accounting for country clustering in italics below the slope coefficients.  
All regressions include a constant. 
Variable definitions (in addition to those given in Table 1 and Table 2): 
IneqDef: dummy, equal to zero for country and periods when Eurostat makes available the 
ECHP-based inequality  measure, to one for country and periods when the EU-SILK measure 
is available, and missing (thus eliminating interpolated values and reducing the number of 
observations) when neither is available.  
 Wage s.: Gross wages and salaries, percent of GDP.  
Sample: as in Table 1, however Wage share is not available for Portugal between 1999 and 2005.   
Source: Eurostat. 
  34 
               Table 4: Inequality, public social expenditure, and EMU. 
 Ineq.  Ineq.  Ineq.  Ineq.  Ineq.  Ineq. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
GDPp.c. -0.13  -0.14 -0.16 -0.15  -0.15 -0.17 
  -5.97 -5.68  -7.05 -6.97 -6.27 -8.49 
Unemp.                          -0.07                        -0.06 
                          -2.36                        -2.90 
Pop.                          0.00                        0.00 
                          1.73                        1.48 
EMU              0.18  0.08            0.08  -0.03 
              1.49  0.71            0.64  -0.24 
EMU0              -0.18  0.05            -0.16  0.08 
              -0.87  0.26            -0.98  0.53 
P.social exp.  -0.12  -0.12  -0.08  -0.09  -0.09  -0.07 
  -2.58 -2.11  -1.89 -2.02 -1.82 -1.80 
P.social exp.                                       0.04  0.04  0.05 
.*IneqDef                                       1.00 1.01  1.47 
IneqDef                                       -0.07  -0.08  -0.22 
                                       -0.11 -0.13  -0.38 
 140  140  140  119  119  119 
r2 0.86  0.86  0.88  0.90  0.90  0.92 
Robust t statistics accounting for country clustering in italics below the slope coefficients.  
All regressions include a constant. 
Variable definitions (in addition to those given in Tables 1 and 2):  
P.social exp.: Social protection expenditure, all ESSPROS classifications except “old age” and 
“survivors,” in percent of GDP.  
Source: Eurostat.  
Sample: as in Table 1, however social expenditure data are not available in 2005. 
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Table 5: Public social expenditure and EMU. 










 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
GDPp.c. 0.37  0.40  0.37  0.41  0.43 
  7.26 6.90  5.90  8.42  6.64 
Unemp.               0.15  0.24              0.25 
               1.20  1.72               1.75 
pop               -0.01  -0.01              -0.02 
               -0.72  -0.85              -1.32 
EMU -1.94 -1.78  -0.77  -1.80  -0.27 
  -3.52 -3.31  -1.73  -3.20  -0.77 
EMU0                           -2.24              -2.75 
                           -2.47              -3.01 
GovtBudg                                     -0.14  -0.27 
                                      -1.25 -3.98 
N 140  140  140  140  140 
r2 0.62  0.64  0.63  0.68  0.72 
       
Robust t statistics accounting for country clustering in italics below the slope coefficients.  
All regressions include a constant. 
Variable definitions (in addition to those given in previous tables): 
GovtBudg: General government deficit(-) /surplus (+), % GDP ( Maastricht criteria 
definition). 
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  This paper analyzes the evolution of per capita income inequality among 
European regions during the 1977-2003 period. After examining the trend in inequality 
measured with conventional inequality indices, I consider two types of variation within 
the income distribution. First, interregional inequality is decomposed in its between-
country and within-country components. Second, using a rank-size function, I check 
whether inequality varies with regions' ranks in the income distribution. Overall, 
inequality has decreased since 1977, owing to a decrease in between-country inequality, 
and despite an increase in within-country since the mid-1990s. Moreover, inequality has 
been greater among low-income regions than among high-income regions. I then examine 
whether the establishment of EMU, and changes in some demographic, macroeconomic, 
and policy-related factors help explain the aforementioned inequality variations. The 
panel analysis suggests that EMU has so far exacerbated regional inequality in richer EU 
countries, while it has not significantly affected regional disparities within poorer 
countries. 
  
    • Keywords: income inequality, European Union, EMU, regional disparities  
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1 Introduction 
 Regional disparities and inequalities in Europe have been the object of extensive 
research over the last decade
1. Several factors can explain this widespread interest. First, 
the revival of growth theory (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1998) was 
contemporaneous to a growing empirical literature on economic convergence (Sala-i-
Martin, 2006; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992, 1995; Quah, 1997, 1996; de la 
Fuente, 2000). Most of the empirical literature reports that, in Europe, the process of 
absolute convergence observed for decades has slowed down almost to an halt during the 
1980s and early 1990s (Boldrin and Canova, 2001;  Neven and Gouyette, 1995;  Magrini, 
1999) at a time when European economic integration was pursued further. Second, 
reducing regional disparities has been one of the most explicit and resolute goals of the 
European Union (EU)
2, which has consequently devoted an increasing share of its budget 
to its regional policy. 
Concerns about the impact of economic integration on regional disparities have 
been revived by the establishment of the Single Market and of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). So far, most of the debate on the impact of the common 
currency has been focused on national economic conditions. Thus, the convergence 
criteria (price stability, low interest rate, stable exchange rates, and limited government 
debts and deficits) that countries need to satisfy in order to qualify for the common 
currency and the Cohesion Fund eligibility criteria
3 are based on national macroeconomic 
variables. Meanwhile, the possible impact of the euro on European regions has received 
much less attention, even though it is also very critical to guarantee the economic and 
social cohesion sought by the European Union (Martin, 2001;  Thirlwall, 2000). 
The current literature offers various and often conflicting models to explain 
                                                       
1Braunerhjelm et al. (2000); Puga (1999); Boldrin and Canova (2001); Basile et al. (2001); Neven and 
Gouyette (1995); Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2002);  Dunford (1993) among others. 
2 Article 158 of the Treaty establishing the European Community for instance states that “the Community 
shall aim at reducing disparities between levels of development of the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least favored regions or islands, including rural areas”. 
3 The Cohesion fund was established in 1994 to contribute to the fulfillment of the conditions of economic 
convergence as set out in Article 104c of the Treaty establishing the European Community. Countries 
qualify for the Cohesion funds when their per capita gross national products (GNP), measured in 
purchasing power parities, of less than 90 % of the Community average. 
  2whether regional disparities will or will not disappear with further economic integration. 
Optimal Currency Area theory
4 considers that the adoption of a common currency brings 
both advantages and disadvantages. Lower transaction costs provide more price 
transparency and less exchange rate uncertainty, which ultimately promotes economic 
growth in the monetary union. But the absence of independent exchange rate and 
monetary policy would make it harder to tackle asymmetric shocks given the current lack 
of labor mobility across EU countries and regions. For proponents of neoclassical 
precepts, disparities are bound to disappear because of diminishing returns to capital. By 
promoting free movements of factors of production, further integration would lead to a 
more efficient resource allocation, and thus to economic growth. To contrast with this 
approach, contributions to the new economic geography theory argue that, by promoting 
trade and factor mobility, deeper economic integration will create new opportunities of 
economies of scale, activity specialization and economic agglomeration, which could 
generate regional disparities in growth and factor accumulation, and thus economic 
divergence (Krugman, 1991a, b). 
On empirical grounds, the literature on the EMU has not yet eliminated these 
theoretical doubts. On the one hand, EMU is expected to bring more macroeconomic 
stability, notably in Southern EU countries, which could promote a more equal income 
distribution. But on the other hand, labor market rigidities, notably in Southern Europe, 
would make these countries more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks (Ardy et al., 2002; 
Barry and Begg, 2003; Barry, 2003; Begg, 2003). Padoa-Schioppa (1987) also concluded 
that the increased competition induced by further integration and improved price 
transparency could put more pressure on the less developed member states, which could 
ultimately lead to more inequalities. Yet, the loss of competition could internally induce a 
reduction in regional disparities in those countries, as only the more advanced regions in 
the country compete on the international market (Petrakos and Saratis, 2000). 
To assess the impact of EMU on regional cohesion, this paper first investigates 
the dynamics of regional income inequality among 197 European regions between 1977 
and 2003. The empirical analysis focuses on per capital income distribution as opposed to 
personal income distribution, because the former is a more appropriate scale to examine 
                                                       
4 Kenen (1969); Mundell (1961); McKinnon (1962); Mongeli (2002). 
  3the effects of economic integration (such as EMU) on income disparities. The overall 
level of systemic inequality is measured with indices commonly used to study personal 
income disparities (Atkinson, 2003; Partridge et al., 1996; Beblo and Knaus, 2001; 
Heshmati, 2004) but, until recently, rarely employed to assess regional per capita income 
distribution. This method does not however detect whether inequality is greater among 
some subgroups of regions, and smaller among other ones. To address this issue, the 
dynamics of per capita income distribution are studied in two complementary ways. First, 
I check whether within or between-country inequalities drive inequality across European 
regions. Using a rank-size function, I then follow Fan and Casetti (1994)'s approach and 
examine the extent to which inequality varies with a region's rank within the income 
distribution. 
Finally, the role played by EMU in shaping interregional income inequality within 
EU countries is more specifically assessed with a panel data analysis that relates 
inequality measures to national demographic, macroeconomic and policy characteristics. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology 
used to measure interregional inequality. Section 3 presents the evolution of interregional 
inequality. Section 4 looks at variation in inequality between and within countries, as 
well as variation within the income distribution. The panel analysis of the determinants of 
inequality is carried out in section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes the main conclusions. 
 
2 Data and methodology 
  I examine the distribution of per capita income across EU regions between 1977 
and 2003. Inequality measures are calculated for 197 NUTS 2
5 regions from the 
following 13 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. Ireland and 
Luxembourg are not included because each one was categorized as one region in the 
nomenclature; thus it is impossible to calculate within-country inequality. All of the 
countries are included in the analysis from 1977 to 2003, regardless of when they joined 
                                                       
5NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) corresponds to Eurostat's classification of 
subnational spatial units where NUTS 0 refers to country level data and increasing numbers indicate 
increasing levels of subnational disaggregation. 
  4the EU. Like Ezcurra, I exclude the region of Groningen in the Netherlands, because a 
change in the Dutch national accounting method in the mid-1980s creates an artificial 
jump in the inequality measures
6. I also exclude Eastern Länder in Germany in order to 
keep the sample of regions constant. The possible impact of these Länder on inequality is 
discussed in the next section. 
The GDP data are compiled by Cambridge Econometrics which provides a 
balanced panel of European regional data. The GDP variable is expressed in Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) because market exchange rate do not account for differences in 
relative prices across countries. Each region' s PPP per capita GDP has been scaled 
relative to EU15 average PPP per capita income. I also use time series instead of random 
years because the latter might not be representative of the overall evolution of inequality 
in Europe. 
 
3 Inequality dynamics: 1977-2003 
   
3.1 Trend in overall inequality 
 There is a great variety of measures available to income inequality scholars, and 
the choice of a measure is always tricky because each measure has its merits and 
shortcomings. Scholars yet agree on a set of axioms that an inequality measure should 
fulfill: the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, income scale dependence, the principle of 
population, and the symmetry principle (see Appendix A for more details.) The Gini 
Index, the General Entropy measure with parameter 1 (GE(1), also referred as income-
weighted Theil index), and the General Entropy measure with parameter 0 (GE(0), also 
referred as population-weighted Theil index) satisfy these four axioms and are thus used 
in this paper to assess the level of inequality among EU regions. Moreover, because 
decomposability is an important component of this paper's analysis, and is more easily 
done for General Entropy indices, the analysis will focus on GE(1) and GE(0) indices. I 
use the Gini index to verify the robustness of my results. The formulas used to compute 
these measures are reported in Appendix B. 
                                                       
6Before the reform, the revenue from gas and oil of the North Sea were allocated to the region of 
  5Figure 1 illustrates the temporal patterns of the aforementioned inequality indices. 
All of the indices show a remarkably similar EU-wide inequality trend. Overall, 
inequality has decreased between 1977 and 2003. The Generalized Entropy measures fell 
by 21% while the Gini index decreased by 10% over the same 26 years. The larger 
decrease in the GE(0) measure which is more sensitive to changes at the bottom of the 
income distribution, provides evidence that less-favored regions have partly caught up 
with richer regions. This fall in inequality is confirmed by time plots (figure 2) of the 
coefficient of variation (COV ) and of the standard deviation of the logs (SDL) which are 
commonly used to measure σ -convergence (the dispersion of per capita income). These 
results are very close to the findings of Duro, despite slight differences in the number of 
regions included in the analysis
7. 
Several phases can be discerned within the 26 years covered in this study. After a 
sharp fall in inequality between 1979 and 1982, the mid 1980s were marked by an 
increase in regional disparities. This increase suggests that inequality shows a 
countercyclical pattern
8. After a short fall between 1986 and 1989, inequality rose again 
in the early 1990s (as European economies were heading towards the 1993 recession), 
and dramatically dropped between 1992 and 1993. Since then, regional disparities have 
kept a downward trajectory, and have experienced a much smaller variation than in the 
1980s. One should also note that the smoother trend begins in 1993, which coincides with 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and stage two of EMU. 
To make more sense out of these statistics, the EU inequality measures need to be 
compared to some benchmark so that one can determined whether inequality among EU 
regions has been high or low. One possible gauge is the United States (U.S.) which have 
similar economic and population sizes. Moreover, since the U.S. constitute a more 
integrated economy than the EU, it could be used to predict future trend in regional 
inequality in Europe. Inequality has been consistently wider among European regions 
than among U.S. states. In 1989 for instance, Fan and Casetti (1994) estimate that the 
Shannon entropy index (similar to the GE(1) index) reached 0.0238. The GE(1) index 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Groningen, while afterwards, the revenues were distributed to the whole country. 
7Duro (2004) includes German Eastern Länder after 1991 and Austria, Finland and Sweden from 1995 to 
1997. 
8See Artis et al. (1997) for European business cycle peaks and troughs. 
  6computed for EU regions was 0.0393 in 1989. In the same year, Ram (1992) found that 
the GE(0) index among U.S. states was equal to 0.012, which corresponds to one third of 
the European GE(0) index plotted in figure 1. Similarly, Boldrin and Canova (2001) find 
that European regional inequalities are twice those of the U.S. when measured either by 
the standard deviation of per capita income or the ratio of the top to bottom decile of 
regions. So if one accepts the U.S. as a reference point, regional disparities in Europe 
should be viewed as quite wide. 
Besides differences in level, the EU and the U.S. have experienced different 
trends. Fan and Casetti (1994) find that inequality in the U.S. decreased between 1950 
and 1975 and then increased from 1975 and 1989. More recently, Tsionas (2000) finds 
that, between 1977 and 1996, there was no sigma-convergence among U.S. states. The 
absence of reduction in disparities across U.S. states in the 1990s thus contrasts with the 
downward trend observed in Europe. 
So far, the analysis provides a general overview of inequality among EU regions 
but does not offer any insights about disparities that could exist among or within 
countries. This issue is addressed in Section 3.2 which compares national inequality 
levels and trends. 
 
3.2 National inequality trends 
 
3.2.1 Comparison of the level of inequality in EU countries 
 The next three figures plot the evolution of three main inequality measures by 
country. Figure 3 presents the GE(1) index by country, figure 4 the GE(0) index, and 
figure 5 the Gini index. Levels of inequality vary significantly from one country to 
another. Belgium emerges as the country that has consistently experienced the highest 
levels of inequality
9. Denmark and France have the lowest levels of inequality. These two 
facts support the conclusion of Felsentein and Portnov (2005) that it is incorrect to 
assume that small countries exhibit smaller regional disparities. Sweden is the only 
country where the level of inequality varies significantly with the inequality measure. 
                                                       
9 This is partly explained by the large number of workers who commute to Brussels from neighboring 
Flanders and Wallony. 
  7Sweden would be considered a low-inequality country based on the Gini and GE(1) 
indices, but a high-inequality country according to its GE(0) index, which suggests that 
inequality exists mostly in the low tail of the income distribution. 
Countries can also be distinguished by the range their inequality measures take. 
Austria, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal have experienced wider ranges of 
inequality levels, while inequality has been more stable in France, Denmark, Spain, and 
Germany. It is important to keep in mind that the inequality measures presented for 
Germany do not include Eastern Länder. The estimations in Duro (2004) confirm that 
inequality increases sharply once these German regions are added to the population of 
regions. He finds that, one year after the 1990 reunification, the GE(0) index had 
increased by 45%, the GE(1) index had increased by 36.6%, and the Gini index rose by 
10%. Yet the author notes that, soon after the German reunification, inequality fell 
sharply in the early 1990s. Because Cambridge Econometrics database does not include 
PPP per capita income for these regions prior to 1997, I am not able to replicate Duro's 
finding. Yet, I do obtain that, for 1997 to 2003 inequality measures (EU-wide measures 
and German measures) rise if Eastern Länder are included, but only by a small 
percentage (less than 2% after 1998). Given the data limitation and the small percentage 
change aforementioned, excluding these 12 Eastern German regions should not affect the 
robustness of this paper's conclusions.  
 
3.2.2 Trends in each EU countries 
  To get a better sense of the evolution of national income inequality, figure 6 
illustrate the same inequality estimates from a different perspective, by plotting inequality 
measures for each country against time. Countries have experienced trends very different 
from the one depicted in figure 1, and can be classified in five categories: those who 
experienced (1)a decrease in inequality, (2)an increase in inequality, (3)a U-shaped trend, 
(4)an inverted U-shaped trend, and (5)no clear trend. Because all of the inequality 
measures depict the same trend in each country, the following comments and statistics are 
based only on the GE(1) index. 
Four countries have experienced significant decrease in inequality over the last 
three decades: Austria (decrease by 60%), Greece (decrease by 65%), Portugal (decrease 
  8by 40%) and Italy (decrease by 15%). The fall in inequality was steeper in Austria and 
Italy in the 1980s. In Greece, the sharp drop in inequality occurs with the early 1980s, 
which coincides with its accession to the EU and with a major increase in government 
spending on welfare policies (Manessiotis and Reischauer, 2001). Inequality fell in 
Portugal at a relative constant pace between 1977 and 1995, before slightly increasing 
between 1995 and 1998. Regional disparities in Germany, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom have on the other hand widened. The GE(1) index grew by 22% in Germany 
(with and without the Eastern Länder), by 34% in the UK, and by 561% in Sweden. This 
dramatic surge in Swedish inequality happened mostly after 1995. Inequality in the next 
three countries has displayed a non-linear trend. Inequality in France is characterized by 
an inverted U-shaped trend, as it leveled off at higher levels between 1985 and 1995. The 
trends in Finland and the Netherlands have the opposite shape, as inequality decreased 
sharply in the early 1980s, and increased again in the late 1990s. One should also note 
that the recent increase was more pronounced in Finland. Finally, Denmark, Belgium and 
Spain have not experienced any clear trend in their inequality levels. Regional disparities 
were stable in Denmark until 1988, and then increased until the mid-1990s before 
returning to their initial levels. Inequality among Spanish provinces peaked in 1981-1983, 
before sharply falling between 1985 and 1995, and have since slightly increased. 
Regional disparities have remained high and stable in Belgium.  
 
 
4 Inequality variations 
  
The conventional inequality measures used in Section 3 capture the overall spread 
of per capita income distribution, but do not provide any insight about variation within 
the distribution. In addition to variation across countries and over time, inequality among 
European regions can be further analyzed with two complementary approaches. First, one 
can distinguish inequality within and between-countries. Second, I check whether 
inequality is homogenous throughout the income distribution or whether it varies with a 
region's ranking. 
 
  9 
4.1 Inequality decomposition  
The decomposition of inequality is carried out using the GE(1) index because, 
like the other Generalized Entropy measures, it is conform to five key axioms (presented 
in Appendix A) that one usually requires inequality measures to meet (Cowell, 2000; 
Bouguignon, 1979; López-Rodríguez and Faiña, 2006; Litchfield, 1999). The 
Generalized Entropy class of measures can easily be decomposed into within-group and 
between-group inequality:  within between total I I I + = . The decomposition is based on GE(1) 
instead of the GE(0), because the latter attributes more weight to the bottom of the 
distribution (i.e. to the poorer regions), while the former applies equal weight across the 
distribution. I checked the robustness of the results presented in this section by 
performing the same analysis with the GE(0) index, and the results were very similar. 
Figure 7 represents the evolution of the overall GE(1) index and its between and 
within components over time. It clearly appears that the level of overall inequality is 
mostly due to within inequality. As indicated in figure 8, within-country inequality 
accounted for 60% of overall inequality until 1995
10. Its share in total inequality then 
started to increase until it reached 70% by 2003. Yet, it is the between-country inequality 
that explains the variation in overall inequality. It is clear, for instance, on figure 7 that 
the increase in inequality in the early 1990s was due to a rise in between-country 
inequality. Moreover, since 1995, the decrease in between-country inequality was large 
enough to offset the slight increase in within-country inequality, and to cause a decrease 
in overall inequality. This reduction in inequality between EU countries has been mostly 
driven by the success of Cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and to a lesser 
extent Greece) at converging with the rest of the EU (European Commission, 2001). 
Even though U.S. inequality has followed a different trend, its decomposition into 
between and within inequalities suggests a pattern similar to European inequality 
decomposition. Most of the inequality among U.S. states also comes from within-group 
inequality. When the 49 contiguous U.S. states are grouped into four regions, the share of 
                                                       
10Because this increase in within-country inequality started in 1995, and coincides with the increase in 
inequality among Swedish regions, I checked whether the trend of the within component could have been 
driven by the evolution of domestic inequality in Sweden. When the decomposition is estimated without 
  10within-group inequality oscillates between 73% and 87.5% from 1950 to 1989 (Fan and 
Casetti, 1994). 
 
4.2 Does inequality varies with a region's rank in the income 
distribution? 
 
The decomposition performed in the previous section suggests that inequality 
between countries is much lower than among regions from the same country. Besides 
checking variation of inequality with the size of the geographic units (countries or 
regions) considered, inequality could also vary among groups of regions depending on 
these regions' positions in the income distribution. 
I use a rank-size function to obtain an additional inequality measure, namely the 
power-law exponent. This technique is usually applied in urban economics where cities 
are ranked according to their populations in order to assess the level of urban 
concentration
11. In the context of this paper, a region's size is captured by its PPP per 
capita income. The rank-size function describes the relation between a region's per capita 
income and its ranking when regions are ordered in descending order (i.e. the wealthiest 
region in the sample has a rank equal to one and the least favored a rank equal to 197). To 
obtain the power-law exponent, I regress logged per capita income ( ) on logged rank y
12:  
  . ln = ln rank q a y +  (1) 
  The absolute value of the slope ( ) is referred as power law exponent, and 
corresponds to a measure of inequality: the higher the absolute value of   the more 
unequal the income distribution across regions. 
q
q
This rank-size function provides only a measure of the overall systemic 
inequality, because it assumes that inequality between all of the regions follows the same 
law. If inequality was similar throughout the income distribution, points on the scatterplot 
would form a straight line, with a slope equal to the power law exponent. Yet, when 
logged regional PPP per capita incomes are plotted against logged ranks (figure 9), the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Sweden, the increase in the late 1990s persists. 
11Midelfart et al. (2003); Krugman (1996); Nitsche (2005); Gabaix (1999); Brakman et al. (1999). 
  11slope (i.e. the power-law exponent) tends to be steeper at lower ranks (ranks between 110 
and 197 for this paper). This implies that, like for U.S. states (Fan and Casetti, 1994), 
inequality is higher among low-income regions than among high-income regions.  
This non-linearity can be further studied by expanding the rank-size equation. Fan 
and Casetti (1994) suggest making the slope a function of the rank or the rank squared, so 
that the rank-size specification can be rewritten as:  
  rank rank q rank q a y ln * ln = ln 1 0 + +  (2) 
 
   (3)  rank rank q rank q a y ln * ln = ln
2
1 0 + +
 
In both specifications, a negative and significant coefficient   implies that, as the 
rank gets larger, inequality increases with the rank. As reported in table 1, inequality does 
increase with the rank, but this effect has decreased over time, with the exception of the 
second half of the 1990s. Both sets of estimates for   are smaller in absolute value than 
those obtained by Fan and Casetti (1994) for U.S. states, which suggests that the 
disparities between high-income regions and low-income regions are more acute in 
Europe than in the U.S. 
1 q
1 q
The findings presented in Section 4 have strong policy implications. First, the 
predominance of within-country inequality over between-country inequality suggests that 
structural policies designed to reduce economic and social disparities within the EU 
should be elaborated at the regional level, and not at the national level. Moreover, given 
that more inequality exists among the least favored European regions, funding should be 
extensively concentrated on regions at the bottom of the income distribution. These two 
conclusions call into question the current set-up of EU regional policy. Beyond its 
apparent desire to reduce interregional income inequalities, EU aid is not perfectly 
correlated with regional development gap or development potential (Fayolle and Lecuyer, 
2000). Only objective-1 funds (which represented 70% of the funds allocated to the 
Structural Funds program between 1989 and 1999) are truly devoted to the poorest 
                                                                                                                                                                 
12The associated R-squared range from 0.800 to 0.8517. 
  12regions, those of which per capita GDP is below 75% of the EU average
13. To further 
discuss the efficacy of the current EU regional policy it would be also interesting to 
examine whether the Cohesion Fund
14 received by Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, 
has induced the reduction in between-country inequality, since its creation coincides with 
the recent downward trend in between-country inequality. 
 
5 EMU and inequality: A panel analysis 
  
In this section, the analysis goes beyond the description of variation in income 
inequality over time and across countries, and examines possible explanations for the 
evolution described in sections 3 and 4. More specifically, I check whether EMU has 
contributed to the recent decrease in inequality. So far, there is no consensus in the 
literature about the possible effect of monetary union on inequality and cohesion within 
the EU (Barry and Begg, 2003; Begg, 2003). On the one hand, further economic 
expansion is thought to favor core countries at the expense of the periphery because, 
according to the new economic geography
15, economic activity would tend to concentrate 
further in core regions and countries. Moreover, by inducing deeper industrial 
specialization, EMU might increase the risk of asymmetric shocks (Midelfart et al., 2003; 
Ardy et al., 2002). Yet Begg (2003) notes that, so far, the core countries have suffered 
from the advent of the euro, and have experienced slower growth than countries at the EU 
periphery. On the other hand, Ardy et al. (2002); Begg (2003) argue that EMU could lead 
to more cohesion (i.e. less inequality) because it will promote macroeconomic stability in 
countries that had previously poor inflation records, such as Greece and Portugal. These 
countries might however be penalized by the lack of flexibility of their labor markets 
(Ardy et al., 2002; Barry and Begg, 2003; Begg, 2003), which would make them more 
vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. Barry and Begg (2003) conclude that the effects of 
                                                       
13Objectives 2 and 3 concern aid for industry-restructuring that affects mostly regions that were formerly 
prosperous, while the remaining objectives target “social cohesion”. 
14According to regulation No 1164/94 of 16 May 1994, a Member State is eligible for Cohesion Fund if it 
has a per capita gross national product (GNP), measured in purchasing power parities, of less than 90 % of 
the Community average. 
15Fujita et al. (1999); Martin (2002); Brülhart and Tortensson (1996); Puga (1999). 
  13EMU will be more pronounced in countries that to change the most in order to participate 
in EMU. 
The explanatory variables considered fall into four broad categories: 
demographics, macroeconomic stability, institution/policy, and EU integration. The first 
three groups of explanatory variables have been commonly used in papers studying the 
determinants of personal income distribution (Gustafson and Johansson, 1999; Halsag 
and Taylor, 1993; Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1998; Breen and Garcia-Peñalosa, 2005). 
Because these demographic variables affect the regional per capita income level rather 
than the distribution of per capita income among regions, larger disparities in these 
regional demographic features exacerbate income inequality across regions. Thus, instead 
of using the level of these variables as independent variables, I use their standard 
deviations measured annually among regions from the same country. Larger standard 
deviations in regional demographic characteristics are expected to be positively related to 
interregional per capita income inequality. The demographic variables are the percentage 
of the regional population that less than 15 year-old and between 65 and 69 year-old
16, 
the female economic activity rate, the regional unemployment rate, the share of 
employment in agriculture, the share of employment in the manufacturing sector. 
Income is likely to be less equally distributed among people over 65 year old 
because pension payments are most of the time earning-related, and thus reflect 
cumulated unequal earnings (Beblo and Knaus, 2001). On the other end of the age 
distribution, a larger share of regional population below 15 year-old would tend to 
decrease per capita income as this population is not involved in productive activities. 
Given that women are more likely to experience breaks in their professional careers, and 
to occupy part-time positions (i.e. lower wage), a higher female economic activity rate 
would result on lower average per capita income (Thurow, 1987). Yet, some authors 
argue that income inequality might fall with higher female economic activity rate as 
women's wage earnings may result in more middle-income households (Cancian and 
Danziger, 1993). Regarding unemployment, higher unemployment rates are usually 
associated with more people in the lower tail of personal income distribution, and thus 
                                                       
16Eurostat does not have regional data sets for the population over 65 year-old except for Austria, Greece 
and Sweden. 
  14with lower per capita income (Levernier et al., 1995). Manufacturing sectors are usually 
associated with better salaries and more job security than services jobs (Gustafson and 
Johansson, 1999; Grubb, 1989). On the other hand, the agricultural sector is usually 
characterized by lower productivity and lower wages. 
In Section 3, plots of inequality measures suggest that inequality usually rises 
during economic downturns. Business cycles tend indeed to be associated with reversal in 
inequality trends (Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Gramlich, 1974). Thus, following Blinder and 
Esaki (1978), and Breen and Garcia-Peñalosa (2005), I include some controls for 
macroeconomic stability, namely the growth rate of real GDP and the inflation rate. I use 
social transfers as a percentage of GDP (Gustafson and Johansson, 1999; Beblo and 
Knaus, 2001) and the union density (Freeman, 2000) as policy variables. The 
aforementioned macroeconomic and policy variables are all measured at the national 
level. 
The effect of EMU on inequality is first captured by a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 when a country has adopted the common currency
17 and zero otherwise. Yet, 
the economic dimension of EMU coincided with the 1993-1998 Stage two (creation of a 
Single market and implementation of the convergence criteria
18). I therefore include one 
                                                       
171999 for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and 2001 
for Greece. 
18The four main criteria are based on Article 121(1) of the European Community Treaty.   
    • Price stability. In practice, the inflation rate of a given Member State must not exceed by 
more than 1.5 percentage points that of the three best-performing Member States in terms of price stability 
during the year preceding the examination of the situation in that Member State.  
    • Government finances. In practice, the Commission, when drawing up its annual 
recommendation to the Council of Finance Ministers, examines compliance with budgetary discipline on 
the basis of the following two criteria:   
        - the annual government deficit: the ratio of the annual government deficit to gross domestic 
product (GDP) must not exceed 3% at the end of the preceding financial year.  
        - government debt: the ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not exceed 60% at the 
end of the preceding financial year.  
  
    • Exchange Rates. The Member State must have participated in the exchange-rate mechanism of 
the European monetary system without any break during the two years preceding the examination of the 
situation and without severe tensions. In addition, it must not have devalued its currency (i.e. the bilateral 
central rate for its currency against any other Member State's currency) on its own initiative during the 
same period.  
    • Long-term interest rates. In practice, the nominal long-term interest rate must not exceed by 
more than 2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best-performing Member States in terms of price 
stability.  
 
  15dummy variable ( ) that takes a value of 1 from 1993 to 2003 (and 0 
otherwise), to capture the effect of the Treaty of the European Union which entered into 
force in 1993 and started the negotiations on a monetary union. I also add a dummy 
variable to capture the effect of the Stability and Growth Pact ( ) that was adopted in 
1997 to ensure that countries would keep respecting the convergence criteria before and 
after adopting the common currency. This variable takes a value equal to 1 for 1997 and 
the subsequent years, and 0 prior to 1997. Finally, to distinguish the effects of EMU from 
those of EU trade integration, I proxy the latter with the share of intra-EU trade 


















−  (4) 
 where trade is measured as the sum of exports ( X ) and imports (M ). 
To determine whether changes in these variables can be used to predict changes in 
inequality, inequality is estimated as a function of the contemporaneous values of the 
explanatory variables. I also control for intertemporal changes in the effects of EU 
integration on inequality by interacting the EU variables with a time trend. Given the 
large number of regressors the analysis includes, I cannot run the similar estimation with 
a time series of overall inequality in the EU for lack of degrees of freedom.  The equation 
to be estimated is: 
  t i t t i t i t i t i u t inequality , , , , , = + + + + α δ w γ z β x  (5) 
   is a matrix of the standard deviations of the demographic variables described 
above,   is a matrix of the national macroeconomic and policy related variables, and 
 is a matrix of the EU variables and their interaction terms with the time trend. 
t i x ,
t i z ,
t i w ,
The error term,  , is defined as:  t i u , t i i t i u , , = ε γ +  where  i γ  is time-invariant and 
denotes any country-specific effect not included in the regression and  t i, ε  denotes the 
remainder disturbance. By assumption,  0 = ) ( ,t i E ε  and  . The panel data is 
estimated with a fixed-effect model because the Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that 
country-specific effects, 
2
, = ) ( σ ε t i Var
i γ , are uncorrelated with the regressors. The data set I employ 
contains data from the same 13 countries but Denmark (too many missing data). The data 
  16set is unbalanced, with countries contributing different numbers of observations 
according to data availability. 
The regression results are reported in table 2. Inequality is first measured as the 
GE(1) index (columns 1 and 2). I investigate the sensitivity of the results to the inequality 
measure used as the dependent variable, and estimate Equation (5) with the GE(0) index 
and the Gini index. The results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of table 2. For ease of 
presentation in the tables, the inequality indices used as dependent variables are 
multiplied by 100. The absence of a significant coefficient on the time trend confirms the 
heterogeneity in inequality variation discussed in Section 3.2.2. The results do not 
confirm the importance of demographic factors in explaining interregional disparities in 
per capita income. This is possibly due to the level of aggregation used in the paper. The 
negative and significant coefficient on the standard deviation in regional unemployment 
is contrary to the hypothesis that wider disparities in unemployment would lead to wider 
disparities in per capita income and thus to higher inequality. The strong correlation 
between this variable and country dummies for Spain, Finland and Italy reveal that this 
negative coefficient is actually driven by data from these three countries. Once I exclude 
these three outliers, the coefficient on the unemployment variable looses its significance. 
Among macroeconomic factors, inequality across regions decreases only with 
price stability. A one percentage point decrease in the inflation rate is associated with a 
0.03-point decrease in inequality, which corresponds to 1.2% of the average GE(1) index. 
GDP growth does not have a significant impact on inequality. As regards policy, large 
social transfers are associated with lower inequality. A one percentage point increase in 
the share of social transfers in GDP is related to a 0.8 % decrease in the GE(1) index 
(decrease by 0.01 point out of an average of 2.5). There is moreover only weak evidence 
that union membership reduces inequality, as union density is only negatively related to 
interregional inequality when the latter is measured with the GE(0) index. 
As for the effect of EU integration, countries who have joined the EMU have 
experienced on average higher level of inequality. This result is robust to changes in the 
inequality measure used as dependent variable. The results from column 2 suggest that 
inequality has been 57% higher under EMU, holding every thing else constant. The 
magnitude of the effect is even larger when inequality is captured with the GE(0) and 
  17Gini indices. However, this negative effect has diminished over time, as suggested by the 
negative coefficient on the interaction term between the EMU dummy variable and the 
time trend. The coefficient in column 2 suggests that the increase in inequality induced 
by EMU is decreasing at a rate of 0.06 point per year (i.e. 2.5% of the index average). 
Similarly, deeper trade integration has been associated with larger inequality, 
corroborating the new economic geography predictions and the fears raised by Padoa-
Schioppa (1987). A one percentage-point increase in intra-EU trade is associated with an 
increase in the GE(1) index by 0.04 or 1.5%. But this effect has also diminished over 
time, at a rate of 0.05% each year. The implementation of the Maastricht Treaty and of 
the convergence criteria has coincided with a decrease in inequality, but the magnitude of 
the effect has diminished over time. Unlike EMU, the impact of the other stages of the 
monetary union are not robust to using a different inequality index. 
Following the literature on the effect of EMU on interregional disparities
19 that 
generally emphasizes the effects of EMU on Cohesion countries, I run the same analysis 
on two sub-samples of countries
20. The first group includes the three Cohesion countries 
included in this paper’s sample: Greece, Spain and Portugal. The other sub-sample 
includes the other ten countries. Results are reported respectively in tables 3 and 4. While 
inflation is still positively correlated with inequality, the effects of the demographic and 
policy variables are not robust to a change in the inequality measure. Regarding EU 
integration, it has affected Cohesion countries very differently. First, EMU and intra-EU 
trade no longer affect interregional inequality. The implementation of the Maastricht 
Treaty is now associated with a significant decrease in inequality, but that effect has 
weakened with time. Inequality was on average 100% lower after 1992. However, the 
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact has been associated with higher levels 
of inequality in Cohesion countries (108% higher). The transition to EMU has thus been 
more painful for these countries that were used to high levels of inflation. This finding 
corroborates Eichengreen's conclusions that, when the monetary regime operates as an 
engine of deflation, it significantly slows down growth, and that this effect can be 
                                                       
19(Barry and Begg, 2003; Barry, 2003; Begg, 2003; Midelfart et al., 2003; Artis et al., 1997) 
20An alternative analysis consists on adding a cohesion dummy variable and interactive terms with the EU 
variables. Because the results obtained with this specification were not significantly different, they are not 
reported. 
  18particularly disadvantageous in poorer countries. The negative coefficient on the 
interaction term between the SGP dummy and the time trend however indicates that this 
negative effect has decreased over time, as the Cohesion countries were gaining 
macroeconomic stability. One way to reconcile the positive effect of the Maastricht 
variable and the negative coefficient on SGP is to consider that the ratification of the 
Treaty of Maastricht coincided with the creation of the Cohesion Fund. Thus, the 
Maastricht dummy variable might also capture the effect of this new instrument of EU 
regional policy. 
Inequality in the other nine countries is driven by a distinct set of factors. As 
predicted, larger disparities in regional manufacturing employment are associated with 
more inequality. The negative and significant coefficients on the standard deviations in 
agriculture employment, female economic activity rate and unemployment rate are 
unexpected, but are not robust when I drop observations from two outlier countries: Italy 
and Finland. Larger social transfers are still associated with less inequality, and this result 
is more robust than for Cohesion countries. This could suggest that transfers affect 
inequality once they have reached a certain threshold. Between 1977 and 2003, Cohesion 
countries annually spent on average 13% of their GDP on social transfers (other than in 
kind), while this share was 18% among the other ten countries. Moreover, higher union 
membership is now associated with lower inequality levels: a one percentage point 
increase union membership is associated with a 0.02 point decrease in the GE(1) (or 0.8% 
of the average). 
Overall, EU integration has been associated with higher inequality among this 
group of more developed countries. Joining EMU is associated with an increase in 
inequality, and the effect is stronger when inequality is measured with the GE(0) index ( 
increase of 140% instead of 61% with the GE(1) index). This suggests that the effect of 
EMU is concentrated on the lower tail of the income distribution (i.e. on the least favored 
regions). This result corroborates Begg (2003)’s finding that so far it is the core of the EU 
that has suffered from the advent of the euro. Similarly, the implementation of the Treaty 
of the European Union has been associated with a rise in inequality, as indicated by the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on the   variable. The 
adjustments for joining EMU seem therefore to have been costly in terms of cohesion, 
Maastricht
  19but these negative effects have diminished over time. Trade integration has also 
contributed, albeit modestly, to increasing inequality (a one percentage point increase in 
the share of intra-EU trade is associated with a rise in inequality by 0.06 or 2.5%). 
Moreover, unlike Cohesion countries, the implementation of the convergence criteria has 
been associated with lower inequality, and that effect has declined over time. 
 
6 Conclusion 
  In this paper, I examine the evolution of per capita income inequality among and 
within EU countries, and the relative contributions of demographics, macroeconomic 
conditions and policy towards explaining this evolution. Overall, interregional inequality 
has significantly decreased between 1977 and 2003, but remains nonetheless high, at 
levels twice as high as those measured for U.S. states. Furthermore, movements in 
interregional inequality have varied significantly across countries. Inequality reduction 
has been quite sizable in Southern European countries, notably after their accession to the 
EU. 
The breakdown of inequality into between-country and within-country 
components suggests that most of interregional inequality occurs within countries rather 
than between countries. Moreover, the importance of the within component has increased 
over time, notably since the mid-1990s. Between 1995 and 2003, the decrease in regional 
income inequality has been driven by a decreasing between-group component, while the 
within-group inequality was increasing. If the U.S. are taken as a benchmark for 
predicting the evolution of inequality in an increasingly integrated Europe, one should 
expect overall inequality and the share of within inequality to rise. 
In addition to distinguishing inequality between countries from inequality within 
countries, I check whether the inequality faced by a region depends on its ranking in the 
regional income distribution. Using an expanded rank-size function, I find that there is 
more inequality among regions with lower ranks (i.e. with lower per capita incomes) than 
among richer regions. This finding would support a reform of the current EU and national 
regional policies. While the increase in within-country inequality suggests that structural 
policies should be elaborated at the regional level, and not at the national level, higher 
  20inequality among poorer regions suggests that funds should be further concentrated onto 
these regions. López-Rodríguez and Faiña (2006)’s findings support this 
recommendation. The authors indeed find that the between objective 1 and non-objective 
1 component of the Theil index has decreased since the end of the 1987, which suggests 
that objective 1 regions have been catching up. 
In the last section of the paper, I examine which factors cause within-country 
inequality to vary over time, and whether EMU has had any significant impact. While 
demographic variables are usually found to shape personal income inequality, they do not 
significantly influence interregional income disparities. Per capita income distribution is 
influenced by several policy-related and macroeconomic factors. Higher price instability 
is consistently correlated with higher inequality, whereas more generous social transfers 
are associated with lower inequality. Regarding EU integration, EMU and intra-EU trade 
are associated with wider regional disparities, but these effects have declined over time. 
I also distinguish the effects of EMU on Cohesion countries from the effects on 
non-Cohesion countries, because the former faced deeper economic adjustments before 
they could adopt the common currency. These more radical adjustments probably explain 
why the implementation of the convergence criteria have been associated with higher 
inequality in Southern European countries which had to curb more macroeconomic 
instability before being allowed to adopt the euro. These adjustments were however 
worthwhile, since EMU has had no significant effect on inequality in Cohesion countries 
while it was associated with higher inequality in non-Cohesion countries. As for the 
earliest stage of the monetary union creation, inequality has fallen with the 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in Cohesion countries, but has risen in the other 
member states. At this stage, further work would be necessary to distinguish the effect of 
the Cohesion funds from those of the Maastricht Treaty. This last result could provide 
some justification for the implementation of countervailing policies (such as the 
Cohesion Fund and Structural Funds), as argued in the Delors and Padoa-Schioppa 
Reports. Yet, the persistence of within-country inequality call for a reform of the existing 
EU regional policies, as there is not yet evidence that these policies has delivered the 
promised regional cohesion. 
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figure 1: Inequality across EU regions 
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figure 3: Interregional inequality measured by the GE(1) index, by country and 
for the EU, 1977-2003   





















figure 4:  Interregional inequality measured by the GE(0) index, by country and for 
the EU, 1977-2003  




















figure 5: Interregional inequality measured by the Gini index, by country and for 
the EU, 1977-2003   













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































inequality across British regions
  




















GE(1) index and its components
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figure 9: Rank-size plots
  35table 1: Estimates of the expanded rank-size function 
 
 
   q as a function of r     q as a function of 
2 r    
 
       1 q  p-value    Wald Chi 
square  
     1 q  p-value    Wald Chi 
square  
 1977-1979    -0.0147    0.064    404.5    -3.70E-05   0.051    1260.46  
1980-1984    -0.0012    0    6308.21    -5.09E-06   0    40300.57  
1985-1989    -0.0012    0    2047.39    -4.71E-06   0    16530.16  
1990-1994    -0.0011    0    7480.46    -4.76E-06   0    2618.32  
1995-1999    -0.0013    0    506.26    -4.75E-06   0    13256.08  
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     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)  
   GE(1)    GE(1)    GE(0)    Gini  
Growth rate of real GDP    0.0132    0.0049    0.0098    0.0345  
   [0.0106]    [0.0097]    [0.0128]    [0.0306]  
Inflation rate    0.0247***    0.0304***    0.0276***    0.0264  
   [0.0087]    [0.0075]    [0.0093]    [0.0226]  
Share of employment in manufacturing 
sector  
 0.0161  
[0.0215] 
 0.0127  
[0.0233] 
 0.0298  
[0.0236] 
 0.081  
[0.0704] 
Share of employment in agriculture    -0.0015    0.0105    0.0195    0.109  
   [0.0245]    [0.0217]    [0.0245]    [0.0659]  
Female Economic Activity rate    0.0148    0.0046    0.0144    -0.0933**  
   [0.0162]    [0.0165]    [0.0189]    [0.0403]  
Unemployment rate    -0.1112***    -0.0955***    -0.0743***    -0.2206***  
   [0.0167]    [0.0175]    [0.0189]    [0.0371]  
Share of pop.    -0.0772    -0.0274    0.0122    0.0034  
Below 15 year-old    [0.0613]    [0.0713]    [0.0753]    [0.1936]  
Share of pop.    0.2843    0.1056    -0.0446    0.011  
Between 65-69 year-old    [0.2269]    [0.2667]    [0.2819]    [0.7244]  
Social Transfers as a % of GDP    -0.0133**    -0.0207***    -0.0291***    -0.0739***  
   [0.0056]    [0.0076]    [0.0079]    [0.0204]  
Union membership    -0.0083    -0.0065    -0.0141**    0.0035  
   [0.0060]    [0.0055]    [0.0070]    [0.0156]  
EMU    0.9982**    1.4325**    3.1898***    4.0722**  
   [0.4736]    [0.6037]    [0.9479]    [1.8211]  
EMU*trend    -0.0381*    -0.0625**    -0.1472***    -0.1845**  
   [0.0194]    [0.0256]    [0.0426]    [0.0772]  
Intra-EU trade       0.0396***    0.0295***    0.0253  
      [0.0093]    [0.0088]    [0.0250]  
Intra-EU trade * trend       -0.0012**    -0.0005    0.0011  
      [0.0005]    [0.0005]    [0.0014]  
Maastricht       -1.0306*    -0.1927    -1.5473  
      [0.5887]    [0.7354]    [1.6119]  
Maastricht*trend       0.0680**    0.0195    0.1017  
      [0.0325]    [0.0402]    [0.0882]  
Stability and Growth Pact       -0.0603    -2.6464**    -1.6281  
      [0.7071]    [1.2262]    [2.0286]  
Stability and Growth Pact *trend       0.0052    0.1296**    0.0818  
      [0.0351]    [0.0606]    [0.1007]  
Trend    -0.0009    0.0321    0.0017    -0.1132  
   [0.0058]    [0.0356]    [0.0371]    [0.1013]  
Constant    2.9710***    0.8985    1.6028***    10.6269***  
   [0.3308]    [0.5668]    [0.5771]    [1.6444]  
Observations    192    190    190    190  
R-squared    0.423    0.549    0.535    0.468  
 Robust standard errors in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)  
   GE(1)    GE(1)    GE(0)    Gini  
Growth rate of real GDP    -0.0012    0.0123    0.0102    0.0123  
   [0.0168]    [0.0157]    [0.0144]    [0.0503]  
Inflation rate    0.0166    0.0309**    0.0263**    0.0558  
   [0.0142]    [0.0140]    [0.0127]    [0.0394]  
Share of employment in 
manufacturing sector  
 -0.1092** 
[0.0478]   
 -0.0356  
[0.0406] 
 -0.0268  
[0.0388] 
 -0.1236  
[0.1325] 
Share of employment in agriculture   -0.0531  
[0.0506] 
 0.0246 
[0.0382]   
 0.0558 
[0.0350]   
 0.2780**  
[0.1093] 
Female Economic Activity rate    -0.0421    -0.0423    -0.0437    -0.1971**  
   [0.0333]    [0.0296]    [0.0273]    [0.0956]  
Unemployment rate    -0.0399    -0.0302    -0.0352    -0.142  
   [0.0591]    [0.0411]    [0.0374]    [0.1231]  
Share of pop.    0.1588    -0.0909    -0.0963    -0.3007  
Below 15 year-old    [0.1483]    [0.1045]    [0.1014]    [0.3398]  
Share of pop.    -0.5754    0.3567    0.3768    1.1742  
Between 65-69 year-old    [0.5493]    [0.3867]    [0.3747]    [1.2590]  
Social Transfers as a % of GDP    -0.1130***    -0.0111    -0.0139    -0.0362  
   [0.0300]    [0.0329]    [0.0294]    [0.0910]  
Union membership    0.0209*    0.0117    0.0072    0.0269  
   [0.0113]    [0.0105]    [0.0097]    [0.0336]  
EMU    0.4458    -1.2293    -1.1893    -2.533  
   [1.2137]    [1.0969]    [0.9586]    [3.1369]  
EMU*trend    -0.0073    0.0607    0.0578    0.1277  
   [0.0508]    [0.0487]    [0.0424]    [0.1378]  
Intra-EU trade       0.0214    0.0181    0.0336  
      [0.0142]    [0.0137]    [0.0457]  
Intra-EU trade * trend       0.0004    0.0004    0.0028  
      [0.0007]    [0.0007]    [0.0022]  
Maastricht       -2.4935**    -2.3182**    -6.8235**  
      [1.0132]    [0.9411]    [3.1918]  
Maastricht*trend       0.1553**    0.1443**    0.4216**  
      [0.0597]    [0.0550]    [0.1849]  
Stability and Growth Pact       2.7157*    2.7439**    7.7081*  
      [1.4261]    [1.2864]    [4.2629]  
Stability and Growth Pact *trend       -0.1221*    -0.1249*    -0.3524  
      [0.0707]    [0.0642]    [0.2137]  
Trend    -0.0426    -0.1216***    -0.1027***    -0.3495***  
   [0.0276]    [0.0417]    [0.0368]    [0.1174]  
Constant    5.3267***    1.6028    1.2909    8.9670**  
   [1.4233]    [1.2472]    [1.1368]    [3.6379]  
Observations    53    53    53    53  
R-squared    0.677    0.843    0.824    0.755  
 Robust standard errors in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
  Note: Cohesion countries are Greece, Portugal and Spain.   
  38table 4: The Determinants of Inequality in non-Cohesion countries   
  
 
    (1) 
 GE(1)  
(2) 
 GE(1)  
(3) 
 GE(0)  
(4)  
Gini  
Growth rate of real GDP    -0.0079    -0.0009    0.0031    0.0187  
   [0.0106]    [0.0109]    [0.0153]    [0.0295]  
Inflation rate    0.01    0.0290**    0.0352**    -0.0181  
   [0.0104]    [0.0134]    [0.0167]    [0.0325]  
Share of employment in 
manufacturing sector  
 0.0390* 




[0.0317]   
 0.2778*** 
[0.0831]   
Share of employment in 
agriculture  
 -0.0469  
[0.0455] 
 -0.0779**  
[0.0378] 
 -0.0770*  
[0.0463] 
 -0.1294  
[0.0941] 
Female Economic Activity rate    -0.011    -0.0368**    -0.0048    -0.1383***  
   [0.0213]    [0.0178]    [0.0254]    [0.0455]  
Unemployment rate    -0.1026***    -0.0855***    -0.0604***    -0.2004***  
   [0.0171]    [0.0161]    [0.0193]    [0.0378]  
Share of pop.    0.1047    0.2636***    0.1891    0.4033  
Below 15 year-old    [0.1182]    [0.1005]    [0.1178]    [0.2594]  
Share of pop.    0.3059    -0.3075    -0.4572*    -0.3217  
Between 65-69 year-old    [0.2380]    [0.2237]    [0.2486]    [0.6381]  
Social Transfers as a % of GDP    -0.0297***    -0.0547***    -0.0633***    -0.1366***  
   [0.0053]    [0.0073]    [0.0091]    [0.0205]  
Union membership    -0.0449***    -0.0194*    -0.0495***    -0.0377  
   [0.0092]    [0.0113]    [0.0175]    [0.0373]  
EMU    0.7068*    1.5176***    3.5639***    5.7926***  
   [0.3838]    [0.5256]    [0.8649]    [1.5153]  
EMU*trend    -0.0285*    -0.0674***    -0.1665***    -0.2611***  
   [0.0157]    [0.0227]    [0.0386]    [0.0651]  
Intra-EU trade       0.0644***    0.0317*    0.0093  
      [0.0153]    [0.0187]    [0.0426]  
Intra-EU trade * trend       -0.0032***    -0.0011    -0.0016  
      [0.0008]    [0.0011]    [0.0023]  
Maastricht       1.4435***    2.2820***    4.0699***  
      [0.5471]    [0.8238]    [1.5003]  
Maastricht*trend       -0.0719**    -0.1229***    -0.2285***  
      [0.0305]    [0.0452]    [0.0830]  
Stability and Growth Pact       -3.1629***    -5.5671***    -9.8039***  
      [0.6934]    [1.2114]    [1.9125]  
Stability and Growth Pact *trend       0.1526***    0.2690***    0.4584***  
      [0.0344]    [0.0605]    [0.0949]  
Trend    -0.0184***    0.1843***    0.0634    0.1252  
   [0.0065]    [0.0484]    [0.0691]    [0.1468]  
Constant    5.1799***    0.4701    3.7279**    13.8257***  
   [0.5168]    [1.2756]    [1.7822]    [3.9148]  
Observations    139    137    137    137  
R-squared    0.627    0.735    0.702    0.692  
 Robust standard errors in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Note: Non-Cohesion countries refer to Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
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A. Five axioms an inequality measure should meet 
    • the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle: income transfer from a poorer region to a 
richer region should register as an increase (or at least not a decrease) in inequality.  
    • Income scale independence: the inequality measure should not change if all 
regions' incomes change in the same proportion.  
    • Principle of population: inequality measure should be invariant to replications 
of the population: merging two identical income distributions should not change the 
inequality measure.  
    • Symmetry: inequality is independent of any other regional characteristics 
besides regional income.  
    • Decomposability: overall inequality should be related to inequality for 
subgroups, so that if inequality increases in all of the population subgroups, overall 
inequality should also increase.  
 For more details, see Cowell (2000), Bourguignon (1979), López-Rodríguez and 
Faiña (2006),  and Litchfield (1999).  
 
B. Inequality measures: formulas 
    • Gini index  












Gini − ∑ ∑  (6) 
 where   per capita income in region  ;  = i y i = y  the average per capita income 
across all of the regions;   the number of regions included in the sample.  = n
The Gini coefficient takes on values between zero and one, with zero interpreted 
as no inequality.  














1 = ∑  (7) 
  










1 = ∑  (8) 
  Generalized Entropy measures take values between zero and ∞, with zero 
representing perfect equality. 
 













i ∑  (9) 
 
 














− ∑  (10) 
 An increase in the coefficient of variation captures an increase in inequality. 
 
    • Power law index 
The Power Law Exponent is obtained by estimating a rank-size function for 
regional income per capita. I regress logged income per capita on logged rank:  
  . ln = ln rank q a y +  (11) 
  The absolute value of the slope ( ) is referred as Power coefficient, and 
corresponds to a measure of inequality: the higher the magnitude of q the more unequal 
the income distribution across regions. 
q
 
C. Decomposition of the GE(1) index  
The GE(1) index can be decomposed in within and between-group inequalities. If 
the   regions are divided into   groups (here countries),   is the number of regions in 
each group (country) and   is the income share of group (country) 
n G k
g s g ,   is the Theil 
index for that group, and 
g T
g y  is the average income in group  , then the Theil index can 
be rewritten as 
g
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1 = 1 = ∑ ∑ +  (12) 
 where   
G is the number of countries  
            n  is the total number of regions  
k  is the number of regions in country     g
y   is the overall average per capita income  
g y   is the average per capita income in country     g
























  The first term in Equation (12) measures within-country inequality, and the 
second term is a weighted sum of between-country inequality. 
 
 
D. Data definitions and sources 
 
    Definition    Source  
Growth    Growth rate of real GDP (in percentage)    Cambridge Econometrics Database 
Inflation    Inflation rate   OECD Monthly Economic Indicators  
Manufacturing   Share of employment in the 
manufacturing sector 
Cambridge Econometrics Database  
  (in percentage)    
Agriculture   Share of employment in the agricultural 
sector 
Cambridge Econometrics Database  
  (in percentage)    
FEA rate    Female Economic    OECD  
   Activity Rate     
Unemployment    Unemployment rate  AMECO, database of the  
     European Commission's DG ECFIN 
Young    Percentage of the population younger 
than 15 year-old 
AMECO, database of the European 
Commission's DG ECFIN 
Old    Percentage of the population 65-69 year-
old 
AMECO, database of the European 
Commission's DG ECFIN 
Union   Share of the employee    OECD  
  population member of a labor union     
Social    Social transfers other than in-kind, as a 
percentage of GDP 
 AMECO, database of European 
Commission's DG ECFIN 
EUtrade    Share of intra-EU trade in total trade   UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 
2006  
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There is growing concern in Europe over the impact of globalization on high and evenly 
shared living standards. These concerns have often surfaced in response to falling labor 
income shares in aggregate national income data. However, these data may tell little about 
the underlying distribution of incomes based on household disposable incomes. While 
summary measures of income distributions also suggest that inequality has increased in most 
industrialized countries, this development was very uneven and much less pronounced in 
euro-area countries, suggesting that broad phenomena such as trade liberalization and 





                                                 
1 I am grateful to Jörg Decressin, Erik Lueth, and Karl Pichelmann for helpful discussions and suggestions; and to 
Anastasia Guscina for assistance in assembling the data on labor shares. The views expressed in this paper are 
those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. This paper is largely based on 
IMF Working Paper 07/169.  2 
I.     INTRODUCTION 
There is growing concern in the industrialized nations over the impact of globalization on 
their ability to sustain relatively high and evenly shared living standards. Globalization is 
widely believed to have had a generally positive impact on global economic growth. But the 
effect of globalization on employment and the distribution of incomes has been intensely 
debated in recent years and has led some observers in Europe and the United States to call for 
protectionist measures, including barriers to cross-border trade, labor, and investment flows. 
This is particularly disconcerting in Europe where, spurred by international competition, the 
export sector has performed very well over past decades.  
 
Income inequality has increased in many advanced economies over the past two decades. In 
some continental European countries, however, inequality rose only modestly, or even 
declined. The inequality upswing was much larger in the United Kingdom and the United 
States. In the United Kingdom, the Gini coefficient of net disposable household income rose 
from 27 in the late 1970s to 34 in the late 1990s, showing that inequality increased by almost 
30 percent. Trends in income inequality across advanced economies have been quite 
different. In the United States, which started out with a relatively high degree of income 
inequality, it has increased even further. However, other countries with initially low levels of 
income inequality, including Denmark, France and the Netherlands, saw some further 
decline. 
 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study; net disposable income. Results might not always be fully comparable as for some countries, datasets may be based on different
surveys. The Gini coefficient is defined as a ratio (multiplied by 100) of the area between the Lorenz curve of the distribution and the uniform (perfect) distribution line 
and of the area under the uniform distribution line. 0 corresponds to perfect income equality  and 100 corresponds to perfect income inequality.































































































































Change in Income Gini Coefficient (in percentage points), 
Late 1970s/Early 1980s - Late 1990s/Early 2000s
 
 
A wide variety of economic and social trends have been associated with rising income 
inequality where it occurred (see, Nielson, Alderson and Beckfield (2005)): 
 
•  Changes Affecting Labor Supply e.g., immigration, trends in education, female labor 
market participation, rise of part-time labor, government transfers. 
•  Changes Affecting Labor Demand e.g., technological (skill-biased) change, increased 
international trade, outsourcing.   3 
•  Changes in Labor Market Institutions e.g., Changes in minimum wages and the 
degree of unionization, tax law changes, deregulation. 
In particular, the effect of globalization on employment and the distribution of incomes has 
been much discussed in recent years. Political changes and trade liberalization have 
accelerated the international integration of product, labor, and capital markets. Rapid 
technological change has contributed to lowering costs of trade in goods and services adding 
momentum to the process of international integration. Jaumotte and Tytell (2007, Spring 
WEO) find that globalization has been one of the factors that has negatively affected the 
share of income accruing to labor in the advanced economies—the labor share. 
 















Change in Labor Share
Change in Income Gini Coefficient
Change in Income Gini Coefficient and Labor Shares
(Late 1970s/Early 1980s - Late 1990s/Early 2000s )
Source: Luxembourg Income Study and OECD, STAN. Labor share (5 year moving average) is wage 
compensation plus computed labor compensation for self-employed over national income.  
 
However, plotting changes in labor shares against changes in the Gini coefficient for net 
disposable income which also includes other income than wages does not suggest any 
obvious relationship between these two measures.
2 This is somewhat puzzling given the 
common perception that a fall in the labor share should be associated with an increase in 
income inequality. On the one hand, poor measurement of income other than wage income, 
in particular income from capital gains, interest, dividends, or other profits may explain this 
outcome to some extent. On the other hand, variations in labor shares may only reveal 
information about changes in overall income inequality if wages and other income (interest 
                                                 
2 If a fall in the labor share caused a rise in inequality, the series should be negatively correlated. However, the 
correlation coefficient is 0.3 for our sample.  4 
and dividend income, profits, government transfers, etc.) are mostly distributed across 
separate population groups. There are also other measurement issues related to the labor 
share that may distort the picture. If the labor share is calculated on the basis of value added 
at market prices (which is the case in the above graph), indirect taxes less subsidies constitute 
a wedge and a fall in labor's share could be associated with a rise in the share of indirect 
taxes less subsidies instead of a rise in the share of capital.
3 Furthermore, a decline in the 
labor share is often erroneously interpreted as a fall in real wages and associated with an 
increase in inequality. But the labor share also falls if real wages are rising but fail to keep up 
with changes in average labor productivity. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) show that the 
correlation between changes in wages and changes in the labor share is relatively weak for a 
sample of 12 OECD countries. 
 
This paper analyzes the evolution of income distributions based on household data across 
industrialized countries over the past decades with a view to identifying stylized facts that 
could help discriminate between competing hypotheses for the evolution of income 
inequality. Standard summary measures of inequality usually do not provide sufficient 
information for that effect. An increase in the Gini coefficient, for example, could reflect a 
fattening of the lower tail of the income distribution due to an inflow of relatively low-
skilled, low wage-earning immigrants, or the abolition of minimum wages. Alternatively, a 
higher Gini coefficient could be caused an increase of inequality at the top of the distribution 
driven by greater demand for highly skilled workers owing to skill-biased technological 
change, capital market liberalization, or the “superstar phenomenon.”
4 Therefore, the paper 
also presents more detailed measures of income distributions than Gini coefficients. 
II.   THE FACTS  
Income inequality can be affected by the composition of the workforce which has changed in 
many countries due to increased labor force participation of women and immigration. Also, 
changes in taxes and government transfers often have a substantial impact on disposable 
income and inequality. However, it is unclear to what extent these developments and changes 
are driven by broader economic pressures related to technology or globalization, the 
hypotheses that are of greatest interest for this paper. Accordingly, to focus the analysis on 
these economic drivers of inequality and to ensure a high degree of data comparability, the 
data are restricted to a sample of hourly wage income of male household heads, aged 18 to 
64, who are employed full time and worked at least 48 weeks per year.
5 The data are from 
                                                 
3 Gomme and Rupert (2004) discuss measurement issues with regard to the computation of the labor share in 
the United States and show that “historic lows” in the early 2000s are observed only in the nonfarm business 
sector while other measures of labor’s share—for example, for the nonfinancial corporate business sector or the 
macroeconomy more broadly—are currently near their averages over the last several decades. 
4 See, Piketty and Saez (2006). 
5 See appendix for further information.  5 
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) which provides high quality household income data for 
a relatively large group of advanced economies. The LIS project is generally thought to be 




Figure 1. Changes in Real Male Hourly Wages by Percentile 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study. Hourly wage figures for the U.K. are computed on the basis of annual wages,


















































































































































Median hourly wages of prime age males rose in many countries in real terms. In the United 
Kingdom, the median wage increased by an impressive 30 percent from 1979 to 2000, in 
West Germany (1981-2000) by about 14 percent and in the United States (1979-2000) by 
about 5 percent.
7 The median hourly wage for prime age males was roughly the same at 
about 16 U.S. dollars in these countries in 2000 (converted at PPP exchange rates). However, 
these numbers should be treated with some caution as datasets are not always fully 
comparable.
8
                                                 
6 The LIS project began in 1983 and the main objective has been to create a micro-database containing social 
and economic data collected in household surveys from different countries. The database currently contains 
information for some 25 advanced countries for one or more years. However, for most countries, data are 
currently available only up to 2000. 
7 In his speech on “The level and distribution of well-being” on February 6, 2007, Federal Reserve Bank 
Chairman Bernanke mentions that the median hourly wage of full-time workers rose by about 11.5 percent 
between 1979 and 2006, indicating a strong pick-up of real wage growth in the United States in the 2000s. 
8 Corresponding figures were not calculated for other countries in the sample, including France and Italy, that 
only report net income and wage data and which are also influenced by tax and transfer changes over time.  6 
 
Wage inequality has broadly moved in line with income inequality in many industrialized 
countries over the past decades. Only in Denmark did wage inequality rise, while total 





th and the 90
th and 50
th percentiles of the hourly wage 
distributions for male household heads. Developments in the Gini coefficient for wages 
(prime age males) and in the 90
th-10
th (log) difference, however, reveal some important 
differences between wage and income developments: 
 
•  Wage inequality increased in virtually all countries (for which data was available). 
•  Wage inequality increased significantly more in Denmark and the United States than 
income inequality. 











Denmark Netherlands France Italy Germany Belgium Sweden U.S. U.K
Total Income Gini Coefficient (entire population)
 Wage (Prime age males) Gini Coefficient
Source: Staff calculations. Data are from LIS.
 
 
Crucially, the data on wages suggest that there were very few common developments across 
advanced countries with respect to inequality. Changes in wage inequality (prime age males) 
often occurred at different times and in different parts of the wage distribution. In Germany 
(West), the wage distribution remained relatively stable during the 1980s but inequality grew 
sharply in the late 1990s in the lower half of the income distribution. Also, in Denmark 
inequality grew mostly in the lower half of the income distribution during the 1990s. In 
Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, wage distributions were relatively stable. The 
United Kingdom experienced a sharp increase in inequality across all wage groups until the 
mid 1990s and saw some modest rise at the top since then. The United States experienced its 
largest increase in wage inequality in the early 1980s. This is also shown by the steep 
positive slope of the curve in Figure 1 describing changes in real hourly wages for prime age 
males during 1979-1986. Table 1 shows that by the mid 1980s the median hourly wage was 
74 percent higher than the wage at the 10
th percentile, compared to 60 percent at the and of  7 
the 1970s. In the 1990s, the United States saw some further increase that was mainly located 
in the upper half of the distribution. 
 
 
Table 1. Log Percentile Differentials for Male Hourly Wages 
Early 1980s Mid 1980s Early 1990s Mid 1990s Early 2000s
Belgium - 0.76 0.77 0.68 0.78
Denmark - 0.86 0.92 0.99 1.03
France 0.97 1.05 1.08 1.02 1.00
Germany (West) 0.80 0.86 0.86 0.87 1.01
Italy - 0.77 0.84 0.84 0.81
Netherlands 0.88 0.89 0.83 0.80 0.87
Sweden 0.77 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.91
United Kingdom 0.72 1.08 1.10 1.18 1.22
United States 1.16 1.40 1.33 1.39 1.43
Early 1980s Mid 1980s Early 1990s Mid 1990s Early 2000s
Belgium - 0.45 0.46 0.37 0.45
Denmark - 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.51
France 0.56 0.63 0.68 0.59 0.57
Germany (West) 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.53
Italy - 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.46
Netherlands 0.53 0.54 0.48 0.43 0.50
Sweden 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.56
United Kingdom 0.30 0.59 0.59 0.64 0.67
United States 0.56 0.66 0.60 0.68 0.73
Early 1980s Mid 1980s Early 1990s Mid 1990s Early 2000s
Belgium - 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.34
Denmark - 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.51
France 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.43
Germany (West) 0.33 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.48
Italy - 0.33 0.37 0.38 0.35
Netherlands 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37
Sweden 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.36
United Kingdom 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.55
United States 0.60 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.70
Source: Staff calculations. Data are from Luxembourg Income Study. Data for Denmark
and Sweden are based on annual wages and for Belgium, France and Italy on net wages.
Log 90th-10th Hourly Wage Differential
Log 90th-50th Hourly Wage Differential
Log 50th-10th Hourly Wage Differential
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Figure 2. Relative Distributions of Hourly Wages for Male Household Heads 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study. Wages are deflated with median wages and the cutoff points for the percentiles 
are determined by a base year and kept constant. Data for Denmark and Sweden are based on annual wages and 
for Belgium, France and Italy on net wages.


















































































































Labor markets in the United States and the United Kingdom, and to some lesser extent in 
Sweden, witnessed some polarization, or hollowing out of the middle class as shown in 
Figure 2. This figure shows the evolution of the relative wage distribution where wages are 
deflated with median wages and the cutoff points for the percentiles are determined by a base 
year and kept constant. 
III.   THE EVOLUTION OF WAGE INEQUALITY ACROSS COUNTRIES—WHAT EXPLAINS THE 
DIFFERENCES? 
The diverse developments in wage distributions across industrial countries could indicate that 
country-specific events and policies may be more important for the wage inequality than 
common, global trends. Also, developments over time within countries raise some doubt as 
to whether globalization has played a major role in changing income distributions. Much of  9 
the literature on wage inequality is focused on the United States (Box 1), where an early 
consensus emerged in the 1990s. 
  Box 1. Rising Wage Inequality in the United States—A Brief Survey of the Literature 
 
The sharp increase in earnings inequality in the United States during the 1980s triggered a renaissance of 
research on wage and income inequality. From the 1940s to the 1970s, the distribution of earnings and 
incomes in the United States had remained remarkably stable and there was little academic interest since 
Kuznets’ (1955) seminal work that predicted a temporary increase in income inequality during the transition 
from an agriculturally based economy to an industrialized one. This changed with the marked acceleration in the 
growth of earnings inequality in the United States that started in the late 1970s and was documented by Katz and 
Murphy (1992) and Levy and Murnane (1992). In particular, the college wage premium expanded dramatically 
in the 1980s, after having fallen in the 1970s.  
 
Some early consensus emerged concluding that economic pressures toward increased inequality and skill 
wage differentials appeared to be mostly driven by skill-biased technological change and between-industry 
shifts in labor demand. Katz and Murphy (1992) also noted, however, that wage inequality within groups 
defined by education, experience etc. had steadily risen even since the early 1970s. The differences in the time 
pattern of rising educational differentials and rising within group inequality suggested that there were at least 
partially distinct economic phenomena at play. 
 
Subsequent studies suggested that growing international trade and economic integration were 
instrumental in explaining relative shifts in the demand for skills and rising inequality in the United 
States. Factor content models of trade predicted a small impact of trade on wages in advanced countries because 
imports of manufactured goods from developed countries amounted to less than 2 percent of the combined GDP 
of the OECD in the 1980s. Leamer (1996), however, argued that prices rather than quantities mattered, and 
economic liberalizations in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America affected United States and European labor 
markets by declines in prices of labor-intensive tradables. Krugman (2000) strongly contested this view and 
showed that, in a two-country general equilibrium model, prices and wages were predominantly determined by 
developments in the large country (i.e., the OECD). 
 
While there is still an ongoing debate on the causes of the apparent shifts in the labor demand, two broad 
conclusions seem to have been reached, according to Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005). First, much of the 
rise in United States earnings inequality during the 1980s appears explained by shifts in the labor supply of and 
demands for skills combined with the erosion of labor market institutions—including labor unions and the 
minimum wage—that protected the earnings of the low and middle wage workers. Second, the surge of 
inequality evident in the 1980s also reflected a secular rise in the demand for skill, possibly linked to the 
computer revolution and other technological advances. Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) conclude that the 
changing distribution of job task demands, spurred directly by advancing information technology and indirectly 
by its impact on outsourcing, goes some distance toward interpreting the recent polarization of the wage structure 
in the US. 
 
However, several studies have recently challenged these conclusions and claim that the rise of U.S. 
earnings inequality in the 1980s and the late 1990s were episodic events mainly accounted for by non-
market factors. Card and DiNardo (2002) argue that the rise in inequality during the 1980s is largely explained 
by factors other than supply and demand for skills, namely, the declining real value of the minimum wage and 
conclude that the growth in United States earnings inequality was primarily a one-time event of the early 1980s. 
Lemieux (2006) also argues that the fall in the minimum wage explains most of the surge in inequality in the 
1980s but finds that the changing composition of the U.S. labor force during the 1990s (rising education and 
experience) has added to some further inequality. 
  10 
 
This concluded that economic pressures toward increased inequality and skill wage 
differentials appeared to have arisen mostly from skill-biased technological change, possibly 
reinforced by globalization and between-industry shifts in labor demand. Figure 3 provides 
some limited evidence that technological advance, proxied by changes in the information and 
communication investment share, may have benefited the highly skilled in advanced 
economies, in particular during the 1990s. 
 
Figure 3. Developments in Technology versus Inequality, 1980-2000 
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A problem with this approach is that although advances in information and communication 
technologies and globalization accelerated substantially in the 1990s, change in the U.S. 
income distribution slowed. This has led Card and DiNardo (2002), Lemieux (2006) and 
others to argue that the rise in inequality during the 1980s is largely explained by factors 
other than supply and demand of skills, namely, the declining real value of the minimum 
wage. Moreover, they find that the change in the composition of the United States labor force 
(rising education and experience) has increased inequality somewhat further during the 
1990s. 
 
Figure 4. Developments in Trade and Financial Openness versus Inequality, 1980-2000 
Source: Authors calculations. Data are from LIS and World Economic Outlook, IMF 2007. 
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The lack of common developments in inequality in EU countries and of any visible link 
between some measures of globalization and inequality across countries (Figure 4) point to 
the importance of other factors than global trends.  
Some authors, including Krugman (1994), have argued that European wage-setting 
institutions have prevented wage inequality from increasing but raised unemployment. But 
Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999) studied changes in the relative structure of wages in the 
United States, Canada, and France and found little support for the “tradeoff” hypothesis 
between wage inequality and employment growth. Acemoglu (2003) developed a model 
where labor market institutions creating wage compression also encourage more investments 
in capital-intensive technologies. These technologies increase the productivity of less-skilled 
workers and have prevented a fall in their relative wages. But Acemoglu (2003) employed 
summary measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient and the difference between the 
90
th – 10
th percentiles of the wage distribution. These measures did not catch the fact that the 
upper part of the wage distribution was very stable in several European countries during the 
1990s.  
This is somewhat at odds with Acemoglu’s (2003) model as wage-setting institutions tend to 
cause wage compression and, possibly, some stability in the lower part of the distribution.
9 
The fact that most changes in inequality, if any, occurred in the lower part of the wage 
distribution in several European countries since 1990 could indicate that changes in labor 
market institutions may have played an important role.
10
Many European countries substantially reformed their labor markets and institutions over the 
past decades and this may explain differences in wage inequality trends. Annett (2006) 
studies Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, countries that 
undertook major reforms and stand out in terms of their success in reducing unemployment. 
Ireland and the Netherlands centered their reforms on consensus-based agreements between 
social partners, trading wage moderation for labor tax cuts while the United Kingdom 
weakened the power of unions. Rather than address union behavior directly, Denmark 
concentrated on benefits reform, by combining continued generous benefit levels with lower 
duration, tougher conditionality, and stricter activation requirements. These different reform 
patterns may help to explain why the United Kingdom experienced such a sharp increase in 
inequality, while wage inequality remained relatively stable in the Netherlands and increased 
only slightly in Denmark and income inequality actually fell in both countries.
11
                                                 
9 The OECD (2007) shows that, for an average of 10 OECD countries, much of the cumulative increase in 
earnings dispersion since 1990 has occurred in the top half of the earnings distribution. But it is likely that this 
finding is strongly driven by developments in the United States, the United Kingdom and Sweden which are all 
included in this group.  
10 One could argue that these institutional changes were a response to globalization. However, Levy and Temin 
(2007) strongly dispute this and states that globalization clearly does not determine institutions. 
11 Income inequality has also remained stable in Ireland from 1987 to 2000. Wage data are only available 
starting in 1994.  12 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The evolution of income and wage inequality is a complex phenomenon, driven by many 
factors that must have played different roles in different countries. In fact, developments in 
income and wage inequality differed appreciably across advanced economies. In particular, 
changes in wage inequality occurred at different times and in different parts of the wage 
distribution across countries. Labor markets in the United States and the United Kingdom 
witnessed some polarization, but the evolution of wage distributions in euro-area countries 
has not followed any common trend and has remained relatively stable in several countries. 
There is currently no consensus on why inequality increased in some industrialized countries, 
but not in others. Some argue that increased inequality, where it occurred, was driven by 
skill-biased technological change and a changing distribution of job task demands, spurred 
directly by advancing information technology and indirectly by its impact on outsourcing. 
This has led some observers to lay the blame squarely on globalization and to call for 
protectionist measures. But others argue that the rise in inequality is largely explained by 
factors other than supply and demand for skills, namely, changes in labor market institutions, 
including minimum wages and the degree of unionization and this fits the stylized facts 




Acemoglu, D. (2003), “Cross-Country Inequality Trends,” Economic Journal, vol. 113, pp. 
121-149. 
 
Alderson, A. S. and F. Nielson (2002), “Globalization and the Great U-Turn: Income 
Inequality Trends in 16 OECD Countries,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 64, 
pp. 606-631. 
 
Atkinson, A.B. and A. Brandolini (2001), “Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of “Secondary” 
Data-Sets: Income Inequality in OECD countries,” Journal of Economic Literature, 
vol. 34, pp. 771-799. 
 
Atkinson, A.B. and A. Brandolini (2003), “The Panel-of-Countries Approach to Explaining 
Income Inequality: An Interdisciplinary Research Agenda,” Conference Paper 
Mannheim. 
 
Autor, D., L. Katz and M. Kearney (2005), “Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Re-Assessing 
the Revisionists,” NBER Working Paper No. 11627. 
 
Beaudry, P. and D. Green (2003), “Wages and Employment in the United States and 
Germany: What explains the difference?” American Economic Review, vol. 93, No. 3, 
pp. 573-602.  13 
 
Bentolila, S., and G. Saint-Paul (2003), “Explaining Movements in the Labor Share,” 
Contributions to Macroeconomics 3(1), Article 9, pp. 1-31. 
 
Card, D., F. Kramarz, and T. Lemieux (1999), “Changes in the relative structure of wages 
and employment: A comparison of the United States, Canada and France,” Canadian 
Journal of Economics, vol. 32(4), pp. 843-877. 
 
Card, D. and J. Di Nardo (2002), “Skill-biased Technological Change and Rising Wage 
Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles.” Journal of Labor Economics, 20(4), pp. 
733-83. 
 
Davis, Donald (1998), “Does European Unemployment Prop Up American Wages? National 
Labor Markets and Global Trade,” American Economic Review, vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 
478-494. 
 
Foerster, M. and M. Mira d’Ercole (2005), “Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD 
Countries in the Second half of the 1990s,” OECD Working Paper No. 05/22, Paris. 
 
Gomme, P. and P. Rupert (2004), “Measuring Labor’s Share of Income,” Policy Discussion 
Paper (7), Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 
 
Gottschalk, P. and T. Smeeding (1997), “Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and 
Income Inequality,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 35(6), pp. 633-687. 
 
Guscina, A. (2006), “Effects of Globalization on Labor’s Share in National Income,” IMF 
Working Paper No. 06/294, IMF, Washington. 
 
IMF (2006), Regional Economic Outlook for Asia, “Rising Inequality and Polarization in 
Asia,” pp. 63-78, IMF, Washington. 
 
IMF (2007), World Economic Outlook (Spring), “The Globalization of Labor,” pp. 161-192. 
IMF, Washington. 
 
Krugman, P. and A. Venables (1995), “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 5098, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Leamer, E. (1996), “Wage Inequality from International Competition and Technological 
Change: Theory and Country Experience,” American Economic Review, vol. 86, No. 
2, pp. 309-314. 
 
Lemieux, T. (2006), “Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition Effects, Noisy 
Data, or Rising Demand for Skill?” American Economic Review, vol. 96, No. 3, pp. 
461-498. 
  14 
Levy, F., and P. Temin (2007), “Inequality and Institutions in 20
th Century America,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 13106. 
 
Nielson, F., A. Alderson, and J. Beckfield (2005), “Exactly how has income inequality 
changed? Patterns of distributional change in core societies,” Luxembourg Income 
Study Working Paper Series, No. 422. 
 
OECD (2006), “OECD Employment Outlook.” 
 
OECD (2007), “OECD Employment Outlook.” 
 
Piketty, T. and E. Saez (2006), “The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and 
International Perspective”, American Economic Review vol. 96(2), pp. 200-205. 
 
Spitz-Oener, A. (2006), “Technical Change, Job Tasks, and Rising Educational Demands: 
Looking outside the Wage Structure,” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 24(2), pp. 
235-270. 
 
World Bank (2006), “New Pressures in Labor Markets: Integrating Large Emerging 
Economies and the Global Sourcing of Services,” in: Global Economic Prospects 
2007, World Bank, Washington15 
DATA APPENDIX 
Data are from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). They are based on national household 
surveys, but the LIS harmonizes and standardizes the micro-data from the different surveys 
in order to facilitate comparative research. The datasets can be accessed via the internet 
mailing system by submitting SAS, SPSS or STATA programs. http://www.lisproject.org/
 
The analysis is restricted to wage income of male household heads, aged 18 to 64, who are 
worked at least 48 weeks per year and more than 35 hours per week. The sample leaves out 
those observations with the lowest 1 percent earnings and with an income above ten times the 
median wage. More detailed information on data sources and definitions can be found on the 
LIS website.  
Homeownership Inequality and the Access to Credit Markets 
 
 
(Can Credit Availability Explain Cross-country Differences in the Inequality of 















This paper focuses on the cross-country differences in homeownership rates and the 
extent this variation can be explained by differences in the degree of financial 
development of the mortgage market. Expecting that home ownership among the young 
is mostly driven by their ability to borrow (against their future income) to buy their 
homes we focus on households 18 to 40 years of age.  We use the newly developed 
Luxembourg Wealth Study and focus on five countries:  Finland, Germany, Italy, the UK 
and the US. 
   We find that aside from Italy, homeownership rates and inequality in the four 
countries more or less correspond to their mortgage take up rates and its distribution 
across income, reflecting the different degree of size and development of their respective 
mortgage markets. In Italy, however, alternative ways of financing a home such as family 
transfers substitute the limited mortgage availability and take up rates. The mortgage 
market in the UK is the most open (in terms of mortgage take up) and the most equal (in 
terms of the distribution of mortgage take-up across household income deciles), which 
leads to the highest and most equally distributed homeownership in this country as well. 
The mortgage market in Germany is on the other side of the spectrum with very low 
mortgage take-up rates and strong dependence of homeownership and mortgage take up 
on household income (high homeownership/mortgage income inequality). Finland and 
the US are in-between.  
Counterfactual predictions suggest that although household characteristics play 
some role in explaining the observed (and predicted) variation in home ownership rates 
across the five countries, it is mostly the country specific effects of these characteristics 
determined by the institutional environment as well as the functioning of the housing and 
mortgage markets that drive the main result. We conclude that in the absence of 
alternative sources, mortgage availability is the main determinant of home ownership 
across countries and also across income deciles within countries. 
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1. Introduction  
 
One of the important decisions individuals make during the life-cycle is the 
amount they wish to spend on housing services and whether or not to combine it with 
ownership. Given that housing is a major component of both consumption and 
investment, it absorbs a large portion of the household budget and in many countries is 
the largest item of households’ wealth portfolios. Homeownership does not necessarily 
have to be preferable to renting. Individuals may prefer not to carry the risks and costs 
related to owning their homes. Homeownership may also decrease mobility and 
migration and thus lead to inefficiencies in the labor market. Nevertheless, in many 
countries, homeownership is identified as the preferred form of living arrangement and 
receives preferential treatment over renting, for example, in the tax code.  It is seen as the 
principal means by which households accumulate wealth, at the same time providing a 
flow of services.  As a major private asset, housing may also serve as a source of 
financial security and income during retirement. When compared to other forms of living 
arrangements, homeownership brings higher housing satisfaction across individuals in 
several European countries (Diaz-Serrano 2006). Owning ones home in some countries is 
also considered an important signal of social status and economic success (Constant et al 
2007). However, rates of homeownership vary substantially across countries. In a sub-
sample of highly developed countries we find
1 cross-country variation in homeownership 
among young households, ranging from 21.4 % of homeowners in Germany to 63.9 % of 
homeowners in the UK. , 
Recent literature has highlighted credit access as one of the key determinants of 
homeownership, next to permanent income, the cost of owning relative to renting, and 
household characteristics (Chiuri and Jappelli 2003, 2007; Ortalo-Magne and Rady 
1999). Meanwhile mortgage market development also varies cross-nationally and 
exhibits a range of characteristics. Unless households have accumulated enough savings 
or have access to informal loans, the ability to purchase homes is largely determined by 
access to formal credit, in this case, mortgage availability. 
Given the importance of housing as a primary and preferred asset and source of 
security, the aim of this paper is to examine the cross-country variation in homeownership 
rates and homeownership-income inequality among the young. We also explore to what 
extent this variation can be explained by differences in the degree of financial development 
of the mortgage markets in these countries. 
The analyses in this paper are in many ways original partly because we use the 
Luxembourg Wealth Study data, which are new (the database has just been finalized in 
November 2007) and partly because there are relatively few methodological conventions 
available for measuring and comparing housing wealth. As we explore the role of 
mortgage availability in determining the observed variation in homeownership rates, we 
focus our analysis on young households (18 to 40 years of age), who are most likely to 
depend on mortgage access to finance their home purchases. It is unlikely that these 
households have high enough savings from their short labor market career to be able to buy 
their home without other funds. Therefore, unless they have an initial endowment in the 
form of wealth or transfers from their parents, they have to take a mortgage to finance their 
home purchase. We therefore expect home ownership among the young to be mostly 
driven by their ability to borrow (against their future income) to buy their homes. As a 
result we would expect that in countries with more developed consumer credit markets, 
such as the US or the UK, higher home-ownership and lower homeownership-income 
 
1 See Table 1.   3
inequality than observed elsewhere. In the latter part of the paper, we link our findings to 
country-specific institutional and regulatory environments and discuss the likely impacts of 
the currently proposed European mortgage market integration. 
We find that the mortgage market in the UK is the most open (in terms of mortgage 
take up) and the most equal (in terms of the distribution of both homeownership and 
mortgage take-up across household income deciles). The mortgage market in Germany is 
on the other side of the spectrum, with very low mortgage take-up rates and strong 
dependence of homeownership and mortgage take up on household income (high 
homeownership/mortgage income inequality). Finland and the US are in between - both in 
terms of homeownership and mortgage take up inequality - with the Finnish mortgage 
market and homeownership distribution somewhat more equal than in the US. While it is 
possible that it is the high financial development of the mortgage market that ensures high 
homeownership rates and wide mortgage availability in the US, it is also the relatively 
small housing prices that lead to a similar result for Finland. The ranking of the four 
countries according to homeownership rates and inequality more or less correspond to their 
mortgage take up rates and its distribution across income, reflecting the different degrees 
of development of the markets for housing debt.   
The only country that does not fit the rankings is Italy. While it has low use of 
mortgages, similar to Germany, homeownership there is almost as high and equal across 
income as in the UK. The data and qualitative evidence suggest that it is the alternative 
sources of home ownership funding, namely transfers (and possibly loans) from family 
(and friends) that substitute the highly underdeveloped mortgage market in Italy. 
Our paper is organized as follows. The introduction is followed by a section that 
discusses the economic background of our analysis and surveys related previous research. 
We next describe the data and methods and sample characteristics. This is followed by a 
discussion of housing and mortgage market characteristics and institutions. The results 
section first presents results on homeownership and mortgage take up rates and their 
distribution across income. This is followed by homeownership-income inequality 
measures and a section with results for a full probability model showing differences in 
homeownership and mortgages rates across income deciles. The last section of the results 
decomposes the cross-country differences due to effects and those due to characteristics, 
and predicts counterfactual homeownership rates based on cross-country interactions of 
effects and characteristics. A section discussing policy implications of our main results 
comes next, followed by conclusions. 
 
2. Economic Background and Selected Research 
 
The standard economic theory suggests that what really matters for the current well 
being (consumption or leisure) of the forward-looking utility maximizing household, is the 
present value of the sum of the current household wealth and the expected lifetime income. 
With perfect financial markets, where individuals can borrow against their future earnings, 
the distribution of the current consumption (and asset holdings) reflects the “overall” 
economic inequality in population, as given by the present value of lifetime resources. This 
is not the case when there are liquidity constraints: two households that are at the 
beginning of their career and that have the same expected lifetime resources - one with 
higher initial assets but flatter labor income profile, the other with lower initial assets but 
higher expected future earnings - are no longer economically equal when measured by 
current consumption or asset holdings. 
As pointed out in Bertola and Koeniger (2004), countries with higher income 
inequality and instability, like the US and the UK, have the most developed financial   4
markets, whereas countries where consumer credit is still limited, such as countries of 
continental Europe, tend to have a more compressed wage distribution and higher income 
stability due to labor market regulations. Therefore, some of the impact of income 
inequality in the US and the UK is likely to be mitigated by easier access to consumer 
credit, whereas this is less likely to happen in countries of continental Europe. Due to 
differences in financial market development, the differences in the “overall” economic 
inequality between US and UK on the one hand, and continental Europe countries on the 
other, might be effectively smaller than documented by the current earnings and income 
inequality measures. Krueger and Perri (2002) show that the substantial increase in income 
inequality in the US over the past 30 years was accompanied by only a minor increase in 
consumption inequality, which suggests that the main cause of increased income inequality 
was higher income volatility and that the growth of consumer credit market made 
consumption-smoothing easier. In this paper, we explore whether the same also holds for 
wealth inequality across different countries, and, in particular, for the distribution of 
homeownership across income groups among the young. That is to what extent does access 
to credit markets help explain homeownership inequality. 
What drives the observed differences in home ownership across different countries? 
The cross-country variation may solely reflect country-specific personal preferences 
(possibly affected by cultural and historic traditions) for owning a house, for investment in 
equity and for mobility. The decision whether to own a home and when, is often related to 
the decision about marriage and child bearing. As the characteristics of the young differ 
across countries - in terms of demographic and human capital characteristics (such as 
family structure and schooling) – the household formation and therefore the need for one’s 
own home varies as well. The choice of owning one’s home also depend on the cost of 
home-ownership relative to the cost of renting, which also varies across countries. There 
are also cross-country differences in terms of economic characteristics of the young 
households (such as distribution of income and wealth). Finally, provided the young are 
the same in terms of personal preferences and characteristics, the observed variation may 
be driven by the differences in access to funds, namely, the access to credit.  
In the context of the life-cycle model of borrowing and saving, we would expect 
that youngest households, which do not have other sources of funds, the need to finance 
the purchase of home through mortgage to be the greatest. Given the uneven pace of the 
development of financial markets, the cross-country differences in home ownership rate 
among the young may just reflect different mortgage availability. The size and efficiency 
of the mortgage market, terms of housing loans as well as transaction costs are likely to 
play a key role in explaining the cross-country variation in the home-ownership rate among 
young.  
  The same holds for cross-country differences in the relationship between 
homeownership and household income and therefore the homeownership-income 
inequality. In countries with less developed credit markets and lower mortgage availability, 
we would expect low homeownership rates, strong homeownership dependence on income 
and high homeownership-income inequality among the young as many of the young are 
likely to be credit constrained. 
 
Preferences vs. Constraints 
 
Homeownership does not necessarily have to be preferable to renting as suggested 
in the introduction. In terms of personal preferences that determine demand for home 
ownership as well as in terms of overall economic efficiency, renting may be preferred to 
owning one’s home. Some people may prefer not to carry the risks and costs related to   5
owning their homes. Homeownership may decrease mobility and migration and therefore 
lead to inefficiencies in the labor market. This may not be so if housing and mortgage 
markets are efficient and keep the transaction costs of moving low. Nevertheless, in many 
countries, homeownership is identified as the preferred form of living arrangement and as 
will be seen in section 5 on Institutions receives preferential treatment over renting (for 
example, in the tax code) since it is seen as the principal means by which households 
accumulate wealth and obtain financial security. 
The homeownership distribution that we observe in each country is an outcome of 
an interaction of supply and demand factors, such as personal preferences, risk attitudes, 
household composition, distribution of income, relative costs of renting versus home 
owning, liquidity constraints and mortgage availability on one side and supply of housing 
on the other. Our analysis does not make any explicit assumptions about which of the 
factors dominate. From the most conservative point of view, making the least 
assumptions, we document the homeownership rates and the distribution of home 
ownership across household income deciles across five different countries, regardless 
whether the observed patterns reflect, preferences or constraints. Although we proxy the 
preferences and needs, which drive the demand for home ownership, with demographic 
household characteristics and other factors, and carry the estimation separately by each 
country, we are not able to control for any unobserved attitudes towards homeownership 
that vary with income.  
However, we need to explicitly state that in several respects, our analysis and 
conclusions do go a step further and assume home ownership is the preferred housing 
arrangement among young households. This is not only through the choice of the topic 
and the key question – as we focus on, analyze and explain probability of home 
ownership and inequality of its distribution across income – but in particular – through 
the interpretation that we give to our results.  
Once we document the homeownership rates and the distribution of home 
ownership across household income deciles, we provide several measures of inequality in 
homeownership across income and compare them across the five countries. The 
interpretation we have in mind is to show the differences in the access to homeownership 
by different types of young households, based on their income status, and relate it to the 
inequality in the access to mortgage market across income. In this sense, we interpret our 
results as reflecting the constraints and assume that homeownership is the preferred 
housing arrangement. This assumption is also necessary to be able to make cross-country 
comparisons and draw conclusions about the inequality of the distribution of home-
ownership and mortgage availability across income.  
The same holds for the decision to take a mortgage versus using other funds in 
order to purchase one’s home. When interpreting the documented mortgage rates and 
distribution of mortgage rates across income deciles, we conjecture that the outcomes 
reflect liquidity constraints (differences in the access to mortgage market) rather than 
cross-income differences in the attitudes toward taking a mortgage versus using other 
funds. 
We kindly ask the reader to bear these considerations in mind when reading the 
interpretations of our results. A structural model of the joint decision of owning one’s 
home and of taking a mortgage would be the adequate treatment of these considerations 




   6
Previous research 
 
Past literature on the demographics of homeownership has conventionally identified three 
main factors affecting tenure choice: permanent income, the cost of owning relative to 
renting, and household characteristics. In recent literature credit access has been brought 
to the forefront as one of the key determinants of homeownership. Chiuri and Jappelli 
(2003) is one of the first attempts to account for age differences in home ownership 
across countries. They find that the availability of mortgage finance, as measured by 
down payment ratios, mortgage equity withdrawal or reverse mortgages- affects the 
distribution of owner occupancy rates across age groups including the young. In countries 
with developed mortgage markets the home ownership profile is much more tilted 
towards the young. In single country studies, such as the one for the UK by Ortalo-
Magne and Rady 1999, access to mortgage credit is also found to be crucial to the 
observed increase in homeownership in the 1980s. When Chiuri and Jappelli (2007) 
study homeownership trajectories in old age, they find that across countries they are 
highly correlated with the degree of mortgage market regulation. 
A number of studies have also examined homeownership by race and by family 
types. Here again, the main barriers that stand out in purchasing a home are wealth, 
income and credit constraints (Bostic, Calem and Wachter (2004)).  Quercia, McCarthy 
and Wachter identify that in the US populations associated with such constraints are 
those with lower incomes, city residents and the young.  Sedo and Kossoudji (2004) 
examine homeownership by family types in the US and find that increases in income are 
more important to homeownership at lower income levels than at high income levels for 
each family type.  Age, like income also exhibits a concave shape in all family types. 
Overall, they find that the impact of householder’s characteristics on the probability of 
owning a home is similar for all the householders, regardless of gender and family type. 
When doing counterfactual predictions they find that each householder regardless of race 
and sex have the highest predicted probabilities of home ownership if they were to have 
coefficients form a married couple household. Marriage appears to be powerful enough to 
stimulate demand for housing and alter mortgage lenders decisions, or change behavior in 
a way that is more compatible with home ownership.  
This also indicates that the most important aspect of the homeownership gap that 
exists across gender and family type is family type itself. It is not clear whether behavior 
on the part of the household or behavior on the part of mortgage lenders (or both) is the 
culprit. Combine this with limited credit availability and credit market development 
across countries and we find that the highest homeownership among young couples is the 
most prevalent in countries where there is the highest rate of married couples among the 
young or credit markets are very well developed.  
Bostic and Surette (2001) find that in the 1990s differences in homeownership 
between minority and non-minority families and between middle-income and lower-
income families declined significantly. Additionally, changes in family-related 
characteristics explain homeownership trends only among the top two income quintiles.  
Their results suggest that favorable changes in mortgage and housing markets and 
changes in the regulations that govern those markets and have facilitated credit access 
help explain the increase in homeownership among lower-income families. 
Di and Liu (2005), on the other hand, examine the importance of wealth and 
income on homeownership over time in the US and their effect on different racial groups. 
Their findings suggest that the proliferation of mortgage products that allowed for low 
down payments in the late 1990s may have contributed to a reduction in the importance 
of wealth for achieving homeownership and they do not find a reduction in the   7
                                                
importance of income, despite the fact that allowable ratios of debt-to-income have 
increased. Other studies have consistently found that wealth and to a lesser extent credit 
constraints are more important than income constraints in limiting access to 
homeownership (eg. Barakova et al (2003); others also point to the cost of owning 
relative to renting as a significant determinant (Haurin, Hendershott and Wachter 1997). 
Another issue encountered in the literature on homeownership is the fact that 
there exists differential household formation across countries. Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) 
outline the problem of the Italian and Spanish young adults that tend to live with their 
parents well beyond the age of 25, due to higher unemployment and greater difficulty of 
having independent living arrangements. Martins and Villanueva (2006) examine 
whether differences in household structure can be traced back to restricted credit access 
for the young and find that access to a mortgage loan increases the probability that a 
young adult creates her/his household by between 31 and 54 percentage points in 
Portugal. Similar argument may possibly also explain the relatively older age of young 
households in Italy. Combining their estimates with cross-country data, they establish 
that differences in the availability of credit can explain up to 20% of the cross-European 
variance of nest leaving.   
 
3. Data, Methods and Descriptive Characteristics  
 
To analyze the impact of credit market development and mortgage availability on 
the differences between the distributions of homeownership across income we use the 
Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS). This is a new project within the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS).
2 The LWS database contains harmonized wealth and income data from ten 
industrialized countries. The primary goal of the project has been to assemble and to 
organize existing micro-data on household wealth into a coherent database, in order to 
provide a sounder basis for comparative studies on household net worth, portfolio 
composition, and wealth distributions. It is the first cross-country comparable dataset, 
which includes information about households’ assets and liabilities, necessary to identify 
homeownership and mortgage take-up, as well as expenditures and income and a range of 
other demographic and economic characteristics of the households. For more details see 
Sierminska, Brandolini and Smeeding 2006 and consult the LIS website. Detailed 
information about different types of debt (home-secured, non-home-secured, informal 
debt) also allows us to identify the cross-country differences in the role of informal 
credit, and to what extent this provides a substitute to the official credit, when credit 
markets are underdeveloped. 
In this paper, we include five countries from the period of 1998-2002. These 
countries include two Anglophone countries, the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (UK); two continental European countries, Italy and Germany; and one Nordic 
country Finland. These countries have diverse economic outcomes and varying housing 
and mortgage systems.
3  In all countries considered the data period of analysis falls 
 
2 LIS is a cross-national archive of harmonized datasets from the industrialized countries, which include 
income data at the household- and person-level, as well as extensive demographic and labor market data. 
Currently, the LIS database includes over 160 datasets from approximately thirty countries, covering the 
period 1967 to 2004. More information is available on the LIS website (http://www.lisproject.org). 
 
3 The original datasets that the LWS project harmonized, and that are included in this study, are: for the 
United States, the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF); for the United Kingdom, the 2000 British 
Household Panel Study (BHPS); for Italy, the 2002 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW); for   8
                                                                                                                                                
during a time of positive house price growth, particularly in Finland, Italy, the UK and 
the US (Consult Appendix Figures A.2-A.6 for details). In Germany the change in house 
prices has been more moderate and not as strikingly positive. 
 
 Sample and Sample Selection 
 
We select households, where the head and spouse are between 18 and 40 years 
old and are not students. We exclude extremely rich individuals that are defined as 
having financial assets greater then the 95
th percentile of the distribution of financial 
assets. 
  The sample data for the US and Germany has undergone multiple imputation 
and consists of 5 replicates of the original data. Consequently, since the five implicates 
would be treated as independent observations and correspondingly inflate the reported 
significance of results




We start our analysis by documenting the cross-country variation in 
homeownership rates and homeownership-income inequality among the young, and then 
we link it to mortgage take-up, mortgage availability, alternative sources of 
homeownership financing, and credit constraints of the young across the five countries 
under analysis. We first focus on cross-country differences in homeownership rates. We 
then analyze the relationship between home ownership and income, looking at the 
distribution of home owners across household income deciles. We develop several 
measures of homeownership-income inequality, such as homeownership in the lowest 
decile, various ratios of homeownership rates across deciles (the ninth to the fifth, the ninth 
to the first, the fifth to the first), and the rank of the first decile in which the home 
ownership rate exceeds half, and the cross country average, then we compare these 
measures across countries.  
Next, we take into account the observed heterogeneity across different 
households, and estimate for each country separately a probability model of 
homeownership as a function of income, while controlling for other factors, such as age, 
education, family structure, presence of children, self-employment status and so on. We 
follow two specifications regarding the household income variable: first, the logarithmic 
function of household income, second (more flexible), the ten binary indicators reflecting 
the household income decile. The coefficient of the logarithm of income and the 
coefficients of the ten (nine with a constant) binary variables provide us with further and 
improved measures of homeownership-income inequality. We present the cross-country 
differences in the marginal effects of income variables on homeownership of the country-
specific representative households, as well as the differences in the marginal effects of 
income variables for the same representative household across different countries, to 
document what drives the observed cross country variation in these effects: either it is 
due to the underlying distribution of endowments (income) and other factors, or due to 
the differences in the relationships between income and homeownership. 
 
Germany, the 2002 Socio-Economic Panel Study (German SOEP); and for Finland, the 1998 Wealth 
Survey.  
4 The imputation procedure is described in Kennickell 1998.    9
                                                
We further explore this issue as follows: we predict cross-country counterfactual 
homeownership rates using the population (sample) of one country and the estimated 
coefficients from the other. The pair-wise cross-country comparisons allow us to identify 
whether it is the differences in the characteristics of the country-specific populations or 
the differences in the country-specific effects of these characteristics on homeownership, 
that drive the cross-country variation in homeownership rates. This procedure is similar 
in nature to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, when applied to binary outcome models. 
As it is the case for the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, while the procedure is useful for 
identification of the two components of homeownership rates, it fully ignores any 
causality between them, i.e. the fact that the distribution of the characteristics may reflect 
their impact and vice versa. However, the question of causality cannot be addressed with 
data available for each country only for one point in time.  
After providing a thorough cross-country comparison of homeownership-income 
inequality, we explore to what extent the observed variation in this inequality may be a 
result of cross-country differences in credit market development and mortgage availability. 
First, we look at cross-country differences in mortgage take-up rates among the young (18 
to 40 years of age) and explore what percentage of owned homes is funded through 
mortgages. Next, we document the distribution of mortgage take-up rates across household 
income deciles and estimate a probability model of mortgage take-up. We control for 
financial wealth as well as for the risk aversion concerning the willingness to borrow by an 
indicator of whether a household has any other debt except for mortgage.
5  The marginal 
effects of income on having a mortgage and the predicted counterfactual homeownership 
rates complement our previous findings and indicate to what extent mortgage take up 





Table 1 shows differences in homeownership in our sample of young households, 
ranging from 21.4 % of homeowners in Germany to 63.9 % of homeowners in the UK, 
with Finland (43.3 %), the US (47.9 %) and Italy (50.9 %) in between. In terms of 
mortgage financing, the UK has the highest mortgage rate (62 %), followed by the US (43 
%) and Finland (39 %). Germany (19 %) and Italy (16 %) have much lower mortgage 
incidence than the other countries under analysis, and are similar in this respect, which 
sharply contrasts with the low homeownership rate in the first and high homeownership 
rate in the latter. Comparing the homeownership and mortgage take-up rates, we see that 
homeownership in four of the countries is mostly driven by housing loans. In Italy, home 
purchases by young households are much less mortgage dependent, which suggests that 
there exist alternative ways of obtaining homes other than mortgage and these compensate 
for the low mortgage availability. Past studies, have indicated that strong, intergenerational 
transfers (homes passed down from generation to generation or new homes bought for the 
young by their parents) provide a substitute for the limited supply of housing loans, with 
the result of homeownership rate among young households being comparable to those in 
countries with highly developed mortgage markets. 
6 (This is also confirmed for the whole 
population. See Appendix for these results) 
 
5 As discussed later, this coefficient may also reflect other factors than just risk aversion towards debt. 
6 In Italy, for instance, Guiso and Jappelli (2002) find that inter vivos transfers and bequests play a 
considerable role in home purchases, particularly in the case where there are credit market imperfections. 














        
Germany 2002  0.214 0.185 0.866 3,270 
Finland 1998  0.433 0.386 0.891 1,102 
USS 2001  0.479 0.427 0.891 1,130 
Italy 2002  0.509 0.157 0.308 1,178 
UK 2000  0.639 0.621 0.971 1,335 
 
Note: Estimation Sample (head and spouse 18-40 years old, extremely rich individuals 
excluded), Weighted with sample weights, Sorted by home-ownership rates. Extremely 
rich individuals are defined as having financial assets greater then the 95
th percentile of 
the distribution of financial assets. 
 
Table 2 compares the country-specific datasets of young heads of household in 
terms of the key variables used in the analysis. The first set of factors that we assume to 
have an affect on homeownership, are demographic characteristics of the household. 
Young household heads are substantially older in Italy, and also somewhat older in the 
UK and Germany, when compared to the US and Finland. Besides the different 
demographic structure of the various populations, this may also reflect the propensity and 
timing of young individuals to leave home and form their own household. Such a 
decision is likely to be influenced by the situation on the labor market, housing market 
and also access to credit (Martins and Villaneuva 2006). In Appendix Figure A.1 we find 
the distribution of households across ages. The probability of forming a household varies 
a great deal across countries for the young and then for the older individuals. 
In Italy individuals form households at a similar level as their counterparts in 
other countries in their thirties. The highest she of young households can be found in 
Finland followed by the US, Germany and the UK. At this point, we do not address the 
potential selection of the individuals to the samples of young heads, but we survey the 
typical country specific characteristics of young households in their respective 
populations in section 4.1. 
The cross-country differences in the distribution of young household heads across 
the three education groups capture both the varying achievements of the national 
educational systems but may also suggest the limited comparability of the educational 
systems across countries. It suggests that there is substantially higher proportion of low-
educated and substantially lower proportion of high-educated in Italy and in the UK, 
when compared to the rest of the countries. Household heads in Italy are more likely, 
while the ones in Germany are less likely to form couples, when compare to the other 
three countries. 
Similar to headship, both marital status and children may be endogenous to the 
factors we are focusing on, in particular, to the situation in the housing market and 
mortgage availability. We discuss this issue later in the text. Young heads in Germany 
and Finland have fewer children younger than 15, compared to the US, the UK and 
Italian heads. The former two countries thus also form smaller households, compared to 
the household size of the rest. 
    11
                                                
Table 2 
 
 Finland  Germany Italy  UK  USS 
age of hh head  31.02 31.97 34.04 32.07 31.19 
low education  0.17 0.13 0.48 0.35 0.13 
Medium education  0.49 0.59 0.41 0.44 0.58 
high education  0.34 0.28 0.11 0.20 0.29 
Couple  0.57 0.52 0.66 0.59 0.59 
has children < 15   0.41 0.40 0.52 0.53 0.55 
self-employed  0.11 0.08 0.30 0.12 0.05 
hh size (in persons)  2.45 2.25 2.74 2.71 2.83 
has other debt  0.58 0.22 0.19 0.69 0.78 
income mean  25,905 25,950 26,011 35,618 36,513 
income median  23,917 22,961 22,423 32,446 28,988 
income min  797 298 290 337 453 
income max  219,382 248,446 233,311 236,076 305,172 
income SD  13,974 16,418 17,031 20,938 30,210 
fin assets > 3000 USD  0.40 0.33 0.67 0.39 0.45 
fin. assets mean  12,433 15,087 15,757 16,458 32,626 
fin. assets median  8,113 11,004 11,690 10,866 11,792 
fin. assets min  3,019 3,003 3,107 3,024 3,047 
fin. assets max  56,602 44,297 62,135 60,773 329,290 
fin. assets SD  10,645 10,389 13,339 14,743 52,326 
 
Notes: Estimation Sample (head and spouse 18-40 years old, extremely rich individuals excluded), 
Weighted with sample weights, income is total disposable household income in 2002 USD, self-employed 
= head and/or spouse is self-employed, distribution of financial assets (last 5 rows) – only individuals with 
financial assets > 3000 USD 
 
  Self-employment and entrepreneurship and home ownership are also interlinked, 
although the effect may go in both directions. Self-employed, who typically have a less 
certain and more volatile income may either prefer renting to homeownership, or may be 
denied mortgages for that reason, and therefore credit constrained – excluded from the 
market. On the other hand, entrepreneurial activities may often be own-home dependent 
and positively related to housing tenure. In our sample, 30 % of the young households in 
Italy
7 are self-employed, it is 12% and 11 % in the UK and Finland, and less than 10 % in 
Germany and the US.   
  Having other (unsecured / consumer) debt may reflect both the willingness to take 
on the risks of borrowing on the one hand (demand) and the development of credit 
markets in general (supply) on the other. At the same time, it may capture the economic 
condition and the degree of credit constraints. Finally, individuals with mortgages may be 
less willing to add other forms of debt to their housing debt. Consistent with the credit 
market development story, the proportions of young households with other debt is much 
lower in Italy and Germany than elsewhere, with the highest proportion in the US. We do 
not find any striking differences among homeowners and non-homeowners holding other 
debt, except for the Italian renters and US homeowners. About 10 percentage more of the 
 
7 The definition of self-employed household indicator is that either head and/or spouse is self self-
employed.   12
Italian renters and US homeowners, hold other debt then their home-owning and renting 
counterparts, respectively.  
 
Table 2a – Homeowners Only 
 
 Finland  Germany Italy  UK  USS 
age of hh head  33.03 34.92 34.52 33.11 32.98 
low education  0.13 0.07 0.43 0.30 0.09 
medium education  0.46 0.55 0.43 0.47 0.52 
high education  0.41 0.38 0.13 0.23 0.38 
Couple  0.75 0.82 0.70 0.71 0.77 
has children < 15   0.60 0.66 0.56 0.53 0.66 
self-employed  0.16 0.11 0.36 0.14 0.08 
hh size (in persons)  3.11 3.15 2.90 2.83 3.25 
has other debt  0.57 0.20 0.15 0.69 0.83 
income mean  33,387 37,942 28,831 40,988 49,373 
income median  32,743 35,419 25,357 38,317 42,561 
income min  797 1,822 290 337 1,016 
income max  219,382 201,537 233,311 236,076 305,172 
income SD  14,413 19,311 19,891 21,534 35,397 
fin assets > 3000 USD  0.58 0.45 0.76 0.51 0.63 
fin. assets mean  13,837 16,369 16,112 17,437 38,712 
fin. assets median  8,880 14,305 12,282 11,052 14,728 
fin. assets min  3,019 3,003 3,107 3,039 3,047 
fin. assets max  56,602 44,297 62,135 60,773 329,290 
fin. assets SD  11,763 9,960 13,316 15,392 57,923 
 
Notes: Estimation Sample (head and spouse 18-40 years old, extremely rich individuals excluded), 
Weighted with sample weights, income is total disposable household income in 2002 USD, self-employed 
= head and/or spouse is self-employed, distribution of financial assets (last 5 rows) – only individuals with 
financial assets > 3000 USD 
 
 
Tables 2a and 2b provide simple comparison of the key characteristics of home owners 
and not-homeowners. Consistently with our expectations, young heads in all the countries 
tend to be older, more educated, be married, have more children and a bigger household 
size than the heads who do not own their homes. Homeowners have higher disposable 
household income, and wealth in terms of the financial assets. In all countries, young 
homeowners are more likely to be self-employed, compared to renters. 
 
Considering that typical mortgage down payments are in the range of 20-30% of 
home values we would expect homeowners to have less liquid assets compared to those 
that have not purchased their homes (yet), ceteris paribus.   
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Table 2b – Non-Homeowners Only 
 
 Finland  Germany Italy  UK  USS 
age of hh head  29.48 31.17 33.54 30.20 29.57 
low education  0.19 0.14 0.53 0.45 0.17 
medium education  0.51 0.60 0.38 0.40 0.63 
high education  0.29 0.26 0.09 0.15 0.21 
Couple  0.43 0.44 0.61 0.36 0.42 
has children < 15   0.27 0.33 0.47 0.52 0.46 
self-employed  0.08 0.07 0.23 0.07 0.02 
hh size (in persons)  1.95 2.01 2.57 2.52 2.44 
has other debt  0.59 0.22 0.24 0.69 0.73 
income mean  20,187 22,684 23,086 26,098 24,586 
income median  18,200 20,445 19,974 24,003 21,627 
income min  3,019 298 290 337 453 
income max  99,572 248,446 129,297 132,426 167,831 
income SD  10,509 13,841 12,812 15,885 17,368 
fin assets > 3000 USD  0.26 0.30 0.58 0.16 0.28 
fin. assets mean  10,057 14,563 15,269 10,759 20,160 
fin. assets median  7,358 11,004 9,320 8,287 8,633 
fin. assets min  3,019 3,026 3,107 3,024 3,047 
fin. assets max  56,602 44,193 62,135 47,882 273,426 
fin. assets SD  7,903 10,516 13,376 8,156 35,287 
 
Notes: Estimation Sample (head and spouse 18-40 years old, extremely rich individuals excluded), 
Weighted with sample weights, income is total disposable household income in 2002 USD, self-employed 
= head and/or spouse is self-employed, distribution of financial assets (last 5 rows) – only individuals with 
financial assets > 3000 USD 
 
4. Housing market characteristics 
 
4.1. Home ownership, mortgage, home value and home equity across the population 
 
Next we look in more detail at the housing market and examine homeownership, 
mortgage, home value and home equity for the whole population and our sample of the 
young households. We compare these across countries for different ages keeping in mind 
we are observing one cross-section for each country in different years. We use a 
smoothing technique, which regresses homeownership on a third-order age polynomial. 
Differences in homeownership by age and across countries can be found in Figure 
1.  Once again we find that homeownership in Germany is the lowest at all ages in 
relation to the other countries. The highest homeownership among the young is in the UK 
and among the older population in the US. Actually, the US is the country where we 
observe the flattest decline in ownership later in life. This is most likely a reflection of 
the ability to extract value from home equity, which is in fact, confirmed when we look at 
mortgage by age in Figure 2.  
 






































We find that the older population in the US has the highest rate of mortgage take-up. 
Peak homeownership occurs at different ages. In Italy and the US it takes place later in 
life, whereas in the UK, Finland and Germany, a bit earlier and in that order. Next, we 
examine the role of mortgage funding in homeownership. As previously indicated 
  14homeownership among young households in Italy does not depend on mortgage 
availability to a great extent and this is true across the age distribution. The highest 
mortgage take-up is in the UK for the young and in the US for the elderly. According to 
Figure 3 mortgage is the biggest source of funding in the UK and the US. It provides 
about 80% of the funding for young homeowners in most countries and about 20% in 


















Homeowners with mortgage by age
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Table 3a. Home value, home equity and mortgage debt for homeowners for the whole 
sample. 
 
         
    Finland Germany  Italy  UK    USS 
home value   mean  93,079   240,470   193,644   209,754   184,131  
home value   median  75,469   218,308   155,337   156,538   124,931  
home value   min  3,773   4,401   621   5,525   1,016  
home value   max  1,132,039   8,252,641   2,485,398   1,841,619   20,300,000  
        
home equity   mean  78,354   198,177   187,853   160,255   124,439  
home equity   median  66,036   165,053   149,124   117,864   73,130  
home equity   min  -179,240   -236,576   -124,270   -736,650   -648,017  
home equity   max  1,132,039   3,576,145  2,485,398   1,565,378   20,300,000  
        
home debt   mean  14,725   42,293   5,792   47,606   59,692  
home debt   median  0   0   0   18,416   32,502  
home debt   min  0   0   0   0   0  
home debt   max  433,948   4,676,497   459,799   1,473,297   7,912,303  
 
Looking at home values in the above tables for the whole population we find them to be 
the highest on average and at the median in Germany, the UK, Italy, the US and Finland. 
For the younger population the ranking is similar, with Italy moving to second place 
indicating that young homeowners in Italy own relatively more expensive homes across 
countries compared to the whole population.
8 One must not forget that even though 
Germany exhibits high home values, homeownership is only 20% versus 51% among the 
young in Italy. It  may be the case that low home ownership in Germany is the result of 
high housing prices or due to selection – across income - only the very rich own their 
homes – that’s why home value is high.  
Home value is interesting in its own right as it can be used as a measure of long-
run potential wealth. Home equity on the other hand is a good indicator of current wealth 
as housing is the main wealth portfolio component. In the whole population, the highest 
home equity is observed in countries with the lowest debt, in Germany and Italy, then in 
the UK, the US and Finland measured both by the mean and median. Among the young 
population we find a re-ranking among countries with the highest value of home equity. 
Italy has the highest home equity for the young followed by Germany, the UK, the US 
and Finland. Big gaps between home values and home equity are present in the UK and 
the US particularly for the young. In most countries we note the existence of negative 
home equity values indicating either a decline in home values since the purchase date 
(less likely since data is based on a self-assessed current value), or the ability to take 
additional loans using home as collateral (this could be the case in Finland and the UK, 
where mortgage information is combined with other housing debt). 
Home debt for the whole population is the highest in the US, UK, Germany, 
Finland and Italy. Among the young it is a very important component of home equity in 




8 This fact is confirmed in Guiso and Jappelli (2002) whose estimates indicate that young adults stay longer 
with their parents and as a result shorten the saving period before home ownership and increase the value of 




            
    Finland Germany Italy  UK    USS 
91,183   219,262   175,220   168,317   138,545   home value   mean 
81,129   198,063   149,124   138,122   101,570   home value   median 
3,773   13,754   12,427   31,308   1,219   home value   min 
660,356   2,200,704   745,620   1,473,297   2,031,400   home value   max 
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53,428   123,390   161,045   75,027   56,130   home equity   mean 
43,584   100,257   136,697   49,724   30,471   home equity   median 
-132,071   -105,422   0   -139,963   -30,471   home equity   min 
653,753   2,135,381   745,620   1,473,297   1,157,898   home equity   max 
           
37,755   95,872   14,174   93,337   82,415   home debt   mean 
33,018   88,028   0   82,873   73,130   home debt   median 
0   0   0   0   0   home debt   min 
207,541   585,311   248,540   478,821   873,502   home debt   max 
            
Note:              
 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 present a complete picture of the age distribution of home values 
and home equity. Home values are the highest in Germany and then UK. This is followed 
by Italy for the young and the US for the older populations. Home values are the lowest 
in Finland. Home equity is the highest in Germany, the UK, Italy and the US for the older 
population and Italy Germany, the UK, the US for the younger part of the population. 
These rankings reflect different combinations of house prices and mortgage take-up in 
each of the countries. Apart from the very young, where Finland surpasses the US, it has 















































































Table 4. Home value and income ratios by income quantiles for homeowners in the 
selected sample. 
 
            
Income     Finland Germany Italy UK  US 
quantiles            
4.06 15.26 15.44 12.15 8.11  1 Mean 
  18
 Median  3.54 12.46 13.11 7.87 6.00 
 ranking  52 1 3  4  
          
3.05 8.46 7.95 5.14 3.57  2 Mean 
 Median  2.80 8.15 7.61 4.27 2.98 
 ranking  51 2 3  4  
          
2.61 6.91 7.25 3.92 3.07  3 Mean 
 Median  2.39 6.44 5.64 3.44 2.89 
 ranking  51 2 3  4  
          
2.65 5.64 5.62 3.88 2.66  4 Mean 
 Median  2.49 5.22 4.68 3.33 2.26 
 ranking  41 2 3  5  
          
2.43 4.73 3.89 3.33 2.65  5 Mean 
 Median  2.42 4.45 3.98 2.99 2.35 
 ranking  41 2 3  5  
 
   19
                                                
Next we look at home value-income ratios by income quantiles for homeowners, which is 
an indicator for home affordability. We divide the income distribution into quantiles and 
within these quantiles calculate mean and median home values and incomes for 
homeowners. The ratios of these values are presented in the following table. First, we 
find that the housing wealth/income ratios diminish for all countries as we move up the 
income distribution. Second, the rankings across countries in terms of the highest home 
value to income ratios are quite consistent across the quantiles with Germany and Italy 
exhibiting the highest ratios (being the least affordable), followed by the UK and the US 
and Finland. The highest ratios are in countries with the highest home values and lower 
incomes, the lowest where there are lower incomes and low home values. The wealth-




Homeownership is substantially affected by the country-specific institutions and various 
market regulations.  We next discuss the main institutions that affect housing and 
mortgage markets in the countries under analysis and discuss the implications they are 
likely to have in explaining the documented homeownership and mortgage take-up 
differences.  
The tax system has a substantial impact on the incentives to purchase a home, to 
finance the purchase through a mortgage, as well as an impact on transaction costs related 
to housing turnover, i.e. the conditions of buying and selling one’s home. In addition to 
the general wealth and property taxes, there are taxes and implicit tax treatments that 
directly affect homeownership. Compared to other forms of housing, homeowners benefit 
from not paying rent and from increases in the value of their homes. The neutral tax 
treatment implies that imputed rent be taxed as additional income and capital gains (i.e. 
home value appreciation) be subject to capital gains tax. This is, however, rarely the case, 
suggesting that most of the tax system implicitly favor homeownership over renting. In 
addition, in some cases mortgage interest payments are fully deductible.
9  
As reported in Table 5, none of the countries we analyze, imputed rents are taxed. 
In Italy, however, this is the case only for principal owner-occupied dwellings. While, 
capital gains on housing assets are taxable in all five countries, most of the principal 
homes of long term homeowners are exempt from this tax. The only exception is Italy, 
where while the owner-occupied homes are not exempted, they are subject only to 50 % 
of the value. There are differences across countries in the definition of the long term 
occupancy, ranging from more than 2 years ownership in Finland and the US
10  to 10 
years in Germany. In the UK, all owner-occupied homes are exempt from the capital gain 
tax. Mortgage interest payments are tax deductible in Finland, Italy and the US but there 
is no tax relief on the interest payments in Germany and the UK. 
In this paper, we focus on the degree of development of the mortgage market as a 
crucial determinant of homeownership. Mortgage market maturity depends on the general 
legal environment (such as the contract enforcement, judicial efficiency, collateral and 
bankruptcy laws), and on credit information availability and information sharing on one 
hand, and on the direct mortgage market regulations on the other. More specifically, the 
first three rows of Table 5 referring to enforcing contracts, report the number of 
procedures from the moment the plaintiff files a lawsuit in court until the moment of 
 
9 In our case, this applies to landlords in Finland and in the US. 
10 This was the case in the US until 2002.   20
                                                
payment, the time in calendar days required to resolve a dispute, and the cost of court 
fees and attorney fees expressed as a percentage of debt. According to all three criteria, in 
Italy, contract enforcement is by far the most difficult among the five countries. Germany 
follows, in terms of the number of procedures, time and then the direct cost. The rest of 
the countries fare similarly well, with Finland having more procedures but the lowest 
cost, while the UK and the US exhibit the opposite. 
In the next section of Table 5 on getting credit, the legal rights index measures the 
degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and 
lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index includes 7 aspects related to legal rights in 
collateral law and 3 aspects in bankruptcy law. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with 
higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand 
access to credit.
11 The legal environment is the most favourable to lending in the UK, 
then Germany, the US, Finland and finally, again the least favourable in Italy. 
 
The next three rows indicate the coverage, scope, quality and accessibility of credit 
information available through public and private credit registries. Credit Information 
Index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit 
information.
12 Credit information is somewhat less available in Italy and Finland than in 
the other countries, in terms of both the index and the coverage. The index of mortgage 
market regulations in a straightforward manner ranks the countries from Italy with the 
most regulated mortgage market, followed by Germany and Finland, to the US and the 
UK with the most deregulated mortgage market.  
The mortgage market characteristics are consistent with the analyzed institutional 
and regulatory environments. Mortgage market development, as measured by overall 
mortgage take-up, and the dependence of mortgage on household income, closely 
corresponds to the degree of mortgage market regulation in the five countries: countries 
with the most regulated mortgage markets such as Italy and Germany have the least 
developed mortgage markets. 
In the five countries we analyze, one clear pattern emerges from the institutional 
information that we survey: the legal as well as regulatory environment in Italy are by far 
the least favorable for the development of the mortgage market, while those in the UK are 
the most supportive. While the legal institutions and information sharing possibly 
facilitates lending in Germany, the strong mortgage market regulations work in the 
opposite direction.   
  Less regulated markets are likely to be more competitive and offer greater variety 
and flexibility. As regards to collateral requirements and the mortgage length, reported in 
Table 5, the typical loan to value ratio and the duration ranges from 78 % and 30 years in 
the US, to 55 % and 15 years in Italy. The mortgage market completeness index describes 
the supply side of the mortgage markets both in terms of the range of products offered, 
the choice of the alternative repayment schemes and the period over which interest rates 
are fixed. It also contains information on the typical age, income and economic status of 
the borrowers that are granted mortgage. The much lower value of the index for Italy and 
Germany (57 and 58 respectively) suggest a rather limited supply of mortgages when 




11 See Appendix  for details. 
12 See Appendix  for details. 
13 Unfortunately, comparable index is not available for Finland and the US.   21
Table 5 
 Finland  Germany  Italy  UK  US 
Tax System           
Tax on Imputed Rents  N N N* N       N 
Tax on Capital Gains   Y < 2 yr Y < 10 yr Y **
Y**
*  Y < 2yr 
          
Enforcing contracts     
Procedures (number) 27 30 40 19 17 
Time (days)  228 394 1210 229  300 
Cost (% of debt)  5.9 10.5 17.6 16.8  7.7 
          
Getting Credit         
Legal Rights Index 6 8 3 10 7 
Credit Information Index 56 5 6  6  
Public registry coverage (% 
adults) 0 0.5 7 0 0 
Private bureau coverage (% 
adults) 14.9 93.9 67.8 86.1 100 
  
Mortgage Market 
Regulation  0.5 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 
 
Mortgage Market Terms  
Typical 75 67 55 69  78  Loan-to-
value ratios 
(%) Maximum 80 80 80 110  NA 
Typical loan term (years) 15-18 25-30 15 25 30 
   
Mortgage Market 
Completeness            NA  58 57 86  NA 
  
Mortgage and Housing 
Market Characteristics   
Share of owner-occupied 
housing (%) in approx. 2002 58 42 80 69 68 
Residential mortgage debt in 
% of GDP in 2002 31.8 54 11.4 64.3 58 
 
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/; Catte et al.(2004); Jappelli and Chiuri (2007); Tsatsaronis and Zhu 
(2004); * Not for principle owner-occupied homes. ** 50 % of the value for principal   
*** Yes, but primary owner-occupied dwellings are exempted. 
 
The aggregate housing and mortgage market characteristics reported in the last 
two rows seem to be consistent with the institutional environments described. The 
aggregate homeownership rates follow the same ranking as the share of residential 
mortgage debt in GDP and also correspond to the legal and regulatory conditions in the 
five countries. The UK with the most favorable and the least regulated conditions has the 
highest homeownership rate of 69 % and the 64.4 share of debt in GDP, whereas 
Germany with one of the most regulated and least developed mortgage markets has the 
lowest homeownership rate of 42 %.  The only country for which the homeownership   22
rate does not correspond to its mortgage take up ranking is Italy. While Italy, with the 
most regulated mortgage market and least favorable conditions has indeed the lowest 
share of debt in GDP of 11.4 %, it has the highest occupancy rate of 80 %. This finding is 
consistent with our aggregate figures for the young households. It confirms that in Italy 
housing is fairly independent of the mortgage market, due to other means of home 
acquisition such as family transfers and passing of the property from generation to 
generation.    
In the policy section of the paper we also discuss  to what extent other institutions, 
such as labor market regulation and housing subsidies can be related to the observed 
cross-country differences in homeownership. For example, employment protection and 
the variation in the length of the employment contracts of the young individuals are likely 




5.1. Distribution of Homeownership across Household Income Deciles 
 
Next, we look at the variation of homeownership across the income distribution. We find 
a wide variation of rates as we move up the income distribution. The biggest range is in 
Finland (from 9% in the lowest decile to 90% in the highest) and the lowest in Italy (from 
40% in the lowest decile to 74% in the highest). Across all the decile we find the highest 
homeownership in the top decile. The highest in the UK (92%) followed by Finland 
(90%), the US (87%), Italy (74%) and Germany (60%).  
 
Table 6a. Homeownership by income deciles. 
      
Income  Finland Germany Italy  UK  US  Total 
Deciles           
1   0.092  0.053 0.404 0.338 0.133 0.132 
2   0.278  0.075 0.397 0.365 0.200 0.184 
3   0.314  0.100 0.405 0.500 0.284 0.249 
4    0.472 0.112 0.511 0.602 0.295 0.270 
5   0.472  0.160 0.410 0.597 0.414 0.361 
6    0.612  0.297 0.590 0.784 0.516 0.481 
7   0.692  0.337 0.597 0.810 0.705 0.636 
8   0.779  0.389 0.593 0.797 0.686 0.631 
9   0.788  0.520 0.541 0.851 0.878 0.790 
10   0.898  0.593 0.736 0.919 0.871 0.788 
           
Total   0.433  0.214 0.509 0.639 0.479 0.424 
          
      P(H=1)>50%      
      P(H=1)>mean(country)    
 
Using the table above we next identify at which stage in the income distribution the 
probability of becoming a homeowner exceeds 50%. This is highlighted with the light 
shading. As expected this occurs fairly early in the income distribution in a country with 
high ownership rates (the UK) and fairly late in the distribution in a country with low 
ownership rates (Germany). For the other countries this occurs in the 6
th decile. We also 
determine when the probability of ownership exceeds the country average. This happens 
in the 4
th decile in Finland and Italy and in the 6
th decile in the other countries.    23
 
 
Table 6b. Mortgage by income deciles 
 
Income  Finland Germany Italy  UK  US  Total 
Deciles           
1   0.052  0.024 0.028 0.319 0.062 0.048 
2   0.231  0.058 0.084 0.326 0.153 0.124 
3   0.290  0.075 0.165 0.470 0.193 0.165 
4   0.364  0.100 0.102 0.570 0.236 0.194 
5    0.411 0.135 0.114 0.573 0.340 0.279 
6    0.567  0.240 0.188 0.778 0.500 0.427 
7   0.686  0.304 0.144 0.775 0.660 0.562 
8   0.736  0.355 0.228 0.837 0.628 0.554 
9   0.751  0.485 0.246 0.829 0.853 0.742 
10   0.817  0.556 0.364 0.911 0.861 0.727 
           
Total   0.386  0.185 0.157 0.621 0.427 0.352 
          
      P(M=1)>50%      
      P(M=1)>mean(country)    
 
Next, we examine whether the mortgage take-up among homeowners is evenly 
distributed across the income distribution. An even mortgage distribution would suggest 
that credit constraints are not binding, as access to credit is not limited by the current 
income. This is found to be the case in the UK, where mortgage take-up is nearly 90% 
throughout the income distribution. In the other countries there is more variation in the 
mortgage take-up, but in all countries except Italy it exceeds 80% past the 3
rd and 4
th 
decile. In all countries mortgage take-up increases as we move up the income 




Table 6c. Mortgage among homeowners by income deciles 
      
Income  Finland Germany Italy  UK  US  Total 
Deciles           
1    0.545 0.447 0.061 0.897 0.465 0.366 
2   0.749  0.768 0.155 0.893 0.714 0.624 
3    0.834 0.731 0.407 0.894 0.679 0.657 
4   0.741  0.786 0.2 0.932 0.802 0.707 
5   0.836  0.814 0.251 0.943 0.823 0.767 
6   0.806  0.762 0.316 0.988 0.971 0.88 
7   0.892  0.893 0.234 0.947 0.936 0.881 
8   0.903  0.903 0.378 0.995 0.916 0.876 
9   0.845  0.924 0.43 0.95 0.971 0.935 
10   0.858  0.929 0.418 0.962 0.989 0.911 
           
Total   0.82 0.845 0.288 0.947 0.889 0.825 
          
      P(M=1/H=1)>50%      
      P(M=1/H=1)>mean(country)     
          To examine homeownership profiles across the income distribution for the whole 
population (Figure 6), we use a smoothing technique, which regresses homeownership on 
a third-order indicator for income percentiles Finland has the steepest profile and Italy is 
at the other extreme with the flattest profile throughout the income distribution.  In terms 
of homeownership rates the highest are in the UK and the lowest in Germany at nearly all 


















Homeownership by income percentiles
 
 
5.2. Homeownership-income inequality measures  
 
In order to pin point the differences in the distribution of homeownership across income 
we reach for a few summary inequality measures. First, we look at decile ratios for 
homeownership. Clearly, the highest differences between the 90
th th  and 10  percentile are 
in Germany, Finland and the US. In Finland and the US more of the differences are 
taking place between the bottom decile and the median then between the top decile and 
the median. In Germany and the other countries it is more or less evenly distributed 
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Table 7a. Homeownership-inequality measures           
             
Income Finland  Germany  Italy UK  US 
Deciles       
P90/p10  8.57 9.81 1.34 2.52 6.60 
P90/p50  1.67 3.25 1.32 1.43 2.12 
P50/p10  5.13 3.02 1.01 1.77 3.11 
       
       
Prob. coefficient 
on log income (not 
weighted)  1.110 0.960 0.382 0.404 0.964 
 
 
Table 7b. Mortgage-inequality measures 
 
Income Finland  Germany  Italy  UK  US 
Deciles       
P90/p10  14.44 20.21 8.79 2.60 13.76
P90/p50  1.83 3.59 2.16 1.45 2.51
P50/p10  7.90 5.63 4.07 1.80 5.48
       
       
Prob. coefficient 
on log income (not 
weighted)  1.170 1.025 0.511 0.490 1.108
 
 
Table 7c. Mortgage-financed home-ownership 
 
Income Finland  Germany  Italy  UK  US 
Deciles       
P90/p10  1.55 2.07 7.05 1.06 2.09
P90/p50  1.01 1.14 1.71 1.01 1.18
P50/p10  1.53 1.82 4.11 1.05 1.77
       
       
Prob. coefficient 
on log income (not 
weighted)  .315 .444 .261 .268 .703
 
 
The inequality rankings in mortgage holdings follow those in homeownership. The only 
difference is that a majority of the inequality is taking place at the bottom of the 
distribution, where there is bigger homeownership variation across the income deciles 
compared to the top half of the income distribution. 
For homeowners the inequality in mortgage holding is more or less evenly 
distributed across the top and bottom of the distribution in all countries except Italy. Here 
we find more variation among homeowners in the bottom half of the income distribution. 
Further we estimate a probit model of the probability of homeownership as a 
function of log of income and find the strongest effect to be in Finland, Germany and the 
US. This is also the case when we repeat this exercise for mortgage. The strongest effect of 
income on mortgage for homeowners is in the US, followed by Germany, Finland, the UK   26
                                                
and Italy. The low coefficient in Italy supports the fact that homeownership in this country 
relies on other means of financing besides mortgages. 
 
5.3. Conditioning on other factors - Marginal effects 
 
In the previous sections, we have focused on the homeownership and mortgage rates and 
how they are related to household income. We next take also into account other household 
characteristics to control for other aspects of the probability of home ownership, namely 
household preferences. We estimate a full probit model of the probability of home 
ownership and mortgage respectively, as a function of several demographic and economic 
characteristics of the household, as well as the set of binary indicators for household 
income deciles. Once again, we are primarily interested in the differences in 
homeownership and mortgage rates across the income deciles.
14  
Most of the effects of the demographic characteristics are similar across countries 
and in line with our expectations. When the household head forms a couple, household has 
children below 15 years old, as well as the household size increase the probability of 
homeownership (with only few exceptions where the effect is negative but always not 
significant). Probability of homeownership increases with age but in a decreasing way and 
the effect is often not significant. The insignificance of some of the demographic variables 
may be also caused by the substantial homogeneity of our sample of the young.  
Education increases the probability of owning ones home. Self-employed are also more 
likely to own their homes, in particular in Finland, but to some extent in all the countries 
except for Germany where the effect is not significant. Having financial assets greater than 
3000 EUR is associated with higher probability of homeownership in all countries. 
Interestingly, having other (unsecured) consumer debt decreases the probability of 
homeownership everywhere except for the US.  
The key effects of interest – the marginal effects of being in income decile n 
rather than in the first income decile - are presented in the table below and in Figure 7. The 
size of the coefficient is the increase in homeownership probability relative to the first 
income decile. The extent to which they grow across the income deciles (how steep the 
lines in the figure are) further reveals the inter-decile differences in home ownership. 
After controlling for individual specific characteristic, we observe that 
homeownership is distributed most unequally in the US and Germany, although all other 
deciles are closer to the first income decile in Germany compared to the US. Finland comes 















14 Both probit regression output and marginal effects are available from the authors upon request. Table 8a. Marginal Effects of Income Deciles - Homeownership 
 
 Finland  Germany Italy UK USS 
 ME  t-st  ME  t-st ME t-st ME t-st ME t-st 
d2 0.05  0.65  0.00  0.04 0.62 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.56 
d3 0.03  0.42  0.01  0.10 1.43 0.05 0.91 0.15 0.18 1.75 
d4 0.18  2.88  0.01  0.14 2.05 0.09 1.64 0.09 0.20 1.04 
d5 0.11  1.48  0.05  0.11 1.58 0.05 0.86 0.17 1.10 1.98 
d6 0.22  3.50  0.12  0.20 3.16 0.17 3.68 0.26 2.64 2.96 
d7 0.24  3.93  0.14  0.21 3.26 0.19 4.23 0.37 2.98 4.27 
d8 0.33  7.17  0.22  0.27 4.38 0.13 2.41 0.34 4.59 3.91 
d9 0.31  5.84  0.34  0.17 2.46 0.17 3.41 0.50 6.35 5.66 
d10 0.35  8.67  0.35  0.24 3.56 0.21 4.22 0.51 6.33 5.15 
 






















When we focus on the effects of being in particular income deciles relative to the first 
decile on probability of having a mortgage, the results are fairly similar. As expected, the 
differences between all deciles (but in particular between the first decile and the rest) 
increase for most of the countries, as home-ownership sponsored by other funds such as 
private transfers that may be less dependent on income than being granted a mortgage are 
ruled out. In addition, in two countries, Italy and Finland, although homeownership 
probability is highest in the very top decile, the mortgage probability is smaller than in 
the ninth decile, possibly suggesting that individuals with very high income have also 
greater access to other resources (wealth, private transfers) to become home owners. 
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Table 8b. Marginal Effects of Income Deciles – Mortgage Probability 
 
 Finland  Germany Italy  UK  US  S 
 ME  t-st  ME  t-st ME t-st ME t-st ME t-st 
D2  0.12 1.47  0.06  1.19 0.04 0.62 0.01 0.12 0.19 1.75 
D3  0.11 1.33  0.06  1.18 0.10 1.28 0.08 1.37 0.19 1.79 
D4  0.22 2.77  0.09  1.92 0.15 1.91 0.12 2.42 0.17 1.68 
D5  0.19 2.25  0.13  2.57 0.12 1.51 0.10 1.89 0.27 2.70 
D6  0.27 3.38  0.17  3.45 0.19 2.29 0.21 4.83 0.40 4.00 
D7  0.40 6.45  0.22  4.34 0.17 2.04 0.21 4.69 0.48 4.72 
D8  0.40 6.33  0.31  5.81 0.19 2.23 0.21 4.68 0.45 4.52 
D9  0.41 6.52  0.43  7.44 0.27 2.97 0.19 3.78 0.60 6.09 
D10  0.38 5.56  0.45  7.44 0.26 2.73 0.27 6.29 0.61 5.66 
 
Note: t-statistics in Germany and the US have been corrected for multiple imputations. 
 
Figure 8 



















5.4. Decomposition of the Key Determinants -Counterfactual Predictions 
 
Finally, we try to identify the cross-country differences in household characteristics (right 
hand side variables) from the cross-country differences in the effect of these 
characteristics (coefficients and marginal effects), in order to reveal how the two of them 
contribute to explaining the cross-country variation in home ownership and mortgage 
rates. We do so by simulating counterfactual predictions of the home ownership rates and 
mortgage rates, using the household characteristics from one country and combining 
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them with the coefficients - estimated in the full probit model – from another country. 
Table 9a and 9b show the results. While rows correspond to the household characteristics 
from the country specified in the first column, columns correspond to the respective sets 
of country-specific coefficients, with the exception of the first column that gives the 
actual homeownership rate in each of the countries for comparison. The fit of our models 
can be read from the table by comparing the true value with the corresponding cell where 
household characteristics and estimated coefficients from the same country are combined, 
yielding the prediction of the model.  
 
Table 9a – Counterfactual Predictions – Home-ownership 
 
Xs TRUE  Xbhat(FI) Xbhat(GE) Xbhat(IT) Xbhat(UK) Xbhat(US)
            
Finland   0.433 0.459 0.195 0.404 0.662 0.366
Germany   0.214 0.394 0.228 0.386 0.605 0.258
Italy   0.509  0.642 0.288 0.499 0.772  0.535
UK   0.639 0.489 0.221 0.393 0.644 0.423
US  0.481 0.521 0.223 0.428 0.67 0.438
 
 
Notes: Estimation Sample (head and spouse 18-40 years old, extremely rich individuals excluded), 
Weighted with sample weights,  
 
First, we observe, that although the UK has the highest actual home ownership rates, it is 
the household characteristics in Italy that lead to the highest predicted counterfactual 
rates when combined with coefficients from other countries. In other words, Italian 
household have the highest predicted home ownership regardless in which countries 
(environments, institutions, mortgage markets and housing markets) they are. US 
households come next (except in Germany), while the ranking of the UK and the Finish 
households alternate. German households, on the other hand, have the lowest predicted 
home ownership rate everywhere except for Germany.  
  In terms of the effect household characteristics have in different countries, as 
reflected by the estimated coefficients, we find that the predicted homeownership rates 
are the highest in the UK for households from all five countries. It is interesting to 
observe, that it is Finland that follows. It is the “unfavorable” ranking of the 
homeownership-enhancing household characteristics in Finland (compared to other 
countries) that is responsible for the observed Finish home ownership rate ranking only 
fourth. In terms of the environments and institutions, Finland ranks as second. The 
opposite holds for the US, where household characteristics are more favorable, while 
regime ranks as third or fourth. Germany is at the other end of the spectrum: no matter 
what the household characteristics are (irrespective of the country), any of the five 
samples reaches the lowest homeownership rate in Germany.   
In addition, it is interesting to notice that in the case of Germany, favorable 
household characteristics do relatively better in unfavorable regime, as German 
households rank second in Germany after Italy. 
To summarize, we find that while it is the Italian households that are –in terms of 
their characteristics - most likely to own their homes, it is in the UK where the regime is 
the most favorable. In Germany, both household characteristics and the regime is the 
least favorable. While household’s characteristics in Finland are relatively less favorable   30
than in the US, Finish regime fares better than the one in the US, so the ranking of the 
two countries vary in these two respects. The regime in Italy on the other hand is 
comparable to that of the US, and fares better for Finish and German households but 
worse for the US and the UK. 
We conclude that although household characteristics play some role in explaining 
the observed (and predicted) variation in home ownership rates across the five countries, 
it is mostly the country specific effects (market evaluations) of these characteristics 
determined by the institutional environment as well as the functioning of the housing and 




Table 9b – counterfactual predictions – has mortgage 
 
Xs TRUE  Xbhat(FI) Xbhat(GE) Xbhat(IT) Xbhat(UK) Xbhat(US)
            
Finland   0.386 0.397 0.159 0.129 0.624 0.318
Germany   0.185 0.381 0.194 0.107 0.577 0.227
Italy   0.157  0.479 0.229 0.164 0.719  0.463
UK   0.620 0.434 0.187 0.131 0.624 0.378
US  0.429 0.46 0.187 0.149 0.646 0.391
 
Notes: Estimation Sample (head and spouse 18-40 years old, extremely rich individuals 
excluded), Weighted with sample weights,  
 
We next look at the respective roles of household characteristics and country specific 
regimes in the variation in the mortgage rates. Interestingly, characteristics of the Italian 
households again yield the highest mortgage rates despite the fact that Italy has the lowest 
actual mortgage rate among the five countries. The ranking of the other countries in terms 
of the effect of the different household characteristics is also the same as for the home 
ownership rate. In terms of the regimes, the UK coefficients are again the most favorable. 
The second most favorable regime is again in Finland, but the unfavorable household 
characteristics bring the country in the ranking of the actual mortgage rate behind the US, 
where the regime and the characteristics rank again in the opposite way than in Finland. 
The Italian regime however is now the least favorable to the mortgage take up, followed 
by the German one. To summarize, with the exception of the Italian regime, the results in 
the last two tables give similar answers. 
             
             
6. Policy Implications 
 
   Our findings suggest that in four out of the five countries, mortgage is the key 
financial tool used by young households to purchase their homes. In these countries the 
observed homeownership rates, as well as, the distribution of homeownership across 
household income levels are determined by the degree of the mortgage market 
development. Mortgage market development, as measured by overall mortgage take-up, 
and the dependence of mortgage on household income, closely corresponds to the degree 
of mortgage market regulation in the five countries: countries with the most regulated 
mortgage markets such as Italy and Germany have the least developed mortgage markets.    31
The legal environment, such as contract enforcement and judicial efficiency, and 
information sharing are also crucial for the development of the mortgage market.  
Integration of the European mortgage markets, one of the topics widely discussed 
at the European Commission (see for example European Commission 2006), presupposes 
harmonization of the mortgage market regulation across its member countries. Such 
harmonization would require substantial mortgage market deregulation in countries like 
Italy or Germany, when compared to their current regulatory environment.  
In the section below we will discuss possible policy implications of our findings 
in light of further deregulation and integration of the mortgage market on 
homeownership, geographical labor mobility and labor contracts.   
 
Homeownership rates and homeownership-income inequality 
 
It is likely that deregulation and opening up of the mortgage markets will increase 
the overall access and access across income levels of young households to mortgage 
loans. Based on our findings, we expect further mortgage market development in 
countries with less developed mortgage markets to increase homeownership rates and 
reduce homeownership income inequality among young households. Our results suggest 
that mortgage market integration will enhance convergence of homeownership rates and 
homeownership income inequality across countries. However, as our findings point out, it 
is not only the mortgage market regulation and legal environment which affect mortgage 
market development. Demand for homeownership and therefore the need for mortgages 
also depends on other aspects of the housing market such as alternative forms of housing 
and how their costs compare with the price of homeownership. The analysis of the five 
substantially different countries undergone in this paper enables us to lay down, discuss 
and assess the likely impact of these additional factors as well. 
  The effect of mortgage market development resulting from mortgage market 
integration is therefore likely to differ across countries. While in Germany, a fairly 
developed (and regulated) rental market offers renting as an attractive alternative to 
homeownership (Ditch et al 2001), this is not the case in Italy, where the major housing 
alternative of the young individuals is to postpone marriage and household formation and 
stay with parents until they accumulate necessary savings or until they acquire homes 
from parents in the form of transfers. As a result, as suggested by Martins and Villanueva 
(2006), the effect of increased mortgage availability on nest leaving is expected to be 
particularly high in the Southern European countries. Besides the relative cost of 
homeownership and renting within the considered countries, cross-country differences in 
housing prices relative to average income (house affordability) will be both affected by 
but also will itself alter the impact of the integration of mortgage markets on 
homeownership rates and their distribution across income particularly at the bottom of 
the income distribution where these differences are the greatest (see Table 4 on housing 
affordability and Table 6a on homeownership across income deciles).  
 
Geographical mobility and labor market 
 
It is not straightforward what effect would mortgage market deregulation, 
increased mortgage availability and a subsequent increase in homeownership have on 
geographical labor mobility. While a developed mortgage market and a well-functioning 
housing market is expected to enhance geographical mobility, as is the case in the US, 
there are microeconomic studies such as (Henley 1998), that find in the case of the 
unemployed, that homeownership may reduce mobility and therefore preserve regional   32
variation in unemployment. The conditions of the housing market turnover also 
determine the relationship between homeownership and geographical mobility. High 
transaction costs in the housing market, for example, reduce home turnover and 
consequently may reduce geographical mobility.  
In our five country study, we see a positive relationship between mortgage 
financed homeownership and geographic mobility (Table 10). Among the five countries 
we consider, Italy is clearly the one with the lowest across-region geographical mobility 
(10 %), while Finland is the highest (36 %). Germany has the second lowest mobility 
after Italy (19 %). The UK follows with about 25 %. These patterns are confirmed when 
within EU and outside EU mobility is considered. For comparison over 40% of the US 
population has been defined as movers (Schachter, Franklin and Perry 2003, Table 
1).This shows that in countries with high homeownership rates financed through 
mortgages we observe high geographical mobility. 
 













Finland  68 36 5 3
Italy  46 8 2 0
Germany  62 19 5 4
Luxembourg  57 21 14 3
Sweden  70 44 8 5
UK  55 25 7 6
 
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
2006, Table 2 
 
The most frequent reason for geographical mobility among prime age individuals is 
moving to a new job. Geographical mobility therefore also reflects labor mobility which 
is crucial for efficient matching of job searchers to vacancies. As a result, a well-
functioning housing market, i.e. market with low transaction cost and high turnover 
(where it is easy to buy and sell one’s home) is a key prerequisites of labor mobility. 
Increased access to housing and less frictions to geographical mobility could therefore 
also result in higher labor market efficiency. When we look at labor mobility across the 
five countries, they rank exactly the same as when compared to geographical mobility: 
over 30 % of Italians have never changed their employer after the age of 35, around 20 % 
of Germans, 14 % of Finns and less than 10 % of British people (see European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006, Figure 18 and 
23). It has been well documented that US has much higher geographical and labor 
mobility compared to the rest of the countries in our analysis. The important finding is 
that it is not the homeownership per se that is positively correlated with high 
geographical and labor mobility but only the mortgage financed homeownership, which 
does not restrict the location of one’s home, as has been shown for the case of Italy-- the 
least mobile country, with the smallest mortgage take-up and the second highest 
homeownership rate in our sample. The effect of mortgage market deregulation on labor 
mobility and labor market efficiency is once again likely to vary across countries, 
depending on other housing alternatives. In the presence of high transaction cost of 
buying and selling one’s home, a substantial rental market (and rent subsidies (Ditch et al   33
2001)) in Germany may imply that renting enhances higher labor mobility than housing 
tenure. On the other hand, mortgage market development in Italy that enables 
homeownership among young individuals, is likely to be crucial for the increase in 
geographical and labor mobility there. 
 
Cross-border mobility and integrated labor market 
 
While mortgage market development is likely to increase regional mobility within 
countries, the integration of the mortgage markets is likely to enhance cross-border 
mobility as well. Immigrants are typically in a worse situation as mortgage market 
applicants due to for example, the lack of credit history information or shorter labor 
contract than natives. The latter has also been an issue for young individuals entering the 
job market, where temporary instead of regular contracts have been offered (see for 
example Blau and Kahn (2002)). As most of the cross-border mobility within EU takes 
place among the young households, the increase in mortgage access to the young across 




This paper uses the newly constructed Luxembourg Wealth Study Database to bring 
detailed evidence on homeownership and homeownership-income inequality among 
young households in Finland, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US.  We explore the role 
of mortgage finance in the cross-country variation in homeownership among young 
households and in the distribution of homeownership across their income. We find that, 
with the exception of Italy, where family transfers substitute the limited access to credit, 
the observed patterns of homeownership among young are mostly driven by mortgage 
take-up as the primary source of finance for a home purchase. Our results show that 
countries with mature mortgage markets such as the UK, have higher homeownership 
rates and lower homeownership-income inequality among young households than 
countries with less developed mortgage markets such as Germany. Even in countries with 
highly developed mortgage markets, like in the US, homeownership and mortgage 
availability among the lower income deciles are limited (homeownership rate is 
distributed more unequally), compared to the UK or Finland. Policies supporting home 
ownership among young households may then need to target specifically the low-income 
groups.    
Although the small number of countries does not allow us to show any 
quantitative evidence on the effect of institutions and policies on the homeownership 
among the young, the observed variation in homeownership rates, mortgage market 
maturity, and size of the rental market, which the five countries represent, enables us to 
draw the following qualitative conclusions: Mortgage market regulation hinders 
mortgage market development, decreases homeownership rates among the young and 
increases the homeownership-income inequality. As the discussed integration of the 
European mortgage markets would also involve mortgage market deregulation in 
countries with limited mortgage availability, it is likely that it will enhance the 
homeownership rates among the young households there, and therefore lead to further 
convergence of the homeownership patterns in Europe. The impact of the integration 
will, however, depend on the housing alternatives available to the young in these 
countries, namely the size and the terms of the rental market. The discussion about the 
mortgage market integration and deregulation should therefore also consider these 
alternatives, and in particular, the current country-specific rental market regulations. If   34
low transaction costs at the housing and mortgage market are assured by the regulatory 
environment, mortgage market integration may also enhance labor market efficiency 
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Germany 2002  .408 .193 .477 12308 
Finland 1998  .638 .283 .417 3893 
USS 2001  .676 .434 .641 4442 
Italy 2002  .688 .102 .133 8011 
UK 2000  .705 .415 .571 4750 
 
Note: Estimation Sample (Whole population), Weighted with sample weights, Sorted by 
home-ownership rates 
   
Details of Table 5: 
 
Legal Rights Index  
 
measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of 
borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index includes 7 aspects related to 
legal rights in collateral law and 3 aspects in bankruptcy law. A score of 1 is assigned for 
each of the following features of the laws:  
• General rather than specific description of assets is permitted in collateral agreements. 
• General rather than specific description of debt is permitted in collateral agreements. 
• Any legal or natural person may grant or take security in the property. 
• A unified registry operates that includes charges over movable property. 
• Secured creditors have priority outside of bankruptcy. 
• Secured creditors, rather than other parties such as government or workers, are paid first 
out of the proceeds from liquidating a bankrupt firm. 
• Secured creditors are able to seize their collateral when a debtor enters reorganization; 
there is no “automatic stay” or “asset freeze” imposed by the court. 
• Management does not stay during reorganization. An administrator is responsible for 
managing the business during reorganization. 
• Parties may agree on enforcement procedures by contract. 
• Creditors may both seize and sell collateral out of court without restriction. 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that collateral and 
bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit. 
 
Credit Information Index 
measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility and quality of credit information 
available through either public or private credit registries. A score of 1 is assigned for 
each of the following 6 features of the credit information system: 
   38
• Both positive (for example, amount of loan and on-time repayment pattern) and 
negative (for instance, number and amount of defaults, late payments, bankruptcies) 
credit information is distributed. 
• Data on both firms and individuals are distributed. 
• Data from retailers, trade creditors or utilities as well as financial institutions are 
distributed. 
• More than 2 years of historical data are distributed. 
• Data on loans above 1% of income per capita are distributed. 
• By law, borrowers have the right to access their data. 
 
The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit 
information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending 
decisions. 
 
Index of Mortgage Market Regulation 
 
The index score adds one point for fulfilling each of the following five criteria:  
•  Mortgage rate arrangements are primarily extended on the basis of fixed rate 
contracts. 
•  Mortgage equity withdrawal is absent or limited. 
•  LTV ratio does not exceed 75 %. 
•  Valuation methods of property is based on historical values, rather than based on 
market values. 
•  Mortgage backed securitization is absent or limited. 
 










































































  39Figure A.2 Real price index of dwellings in old blocks of flats by quarter I/1970-
III/2007, 1970=100 (according to the Cost-of-living index) in Finland. 
 
 
   
 
Source: Statistics Finland (http://www.stat.fi/til/ashi/2007/03/ashi_2007_03_2007-10-
30_tie_001_en.html) 
 
House price change and average price of dwellings in Finland.
 
 




  40Figure A. 3 House price change and average price of residential properties in 13 
urban areas in Italy.  
 
   
Source: Global Property Guide (http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/real-estate-house-
prices/I) 
 















Source: Global Property Guide (http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/real-estate-house-
prices/U) 
 















Source: Global Property Guide (http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/real-estate-house-
prices/U) 
 
Housing Price Index Series in the US 1987-2007. 
 
 
Source: S&P/Case-Shiller® Home Price Indices 
(http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/indices_csmahp/2,3,4
,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0.html) 
 
 
 
  43